Richard Wood & Anor v Sophie Fleming [2026] EWCA Civ 780
[2026] EWCA Civ 780Case No CA-2026-000220
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
Venue ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS IN BIRMINGHAM, PROPERTY, TRUSTS AND PROBATE LIST (ChD)[2026] EWHC 490 (Ch)
His Honour Judge Tindal sitting as a Judge of the High Court
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 25 June 2026
Before
LADY JUSTICE ASPLINLORD JUSTICE ARNOLD
Between
RICHARD WOODClaimants/RespondentsREBECCA WARDRespondentSOPHIE FLEMINGDefendant/ AppellantAnd between :
Between
FIONA EUGENIE LAWRENCEApplicants/RespondentsMICHELE DAWN ROSERespondentSOPHIE FLEMINGRespondent/AppellantThe Appellant appeared in person by video link for in personDorian Day (instructed by IMD Solicitors LLP) for First and Second RespondentsAlexander Learmonth KC (instructed by Veale Wasbrough Vizards LLP) filed written submissions for Third and Fourth RespondentsHearing Hearing date : 18 June 2026Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 25 June 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................
Introduction
[1]This is an appeal by Sophie Fleming against an order made by HHJ Tindal sitting as a Judge of the High Court on 26 January 2026 (“the Committal Order”). By paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Committal Order the judge sentenced Ms Fleming to imprisonment for a period of 28 days, suspended until 26 January 2028, for 23 breaches of an order dated 2 July 2024 (sealed 3 July 2024, “the Executors’ Order”). By paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Committal Order the judge sentenced Ms Fleming to imprisonment for a period of 7 days, suspended until 26 January 2027, to run concurrently, for four breaches of an order dated 10 November 2025 (sealed 17 November 2025, “the Administrators’ Order”).[2]The appeal was brought as of right, permission to appeal not being required. In her appellant’s notice Ms Fleming gave her address as an address in Turkey, although her address for service in the underlying proceedings is an address in Northern Ireland. On the hearing of the appeal Ms Fleming represented herself in the circumstances described below. She appeared by video link from an undisclosed location.
Background
[3]The late Brendan Fleming was a solicitor who was born in Ireland and remained an Irish citizen but lived and practised for most of his life in Birmingham. HHJ Tindal described Mr Fleming in his first judgment in these proceedings as “a giant of the Birmingham legal community”. For some time before his death Mr Fleming’s solicitor’s practice was conducted through a company called Brendan Fleming Ltd (“BFL”), of which he was the sole shareholder and director. At the time of his death BFL employed 16 or 17 people.[4]Mr Fleming’s partner in the latter part of his life was Ms Fleming, and they had six children together. In 2013 or 2014 they moved to Turkey. In early 2023 they moved to Northern Ireland. On 31 December 2023 Mr Fleming unexpectedly passed away at the age of 75. Besides BFL, he owned two other English companies which held investment property in the UK, real property in Turkey and some funds in Canada.[5]After Mr Fleming’s death, Ms Fleming continued to live in Northern Ireland, but in about September 2024 she returned to Turkey with her children (although it appears that she may have left Turkey again more recently). She was understandably grief-stricken by the death of Mr Fleming. She also faced financial problems. As HHJ Tindal noted in another of his judgments, Ms Fleming’s reaction to the difficult situation she found herself in has been an impassioned one. In spite of her oft-stated desire to protect her children’s inheritance, she has repeatedly behaved in a manner which is contrary to their interests.[6]According to his last will dated 4 December 2020, the executors of Mr Fleming’s estate were Richard Wood (his accountant) and Rebecca Ward (a colleague at BFL) (together, “the Executors”). There were pecuniary legacies to a number of people. 50% of BFL was left to Ms Ward, while the other 50% fell into residue. Ms Fleming’s only interest under the will was a right to occupy some Turkish property. The residue was placed on trust for Mr and Ms Fleming’s children.[7]On 8 January 2024 the Executors commenced a Part 8 claim (“the company claim”) and applied without notice for an order under section 125 of the Companies Act 2006 (“CA 2006”) for Mr Fleming to be replaced as the sole shareholder in BFL by themselves in their capacity as executors in order for them to pass an ordinary resolution appointing Ms Ward as a director. This was in order to enable BFL to continue to trade in circumstances where the Solicitors Regulation Authority had raised concerns about the lawfulness of BFL doing so. The application was heard by HHJ Rawlings sitting as a Judge of the High Court in the Business and Property Courts in Birmingham, who made the order sought upon the Executors undertaking (among other things) to apply for probate of Mr Fleming’s will as soon as possible (“the Company Order”).[8]On 19 February 2024 Ms Fleming entered a caveat against Mr Fleming’s estate on the grounds that Mr Fleming was domiciled in Turkey, the will was not valid in Turkey and Mr Fleming did not have knowledge and approval of the effect of the will.[9]On 12 March 2024 Ms Fleming applied to set aside the Company Order on the grounds that(i) the Court had no jurisdiction to make the order because Mr Fleming was domiciled in Turkey, and(ii) the Executors had exhibited a redacted copy of the will in order to conceal the fact that it gave Mr Fleming’s address in Turkey and referred to properties in Turkey. On 5 May 2024 Ms Fleming applied for permission to bring an application for contempt of court against the Executors on various grounds. It appears, but it is not clear, that at some point in May 2024 Ms Fleming brought proceedings in Turkey concerning Mr Fleming’s will. On 3 June 2024 Ms Fleming and her children applied under section 50 of the Administration of Justice Act 1985, alternatively section 116 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, for the will be declared invalid and for the Executors to be removed.[10]All three of Ms Fleming’s English applications came before HHJ Tindal on 7 June 2024. Although Ms Fleming had previously been acting in person, by the time of the hearing she was represented by solicitors and counsel. HHJ Tindal dismissed the applications to set aside the Company Order and for permission to bring a contempt application, and adjourned the removal application to the first available date after 25 July 2024, for the reasons he gave in his judgment of that date (no neutral citation number). As he explained, the High Court did have jurisdiction to make the Company Order because BFL was an English company, and the will had properly been redacted because the only relevant part of it was the part concerning BFL. Furthermore, the Company Order had no bearing on the administration of Mr Fleming’s estate since the shares in BFL remained part of the estate. Ms Fleming’s other allegations against the Executors had no bearing on this. HHJ Tindal refused permission to bring an application for contempt of court because the appropriate procedure for determining Ms Fleming’s allegations against the Executors was the removal application. As for the removal application, the Executors had not had the opportunity to prepare for it. Accordingly, he gave directions to enable that application to be heard, including a direction that the company claim be transferred from the Insolvency and Companies List to the Property, Trusts and Probate List.[11]In his judgment HHJ Tindal made it clear that he expected the litigation to be conducted in a professional and courteous way, because Ms Fleming had been sending seriously abusive and defamatory messages and threats to the Executors and to staff at BFL, and posting similar messages on social media (as well as making complaints to regulators and to the police). Despite this, Ms Fleming increased, rather than reduced, these activities. This led to the Executors making an application on 27 June 2024 without notice to Ms Fleming for an interim injunction pursuant to sections 3 and 3A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. This application was heard on 2 July 2024 by HHJ Tindal, who acceded to it for the reasons he gave in his judgment of that date (no neutral citation number). Accordingly, he made the Executors’ Order restraining Ms Fleming from harassing the Executors in any of a number of specified ways until a return date on 19 July 2024 upon the Executors undertaking (among other things) to issue a claim for protection from harassment. It appears that the claim form was issued the following day (“the protection from harassment claim”). It is not necessary to set out the precise terms of the Executors’ Order for reasons that will appear. The Executors’ Order was personally served on Ms Fleming on 3 July 2024.[12]On 16 July 2024 the Executors applied for Ms Fleming to be committed to prison for contempt of court by multiple breaches of the Executors’ Order. This application was personally served on Ms Fleming on 17 July 2024.[13]At the hearing on 19 July 2024, at which Ms Fleming represented herself (her solicitors having applied to come off the record) and attended remotely, HHJ Tindal continued the Executors’ Order until 13 August 2024.[14]On 29 July 2024 the Executors commenced a Part 8 claim (“the probate claim”) seeking probate of Mr Fleming’s will and a declaration that Mr Fleming had died domiciled in Northern Ireland or such other territory as the court should determine. (By this stage, there were three extant claims – the company claim, the protection from harassment claim and the probate claim. Although there was no order for consolidation, they were case managed and heard together.)[15]On 30 July 2024 the Executors applied for the appointment of Fiona Lawrence and Michelle Rose (“the Administrators”), two solicitors, as interim administrators of Mr Fleming’s estate pending the determination of the probate claim. The appointment of new, neutral, professional interim administrators was in part intended to defuse the situation.[16]It is convenient to note at this point that no-one has ever asserted that Mr Fleming was domiciled in England at any relevant date. Furthermore, it has always been common ground that the estate did not include any immovable assets situate in England and Wales. Accordingly, the Executors and the Administrators have always accepted that the English courts’ jurisdiction is limited to the administration of movable assets situate in England and Wales, and does not extend to assets situate abroad or to questions of succession.[17]On 7 August 2024 Ms Fleming applied to set aside the Executors’ Order and to stay the probate claim on the ground of forum non conveniens. On 11 August 2024 she acknowledged service of the probate claim indicating her intention to contest jurisdiction. On 12 August 2024 she applied for a declaration that the English courts did not have jurisdiction.[18]The Executors’ applications for the continuation (and indeed extension) of the Executors’ Order, for committal and for the appointment of the Administrators and Ms Fleming’s applications were all heard by HHJ Tindal at a hearing on 13 August 2024, at which Ms Fleming largely represented herself and attended remotely, although she was legally represented in relation to the committal application.[19]HHJ Tindal continued and extended the Executors’ Order, appointed the Administrators, adjourned the committal application and dismissed Ms Fleming’s applications for the reasons he gave in an impressive judgment on 13 August 2024 ([2024] EWHC 2398 (Ch)). Among other things, he explained why Ms Fleming’s allegations of misconduct against the Executors were unfounded, why the High Court had jurisdiction to make a grant of representation in respect of Mr Fleming’s English estate regardless of his domicile and why it would not be appropriate to stay the probate claim on the ground of forum non conveniens. In his order he directed that the committal application be listed for hearing on 14 November 2024 and that Ms Fleming should attend that hearing in person.[20]On 14 October 2024 Ms Fleming filed an appellant’s notice out of time at this Court seeking permission to appeal against HHJ Tindal’s order dated 7 June 2024. It appears that she did not satisfy the other requirements for the appellant’s notice to be issued until 30 October 2024. On 4 November 2024 she filed amended grounds of appeal settled by counsel. On 11 November 2024 she filed a skeleton argument settled by counsel. On 30 December 2024 she filed re-amended grounds of appeal and an amended skeleton argument settled by counsel.[21]On 11 November 2024 there was a directions hearing in the probate claim, at which Ms Fleming was represented by counsel, and HHJ Tindal gave directions for the trial of that claim. Ms Fleming applied out of time for permission to appeal against the order dated 13 August 2024, but this was refused.[22]The trial of the protection for harassment claim and the hearing of the Executors’ committal application both took place before HHJ Tindal on 14 November 2024. Ms Fleming was represented by counsel, who cross-examined each of the Executors. Despite the judge’s order on 13 August 2024, Ms Fleming did not attend the hearing (and therefore did not give evidence). By this stage Ms Fleming was alleging that Mr Wood had conspired with others in his financial advice firm Barnett Ravenscroft, and latterly also Ms Ward, to take control of BFL away from Ms Fleming and her children, and thereby defraud them. In his judgment of the same date ([2024] EWHC 1421 (Ch)) HHJ Tindal explained why none of the matters relied upon by Ms Fleming supported this allegation. For example, there was nothing suspicious or sinister in the fact that BFL’s company articles, drafted by Barnett Ravenscroft some years ago, had omitted clause 17(2) of the statutory model articles for private companies limited by shares, which subsequently enabled the Executors to apply for the Company Order. HHJ Tindal found Ms Fleming liable for harassment and found the Executors’ allegations of breaches of the Executors’ Order proved beyond reasonable doubt. Although he granted a final injunction in the protection from harassment claim, he adjourned determination of the sanction for contempt of court pending the conclusion of the probate claim in hope that this would persuade Ms Fleming to curb the conduct in question.[23]On 4 February 2025 there was a further directions hearing in the probate claim, which Ms Fleming attended remotely. HHJ Tindal gave further directions for trial, including for expert evidence.[24]On 18 February 2025 the late William Davis LJ refused Ms Fleming an extension of time for filing her appellant’s notice against HHJ Tindal’s order dated 7 June 2024. For good measure, he held that permission to appeal should be refused in any event because none of the grounds of appeal had a real prospect of success, nor was there any other compelling reason to hear the appeal. Indeed, he expressed the view that the grounds came close to being totally without merit.[25]On 9 June 2025 there was a hearing before HHJ Tindal of an application by the Executors for orders under CPR rule 6.15 and/or 6.27 permitting service by email. Ms Fleming attended the hearing remotely. HHJ Tindal was satisfied that Ms Fleming had taken steps to avoid service and had provided conflicting information as to her current whereabouts, and so he made the order sought.[26]Ms Fleming recorded at least part of the hearing on 9 June 2025 and subsequently posted the recording on social media, alongside abusive and defamatory messages. HHJ Tindal did not sanction Ms Fleming for this, but on 22 September 2025 he made a direction that all subsequent hearings would be in person, in order to prevent this conduct from being repeated.[27]On 17 October 2025 there was a pre-trial review of the probate claim before HHJ Tindal. Ms Fleming did not attend, but filed written submissions seeking(i) recusal of HHJ Tindal,(ii) a declaration that the High Court did not have jurisdiction to grant the relief sought,(iii) a stay and(iv) removal of the Executors. HHJ Tindal dismissed all these applications as being totally without merit and made further directions.[28]By this point Ms Fleming was behaving in a similar manner towards the Administrators as she had previously behaved towards the Executors. Accordingly, on 17 October 2025 the Administrators applied on notice to Ms Fleming for an interim injunction for protection from harassment. This application was heard by HHJ Tindal on 10 November 2025. Ms Fleming did not attend. HHJ Tindal granted the Administrators’ Order on this application. Again, it is not necessary to set out the precise terms of the Administrators’ Order. Ms Fleming was served with the Administrators’ Order by email on 17 November 2025, HHJ Tindal having authorised service of the Order in that manner.[29]The probate claim was tried by HHJ Tindal on 24 and 25 November 2025. Ms Fleming did not appear and was not represented. The children were represented by solicitors and counsel instructed on behalf of the children by their litigation friend Trevor Fleming (Mr Fleming’s nephew). HHJ Tindal gave another careful and detailed judgment on 25 November 2025 (no neutral citation number). He found the will to be valid under English (and Northern Irish and Irish) law. It was not disputed that, at the time he executed the will, Mr Fleming was domiciled in Turkey; but HHJ Tindal found that, at the time of his death, Mr Fleming was domiciled in the Republic of Ireland (his domicile of origin having revived due to his having abandoned his domicile of choice in Turkey in 2023 without acquiring a new domicile of choice in Northern Ireland). Accordingly, HHJ Tindal made an order dated 25 November 2025 granting probate of the will to the Executors. The order also authorised the Executors’ solicitors to take custody of the original of the will, which was held in court and which HHJ Tindal had seen. It appears that the court staff subsequent posted the will to the Executors’ solicitors using an incorrect post code, as a result of which it is presently missing. Ms Fleming regards this as sinister, but it is nothing of the kind.[30]On 9 December 2025 the Administrators issued an application for Ms Fleming to be committed to prison for contempt of court by several breaches of the Administrators’ Order. By mistake, the Administrators’ solicitors used Form N244 for this purpose, rather than Form N600, which is the correct form for a committal application. The application notice sought permission to serve the application on Ms Fleming by email.[31]On 5 January 2026 the High Court issued a notice of hearing of the committal application on 26 January 2026 which was uploaded to CE-file. As a litigant in person Ms Fleming had access to CE-file, and she became aware of the hearing date by 15 January 2026 at the latest.[32]On 20 January 2026 HHJ Tindal made an order authorising service of the committal application on Ms Fleming by email. The application notice and notice of hearing were served by email the following day.[33]On 22 January 2026 the Administrators’ solicitors issued an application for committal of Ms Fleming on Form N600. This was served by email after close of business on the same day.[34]On 26 January 2026 there was a hearing before HHJ Tindal to deal with both the Administrators’ committal application and determination of sanction in relation to the Executors’ committal application. Ms Fleming did not appear and was not represented. HHJ Tindal found four breaches of the Administrators’ Order proved beyond reasonable doubt and imposed the sentences set out in paragraph 1 above for the reasons given in his judgment of that date ([2026] EWHC 490 (Ch)).
The appeal
[35]The only order against which Ms Fleming has appealed is the Committal Order. She has not appealed, or even sought permission to appeal, against the Executors’ Order or the Administrators’ Order. Nor has she appealed against the order dated 25 November 2025. The only orders of HHJ Tindal she has attempted to appeal are the orders dated 7 June 2024 and 13 August 2024, and as explained above she was refused permission to appeal in both cases.[36]Ms Fleming drafted her grounds of appeal herself. They raise seven grounds. One of these, ground 2, is a complaint of procedural unfairness.[37]A person accused of contempt of court is entitled to legal aid. Accordingly, an order was made by Master Bancroft-Rimmer on 23 March 2026 authorising the appointment of solicitors and counsel to represent Ms Fleming on legal aid. On 26 April 2026 counsel for Ms Fleming filed a skeleton argument which only pursued a variant of ground 2, and only with respect to paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Committal Order. Upon enquiry by the Executors’ solicitors, Ms Fleming’s solicitors confirmed that no other grounds of appeal were pursued.[38]On 29 May 2026 Ms Fleming’s solicitors applied to come off the record on the ground that they were professionally embarrassed. On 5 June 2026 Asplin LJ made an order to that effect. Ms Fleming was reminded that she was entitled to representation on legal aid, and informed that she could apply for an adjournment of the hearing if she was unable to find alternative representation. Ms Fleming did not apply for an adjournment, and instead requested permission to attend the hearing by video link, which was granted. (Given the point made in the postscript below, I should explain that denying Ms Fleming permission to attend by video link would not only have been of doubtful procedural fairness, but also would not have relieved the Court of the need to consider the merits of her appeal.) It is clear from Ms Fleming’s own comments, both in response to her solicitors’ application to come off the record and during the hearing of her appeal, that she was unhappy with the manner in which her solicitors and counsel were pursuing the appeal and wished to advance arguments which they evidently did not consider they were professionally able to do.[39]Against this background, it is logical first to consider Ms Fleming’s appeal against paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Committal Order and then to consider her appeal against paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Committal Order.
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Committal Order
[40]As I have explained, there has been no appeal by Ms Fleming against HHJ Tindal’s judgment and order dated 14 November 2024 finding that Ms Fleming had committed 23 breaches of the Executors’ Order. It follows that Ms Fleming’s appeal against paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Committal Order is necessarily limited to an appeal against sanction. Despite this, none of Ms Fleming’s grounds of appeal challenges the sanction imposed by HHJ Tindal. In any event, it could not possibly be said that the sanction he imposed was outside the reasonable range of sanctions available to him. Accordingly, Ms Fleming’s appeal against paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Committal Order must be dismissed. I shall nevertheless consider her grounds of appeal.[41]Ms Fleming’s grounds of appeal are as follows:(1) The Executors’ Order was unlawful and constituted an abuse of process: it was made without any proper consideration of jurisdiction or the lawfulness of Ms Fleming’s conduct and was used to silence allegations of fraud concerning the shares in BFL and the administration of the estate.(2) The judge proceeded in a manner which was procedurally unfair because Ms Fleming was refused permission to attend remotely, thereby materially preventing her from properly presenting her case.(3) The judge erred in law as to jurisdiction and the relevance of domicile.(4) The judge failed properly to address Ms Fleming’s allegations of fraud, including misuse of section 125 CA 2006, and made irrational findings.(5) The judge mischaracterised lawful expression as harassment.(6) The committal proceedings were tainted by the unlawfulness of the underlying orders.(7) The judge failed to take into account the fact that Ms Fleming’s conduct arose from legitimate objections to the actions of the Administrators which were in conflict with the interests of the minor heirs and were ultra vires.[42]In her oral submissions at the hearing Ms Fleming focussed on grounds 1, 3, 4, 6 and 7. Her overarching contention was that all of the orders made by the High Court in these proceedings were ultra vires because the High Court had no jurisdiction to make those orders.[43]This contention is untenable for a number of reasons. First, as I have already explained, Ms Fleming has either not attempted to appeal the orders which preceded the Committal Order or has been refused permission to appeal. Accordingly, this Court has no jurisdiction on the present appeal to question the lawfulness of those earlier orders.[44]Secondly, the only prior orders which are relevant to the Committal Order are the Executors’ Order and the Administrators’ Order since it is those orders that Ms Fleming was found to have breached. Ms Fleming’s contention that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to make those orders is misconceived. Those orders were made pursuant to sections 3 and 3A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. Even if the High Court lacked jurisdiction in relation to the company claim or the probate claim, it would still have had jurisdiction in respect of the protection from harassment claims.[45]Thirdly, Ms Fleming’s challenges to the jurisdiction of the High Court in respect of the company claim and the probate claim are equally misconceived for the reasons which HHJ Tindal has explained more than once and which I have set out in paragraphs 10 and 16 above. As HHJ Tindal also explained more than once, Mr Fleming’s domicile (whether at the time of executing the will or at the time of his death) is largely irrelevant to these jurisdictional issues. If and in so far as Ms Fleming challenges the appointment of the Administrators, she has no grounds upon which to do so.[46]Fourthly, Ms Fleming’s allegations of conspiracy and fraud are baseless for the reasons which HHJ Tindal has explained more than once, but in particular in his judgment dated 14 November 2024. Contrary to Ms Fleming’s protestations, the High Court orders in these proceedings have not been directed at the victims of crime.[47]Fifthly, even a High Court order which is ultra vires must be obeyed unless and until it is set aside: see M v Home Office [1994] 1 AC 377 at 423 (Lord Woolf).[48]I understood Ms Fleming expressly to abandon ground 2, but in any event this ground as articulated in her grounds of appeal is without merit. HHJ Tindal had previously precluded Ms Fleming from attending remotely for sound reasons. She did not request permission to attend the hearing on 26 January 2026. Even if she reasonably assumed that permission would be denied, there was nothing to prevent her from attending in person or from instructing solicitors and/or counsel to represent her. If she was in difficulties attending in person or obtaining legal representation in time, she could have applied for an adjournment, but she did not.[49]Ms Fleming did not abandon ground 5, but it is equally without merit. HHJ Tindal gave careful consideration to Ms Fleming’s right to freedom of expression in his judgments dated 2 July 2024, 13 August 2024 and 14 November 2024 and gave cogent reasons for concluding that it was outweighed by the Executors’ right to be protected from harassment.
Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Committal Order
[50]None of Ms Fleming’s grounds of appeal challenge HHJ Tindal’s findings of breach of the Administrators’ Order. Nor do any of them challenge the sanction he imposed. In any event, it could not possibly be said that the sanction he imposed was outside the reasonable range of sanctions available to him. Accordingly, Ms Fleming’s appeal against paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Committal Order must be dismissed.[51]Ms Fleming did not differentiate in either her grounds of appeal or in her oral submissions at the hearing between paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Committal Order on the one hand and paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Committal Order on the other hand. I have already considered the grounds of appeal in the context of paragraphs 1 and 2, and everything I have said in that context also applies mutatis mutandis with respect to paragraphs 3 and 4.[52]Even though it was not pursued by Ms Fleming, I should address the complaint of procedural unfairness raised by her counsel in his skeleton argument. As he pointed out, CPR rule 81.4(2) provides that a contempt application must include a series of statements. In the present case none of the information required by paragraphs (i), (j), (l), (m) or (n) was included in the application notice on Form N244. It was included in the application notice on Form N600, but that was served only one clear working day before the hearing. He cited a number of authorities for the proposition that procedural safeguards are very important in the context of contempt applications, and therefore should be strictly observed.[53]As one would expect, HHJ Tindal carefully considered the procedural fairness of the Administrators’ committal application being heard on 26 January 2026 in his judgment of that date at [6]-[15]. He concluded that it would not be procedurally unfair to Ms Fleming to hear the application for reasons which may be summarised as follows. First, Ms Fleming had been aware of the existence of the application since at least 15 January 2026, if not since 5 January 2026. Thus she had had ample opportunity to defend it, for example by filing evidence. Secondly, although the application notice on Form N244 omitted the statements concerning Ms Fleming’s rights, Ms Fleming was already aware of those rights from the Executors’ application notice and from what HHJ Tindal himself had said to her in the context of that application on 13 August 2024. Thirdly, Ms Fleming could have requested an adjournment, but had not done so. Fourthly, it was evident from evidence before him that Ms Fleming had deliberately decided not to attend the hearing because she feared being sent to prison before a hearing in Turkey on 6 February 2026. Furthermore, there was no reason to think that her position, which was to deny the High Court’s jurisdiction rather to dispute the merits of the application, would change if the hearing were to be adjourned.[54]In my view the judge’s reasoning on this question was unimpeachable. There was no procedural unfairness.
Conclusion
[55]For the reasons given above the appeal must be dismissed. I would certify that it was totally without merit. Counsel for the Executors suggested that, in that event, this Court should impose a civil restraint order on Ms Fleming of its own motion. Ms Fleming had not been forewarned of this. In my view it would be better if any application for a civil restraint order were made to the High Court on notice to Ms Fleming.
Postscript
[56]This is yet another case in which the comments of Jackson LJ in Thursfield v Thursfield [2013] EWCA Civ 840, [2013] CP Rep 44 are apposite: “43. As the law now stands, a contemnor who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment has a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal without any need for permission …. If there were a requirement for permission, I have little doubt that, in a case such as this, any grant of permission would be made subject to a condition that the appellant must attend the hearing of his appeal in person. 44. It is repugnant to the proper administration of justice that a contemnor can flout orders of the court, then absent himself from the committal hearing, then avoid serving whatever prison sentence is imposed and then finally avail himself of the procedures of the Court of Appeal, whilst enjoying the shelter of some safe haven overseas.” 13 years later, reform of this aspect of the law is long overdue.[57]I agree.