Mohammed Sury Dabo v Secretary of State for The Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 907

[2026] EWCA Civ 907Case No CA-2025-002104
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER)
Upper Tribunal Judge Hirst and Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Neilson
UI-2023-004749
ON APPEAL FROM THE FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
First Tier Tribunal Judge G. Clarke
PA/10326/2018
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 15/07/2026
Before
LORD JUSTICE MOYLANLADY JUSTICE ANDREWSLORD JUSTICE ZACAROLI
Between
MOHAMMED SURY DABORespondentSECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENTAppellant
Paul Skinner (instructed by Government Legal Department) for AppellantSadat Sayeed and Alex Schymyck (instructed by Ata & Co Solicitors) for RespondentHearing Hearing date: 2 July 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 15 th July 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................

Introduction

[1]This is yet another case concerning the situation when a “foreign criminal” contends that an order for their deportation would breach their human rights. The relevant statutory provisions are set out in sections 117A to 117D of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”). The Secretary of State for the Home Department (“SSHD”) appeals against the decision of the Upper Tribunal (IAC) (“UT”) dismissing her appeal against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) which dismissed the Respondent’s protection claim, but allowed his appeal against an order for his deportation, on human rights grounds (Article 8, private life).[2]The Respondent, (“Mr Dabo”) is a national of Guinea, born on 7 July 1990. He arrived in the UK on 4 March 2007, aged 16, as an unaccompanied asylum-seeking child. He has since made three claims for asylum, all of which have failed. He has remained in the UK unlawfully since October 2011, when he exhausted his rights of appeal against the refusal of the second protection claim.[3]Mr Dabo is also a prolific and persistent offender, though prior to the conviction which instigated the deportation order, few of his offences had resulted in custodial sentences, and all had been dealt with in the Magistrates’ court. The judge had a copy of the computer print-out of his full conviction history (“the PNC”) and referred to it at [23] of his decision, which noted that Mr Dabo then had 19 convictions for 34 offences. On 2 November 2016 at Swansea Crown Court, he was convicted on a guilty plea of 4 counts of possession of Class A drugs (heroin and cocaine) with intent to supply, and sentenced to 2 years 8 months’ imprisonment. Full credit was given for his plea.[4]On 14 November 2016, the SSHD wrote to Mr Dabo and invited representations as to why a deportation order should not be made. He raised protection and human rights claims, which the SSHD refused on 6 August 2018. On the same day, the SSHD made a deportation order. Mr Dabo exercised his right of appeal to the FtT. He sought to rely upon fresh evidence that had not been before the FtT at his previous hearing in 2011, including expert reports on his mental health. The report of the consultant forensic psychologist, Lisa Davies, contains a lot of information provided to her by Mr Dabo, including his explanation of the reasons for his offending and his problems over the years with alcohol and drugs. She diagnosed him as suffering from anxiety and depression, and as displaying symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder, though he did not meet the diagnostic criteria for that condition. That diagnosis was accepted by the FtT judge (“the judge”).[5]The hearing took place on 5 June 2023. In a decision that runs to 30 pages and 214 paragraphs, promulgated on 18 August 2023, the judge rejected the protection aspect of the claim. He did, however, accept on the basis of fresh medical evidence that Mr Dabo had been detained for 2 days and tortured by the police in Guinea in 2007 after he had attended an anti-Government demonstration. He also accepted that Mr Dabo’s father (who Mr Dabo claimed was the Treasurer of a prominent anti-Government organisation, the USTG) was unlawfully killed in February 2007; that Mr Dabo fled to the UK shortly after, and that his mother subsequently fled to Mali (paras 98 to 101 of the FtT decision). There was no appeal against the rejection of the protection claim.[6]As to the human rights claim, the judge found that Mr Dabo did not meet the private life or family life exceptions to deportation under s.117C(4) and (5) of the 2002 Act, but that his Article 8 private life claim was strong enough to meet the elevated threshold of “very compelling circumstances” over and above the rules, and therefore deportation would be a disproportionate interference with his private life established in the UK.[7]On behalf of the SSHD, Mr Skinner contends that there were material errors of law in the FtT decision, and the UT erred in upholding it because:(1) the judge erred in his approach to the question whether Mr Dabo was socially and culturally integrated into the UK, by failing to consider whether his integration was into the lawful social structure of the UK and whether any such integration had been broken by his offending;(2) the judge, when considering whether there were very significant obstacles to Mr Dabo’s reintegration into Guinea, only addressed the question of what obstacles there were to reintegration, without carrying out an evaluation of whether the elevated threshold of “very significant” was met, i.e. whether those obstacles would prevent or seriously inhibit his reintegration. Alternatively, if such an evaluation was carried out, the judge failed to explain why the threshold was met.[8]Notably, there is and was no challenge to the FtT judge’s conclusion that there were “very compelling circumstances” over and above the rules, though Mr Skinner submitted that if the judge’s evaluation of Mr Dabo’s integration into the UK, or his evaluation of the question whether there were “very significant” obstacles to his reintegration into Guinea, or both, were legally flawed, the errors would feed into the overall balancing exercise and necessitate our sending the matter back to the FtT for a fresh assessment. Mr Sayeed, who appeared with Mr Schymyck on behalf of Mr Dabo, agreed with that analysis, although he contended that the FtT judge made no errors of law and therefore the question of remission did not arise.[9]Given the nature, duration and strength (or lack of it) of the social, economic and cultural ties that, on the facts found by the judge, Mr Dabo had established in the 16 years that had elapsed since he first arrived in the UK, particularly when viewed in the light of his prolific offending history since 2011, the conclusion at [161] of the FtT decision that he was socially and culturally integrated into the UK is, on the face of it, somewhat surprising. However, the SSHD now accepts that it was within the ambit of conclusions that were reasonably open to the judge, and, by contrast with the second ground of appeal, it is no longer suggested that the judge’s reasoning was deficient (though that was a ground of appeal to the UT). As Baroness Hale observed in R (MM) Lebanon v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 10; [2017] 1 WLR 771 at [107]:
“the mere fact that one tribunal has reached what may seem an unusually generous view of the facts of a particular case does not mean that it has made an error of law.”
[10]For the reasons set out in this judgment, I am unable to accept that the judge made the errors of law complained of, and would therefore dismiss the appeal.

The Statutory Framework

[11]S.117A (2) of the 2002 Act requires judicial decision makers to have regard, in all cases, to the considerations listed in s.117B, and “in cases concerning the deportation of foreign criminals” to the considerations listed in s.117C “in considering the public interest question”.[12]S.117C is entitled “Article 8: additional considerations in cases involving foreign criminals.” A “foreign criminal” is defined in s.117D(2) as a person who is not a British citizen, who has been convicted in the UK of an offence, and who(i) has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least 12 months, or(ii) has been convicted of an offence that has caused serious harm, or(iii) is a persistent offender. The respondent qualifies because each of the drug offences of which he was convicted resulted in a sentence of more than 12 months’ but less than 4 years’ imprisonment.[13]In cases such as the present, in which the decision to deport is based upon the offence or offences for which the individual concerned has been convicted, s.117C provides, so far as relevant, as follows:
“ (1) The deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest. (2) The more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater is the public interest in deportation of the criminal. (3) In the case of a foreign criminal (“C”) who has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires C’s deportation unless Exception 1 or Exception 2 applies. (4) Exception 1 applies where – (a) C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C’s life; (b) C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and (c) there would be very significant obstacles to C’s integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported. (5) Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of C’s deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh. (6) In the case of a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years, the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2… ” (2) The more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater is the public interest in deportation of the criminal. (3) In the case of a foreign criminal (“C”) who has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires C’s deportation unless Exception 1 or Exception 2 applies. (4) Exception 1 applies where – (a) C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C’s life; (b) C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and (c) there would be very significant obstacles to C’s integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported. (5) Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of C’s deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh. (6) In the case of a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years, the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2… ”
[14]In relation to “foreign criminals” who have not been sentenced to four years’ imprisonment, the exceptions reflect where the balance should generally be struck between the public interest in deportation of foreign criminals and a person’s rights to pursue a private life or family life in the UK. It is common ground that Mr Dabo did not meet Exception 1 because he had not been lawfully resident in the UK for most of his life. The judge found that although Mr Dabo has a long-term girlfriend (with whom he does not cohabit) he did not meet Exception 2.[15]As the custodial sentence was over 12 months, but less than 4 years, Mr Dabo is what is sometimes described, by way of convenient shorthand, as a “medium offender”. It was established in NA (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 662; [2017] 1 WLR 207, that as a result of an obvious drafting error in the statute, section 117C(3) of the 2002 Act should be interpreted as permitting such offenders who do not meet Exceptions 1 or 2 to rely on very compelling circumstances over and above those described in those exceptions, since Parliament would have intended to give the same right to such offenders as it gave to long term offenders, i.e. those who had been sentenced to more than 4 years’ imprisonment.[16]The upshot is that if Exceptions 1 and 2 are not satisfied, it would only be in very compelling circumstances that a medium offender would be able to rely on Article 8 to resist deportation. In determining whether “very compelling” circumstances exist, it is relevant to consider the extent to which the individual concerned meets any of the requirements of Exception 1 or Exception 2, as those matters are relevant to an assessment of the strength of that person’s private or family life and the extent to which deportation will interfere with it.

Factual Background

[17]Mr Dabo made his first claim for asylum when he arrived in the UK in March 2007. That claim was refused and his subsequent appeal was dismissed on 19 June 2007. However, as an unaccompanied asylum-seeking child, he was granted discretionary leave to remain until 7 January 2008. He made an in-time application for further leave to remain, again claiming asylum. That application was eventually refused by the Secretary of State on 2 July 2011 with an in-country right of appeal.[18]Mr Dabo’s appeal against that decision was dismissed on 31 August 2011, with adverse credibility findings. By then he was 21 years old. The FtT judge on that occasion found that he would not face a real risk of suffering serious harm on his return to Guinea, but that in any event, it would not be unreasonable to expect him to relocate to a different area of Guinea. Mr Dabo was refused permission to appeal to the UT, and his appeal rights were exhausted on 26 October 2011. At that stage he ceased to have any lawful immigration status. He remained in the UK thereafter as an overstayer.[19]By this stage, Mr Dabo appears to have been drifting in and out of homelessness. In July 2010 (aged 20) he was seen at a health centre regarding his excessive consumption of alcohol. He was noted at that time to be drinking 30 units per week. Although he had isolated cautions for criminal damage in 2008 and theft in 2009, his first criminal conviction was for burglary and theft (non-dwelling) on 19 December 2011, for which he received a community order with an unpaid work requirement. In 2013 and 2014 he had various convictions for shoplifting, criminal damage, and public order offences. On 7 July 2014 he received a suspended sentence of 8 weeks’ imprisonment for possession of an offensive weapon in public, and on 3 November 2014 he received short concurrent custodial sentences of 4 weeks and 8 weeks respectively for criminal damage and theft.[20]By mid-2014 Mr Dabo was presenting with mental health issues, in particular, depressive episodes, as well as continuing to drink to excess. On 9 November 2015 he was diagnosed with alcohol-induced acute pancreatitis. On 19 November 2015 he was served with notice as an overstayer and made subject to reporting requirements.[21]On 26 January 2016 he was arrested for fare evasion; whilst in police custody it emerged that he was wanted for a series of offences committed in November and December 2015, consisting of failures to appear in the Magistrates’ court for non-payment of fines and to answer a criminal charge of possessing a bladed article in public. On the following day, 27 January 2016, he was charged with all those offences, pleaded guilty, and sentenced to 12 weeks’ imprisonment. On the same date the magistrates activated an earlier suspended sentence of 8 weeks’ imprisonment, for non-compliance with the community requirements of the suspended sentence order. He spent around a month in immigration detention after that sentence was served, but was released on 22 April 2016.[22]Mr Dabo’s drug offence conviction in November 2016 represented a serious escalation in his offending behaviour. This was a “county lines” case in which Mr Dabo was engaged as a drugs runner by an organised criminal group. According to the sentencing remarks, he played a significant role in bringing the drugs into Swansea from outside South Wales. When he was apprehended after selling drugs to two undercover police officers, the phone that was seized from him indicated that there were possibly over a thousand transactions during a month of analysis of its data.[23]On his release on licence from that sentence on 1 February 2018, Mr Dabo was detained under immigration powers. He was still in detention when the deportation order was made on 6 August 2018. This period of immigration detention appears to have ended when Mr Dabo was sentenced on 24 August 2018 to a further period of imprisonment (18 months for a robbery committed two years earlier, in September 2016). He was again detained on completion of the custodial element of that sentence on 11 November 2018, until 23 July 2019. There followed convictions in 2020, 2021 and February 2022 for criminal damage, battery, and public order offences.[24]The final relevant conviction prior to the hearing of his appeal in the FtT was on 7 May 2022, for possession of a bladed article, for which he was sentenced to 32 weeks’ imprisonment. He was again placed in immigration detention following the completion of the custodial element of that sentence, from October 2022 until 24 February 2023.

The Grounds of Appeal

[25]When considering the grounds of appeal, both of which are essentially complaints about the way in which the judge went about making an evaluative assessment, it is important to bear in mind the fact that the judge had read all the evidence, including the medical reports, which gave a great deal more information about Mr Dabo and his account of the circumstances of the various offences, and that the judge had the benefit of seeing and hearing Mr Dabo being cross-examined (see paras 20 and 21 of the decision).

Ground 1

[26]The judge addressed the question whether Mr Dabo was socially and culturally integrated into the UK at paras 153 to 161 of his decision. He said that he had reminded himself of CI (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 2027; [2020] 1NLR 191 (“CI (Nigeria)”). He then went on to consider the evidence of integration.[27]He referred to the fact that Mr Dabo entered the UK when he was still a minor and was looked after by social services during his period of discretionary leave to remain. He considered the evidence of Mr Dabo’s on-off relationship with his girlfriend (to which he had previously referred in the section of the decision dealing with Art 8 family life), noting that they began dating in 2010, broke up in around 2011, and resumed their relationship in 2019. The judge accepted that the relationship was evidence of a degree of social and cultural integration into the UK (para 154). Although he did not say so in terms, the judge would have been well aware from the PNC and Ms Davies’ report, that the relationship had been rekindled after Mr Dabo had served his sentence for the drugs offences and, indeed, after he had served his sentence for the subsequent robbery offence in 2018.[28]The judge then referred to evidence that Mr Dabo had received some education in the UK and undertook some employment, and that he had received support from social services when he first came to the UK, and medical support for his alcohol and drugs issues. He then referred at para 160 to what Mr Dabo’s then counsel had described in her skeleton argument as his “chequered adult life involving periods of homelessness and repeated offending”. He concluded as follows at para 161: “Nonetheless, when I take all these factors into account, given that the Appellant has resided continuously in the United Kingdom since 2007, which includes a period as a minor, I find that the Appellant is socially and culturally integrated into the United Kingdom”.[29]In his skeleton argument, Mr Skinner placed considerable reliance on the decision of the Court of Appeal in Binbuga v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 551 (“Binbuga”). That decision, which pre-dated CI (Nigeria), concerned a finding by the FtT that the appellant, a Turkish national who had entered the UK with his family when he was 9 years old, was socially and culturally integrated into the UK, among other matters because he had become involved in North London gang culture. The UT decided that the FtT erred in law, holding that “there must be imported into the term ‘social and cultural integration’ the norms of British society.” The Court of Appeal (Floyd and Hamblen LJJ) agreed with that approach, finding that membership of a pro-criminal gang tells against rather than for social integration.[30]Hamblen LJ said this:
“[56] … In this context, social integration refers to the extent to which a foreign criminal has become incorporated within the lawful social structure of the UK. This includes various incidents of society such as clubs, societies, workplaces or places of study, but not association with pro-criminal peers. [57] Similarly, cultural integration refers to the acceptance and assumption by the foreign criminal of the culture of the UK, its core values, ideas, customs, and social behaviour. This includes acceptance of the principle of the rule of law. Membership of a pro-criminal gang shows a lack of such acceptance. It demonstrates disdain for the rule of law and indeed undermines it. [58] Social and cultural integration in the UK connotes integration as a law-abiding citizen. That is why it is recognised that breaking the law may involve discontinuity in integration…” [57] Similarly, cultural integration refers to the acceptance and assumption by the foreign criminal of the culture of the UK, its core values, ideas, customs, and social behaviour. This includes acceptance of the principle of the rule of law. Membership of a pro-criminal gang shows a lack of such acceptance. It demonstrates disdain for the rule of law and indeed undermines it. [58] Social and cultural integration in the UK connotes integration as a law-abiding citizen. That is why it is recognised that breaking the law may involve discontinuity in integration…”
[31]In his skeleton argument, Mr Skinner submitted that the judge erred in not directing himself in accordance with those principles, because he failed to ask whether Mr Dabo’s offending had broken such cultural and social integration as he had developed before he embarked upon it. Whilst he accepted that CI Nigeria requires a multi-factorial assessment of integration, he submitted it was not enough to consider the offending as part of an holistic assessment of whether there was integration in the first place. Here, there was a failure to address the question of discontinuity in integration which had been recognised as relevant in Binbuga.[32]In his oral submissions, however, Mr Skinner moved away somewhat from reliance on the concept of periods of offending breaking the continuity of social integration, to submit that the judge was obliged to expressly consider how the nature and frequency of the offending, the length of time over which it took place, and the periods of incarceration or detention that followed it affected Mr Dabo’s integration into the society and culture of the host state, and to explain why he concluded that he was sufficiently integrated despite those matters. He submitted that, although this was not a “reasons” challenge, and the judge did not have to give lengthy or extensive reasons, the absence of any reasons beyond the bare conclusion stated in para 161 meant there was no indication that the judge had even turned his mind to that question.[33]CI (Nigeria) is, as Mr Sayeed pointed out, regarded as the guideline case on how to approach the issue of social and cultural integration. The leading judgment was given by Leggatt LJ, with whom Sir Ernest Ryder and Hickinbottom LJ agreed. In that case, the judge had made a finding that CI’s criminal offending and detention had “broken” his social and cultural integration in the UK notwithstanding that CI had lived in the UK since he was 1 year old and his entire social and cultural identity was formed in the UK. It was held that the judge fell into error by giving no reasons for reaching that conclusion, and that he should at least have identified the main facts and circumstances which led to it, and why he considered them to be significant.[34]There is no need to reproduce paragraphs [57] to [62] of CI (Nigeria), which begin with a reminder that the rationale behind the test is to determine whether the person concerned has established a private life in the UK which has a substantial claim to protection under Art 8. Leggatt LJ went on to point out the importance of upbringing and education in the formation of a person’s social identity, and accordingly, the question whether that person came to the UK as a child, or only as an adult, can make a difference to the outcome of the assessment.[35]Leggatt LJ then identified two ways in which criminal offending is relevant to the assessment. First, as was decided in Binbuga, association with criminals or pro-criminal groups could not be relied on as examples of integration into life in the UK. Secondly, criminal offending and time spent in prison are in principle relevant, insofar as they indicate that the person lacks legitimate social and cultural ties to the UK. However, the impact of offending and imprisonment upon a person’s integration depends not only on the nature and frequency of the offending, the length of time over which it takes place and the length of time spent in prison, but on how deeply the individual was socially and culturally integrated into the UK to begin with.[36]In a passage at [76] upon which Mr Skinner placed considerable reliance, the court found that the judge in that case had fallen into error because he had not considered to what extent CI’s criminal behaviour and time spent in detention did in fact disrupt or destroy his social and cultural ties in the UK, before finding that there was a break in his integration. To reach that conclusion would have required an assessment of CI’s current situation to see the extent to which he had maintained relationships with members of his family, had other social relationships, had found or looked for work, had avoided re-offending and had engaged in activities of a positive nature since his release from custody.[37]This passage, Mr Skinner submitted, provided the context for the passage at [77] which was subsequently approved by Lord Stephens JSC in SC (Jamaica) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 15; [2022] 1 WLR 3190 at [51]. The judge in this case had not considered the impact of Mr Dabo’s prolific offending and incarceration or detention as an adult on the social and cultural ties he had established prior to 2011.[38]In my judgment, what Leggatt LJ said at [77] does bear repeating:
“The judge should simply have asked whether – having regard to his upbringing, education and employment history, history of criminal offending and imprisonment, relationships with family and friends, lifestyle and any other relevant factors – CI was at the time of the hearing socially and culturally integrated in the UK. The judge should not, as he appears to have done, have treated CI’s offending and imprisonment as having severed his social and cultural ties with the UK through its very nature, irrespective of its actual effects on CI’s relationships and affiliations – and then required him to demonstrate that integrative links had since been “re-formed”.” [Emphasis added].
[39]Leggatt LJ went on to say at [78] that:
“The phrase “socially and culturally integrated in the UK” is a composite one, used to denote the totality of human relationships and aspects of social identity which are protected by the right to respect for private life. While criminal offending may be a result or cause of a lack or breakdown of ties to family friends and the wider community, whether it has led or contributed to a state of affairs where the offender is not socially and culturally integrated in the UK is a question of fact, which is not answered by reflecting on the description of criminal conduct as anti-social.” [Emphasis added].
[40]At [80] Leggatt LJ deprecated the many references made by the judge in that case to CI’s integration being “broken,” because it gave the impression that the judge saw the relevant question as being whether, through the nature and seriousness of his offending, the “foreign criminal” had broken the social contract which entitles him to protection of the state. That, however, is not the relevant test, which should be concerned solely with the person’s social and cultural affiliations and identity.[41]The question, therefore, is whether the judge in the present case asked himself what impact Mr Dabo’s offending had had on his social and cultural ties to the UK, or what effect (if any) it had had upon his relationships and affiliations as at the date of the hearing. I reject any suggestion that this should have been approached on a temporal basis by asking whether the offending interrupted his social and cultural integration at any given time and then considering whether that integration was resumed. It is clear from CI (Nigeria) that the assessment must be holistic. It is wrong to extrapolate from what was said in Binbuga a legal requirement to consider whether someone’s offending has broken the continuity of their integration. There may be cases in which a person’s integration into the UK prior to their offending is so limited that their subsequent criminal history and antisocial behaviour and attitudes can be treated as bringing it to an end, or even expunging it, but that does not mean that the tribunal must adopt some kind of linear chronological approach. Rather, CI Nigeria requires an assessment of the individual’s integration, or lack of it, as at the time of the hearing, when all the offending behaviour and its impact on the offender’s social and cultural ties must be considered as part of that assessment.[42]Whilst brevity is generally to be encouraged, I accept that the judge could have given a better explanation of how he assessed the impact that Mr Dabo’s offending had had upon his social and cultural integration into the UK which had been established particularly in the 4 years or so of his lawful presence in the UK since his arrival in 2007 at the age of 16. Most of the matters to which the judge expressly referred before para 160 – his education, his work, his involvement with social services – pre-dated 2011, which was when he became destitute and homeless, his relationship with his girlfriend initially broke down, and he started offending.[43]However, I do not accept that the inference can fairly be drawn that the judge did not make that assessment, just because he did not expressly state that he did. Nor do I accept that the judge fell into the error of weighing all the factors he identified in order to determine whether Mr Dabo was socially and culturally integrated in the UK in the first place, rather than looking at the position as at the date of the hearing. Paragraph 161 is succinct, but it is plainly addressing the question of integration as at the time of the hearing. It is expressed in the present tense, and it refers to Mr Dabo’s presence in the UK since 2007, beginning with a time when he was still a minor.[44]The word “nonetheless” indicates that the judge had turned his mind to the impact of the matters he identified at paragraph 160 on the question of integration. Whilst it would have been better if he had said a little more by way of explanation as to why he reached that conclusion, that, to my mind, is just about sufficient to demonstrate that he did make the relevant assessment in accordance with CI (Nigeria). The UT was therefore right to reject this aspect of the SSHD’s appeal.

Ground 2

[45]The judge addressed the question whether there were very serious obstacles to Mr Dabo’s reintegration to life in Guinea in paras 162 to 174. He stated that he applied the principles in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Kamara [2016] EWCA Civ 813; [2016] 4 WLR 152 (“Kamara”). He then went on to identify what the obstacles to reintegration were, by reference to the reports of the two country experts, Mr Burchill and Dr Kenny. He concluded at [173]:
“Applying Kamara and making a broad, evaluative judgment, I find, on the balance of probabilities, that [Mr Dabo] will not be enough of an insider so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there and to be able to operate on a day to day basis.”
[46]Mr Skinner referred to the more recent decision of this Court in Ackom v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 537 (“Ackom”) in which Kamara and subsequent cases on “very significant obstacles to integration” were considered. He drew attention to para [23] of Ackom, in which Underhill LJ’s observations in Parveen v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 932 (which related to the same phrase, used in different legislation) were adopted in the specific context of a case under s.117C. Underhill LJ had pointed out, rightly, that Kamara focused more on the concept of reintegration than on what is meant by “very significant obstacles” to it. He went on to say that the task of the SSHD or tribunal in any given case is:
“simply to assess the obstacles to integration relied on, whether characterised as hardship or difficulty or anything else, and to decide whether they regard them as “very significant”.”
[47]Mr Skinner’s complaint is that the judge directed himself only to the question whether Mr Dabo would face obstacles to reintegration in Guinea. After identifying those obstacles, he did not go on to consider the elevated test of “very significant obstacles”, or at the very least failed to give a cogent explanation of why it was met. That required considering whether the obstacles identified would prevent or seriously inhibit the individual’s reintegration in terms of understanding how life in the country of destination was carried on, and his capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, so as to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to his private life.[48]In Ackom the judge had failed in substance to address that question. However there are cases in which the identified obstacles are by their very nature serious enough to prevent or significantly inhibit the individual’s reintegration. In a case where that is self-evident, the judge does not need to say more. This case falls within that category.[49]The judge had the “very serious obstacles” test well in mind; he referred to it at paras 152, 162, 163 and 174. At para 173 he found that (by reason of the obstacles identified in the preceding paragraphs) Mr Dabo “will not be enough of an insider so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted [in Guinea] and be able to operate [there] on a day to day basis.” That is a finding, in substance, that the obstacles he has identified will prevent or seriously inhibit Mr Dabo’s reintegration.[50]That conclusion is reinforced by findings made later in the FtT decision, for example, at paras 197 and 198, which find that Mr Dabo has no solid ties in Guinea and that he will face very significant difficulties accessing kinship ties there, for the reasons stated in Dr Kenny’s report; and at para 211, where the judge stated that Mr Dabo would return with no financial resources, no financial backing from abroad, no accommodation and no employment. He has significant mental health issues, has already experienced homelessness in this country and the clinical evidence is that his mental health is likely to deteriorate on return. The judge said it was one of those rare cases where he could see that Mr Dabo may become destitute.[51]Mr Sayeed referred the Court to para 28 of the UT’s decision in which they said this:
“The judge correctly directed himself by reference to Kamara; it is clear from his reasoning that he considered that the obstacles to the Respondent’s reintegration in Guinea, given the length of time he had been absent and the lack of any family support in a society reliant on kinship structures, went beyond mere hardship or difficulty. The judge did not make reference to the Respondent’s mental illness or the stigma attached to mental illness in Guinea in relation to the issue of reintegration, but given his unchallenged factual findings at paras 207-208 of the decision I consider that those aspects of the evidence would in any event provide further support for his conclusion.”
I respectfully agree with those observations. Ground 2 must also fail.[52]For those reasons, I would dismiss the appeal on both grounds.[53]I agree.[54]I also agree.