Rory Lyndon Nash, R (on the application of) v Brighton County Court [2026] EWCA Civ 914

[2026] EWCA Civ 914Case No CA-2025-002926
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING’S BENCH DIVISION
Mrs Justice Stacey
AC-2025-LON-002661
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 14 July 2026
Before
SIR COLIN BIRSS, CHANCELLOR OF THE HIGH COURTLORD JUSTICE PETER JACKSONLADY JUSTICE ELISABETH LAING
Between
THE KINGClaimant(ON THE APPLICATION OF RORY LYNDON NASH) Appellant/ClaimantBRIGHTON COUNTY COURT Respondent/Defendant
The Appellant appeared in person for in person for The Respondent did not attend and was not representedHearing Hearing date: 14 July 2026
Approved Judgment.............................
[1]This is an application by Rory Lyndon Nash for permission to appeal from the refusal of his application to the Administrative Court for permission to apply for judicial review of a decision of Brighton County Court. The application was listed, with the appeal to follow, by paper order of Andrews LJ dated 6 May 2026.[2]Mr Nash, who is a musician, describes himself as neurodivergent in a number of ways. He is a profuse communicator in writing. He was accompanied to the hearing by his mother. He explained that he found it difficult to trust the court process but that he was able, as he put it, to feel safe at this hearing.[3]Mr Nash wishes to bring judicial review proceedings against Brighton County Court arising from its handling of a possession claim against him in 2024 and 2025. That litigation arose in this way. In 2016, Mr Nash and another person were granted a six-month tenancy of a property in Brighton. The other tenant left and from January 2017 Mr Nash occupied it alone. With the Landlord’s consent, he stayed on, paying rent. No written agreement existed.[4]There were running issues about the state of the property, which caused great concern to Mr Nash. After many intervening events, all chronicled in the papers before us, the Landlord served a notice under s.21 of the Housing Act 1988, under which landlords could, until 31 May 2026, recover properties on Assured Shorthold Tenancies with two months’ notice.[5]Such a notice was given to Mr Nash in June 2023. He did not vacate the property and the Landlord took accelerated possession proceedings. At the end of the year, Mr Nash filed a defence casting doubt on the nature of the tenancy and referring to disrepair, the deposit, the licensing of the property as a House in Multiple Occupation, disability discrimination, and various mental health considerations. His relevant assertion was that “a s.21 notice can only be filed on a valid and active tenancy contract”.[6]A hearing was listed. The Landlord’s solicitors offered to vacate it on the basis of proposed agreed directions, but were rebuffed by Mr Nash who said that he would, in effect, see them in court. The hearing took place before DDJ Slack on 15 March 2024 at Brighton County Court. Mr Nash represented himself while the Landlord had counsel.[7]We have a transcript. Mr Nash said that the status of the tenancy was unknown and that a s.21 notice was not therefore valid. DDJ Slack agreed with the Landlord that it was a periodic tenancy to which s.21 applied and he made a possession order with effect from a date in May. Mr Nash was aggrieved that he was not allowed to develop all his arguments, but for the court the issue turned on the validity of the s 21 notice.[8]In April, six days out of time, Mr Nash issued an appeal to the Circuit Judge. Skeleton arguments were filed. Mr Nash asserted that he had an indefinite tenancy and not a periodic Assured Shorthold Tenancy. On 21 November 2024, HHJ Simpkiss dismissed the appeal on paper as being out of time and totally without merit.[9]His reasons for doing so were as follows:
“(1) There is no basis for the Appellant's complaint that he was not allowed to present evidence at the hearing; the Transcript makes no reference to him requesting to do so; (2) The evidence would have been irrelevant. The Deputy District Judge found that the tenancy had been terminated by a valid s.21 notice; (3) The Appellant was originally granted a 6 month Assured Shorthold Tenancy after 28 February 1996. He doesn't contend that there was a concluded agreement for a further fixed term tenancy and his continued re-occupation after the end of the 6 month term was a periodic tenancy which did not fall within any of the exceptions in Schedule 2A of the Housing Act 1988. It cannot, therefore, have been an assured tenancy; (4) No points were taken on the form of the section 21 notice; (5) The underlying grounds of appeal are, therefore, totally without merit irrespective of whether or not time for appealing should be extended.”
[10]In December 2024, Mr Nash applied to set aside the 21 November order. On 26 March 2025, HHJ Simpkiss refused the application in the following terms:
“There is no basis for the Court to set aside its order; There was no arguable case that the Appellant's tenancy was not an Assured Shorthold Tenancy and that the Section 21 Notice was valid and effective; There was no Defence to the Claim for possession and any claim for disrepair (which was not evidenced before the Deputy District Judge) is not a defence for a possession claim but sounding in damages; No arguable point was taken in the Defence as to the validity of the Section 21 Notice; Even if time for appealing was extended, the appeal is totally without merit; The Appellant may not request an oral reconsideration.”
The Appellant may not request an oral reconsideration.”[11]When Mr Nash further objected, he was told that his only remedy lay in judicial review.[12]In April 2025, a warrant of possession was executed and Mr Nash left the property after some nine years of occupation and approaching two years of litigation.[13]However, matters did not end there. In June 2025, Mr Nash issued judicial review proceedings against Brighton County Court concerning the refusal of reconsideration on 26 March 2025. The Landlord was joined as an interested party, but neither he nor the court has played any part in these proceedings. Directions were given by Mould J in August. He warned that the circumstances in which judicial review of a County Court appeal decision will run are very narrow.[14]On 16 September 2025, permission to apply for judicial review was refused on paper by Sheldon J. In a full and careful decision, he set out the history. At [6]-[7] he reviewed the communications regarding the tenancy after the co-tenant left in 2017. He held that it was not arguable from a perusal of the transcript that there was any jurisdictional error at the hearing before DDJ Slack. There was clearly jurisdiction to entertain the possession application. The judge considered the relevant law, and Mr Nash had a full opportunity to make representations and present his case. He concluded:
“17. I have considered the various arguments and material produced by the Claimant with some care. I do not consider, however, that it is arguable that the grounds of challenge raised by the Claimant fall within the exceptional categories where the Administrative Court will intervene. It is clear from the documentation provided by the Claimant that his arguments were properly heard and considered by the different judges at Brighton County Court. They reached conclusions which were tenable on the available evidence - that the Claimant’s tenancy was not (sc. was) an assured shorthold tenancy and that the section 21 notice was valid and effective - even if the contrary argument being made by the Claimant about the nature of the tenancy was itself a plausible one. (18) I may have reached a different view than HHJ Simpkiss as to whether to extend time for the Claimant to lodge his appeal, and may also have reached a different view as to whether his appeal was “totally without merit”
. That, however, is not sufficient to justify a judicial review challenge. (19) Whilst I have sympathy with the Claimant, as explained by Lord Phillips MR in Sivasubramaniam at [54], “Parliament has put in place an adequate system for reviewing the merits of decisions made by district judges and [save for exceptional cases] it is not appropriate that there should be further review of these by the High Court.””[15]Mr Nash renewed his application at a hearing before Stacey J on 6 November 2025, when his mother accompanied him. He presented a bundle running to 972 pages, with numerous grounds for judicial review.[16]We have read a transcript of the hearing and of the judgment. Stacey J engaged with Mr Nash’s submissions for an hour and gave her decision. She concluded:
“13. I find that there is no basis in judicial review on the facts in this case. The arguments were properly heard. 14. The hearing on 15 March 2024 was not a lengthy hearing, but on the basis of what was in Mr Nash's defence and the further letter that he put before the court, it was a decision that the judge was entitled to come to and the arguments that he now seeks to make were not apparent at that hearing from the paperwork. But in any event, the route of challenge is through the appeal process, not judicial review. 15. Mr Nash has sought to appeal and the matter has been considered by different judges in Brighton County Court and reasons have been given and decisions have been made following the rules and procedure for bringing an appeal. The route of appeal is now exhausted. There is no basis for setting aside the notice of eviction to challenge the finding that the section 21 notice was validly served and the interested party was entitled to possession under a section 21 notice. 16. The argument now has developed that the claimant argues that he had an assured shorthold tenancy. The argument put on 15 March 2024, however, was different. He explained that there was no proper tenancy agreement of any sort at all, but the logical consequence of his submission made in the paperwork before the hearing was that he would have had even fewer rights than that of a periodic tenant. 17. Judicial review cannot be used to reopen a case that has been properly decided because a litigant disagrees with the outcome. HHJ Simpkiss quite properly directed the administrative staff to write to the claimant explaining that no further applications could be made to the county court and the only available avenue was judicial review. It was not an invitation to apply for judicial review and it was not intended to give any indication of likely success. It was fairness and transparency that motivated HHJ Simpkiss to assist a litigant in person to know of the only possible technical avenue open to him. 18. There are no exceptional circumstances in this case so as to give this court the jurisdiction in judicial review proceedings to reopen the litigation in the county court. The procedural rules were followed and they were neither irrational, unlawful or procedurally unfair or improper. It is not therefore necessary or appropriate for me to address the 13 detailed grounds sought to be advanced and the application is refused.”
[17]Mr Nash now seeks to appeal to this court by an Appellant’s notice submitted on 27 November 2025.[18]There are three grounds of appeal, which can be summarised in this way: 1. The hearing before Stacey J was a procedural nullity because there was no notice of the hearing (Mr Nash learned of it from the public list). This created a situation in which only refusal was possible. The hearing was void ab initio and any order arising from it was ineffective. 2. The failure to grant relief on an unopposed claim was irrational in view of the Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide 2025 16.3.3: the court “will usually grant the relief sought without a hearing unless it considers doing so would be highly detrimental to the interests of justice”. (sic) 3. There is a systematic conflict of interest in judges reviewing the misconduct of colleagues and of HMCTS. Here, Mr Nash alleges malicious prosecution of the possession claim, fraud by the Landlord’s counsel before DDJ Slack, false imprisonment of him in a defective property, and defamation in descriptions given of him during the proceedings. There should have been a trial by jury under s.69 of the Senior Courts Act 1981.[19]Other matters have been raised. The first is that Mr Nash has widened his focus to allege in the strongest terms that there has been corruption on the part of the Civil Appeals Office in rejecting, altering or suppressing documents filed by him. He asked us to adjourn until the afternoon to read further documents that he says have been withheld by the Office from us, and from the Chancellor when he made a directions order on 3 July, dismissing a number of administrative applications. The second matter is that Mr Nash seeks orders for costs in excess of £20m. These include compensation for over 2,400 hours spent on this application to appeal since December, which he attributed to the faults of the Civil Appeals Office. He asks us to join the Landlord’s solicitors so that he can bring a costs claim against them. He also considers it to be contempt of court for the Landlord to market the property for sale.[20]Mr Nash seeks a mandatory order to quash all county court orders and to reinstate him in the property. He asks us to refer Stacey J to the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office (JCIO) for misfeasance and conspiracy, and told us that he had reported her to the police. He has also made a number of complaints and police reports about other individuals he has encountered, including the Landlord, the Solicitors Regulation Authority, the Bar Standards Board, the JCIO, HMCTS, his own sometime solicitors, and the Landlord’s solicitors.[21]We informed Mr Nash that the hearing would not be adjourned to read further documents. Each member of the court has read the bundle of documents previously filed, which runs to over 900 pages. There is, to put it at its lowest, more than enough information before this court and Mr Nash has not identified anything that we are lacking. The application is overdue for decision. I also entirely reject the intemperate criticism of the Civil Appeals Office. They have sought to assist Mr Nash to present his case at the risk of being overwhelmed by the sheer volume of his communications, of which this constitution of the court has been aware since it was formed some weeks ago. The Civil Procedure Rules require the court to share its resources fairly between litigants and Mr Nash has had a far greater share than is reasonably required, even by a litigant with his characteristics.[22]As to the substance of the claim, in R(Sivasubramaniam) v Wandsworth County Court [2002] EWCA Civ 1738; [2003] 1 WLR 475 at [54], it was said that it will be a very rare case where the Administrative Court should entertain an application for judicial review from a refusal of permission to appeal in the County Court. An example would be the denial of the right to a fair hearing.[23]In R (Strickson) v Preston County Court [2007] EWCA Civ 1132, the Court of Appeal limited the jurisdiction of the Administrative Court in this context to cases where “the judicial process itself has been frustrated or corrupted”. At [32] Laws LJ referred to cases “where the court embarks upon an enquiry which it lacks all power to deal with, or fails altogether to enquire or adjudicate upon a matter which it was its unequivocal duty to address. It would include substantial denial of the right to a fair hearing, and it may include cases where the lower court has indeed acted "in complete disregard of its duties”. In that case, judicial review relief was refused even though the judge in the Administrative Court had held that both the District Judge and the Circuit Judge had reached the wrong conclusions in the underlying claim.[24]Today, Mr Nash asks “Why are we here? There is no defence and the court should not act as a surrogate advocate for the defendants. The grant of permission to appeal should be a formality.” My conclusion is entirely different. In overview, two judges of the Administrative Court have given painstaking consideration to Mr Nash’s application for permission to apply for judicial review and have found it not to be arguable. We could only interfere with that conclusion if we were persuaded that it was wrong or so procedurally irregular as to be unjust. Mr Nash has now been allowed a hearing before the full court, and it has become even clearer that the refusal of permission to apply for judicial review was not only not wrong, but plainly right, for the reasons given by Sheldon J and Stacey J. The County Court exercised its jurisdiction and did so in a coherent way. Mr Nash did not lose the litigation because of any fault on the part of Brighton County Court but because it found that he did not have an arguable legal case to put before it.[25]The grounds of appeal from the decision of Stacey J are, I regret, hopeless.[26]The way in which Mr Nash and his mother learned of the appeal has no bearing on the decision that emerged. It is regrettable if he had shorter notice than he would have liked, but the transcript shows that he had a more than fair hearing. The criticism made of Stacey J’s conduct is entirely uncalled-for.[27]The suggestion that the Administrative Court was bound to grant leave because the Brighton County Court did not participate is absurd. The Administrative Court Guide 8.3.5 states that:
“Where a court or tribunal is a party to a claim, there is generally no expectation that they will participate in proceedings”
. Similarly, as appears from this exchange with Stacey J, there is a reason why the claim has not been contested:
“MR NASH: I am challenging the process. I have lost two years of my life and so what you have just explained to me there has not happened. So how can someone make a decision that is fair for everyone when the other people have not even made a defence? MRS JUSTICE STACEY: Shall I tell you, this is going to feel like a brutal answer. MR NASH: Okay, that is fine, but I will respond brutally if I disagree. MRS JUSTICE STACEY: The reason why no-one else is here is because they know that your claim cannot succeed.”
[28]Further, the paragraph cited by Mr Nash from the Administrative Court Guide (16.3.3) does not exist. The assertion that it is said to support (that relief will usually be granted) is not to be found in the Guide. That is not at all surprising as the Administrative Court is a court of law and it will not uphold arguments that are self-evidently unsound. When asked about this, Mr Nash fell back uponR v Talpada[2018] EWCA Civ 841 as authority for his proposition, but that case says thatunchallenged evidence does not have to be accepted automatically.[29]Lastly, the assertion that the High Court cannot fairly judge the validity of County Court proceedings is unarguable. In this case, the judges of the Administrative Court have performed that task with exemplary care and patience. As to s.69 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, there is no power to order a jury trial in the Administrative Court and if there was, it certainly would not be exercised here.[30]I would therefore refuse permission to appeal. None of the grounds of appeal establishes any prospect of success on appeal and there is no compelling reason for an appeal to be heard. I would certify the application as being totally without merit because it has no legal coherence. The remedy of judicial review has never been open to Mr Nash, and I fear that his pursuit of it is only causing him additional distress. He no doubt strongly disagrees and there is nothing that we could say to alter his fixed opinion about what he sees as well-founded grievances. However, he is misguided. The strength of a person’s argument is not to be measured by how strongly they feel about it. The task of all the judges who have encountered the proceedings over the past two years has been to apply the law correctly in a fair and objective way. Mr Nash’s wildly disproportionate response and his recent correspondence with this court and many other individuals and institutions, most of whom have absolutely nothing to do with any genuine grievance, is concerning. His account of the time that he has spent on this appeal suggests that he has no time for anything else. If he cannot regain a sense of perspective and refrain from unmeritorious applications, a Civil Restraint Order will sadly become inevitable.[31]I agree.

Sir Colin Birss, Chancellor of the High Court:

[32]I also agree. _______________