‘all information (however recorded or preserved) disclosed by either Party or by its employees, officers, representatives, advisers or subcontractors (Representatives) to the other Party or to that Party’s Representatives in connection with this agreement, which is either labelled as confidential or which should reasonably be considered confidential because of either its nature or the manner of its disclosure.’
‘141. All of that involves a relationship with the two parties whereby it was contemplated that confidential information would be transmitted, with provisions in the relevant OMA that such confidential information should not be used in the terms that are set out in the OMA, and an allegation that a rival product to the Tavistock MPS was set up using that information by the Claimants. Standing back, it is clear enough what the allegations are that are made, and that those, and that pleaded case is not only coherent but gives rise to a cause of action that has a real (as opposed to fanciful) prospect of success.’
‘32. It is well established that, in a claim for misuse of trade secrets, it is important for the claimant properly to particularise the information which is alleged to be a trade secret and to have been misused. The reasons for this were clearly and forcefully articulated by Laddie J, who had considerable experience in this field, in two judgments. First, in Ocular Sciences Ltd v Aspect Vision Care Ltd[1997] RPC 289 he said at 359-360: “The rules relating to the particularity of pleadings apply to breach of confidence actions as they apply to all other proceedings. But it is well recognised that breach of confidence actions can be used to oppress and harass competitors and ex-employees. The courts are therefore careful to ensure that the plaintiff gives full and proper particulars of all the confidential information on which he intends to rely in the proceedings. If the plaintiff fails to do this the court may infer that the purpose of the litigation is harassment rather than the protection of the plaintiff's rights and may strike out the action as an abuse of process. Such a case was John Zink Co. Ltd. v. Wilkinson[1973] RPC 717 in which the Court of Appeal ordered particulars before defence. The case returned to the High Court on a successful application to strike out. This is reported under the name John Zink Co. Ltd. v. Lloyds Bank Ltd[1975] RPC 385 . … The normal approach of the court is that if a plaintiff wishes to seek relief against a defendant for misuse of confidential information it is his duty to ensure that the defendant knows what information is in issue. This is not only for the reasons set out by Edmund Davies LJ in John Zink [namely, that an allegation of misuse of trade secrets is a serious allegation] but for at least two other reasons. First, the plaintiff usually seeks an injunction to restrain the defendant from using its confidential information. Unless the confidential information is properly identified, an injunction in such terms is of uncertain scope and may be difficult to enforce: … Secondly, the defendant must know what he has to meet. He may wish to show that the items of information relied on by the plaintiff are matters of public knowledge. His ability to defend himself will be compromised if the plaintiff can rely on matters of which no proper warning was given. It is for all these reasons that failure to give proper particulars may be a particularly damaging abuse of process.” 33. Secondly, in CMI-Centers for Medical Innovation GmbH v Phytopharm plc[1999] FSR 235 Laddie J said, when considering an application for an interim injunction, at [27]: “As to the first of these four matters [namely ‘the plaintiff must identify clearly what is the information he is relying on’], the fact that the proceedings are only at an interlocutory stage does not justify less precision. The defendant must be told what it is he is accused of misusing. He must be told precisely what it is that he will be prevented from doing or using by the injunction sought. This does not mean that the plaintiff is locked into his case at the interlocutory stage. He may find that additional information has been taken or misused by the defendant in which case he will be able to amend his claim to include additional material. He may find that some of the information which he had thought was confidential is not or has not been used by the defendant. In that case he can restrict his claim. But this does not affect his obligation to set out precisely what, at the interlocutory stage, is the confidential information he wishes to rely on.’ “The rules relating to the particularity of pleadings apply to breach of confidence actions as they apply to all other proceedings. But it is well recognised that breach of confidence actions can be used to oppress and harass competitors and ex-employees. The courts are therefore careful to ensure that the plaintiff gives full and proper particulars of all the confidential information on which he intends to rely in the proceedings. If the plaintiff fails to do this the court may infer that the purpose of the litigation is harassment rather than the protection of the plaintiff's rights and may strike out the action as an abuse of process. Such a case was John Zink Co. Ltd. v. Wilkinson[1973] RPC 717 in which the Court of Appeal ordered particulars before defence. The case returned to the High Court on a successful application to strike out. This is reported under the name John Zink Co. Ltd. v. Lloyds Bank Ltd[1975] RPC 385 . … The normal approach of the court is that if a plaintiff wishes to seek relief against a defendant for misuse of confidential information it is his duty to ensure that the defendant knows what information is in issue. This is not only for the reasons set out by Edmund Davies LJ in John Zink [namely, that an allegation of misuse of trade secrets is a serious allegation] but for at least two other reasons. First, the plaintiff usually seeks an injunction to restrain the defendant from using its confidential information. Unless the confidential information is properly identified, an injunction in such terms is of uncertain scope and may be difficult to enforce: … Secondly, the defendant must know what he has to meet. He may wish to show that the items of information relied on by the plaintiff are matters of public knowledge. His ability to defend himself will be compromised if the plaintiff can rely on matters of which no proper warning was given. It is for all these reasons that failure to give proper particulars may be a particularly damaging abuse of process.” “As to the first of these four matters [namely ‘the plaintiff must identify clearly what is the information he is relying on’], the fact that the proceedings are only at an interlocutory stage does not justify less precision. The defendant must be told what it is he is accused of misusing. He must be told precisely what it is that he will be prevented from doing or using by the injunction sought. This does not mean that the plaintiff is locked into his case at the interlocutory stage. He may find that additional information has been taken or misused by the defendant in which case he will be able to amend his claim to include additional material. He may find that some of the information which he had thought was confidential is not or has not been used by the defendant. In that case he can restrict his claim. But this does not affect his obligation to set out precisely what, at the interlocutory stage, is the confidential information he wishes to rely on.’
‘48. … What amounts to sufficient particularisation must depend on the circumstances of the individual case, however. Furthermore, a lesser degree of particularisation may be acceptable at the outset of a case than at later stages of the case. Still further, I accept that it is relevant to take into account the claimant’s ability to provide further particulars, and the extent to which the claimant has been hampered by obstructiveness, or at least non-cooperation, on the part of the defendant …’
‘40A. The Tavistock MPS is comprised of a series of different investment strategies and risk levels which can be tailored to each individual investor. In relation to each such strategy, Tavistock AM and the Tavistock group invest significant time, expertise and resources in identifying and selecting appropriate asset classes and product types from a wide range including unit trusts, OEICs, investment trusts, structured products, Exchange Traded Funds (“ETFs”), and commodities. As a result, the individual investor is able to invest in a broad range of products selected by Tavistock within asset classes also selected by Tavistock without the investor or their financial adviser having to conduct their own due diligence on each individual product or themselves construct an investment portfolio. 41. For each MP offered by Tavistock AM: 41.1 The portfolio comprises a basket of investments selected and managed by Tavistock AM in line with a strategy and within a risk or volatility range which is set out in a publicly available factsheet. 41.2 The investments within a given portfolio may include, for example, investment holdings (e.g. ETFs), investment funds (such as Unit Trusts and OEICs sub-funds), individual company shares, bonds and cash. 41.3 Tavistock AM designates the MP [i.e. the Model Portfolio] with an internal risk rating classification and manages the portfolio with a view to maintaining that classification. The risk rating is from 1 (lowest risk) to 10 (highest risk). All MPs offered by Tavistock AM use a risk rating range from 3 to 8. 41.4 Tavistock AM receives a DFM [discretionary fund management] fee from investors who have invested in the MP, but for any proportion of the MP which invests in another Tavistock AM product (including the Acumen Funds which are now owned by Titan Wealth), the DFM fee is reduced to zero. The Tavistock Profiles are the only MPs in respect of which the DFM fee has been waived in this manner.’ 41.1 The portfolio comprises a basket of investments selected and managed by Tavistock AM in line with a strategy and within a risk or volatility range which is set out in a publicly available factsheet. 41.2 The investments within a given portfolio may include, for example, investment holdings (e.g. ETFs), investment funds (such as Unit Trusts and OEICs sub-funds), individual company shares, bonds and cash. 41.3 Tavistock AM designates the MP [i.e. the Model Portfolio] with an internal risk rating classification and manages the portfolio with a view to maintaining that classification. The risk rating is from 1 (lowest risk) to 10 (highest risk). All MPs offered by Tavistock AM use a risk rating range from 3 to 8. 41.4 Tavistock AM receives a DFM [discretionary fund management] fee from investors who have invested in the MP, but for any proportion of the MP which invests in another Tavistock AM product (including the Acumen Funds which are now owned by Titan Wealth), the DFM fee is reduced to zero. The Tavistock Profiles are the only MPs in respect of which the DFM fee has been waived in this manner.’
‘153E. Following and pursuant to the OMA, Tavistock AM communicated information necessary to implement the Tavistock MPS to Titan AM. Such information formed part of the MPS as described at paragraph 41 above, within the Tavistock MPS as described in paragraph 40A above. This information included instructions as to which investments were to be on boarded for the Tavistock MPS (the “Investment Information”). This included, by way of example only, instructions contained within: (i) emails sent by David Chandler, a Senior Portfolio Analyst of Titan AM, dated13 June 2024 and27 August 2024 , and two emails dated20 September 2024 ), and (ii) email exchanges between third parties and James Peel, a portfolio manager of Titan AM in July-August 2023 and July 2024 (the “Investment Emails”). The Investment Emails are attached at Annex 4. 153F. On a date unknown to the Defendants but believed to be in or around January 2023, Titan AM launched its own Model Portfolio Service (the “Titan MPS”). The Titan MPS was, and was intended to be, a rival to the Tavistock MPS.’
‘153N. In light of the commercial sensitivity and value of each and all of the Investment Information, the MPs and the Tavistock MPS and of the context in which and purpose for which they were created, each part of the Tavistock MPS Information was inherently confidential, save insofar as that information was deliberately published by Tavistock Plc or Tavistock AM. That confidential information is referred to hereafter as the “Tavistock MPS Information”.’
‘153U. It is to be inferred that Titan AM used the Tavistock MPS Information in creating and administering the Titan MPS. The precise nature and scope of use is outside the knowledge of Tavistock AM but pending disclosure, further information and/or evidence Tavistock AM pleads as follows. 153U.1 When Titan AM was discharging its obligations under the OMA to undertake the work of onboarding new investments for the Tavistock MPS, it also onboarded the same investments for Titan AM. This is demonstrated in the Investment Emails. 153U.2 Titan AM’s use of the Tavistock MPS Information is further to be inferred from the similarities of (i) the factsheets for relevant Titan MPS profiles compared to the equivalent factsheets for Tavistock MPS profiles, and (ii) the underlying investments described in those factsheets examples of which are set out in Annex 8.’ 153U.1 When Titan AM was discharging its obligations under the OMA to undertake the work of onboarding new investments for the Tavistock MPS, it also onboarded the same investments for Titan AM. This is demonstrated in the Investment Emails. 153U.2 Titan AM’s use of the Tavistock MPS Information is further to be inferred from the similarities of (i) the factsheets for relevant Titan MPS profiles compared to the equivalent factsheets for Tavistock MPS profiles, and (ii) the underlying investments described in those factsheets examples of which are set out in Annex 8.’
‘25. I would generally expect that any discussions between investment professionals as to the assets that they intend to purchase in the future would be confidential by default. 26. The Tavistock group invests significant time, effort, expertise and resources in identifying and selecting appropriate assets. If a competitor obtained knowledge of the assets that the Tavistock MPS intended to invest in, they would gain the commercial benefit of Tavistock’s investment knowledge and analysis without paying for it. This is particularly true if such a competitor obtained access in real time. Access to comprehensive historic records may also be valuable but that value would be less. 27. To give a simple example, if a successful fund or portfolio makes a profitable investment and this is reflected in the factsheet which is published later, other competitors may copy the strategy and hope to benefit from the successful fund's expertise by doing so. However, by the time that the factsheet showing the profitable investment is made public, the value of the relevant investments will have changed. A fund which mimics other funds' investments using public factsheets will often be behind the curve and will lose out on some of the profit made by the original fund because it identified the opportunity earlier than others. If a rival fund or portfolio service has access to investment decisions in real time, then it does not have that disadvantage and can copy the investment strategy much more successfully, thereby positioning itself as a rival more successfully. For this reason, investment research and analysis is highly confidential and a significantly valuable asset for a firm such as Tavistock. 28. For these reasons, the work of the Investment Team was generally confidential at the time when it was conducted.’
‘B. Information required for the creation or management of an MPS 29. From an external perspective, an MPS appears to be a single defined product. In fact, it is comprised of a collection of documents, agreements and investment philosophies which are built up over time into a set of strategies and related investments which are appealing to investors. 30. A party who wished to set up their own MPS would need to invest a substantial amount of time, resources, and expertise. By way of illustration only, they would need to identify and negotiate agreements with suitable fund managers, identify and investigate a range of assets which are suitable for investment, benchmark those assets in relation to risk (both individually and in aggregate), determine appropriate asset allocation, and establish mechanisms to monitor and update the investments over time. Furthermore, they would need to create public-facing documents (factsheets) which are attractive to investors and which contain various key information (both from a regulatory perspective and in terms of what investors/IFAs expect to see). 31. A relatively small proportion of the information relating to an MPS is initially public. For example, in relation to Tavistock, I would expect information relating to live strategy or future investments to be kept strictly confidential. However, we also publish factsheets which specify some limited detail, for example the top 5 investment holdings. In this way, some limited information that would initially be confidential may later become public. This is important because it is not generally advisable to copy a party's historic investment decisions, but as I have explained above, access to their real time strategy decisions could be very valuable. 32. Tavistock alleges that Titan misused confidential information in order to create the Titan MPS. I understand that Titan has criticised the degree to which Tavistock has provided a list of the exact confidential information that was misused. Titan was in an advantaged position in respect of the Tavistock MPS with access to its core workings including live information regarding future investments and strategy. Prior to disclosure by Titan, I am not able to say for sure what information Titan copied or misused in the creation of the Titan MPS. However, in my view, from my experience of MPS set-up and operation, the information which would have been helpful to Titan is likely to have included: 32.1 The fundamental structure of the Tavistock MPS including factors such as the way in which risk is categorised and assigned; 32.2 Information received from the TAM Investment Committee and Abacus Investment & Oversight Committee regarding matters such as investment strategy and appropriate assets to on-board; and 32.3 Information received in relation to the “rebalancing” of holdings within each portfolio so that the proportion held is returned to the appropriate level of risk.’ 32.1 The fundamental structure of the Tavistock MPS including factors such as the way in which risk is categorised and assigned; 32.2 Information received from the TAM Investment Committee and Abacus Investment & Oversight Committee regarding matters such as investment strategy and appropriate assets to on-board; and 32.3 Information received in relation to the “rebalancing” of holdings within each portfolio so that the proportion held is returned to the appropriate level of risk.’