Meerna Ali Ghuloom Faraj v Sohail Sultan Ahmad & Anor [2026] EWCA Civ 977
[2026] EWCA Civ 977Case No CA 2023 002533, CA 2024 000065 & CA 2025 001974
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE FAMILY COURT
Venue SITTING AT THE ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE
SIR JOHNATHAN COHEN
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 30/07/2026
Before
LADY JUSTICE KINGLORD JUSTICE BAKERLORD JUSTICE FRASER
Between
MEERNA ALI GHULOOM FARAJClaimant/ Appellant(1)SOHAIL SULTAN AHMADDefendants/ Respondents(2)IIB GROUP HOLDINGS WLLRespondentDeborah Bangay KC and James Weale (instructed by Level Law) for AppellantGiles Richardson KC and Jamie Randall (instructed by Ashfords LLP) for First RespondentMichael Glaser KC and Thomas Haggie (instructed by Forsters LLP) for Second RespondentApproved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 2.00pm on 30 July 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................
[1]On 24 July 2026 this court handed down judgment in the substantive appeals by each of Meerna Ali Ghuloom Faraj ("the wife"), Sohail Sultan Ahmad ("the husband") and IIB Group Holdings (“IIB” or “the Bank”). The Bank is an investment holding company in Bahrain, of which the husband is the majority shareholder, a director and its chief executive. Financial remedy proceedings between the parties were determined at first instance by Sir Jonathan Cohen, that judgment being at Ahmad v Faraj [2023] EWFC 209. Consequent upon that judgment, the judge made a detailed order dated 15 December 2023 (the “2023 Order”). The appellate judgment is at [2026] EWCA Civ 962. The judgment heard three appeals by each of the husband, the wife and the Bank. In summary only, all three appeals were allowed and this court has ordered a full retrial of all the issues.[2]Although the following sentiments are expressed already in the substantive appellate judgments, they merit repetition. As my ladyship expressed it at [6] to [8] in her judgment, there has been exorbitant expenditure on costs to date, the prospect of a retrial is shocking, and this outcome was reached with considerable reluctance. However, for the reasons more fully explained in the appellate judgment, there was no option but to make such an order. None of the judge’s findings of fact, whether the subject of appeal or otherwise, can stand.[3]Ordinarily when an appeal is decided, the parties will co-operate and agree the relevant order consequential upon that outcome, which will include the correct order on costs. That has not, however, sadly been possible in this case. Perhaps, given the history of this litigation, this will not come as a surprise. It does, however, come as a considerable disappointment. The total costs bill for all three parties as at the date of the appeal is explained at [7] and [10] in the substantive judgment, and was at that point some £6.5 million. That figure will now inevitably be even higher.[4]Because of the inability of the parties to agree, both regarding costs but also other parts of the consequential order, it has been necessary to receive submissions on these matters. These were ordered in writing and restricted to four pages. The reason for this short judgment is to provide reasons to the parties which explain why the order on appeal has been drafted by this court in the way it has. The parties are aware of the submissions made in respect of each part of the order that they seek, and it is therefore unnecessary to set these out here in any detail.[5]In summary only, the issues between the parties are the costs of the appeal, and other aspects of the litigation (or previous orders) which the husband (supported by the Bank) sought to have rolled up into the order.[6]Firstly, however, I deal with the convenience of counsel. Ordinarily, it is beneficial for parties to have counsel of their choice at all stages in proceedings. However, it is also part of the overriding objective that governs all family proceedings in FPR Part 1.1(2)(a) that these be dealt with expeditiously and fairly The phrase “expeditiously and fairly” also appears in the overriding objective at CPR Part 1.1(2)(d). The overriding objective in the FPR is similar, but not identical, to that in the CPR because the former includes “having regard to any welfare issues involved”. . As I explained in Bates v Post Office Ltd [2017] EWHC 2844 (QB), the obvious difficulty of fitting hearings around the diaries and convenience of counsel will cause delay. This extra delay inevitably causes extra cost. At [20] of the same case, it is stated that Jackson LJ in his Review of Civil Litigation Costs long ago identified that delay causes increased costs.[7]The order this court makes, therefore, does not require fixing a date for the convenience of counsel, so far as the first hearing before the retrial judge is concerned. It will be a matter for him or her going forwards as to how the proceedings are case managed both in that and other respects. That hearing must take place as soon as possible and therefore it will be listed on the first available date after 26 October 2026.[8]Finally, submissions were made both by the husband and the Bank at the hearing of the appeal that they were essentially separate parties and were pursuing their different paths in the litigation entirely separately. Co-incidentally, however, their interests do seem to align to an extraordinary degree. This has continued in their collective approach to the proposed wording of the order. A draft order was submitted with proposals by the husband and the Bank, not agreed by the wife, identified in green. Similarly proposals by the wife, not agreed by the husband and the Bank, were identified in red. There was no colour to identify any proposals made by the husband but not agreed by the Bank, or vice versa, because there were none.
The recitals to the Order
[9]The recitals sought by the husband include some relating to the legal services payment order (“LSPO”) that was made on 13 December 2024, and in respect of which the husband’s appeal was dismissed. That dismissal was in an order of 21 February 2025 (“the LSPO Appeal Order”), in respect of which a further and unless order was made on 14 April 2025 (“the Unless Order”). Greater background and the explanation for the making of the LSPO Appeal Order and the Unless Order are given in the judgment at [2025] EWCA Civ 468 per King LJ with whom Snowden LJ (as he then was) agreed (“the LSPO Appeal judgment”). The LSPO required the husband to pay the wife £120,000 plus VAT, and the husband was not permitted to pursue his appeal against the substantive order unless or until he did so.[10]In the draft order submitted to this court, the husband proffers an undertaking which reads “upon [the husband] undertaking to the Court (by his Leading Counsel) that he will not seek to recover any sums paid to W pursuant to the LSPO pending the conclusion of these proceedings.” The draft order submitted also has both the husband and the Bank contending for a paragraph whereby the LSPO, the LSPO Appeal Order and the Unless Order are to be set aside.[11]The basis for this is set out in the submissions on costs. The most useful ones are those of the husband, in which it is said that one of the principal issues to be decided is “the status of the LSPO and other orders made consequent upon it”. There is no such issue.[12]The proposed undertaking by the husband, and indeed any attempt to disturb either the LSPO itself or the LSPO Appeal Order, is or are fundamentally wrong. The husband did not make any application to set aside those orders, and what the husband is now doing is seeking to appeal the LSPO Appeal Order by an alternative route which is simply not available. The LSPO was unsuccessfully appealed to this court, as is made clear in the judgment of my ladyship at [2025] EWCA Civ 468. Although the husband seeks to dress up a potential challenge to the LSPO and the LSPO Appeal order as in some way consequential upon the outcome of this substantive appeal, he is wrong to do so. Firstly, this court has specifically not accepted any case he advanced on the facts as to the existence of the Disputed Accounts. Secondly, as my ladyship made clear in the LSPO Appeal judgment, the failure by the husband to pay the amount ordered was “deliberate and wilful” (at [36]); the judgment also states that the husband had the means to pay (at [37]), Thirdly, the judge below made his findings which led to the LSPO based on a range of matters, not solely the Disputed Accounts (at [37]).[13]There is no basis for any application by the husband “to recover” sums paid to the wife under the LSPO, and there is therefore no need for any undertaking in that respect by the husband. Its mere presence alone suggests yet a further chapter of delay and attritional expenditure in this litigation. It is clear that the paragraph setting aside the LSPO, the LSPO Appeal Order and the Unless Order should not be included.
The costs of the appeals
[14]There have been three appeals, all of which succeeded. They were in one sense interleaved and woven into one another. For example, the status of the FAP and the wife’s submissions to the judge below, and paragraph 10 of the 2023 Order which ordered the Bank and the wife to negotiate about the Bank’s potential purchase of a replacement matrimonial home, cannot sensibly be untangled. They both relate to where the wife and children are to live, which as explained at both [13] and [189] to [191] of the appellate judgment, all fall for consideration afresh as part of the court satisfying its statutory obligation under section 25 MCA 1973. These are very important issues which are to be retried. The Bank’s interest, if any, in respect of Belgrave Place rests on the status of the FAP; the obverse of that is the wife’s claim in respect of the FAP too.[15]There are different costs orders, or combinations of costs orders, sought regarding the costs of the three appeals. One is no order as to the costs of any of them, an alternative proposed by both the husband and the Bank. The consequences of such an order for the different parties would of course be very different, given that the Bank (for example) is a significant financial institution and the wife has litigation funding. Another option sought by the wife is that the husband and the Bank be jointly and severally liable for her costs of her appeal, with an amount to be paid on account. That too risks potential injustice.[16]In my judgment, the only just course in the unusual circumstances of this case is for the costs of all three appeals to be reserved to the retrial Judge at the conclusion of the financial remedy proceedings. If the FAP is found to be a sham, for example, an entirely different order for costs on appeal is likely to be made (and likely to be just and fair) compared to a scenario whereby the FAP were found to be valid. These important issues cannot be pre-determined, regardless of the outcome of the three appeals, and the findings yet to be made potentially impact upon the costs orders that should be made in respect of the appeals.
Other elements of disagreement
[17]The parties are all agreed that certain paragraphs of the 2023 Order must remain live and enforceable. These deal with matters such as spousal periodical payments, child periodical payments and school fees. It is obvious that these paragraphs must remain.[18]The parties cannot however agree concerning paragraph 26. In that paragraph of the 2023 Order, the husband was ordered to pay the wife £156,000. In the judgment itself, the judge prepared an Appendix dealing with costs issues from [161] to [175]. This sets out that the figure was a net amount (itself made up of other, smaller sums of £100,800 and £86,000 in the wife’s favour, with sums due from her to the husband of £25,000 and £5,750). This swept up a number of various other costs orders that had been made both in the wife’s and also the husband’s favour. It is not necessary to itemise what all of them are, but to explain that they were for matters that had taken place in the litigation up to that point. For example, a summary assessment in the wife’s favour of 60% of the her ultimately obtaining a non-molestation order; and the husband obtaining a costs order against the wife in relation to the “Imerman” proceedings. This shorthand relates to a situation whereby documents confidential to one party are held by the other party, with the input of solicitors to preserve confidentiality.[19]Both the Bank and the husband seek to have paragraph 26 of the 2023 Order set aside or rescinded. There is no basis for this. Paragraph 26 must remain as well as the paragraphs that deal with periodic payments to the wife, and also for the children. These numerous costs orders have been dealt with and relate to certain things that had occurred in the proceedings up to the making of the 2023 Order. There is no reason or sensible justification to disturb them.[20]The wife has also indicated that she is minded to apply for a further LSPO. If so, then that must be done promptly. She has indicated through her leading counsel that she is prepared to give an undertaking to make such an application within 28 days. If she does, then that can and should also be dealt with by the retrial judge at the hearing to which I have referred at [7] above. The retrial must also be expedited for what I hope are obvious reasons.
Conclusion
[21]The only light at the end of the tunnel in this litigation is that one recital in the consequential order upon which the parties are agreed is that they would engage in ADR before the directions hearing before the judge who is to hear the retrial (“the retrial judge”) on the first available date after 26 October 2026. These proceedings between the husband and wife commenced in October 2020. There is an obvious period of six years between those two dates.[22]That interval of six years between the wife petitioning for divorce and the first case management directions hearing to be heard by the retrial judge is, of itself, lengthy enough. It is however put into yet further stark context by reminding oneself that the parties married in April 2013. This means that this litigation has lasted almost as long as the marriage itself. This is not to blame the parties alone for the duration of the litigation; the justice system itself must also take its share of the blame, given a retrial is necessary. However, there is a cost to litigation that cannot be measured in money alone. It is in the interests of all the parties that the ongoing stress, uncertainty and expenditure in this case comes to an end as soon as possible. All those involved in representing each of the parties should also bear this firmly in mind at all times. LORD JUSTICE BAKER :[23]I agree.