“37. In relation to a serious offender, it will often be sensible first to see whether his case involves circumstances of the kind described in Exceptions 1 and 2, both because the circumstances so described set out particularly significant factors bearing upon respect for private life (Exception 1) and respect for family life (Exception 2) and because that may provide a helpful basis on which an assessment can be made whether there are “very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2” as is required under section 117C(6) . It will then be necessary to look to see whether any of the factors falling within Exceptions 1 and 2 are of such force, whether by themselves or taken in conjunction with any other relevant factors not covered by the circumstances described in Exceptions 1 and 2, as to satisfy the test in section 117C(6).”
“96. For the cumulative reasons above (to include the appellant’s son, appellant’s lack of support, appellant’s mental health), and when looking at matters in the round, I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that there are very compelling circumstances. Those factors, I find, are over and above any test of unduly harsh and/or indeed very significant obstacles. 97. I also have regard to the strong public interest in the deportation of foreign criminals. In the case of the appellant, he commits further serious criminal offences in the face of deportation proceedings. However, when balancing the strong public interest against the factors above. I find that the very compelling circumstances do outweigh the factors above. I find that the very compelling circumstances do outweigh the public interest and makes the deportation of the appellant disproportionate. I go so far as to say this is not a case which is “finely balanced” like many cases are. I find that the factors as found above are such that they do tip the balance firmly in favour of the appellant despite his serious criminal offending history. 98. For all those reasons I allow the appeal.”