DA v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 724

[2026] EWCA Civ 724

Case No CA-024-002851

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)

ON APPEAL FROM THE UPPER TRIBUNAL (IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER)

Upper Tribunal Judge Meah

UI-2024-002293

Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date 9 June 2026

Before

LORD JUSTICE MOYLAN

LORD JUSTICE LEWIS

LADY JUSTICE ELISABETH LAING

Between

DAAppellant

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENTRespondent

Adrian Berry KC and David Sellwood (instructed by Barnes Harrild & Dyer solicitors) for Appellant

Colin Thomann KC (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) for Respondent

Hearing Hearing date: 21 May 2026

Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down remotely at 11 am on 9 June 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

.............................

Introduction

[1]DA is a national of Iran. He is a Kurd. He arrived in the United Kingdom illegally on 26 September 2021 in a boat. He claimed asylum on 29 September 2021. The Secretary of State refused his asylum claim on 5 May 2023 in the Decision. DA appealed against the Decision to the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (‘the F-tT’). The Secretary of State reviewed the Decision on 25 January 2024 and maintained it. The F-tT dismissed his appeal in determination 1. It did not believe his account of his activities in Iran. It also held that his ‘sur place’ activities in the United Kingdom did not create a real risk of persecution or ill-treatment were he to return to Iran. DA appealed to the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (‘the UT’), on three grounds, with the permission of the UT. The UT dismissed his further appeal in determination 2.

[2]He now appeals to this court, with the permission of Edis LJ. Edis LJ refused permission to appeal on one ground of appeal. He gave permission to appeal on grounds ‘1A’ and ‘2A’. He said ‘sur place’ claims were very common and that there was a compelling reason for an authoritative decision about them.

[3]On this appeal, DA was represented by Mr Berry KC and Mr Sellwood. The Secretary of State was represented by Mr Thomann KC. I thank counsel for their written and oral submissions. Mr Thomann’s skeleton argument was a particularly helpful summary of the relevant country guidance (‘CG’) determinations of the UT.

[4]I do not consider that this case raises any general legal issue about sur place activities or about the status of CG determinations by the UT. Nor would it be appropriate for this court to give guidance in this case, as the issues in this case all depend on the evidence before, and the findings of fact made by, the F-tT and are thus peculiar to this case. The simple issue is whether in making determination 1 the F-tT materially erred in law. It is not necessary for me to say much about determination 2. If there is no material error of law in determination 1, the UT did not err in law in upholding it. By the same token, if there is a material error of law in determination 1, the UT did err in law in upholding it. For the reasons given below, I do not consider that the F-tT did materially err in law in determination 1. DA’s appeal to the F-tT DA’s skeleton argument for the F-tT appeal

DA’s appeal to the F-tT

[5]DA relied on a skeleton argument which was drafted by counsel (not the counsel who appeared at the hearing) (‘the ASA’). Counsel who appeared before us did not draft the ASA or appear in the F-tT hearing. The ASA argued that even if DA’s account of events in Iran were rejected, his risk on return had to be assessed by reference to the relevant CG cases, which were referred to in paragraphs 23 and 24 of ‘Annex A’. We were not shown Annex A. Even if DA’s activities were done in bad faith, he was entitled to asylum if they would give rise to a real risk of persecution. He had left Iran illegally and was likely to be questioned at the airport.

[6]In paragraph 24 of the ASA, DA asked the F-tT to depart from the CG in paragraph 9 of BA (Demonstrators in Britain – risk on return) Iran CG

[2011] UKUT 00308 (IAC)

(‘BA’) because there was now ‘cogent evidence’ that the Iranian regime used facial recognition technology (‘FRT’).

[7]Even if the F-tT did not accept that argument, it was necessary to consider what would happen if DA were questioned by the Iranian authorities. Anyone who is asked about whether he has taken part in demonstrations abroad ‘is likely to be aware that the Iranian authorities have intelligence gathering systems and will consequently be placed in the invidious position of either having to admit participation or falsely deny such activity in the knowledge that their lie may be immediately exposed’. The means by which the authorities at the airport might discover that DA had demonstrated outside the Iranian Embassy made no difference to the risk. The question whether DA was genuinely committed to any cause was less relevant than it might be given the ‘hair-trigger’ approach of the authorities to Kurdish Iranians (see HB (Kurds) Iran CG

[2018] UKUT 430 (IAC)

) (‘HB’) (paragraph 25 of the ASA).

Determination 1

[8]The F-tT recorded that DA was represented by counsel, and that a Home Office Presenting Officer (‘HOPO’) represented the Secretary of State. The F-tT had over a thousand pages of documents to consider (paragraph 3). The Secretary of State’s view was that DA was a national of Iraq, not Iran. The Secretary of State did not accept his account of his activities in Iran. The Secretary of State considered that his sur place activities were self-serving. The HOPO did not object to documents about those activities which had not been uploaded until the day before the hearing (paragraph 8). With the agreement of both representatives, the F-tT treated DA as a vulnerable witness (paragraph 9).

[9]The representatives also agreed on the issues. The F-tT recorded them in paragraph 10. They included the credibility of DA’s account, and whether he would be at risk on return to Iran because of his activities in Iran, his illegal exit from Iran, or his sur place activities in the United Kingdom. DA gave evidence with the help of a Kurdish Sorani interpreter. The HOPO cross-examined him (paragraph 12). The F-tT described the legal framework in paragraphs 13-18.

[10]The F-tT made its findings in paragraphs 19-65. In paragraphs 19-24, and 25-32, the F-tT made findings about DA’s nationality and his activities in Iran, respectively. It held that he was an Iranian, not an Iraqi, national. It also held, despite ‘applying the benefit of the doubt liberally’ to his account, and applying ‘the relatively low standard of proof’ that his account of ‘having been involved in activities for the KDPI in Iran and those activities having been detected by the authorities is not credible’ (paragraph 32).

[11]The F-tT considered the risk to which DA might be exposed on return by those activities and by his Kurdish ethnicity in paragraphs 33 and 34. It held that neither factor would expose him to risk on return.

[12]In paragraphs 35 to 41 it summarised the CG determinations about sur place activities. They were XX (PJAK, sur place activities, Facebook) Iran (CG)

[2022] UKUT 23 (IAC)

(‘PJAK’), BA (Demonstrators in British – risk on return) Iran CG

[2011] UKUT 00036

, and AB (internet activity - state of evidence) Iran

[2025] UKUT 00257 (IAC)

(‘AB’).

[13]The F-tT derived several relevant points from those cases.

[14]There was a gap between what the Iranian authorities claimed to be able to do to get access to the electronic data of Iranian citizens in and outside Iran and what it was actually able to, and did, do. The evidence did not show that it was reasonably likely that they could monitor Facebook accounts on a large scale. Ad hoc, and labour-intensive searches would be limited to ‘individuals who are of significant adverse interest’. The risk that a particular person would be the target of such searches was ‘nuanced’ and would depend on various factors (see paragraph 35(b)). The likelihood that Facebook material would be available to the authorities would depend on whether the person concerned had at any stage been ‘a person of significant interest’, because such a person is likely to have been the subject of Facebook surveillance. If so, risk would not be mitigated by the later closing of a Facebook account. If a person returns to Iran, the fact that he does not have, or has deleted, a Facebook account, does not itself make the Iranian authorities suspicious.

[15]The point when a person applies for a travel document is the first ‘potential pinch point’ referred to in AB. It was not realistic to suppose that the authorities would do no internet searches until a person returned to Iran. Such people were an obvious target for basic internet searches (paragraph 35(e)). The timely closure of a critical Facebook account neutralises any risk unless that account was being monitored before it was closed. Selective evidence from social media such as printed photographs without full disclosure of the electronic format may be of ‘very limited value’ if wider contextual information has not been disclosed. It is very easy to download such information ‘in a matter of moments’ (paragraph 35(g)). It is easy to manipulate apparent printouts or electronic excerpts from internet pages by changing the page source data. If a decision-maker does not have access to an ‘actual account, purported printouts from such an account may also have very limited evidential value’ (paragraph 35(h)).

[16]A decision-maker may ask whether, before applying for a travel document, a person might close a Facebook account and not disclose that fact later. A decision-maker can consider what a person will do to mitigate any risk on return, and why. It is difficult to see how the deletion of a Facebook account could amount to persecution. The Refugee Convention does not recognise or protect a fundamental right of access to a particular social media platform, ‘as opposed to the right to political neutrality’. Whether such an inquiry is too speculative will depend on the facts.

[17]In PJAK the UT confirmed that BA was still accurate. BA lists factors which are relevant to the assessment of risk on return from sur place activities. They include the nature of the sur place activities; the theme of any demonstrations; how the authorities will perceive any activities; a person’s role in any demonstrations and his political profile; the demonstrator’s motives, as those are relevant to the authorities’ view of his profile; how many demonstrations a person has been on and how regularly; and whether the demonstrations have been publicised (and if so, to what extent).

[18]The F-tT listed several factors which are relevant to identification in paragraph 37. Surveillance was relevant. On the assumption that the regime tries to identify those who demonstrate against it, how does it do that? Does it film them, do its agents mingle with the crowd, and does it review images and recordings of demonstrations? Is the regime able to identify individuals? Does it use FRT and does it use people to fit names to the faces in a crowd?

[19]The F-tT also considered what factors might provoke the interest of the authorities when a person returned to Iran. The first was the nature of a person’s profile. The second was his immigration history (paragraph 38), including how he had left Iran and the circumstances of his return.

[20]The F-tT then asked about the consequences of identification, and whether the regime distinguished between demonstrators according to their profiles (paragraph 39). It also asked whether information about demonstrators who had been identified was stored systematically and whether border posts were ‘geared to the task’ (paragraph 40).

[21]The UT had held in BA that the Iranian authorities did try to identify demonstrators outside the Embassy in London but that there was not enough evidence to show that the regime used FRT in the United Kingdom. The authorities try to match names to the faces of demonstrators from photographs. How determined they would be to identify a particular person in the United Kingdom would depend on the nature of his sur place activities. The regime’s ability to identify all the returnees who had been to demonstrations was limited by the lack of FRT and the haphazard checks at the airport. There was no real risk that an infrequent demonstrator who had no particular role in demonstrations and whose participation was not highlighted in the media would be identified; and there was, therefore, no real risk that he would suffer ill treatment on return (paragraph 41).

[22]In paragraphs 42-65 the F-tT carefully applied those principles to this case. DA’s case was that he had been to between eight and ten demonstrations. He provided a document with pages of text and photographs, said to have been taken from his Facebook account. He had not provided a download which complied with the guidance in PJAK. He said he had not been able to, but it was clear from PJAK that that would not have been ‘a particularly onerous process’ (paragraph 44). There was no evidence to support his assertion that his Facebook posts were ‘public’ (paragraph 44).

[23]In paragraph 45, the F-tT listed the six dates between 6 June 2023 and 25 February 2024 on which, according to the limited material which DA had provided, he had been to demonstrations outside the Iranian Embassy. All the photographs had the same caption, which the F-tT quoted in paragraph 46. Some photographs had a little more text (see paragraph 47). He was often shown holding an A4 sheet of paper. It was often not clear what the paper said. In some of the photographs, he was shown in a high-visibility vest. He did not anywhere suggest that he had been prominent in, or had organised the demonstrations (paragraph 48). There were eight other Facebook posts between 23 May 2023 and 2 March 2024 in which he had criticised the regime.

[24]In paragraph 50, the F-tT found, in the light of the photographic evidence, that DA had been to demonstrations on the dates listed in paragraph 45 of determination 1 (see the previous paragraph). His attendance at the demonstrations and his posts were ‘sporadic in nature and characterised by a flurry of activity followed by a lengthy pause and a further flurry months later’. His on-line activity was ‘clustered around’ the immediate aftermath of the Decision, the months before the F-tT hearing and the date of his witness statement for the appeal.

[25]DA had said in his witness statement of 6 December 2023 that a friend staying in the same hotel had told him about the KDPI political party and its activities. That had motivated him to go to the demonstrations. ‘Back in Iran’ he was not ‘familiar with the PKDI [sic] program…’ but had recently been to demonstrations and ‘shared’ his ‘involvement’ on Facebook. He had also learnt more about the KDPI from going to the demonstrations. The F-tT observed that that account was inconsistent with his asylum interview. He had then said that he was not a supporter of the KDPI, but had been to his first demonstration because his friend had told him to go there and to take photographs, which he then sent to his solicitor. He had said that he had taken some photographs and then left (paragraph 51).

[26]His solicitor had, in a later letter, ‘sought to clarify’ that DA had meant to say that he had gone to the demonstration ‘because of how the Kurdish people are treated in Iran’. The F-tT remarked, ‘It is difficult to see from the words that [DA] is recorded to have said in his asylum interview how he could have meant what was ascribed to him in this letter’ (paragraph 52).

[27]In paragraph 53 the F-tT listed four factors which had led it to decide that DA had not shown, to the lower standard, that his attendance at the demonstrations or his on-line activity generally ‘related to any genuine political belief held by him in the cause of Kurdish rights’. Rather, ‘…his attendance at demonstrations was contrived in order to bolster his asylum claim, as he candidly admitted in his asylum interview’.

[28]The F-tT immediately acknowledged that that finding did not mean that DA’s activities would ‘not be known to the Iranian authorities and perceived as political activity giving rise to a real risk of persecution or serious ill-treatment on return to Iran’. The F-tT recognised that it had also to consider whether DA’s ‘accepted attendance at demonstrations and his social media activity would have come to the attention of the Iranian authorities’ (paragraph 54).

[29]In paragraph 55, the F-tT explained its assessment that DA’s relevant activities were ‘sporadic and irregular’. Those factors included how long he had been in the United Kingdom, and the timing of those activities. The Facebook posts expressed dissatisfaction with the regime but did not call for violence or insurrection (paragraph 56). There was no independent evidence that DA’s Facebook posts were public. Little weight should be given to the material he relied on because ‘the full picture has not been disclosed’ (paragraph 57). No evidence suggested that DA had ‘led, organised or otherwise played a significant role in any’ of the demonstrations. He seemed to the F-tT to be ‘an ordinary member of the crowd’. He was often holding a small poster or piece of paper, but there was ‘no clear evidence’ about what they said and ‘they were often difficult to read’ (paragraph 58). There was no evidence that DA’s attendance at demonstrations had been covered in the media (paragraph 59).

[30]The F-tT considered the submission that it should depart from BA in paragraph 60. It summarised the evidence on which DA relied. The F-tT noted that there was no evidence that the regime used FRT at the Embassy in the United Kingdom, and that in PJAK the UT had referred to the gap between claims made by the regime and what it could actually do. It refused, for those reasons, to depart from BA.

[31]It considered DA’s profile in paragraph 61. His account of what he had done in Iran was not credible. There was no other evidence that he was ‘likely to be a person of interest to the Iranian authorities or someone with a profile who might be said to be reasonably likely to be the target of Facebook surveillance’.

[32]The F-tT’s conclusion, in paragraph 62, applying BA and PJAK was that there was not ‘presently a serious possibility that [DA’s] attendance at the demonstrations…has come to the attention of the Iranian authorities’.

[33]The F-tT then considered what might happen when DA returned to Iran. He would need to get a travel document from the Iranian Embassy. Basic internet searches at that point might reveal that he had a Facebook account. Nevertheless, in the light of the F-tT’s finding that his account of his activities in Iran was not credible, and that his activities ‘to date’ were ‘not likely to have been detected’ (see paragraph 32, above), it was not ‘too speculative to consider’ whether DA would delete his Facebook account ‘in a timely manner before applying for a travel document in order to mitigate the risk of persecution on return to Iran’. The F-tT had invited DA’s counsel to make submissions about that, and he had done so (paragraph 63).

[34]The F-tT’s conclusion was that DA was likely to delete his Facebook account. There was no evidence that he used it ‘for purposes other than posting messages drafted for him by others’. The F-tT had found that he had ‘no genuine political belief in the cause of Kurdish rights’ so the deletion of the account did not engage the principle in HJ (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

[2010] UKSC 31

;

[2011] AC 596

‘that a person cannot be required to suppress a characteristic which they have a right not to be required to suppress’. If he closed the account before he applied for a travel document, ‘his posts are unlikely to come to the attention of the Iranian authorities’ (paragraph 64).

[35]In paragraph 65 the F-tT recorded a submission by DA’s counsel that DA might be questioned about his sur place activities such as demonstrations and social media activity, and that he would have to disclose it, or deny it ‘in the knowledge that the lie would be exposed through intelligence gathering systems’. That concern had to be considered ‘in the light of the finding in BA that the ability of the Iranian regime to identify all returnees remains limited and for the infrequent demonstrator who plays no particular role in demonstrations and whose participation is not highlighted in the media (as I have found [DA] to be) there is not a real risk of identification and therefore not a real risk of consequent ill-treatment, on return’ (paragraph 65).

[36]The F-tT concluded that DA did not face a real risk of persecution on return because of his sur place activities (paragraph 66). The F-tT dismissed DA’s appeal.

The application for permission to appeal to the UT

[37]DA applied for permission to appeal. In his application, DA quoted paragraphs 48, 50, 53-58, 60, and 63-65 of determination 1. He argued that the F-tT’s assessment of risk had three flaws. 1. The F-tT had not made a finding to the lower standard whether or not DA had been photographed by Iranian authorities at the demonstrations. 2. The F-tT’s consideration in paragraph 65 of the risks from questioning on return was perverse. The inability of the authorities to identify all the returnees who have taken part in demonstrations was not an answer to this point. If the authorities knew about sur place activities (even if they were contrived) they would put DA at risk. If DA were to lie about his sur place activities from a fear about the repercussions of admitting sur place activities, that would contravene the HJ (Iran) principle even if the activities were cynical because the authorities would still impute a political opinion to DA. The F-tT did not consider that a failure to co-operate with the authorities was likely to lead to harsher treatment. 3. The F-tT’s decision not to depart from BA was unlawful.

[38]The F-tT refused permission to appeal. DA applied to the UT. The UT gave permission to appeal, pragmatically, on all three grounds, while observing the argument based on the submission in paragraph 25 of the ASA (see paragraph 7, above) was stronger than the other grounds.

Determination 2

[39]Mr Berry (as he then was) represented DA at the UT hearing. The Secretary of State was represented by a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer. The UT considered all three grounds of appeal and was not persuaded that any of them showed that the F-tT had materially erred in law.

The grounds of appeal to this court

[40]There were three grounds of appeal. i. Ground 1A: the F-tT erred in law in not making a finding about whether or not DA had been photographed at demonstrations outside the Iranian Embassy. ii. Ground 2A: the F-tT erred in law in its assessment of risks arising from questioning on return to Iran. iii. Ground 3A: the UT misdirected itself by relying on Volpi v Volpi

[2022] EWCA Civ 464

;

[2022] 4 WLR 48

[41]Edis LJ gave permission to appeal on grounds 1A and 2A. He refused permission to appeal on ground 3A.

DA’s arguments on the appeal

[42]Mr Berry did not criticise the F-tT’s summary of the legal framework. In answer to a question by Lewis LJ, Mr Berry accepted that there were no errors of law in paragraphs 35-38. He did not criticise paragraph 41, paragraphs 50 or 59. Nor did he criticise the F-tT’s factual summary. He also accepted that there was no error in the F-tT’s summary of the CG determinations.

[43]He submitted, on ground 1, that it was not open to the F-tT to find that DA would not be identified by the Iranian authorities as a result of attending the demonstrations at the Embassy. He identified various factors: the attempts of the authorities to identify people by filming them and by using spotters in the crowd, the fact that DA is Kurdish and was wearing a high-visibility vest. Those factors meant the F-tT’s conclusion that the Iranian authorities would not have identified DA was flawed. It erred in law in not finding whether or not DA had been photographed.

[44]On ground 2 he argued that ‘the weight of authority and evidence supports’ the argument that a failed asylum seeker like DA would be questioned on return. The F-tT erred by focusing on the fact that the authorities cannot identify all returnees, rather than on asking whether there was a risk that DA was likely to be identified. The F-tT left important matters out of account: he might have been photographed, he was wearing a high-visibility vest, the text on his Facebook posts and a recent photograph sent to the Secretary of State (supplementary bundle page 40).

[45]In the course of his oral argument, Mr Berry refined ground 2 from its somewhat diffuse formulation in DA’s grounds of appeal to the UT and in his skeleton argument for this court. His real point was that if DA was questioned at the airport on his return to Iran, he would be in a dilemma. He would know that the Iranian authorities would or might have evidence of his sur place activities and would have to decide whether to lie about them and risk exposure if the authorities did have such evidence, or not to run that risk, tell the truth, and then be exposed to persecution for telling the truth about those activities.

[46]Having read the ASA, which was provided to us during the hearing, I consider that this argument was raised at the F-tT. Mr Berry submitted that paragraph 65 of determination 1 did not ‘do enough work’ and that the F-tT had ignored ‘the full plenitude of the rubric of BA’. He acknowledged that no CG determination supported this point, and that no evidence before the F-tT supported it. As Moylan LJ put it in argument, ‘It looks like a hypothetical submission’.

[47]I have already acknowledged the help which Mr Thomann gave us by his full analysis of the relevant CG determinations in his skeleton argument. In his economical oral argument, he drew our attention to paragraphs 2(a)-(c) of the headnote in BA, paragraph 3, and paragraph 66. The frequency of attending demonstrations was a relevant factor. He also relied on paragraphs 18 and 100-102 of PJAK in relation to ground 2.

[48]He submitted, on ground 1, that the F-tT had applied BA without error in paragraphs 55 and onwards of determination 1. The F-tT had made findings of fact about all the relevant factors, and had taken them into account. Paragraphs 58-61 were the significant parts of the F-tT’s reasons. DA did not have a significant role and the evidence about the piece of paper was not clear. The fact that the demonstrations had not been publicised in the media was a further relevant factor which the F-tT was right to take into account in this context.

[49]The F-tT’s conclusion in paragraph 61 was important. In sum, the process of gathering information and whatever pictures might or might not be taken at Embassies across the globe was not automated. Individuals who have an overall profile may be identified; but the F-tT must consider all the circumstances in the round in order to see whether a face in the crowd would become known to the authorities. In that context, whether or not the authorities happened to have taken a photograph of a face in the crowd was not a relevant inquiry, and none of the CG determinations required findings of fact about it.

[50]There was no evidence before the F-tT which could support ground 2, he submitted. Without such evidence, ground 2 could not succeed. It was too speculative.

Discussion

[51]I have summarised determination 1 at some length. It is a full and thorough analysis of the relevant CG determinations and of the evidence. I particularly note that Mr Berry did not suggest that the F-tT’s summary of the relevant CG determinations was inaccurate. The submission I recorded in paragraph 46, above, did not identify any such error. Having summarised those determinations accurately, the F-tT then applied them to the facts it had found, without error.

Ground 1

[52]The premise of ground 1 is that the F-tT erred in law in not making a specific finding about whether or not DA had been photographed. I do not accept that premise. First, the F-tT is not omniscient. I do not understand how it could possibly have made a finding either way, without speculating. Second, such a finding would not have helped the F-tT in any way. Further questions would have arisen, such as what the authorities might have made of such a photograph, whether it would have led them to want to identify DA, and whether it would create a profile for DA which he did not otherwise have. That would have required yet more speculation. It was not an essential part of the F-tT’s factual inquiry.

[53]What the F-tT did, instead, was to consider the evidence about the relevant factors identified in the CG determinations, and to decide, in the round, whether DA had a profile which would mean that the Iranian authorities would be interested enough to try and identify him and store that information in some way. The mere fact that DA had been photographed (if he had been) would not have taken that inquiry any further unless, and this is the important point, DA had a profile of a kind which would arouse the adverse interest of the Iranian authorities. For those reasons the F-tT did not err in law in not finding whether or not DA had been photographed.

[54]I also reject Mr Berry’s criticisms of the F-tT’s use of ‘sporadic’ and ‘flurry’. Those descriptions were appropriate and the F-tT did not err in law in using them.

Ground 2

[55]On ground 2, I accept Mr Thomann’s submissions. As I have already indicated, the argument about the dilemma was put to the F-tT in the ASA. There are at least two necessary foundations for this argument which are missing on the facts. The first is that the Iranian authorities have more sophisticated systems for gathering and analysing information than is supported by the country guidance determinations. That is why DA tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade the F-tT to depart from BA on this point. The second necessary foundation is that DA nevertheless knew about, or feared, the Iranian authorities’ supposed systems for gathering information. There was no evidence before the F-tT, in either of DA’s witness statements, or in his candid asylum interview, which would support a finding to that effect. Indeed, it seems from his asylum interview that DA is not well informed about the situation in Iran. I reject the submission that the F-tT erred in law, in the face of a complete dearth of relevant evidence, in not making a finding about this hypothetical dilemma.

[56]I agree.

[57]I also agree.