“… The above objective information states that the Government’s policy with regards to former Congolese combatants is to reintegrate them. Furthermore, the Government is offering financial support. Furthermore, even if your claim that you were taken by the rebels and that your father had been subsequently arrested and released were accepted (which it is not) it is noted that the authorities did not arrest you either at the hospital or later when your father returned after his release. Consequently, it is considered that you do not have any profile with the authorities in DRC or that you would be of any interest to them if you were to return. It is therefore considered that you would not be at any risk from the authorities on return to Democratic Republic of Congo.”
“… For the reasons set out above, it is considered that you have not demonstrated a real risk of torture or of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment on return to DRC. Consideration has also been given to the general country situation in DRC and specifically North Kivu where you lived prior to leaving … [Objective information shows that there has been fighting in eastern DRC.] However, this situation is geographically limited and the general security situation is considerably more stable throughout other areas of DRC, particularly Kinshasa. Therefore it is considered that you would not face a breach ofArticle 3 of the ECHR if you were to return to the Kinshasa area. It is noted that you have previously resided there and you continue to have family there. It is therefore considered that with the support of your family you could return to this area.”
“Having taken into account the prevailing conditions for unaccompanied children in the DRC and the applicant’s own profile it is considered that there is a reasonable likelihood that if returned to the DRC he would be at real risk of treatment contrary toArticle 3 of the ECHR . As his vulnerability to such treatment arises from his age and lack of support it is considered that he falls into a particular social group, namely street children in the DRC (see LQ Afghanistan). Therefore it is considered that the applicant qualifies for a grant of Asylum.”
“… You were 16 when you entered the United Kingdom and you are now 24 years of age. In view of your age when you arrived in the UK it is considered that you will be familiar with the language and culture of your country of origin. Since your arrival in the UK you have obtained the skills to enable you to gain employment from Sheffield City Council and it is therefore considered that you will be able to find employment on return to the DRC. It is considered that you no longer remain especially vulnerable to abuse as was the case when you were recognised as a member of a particular social group namely street children in the DRC.”
“In your statement dated 20 February [sic – this should be July] 2018 you declare that you still fear the authorities of the DRC as your family was accused of helping rebel groups. However, as noted above you were granted refugee status as a particular social group, namely street children in the DRC. It is also noted that you have provided no account of persecution from the DRC authorities and that you were able to leave the DRC unhindered. There is currently no evidence that you are personally of adverse interest to the DRC authorities or face a real risk of harm from them.”
“… the conclusion is the same as that reached within the letter of15 October 2018 that in the intervening years since your grant of refugee status, the security landscape of the of the DRC had improved fundamentally and durably. Therefore, your circumstances upon return to the DRC in respect of your protection concerns would not be such as to place you in need of humanitarian protection or engage your rights under the 1951 Refugee Convention or Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR.”
“The key issue which arises from the examination of country evidence in PO is that a person needs to demonstrate an actual or perceived political opinion contrary to the current President and/or to have a profile of significant and active opposition to that person before they can establish a real risk on return. That is not the position of the appellant on the facts of this appeal.”
“29. As found in PO, risk that an individual is exposed to will continue to depend upon the person’s political affiliations, profile, actions and attitude towards the government, taking into account as the Upper Tribunal has previously observed at [51 (iii)] in AB and DM Democratic Republic of Congo CG[2005] UKAIT 00118 that risk ‘fluctuates in accordance with the political situation’. 30. The appellant is from North Kivu but will be returned to Kinshasa, the capital, which has not been identified as an area where there is any ongoing risk or to which it would be unreasonable to expect the appellant to relocate, to if needed. He has not provided adequate evidence to establish this fact, or to show he could not return to his home area. 31. My primary finding is that there has been a durable change within the DRC following the elections held on30 December 2018 and that although some may continue to be at risk on return that is dependent upon their profile which is a fact sensitive assessment. I do not find it made out that the appellant, even taking at its highest what it claims occurred to him in the DRC as a child, is of interest to anybody within his home state and in particular has failed to establish he will face a real risk on return of persecution for a Convention reason or ill-treatment sufficient to engage an entitlement to international protection on any other basis. I find the reason the appellant was granted status initially was as a result of his being an unaccompanied minor not on the basis of an adverse political opinion. I find that the Secretary of State has established material change in the DRC of a sustainable nature such that the cessation decision is in accordance with the law and the facts of this appeal and is sustainable. 32. I do not find the appellant has established an entitlement to be recognised as a refugee at the date of this appeal or to be entitled to a grant of Humanitarian protection or leave pursuant to Article 2 or 3 ECHR if returned to his home area on the basis of his previous activities and current presentation in relation to political issues.”
“Definition of the term ‘refugee’ A. For the purposes of the present Convention, the term ‘refugee’ shall apply to any person who: … (2) Owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. … C. This Convention shall cease to apply to any person falling under the terms of section A if: … (5) He can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality; …”
“Prohibition of expulsion or return (‘refoulement’) No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”
“A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS … 6. When interpreting the cessation clauses, it is important to bear in mind the broad durable solutions context of refugee protection informing the object and purpose of these clauses. … Accordingly, cessation practices should be developed in a manner consistent with the goal of durable solutions. Cessation should not therefore result in persons residing in a host State with an uncertain status … conditions within the country of original must have changed in a profound and enduring manner before cessation can be applied. 7. Cessation under Article 1C(5) and 1C(6) does not require the consent of or a voluntary act by the refugee. Cessation of refugee status terminates rights that accompany that status. It may bring about the return of the person to the country of origin and may thus break ties to family, social networks and employment in the community in which the refugee has become established. As a result, a premature or insufficiently grounded application of the ceased circumstances clauses can have serious consequences. It is therefore appropriate to interpret the clauses strictly and to ensure that procedures for determining general cessation are fair, clear, and transparent. B. ASSESSMENT OF CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE COUNTRY OF ORIGIN … Restoration of protection 15. In determining whether circumstances have changed so as to justify cessation under Article 1C(5) or (6), another crucial question is whether the refugee can effectively re-avail him- or herself of the protection of his or her own country. Such protection must therefore be effective and available. It requires more than mere physical security or safety. It needs to include the existence of a functioning government and basic administrative structures, as evidenced for instance through a functioning system of law and justice, as well as the existence of adequate infrastructure to enable residents to exercise their rights, including their right to a basic livelihood. … D. INDIVIDUAL CESSATION 18. A strict interpretation of Article 1C(5) and (6) would allow their application on an individual basis. … Yet Article 1C(5) and (6) have rarely been invoked in individual cases. States have not generally undertaken periodic reviews of individual cases on the basis of fundamental changes in the country of origin. These practices acknowledge that a refugee’s sense of stability should be preserved as much as possible. They are also consistent with Article 34 of the 1951 Convention, which urges States ‘as far as possible [to] facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees’. Where the cessation clauses are applied on an individual basis, it should not be done for the purposes of a re-hearing de novo. E. EXCEPTIONS TO CESSATION Continued international protection needs 19. Even when circumstances have generally changed to such an extent that refugee status would no longer be necessary, there may always be the specific circumstances of individual cases that may warrant continued international protection. It has therefore been a general principle that all refugees affected by general cessation must have the possibility, upon request, to have such application in their cases reconsidered on international protection grounds relevant to their individual case.”
“Refugee Convention ceases to apply (cessation) This paragraph applies when the Secretary of State is satisfied that one or more of the following applies: … (v) they can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with which they have been recognised as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail themselves of the protection of the country of nationality; … In considering (v) …, the Secretary of State shall have regard to whether the change of circumstances is of such a significant and non-temporary nature that the refugee’s fear of persecution can no longer be regarded as well-founded.”
“The reason for applying a ‘strict’ and ‘restrictive’ approach to the cessation clauses in general and 1C(5) in particular [as advocated in UNHCR Guidelines published in April 1999] is surely plain. Once an asylum application has been formally determined and refugee status officially granted, with all the benefits both under the Convention and under national law which that carries with it, the refugee has the assurance of a secure future in the host country and a legitimate expectation that he will not henceforth be stripped of this save for demonstrably good and sufficient reason. That assurance and expectation simply does not arise in the earlier period whilst the refugee’s claim for asylum is under consideration and before it is granted. Logically, therefore, the approach to the grant of refugee status under 1A(2) does not precisely mirror the approach to its prospective subsequent withdrawal under 1C(5).”
“Whether one explains the process as Lord Brown did in Hoxha, that a recognised refugee should not be stripped of that status ‘save for demonstrably good and sufficient reason’; or, as UNHCR does, that ‘a practical or evidential burden of proof lies with the asylum State authorities’; the outcome is the same. Even if, in Australia, it is not appropriate to speak of a legal ‘burden of proof’ in this context, what is still required is a rigorous satisfaction of the circumstances warranting the decision-maker’s taking a step so potentially serious for the person affected. ….”
“In a situation in which the previous circumstances, on the basis of which the person concerned was granted refugee status have ceased to exist, are new, different circumstances founding, persecution to be: (a) measured against the standard of probability applied for recognising refugee status, or is another standard to be applied in favour of the person concerned, and/or (b) assessed having regard to the relaxation of the burden of proof under Article 4(4) of [the Qualification] Directive ...?”
“81. The third question relates to the situation in which it is assumed that a finding has already been made that the circumstances on the basis of which refugee status was granted have ceased to exist. 82. It concerns the conditions under which the competent authorities then verify, if necessary, before finding that that status has ceased to exist, whether there are other circumstances which may give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution on the part of the person concerned. 83. That verification therefore implies an assessment analogous to that carried out during the examination of an initial application for the granting of refugee status.”
“87. … a person who, after having resided for a number of years as a refugee outside of his country of origin, relies on other circumstances to found a fear of persecution does not normally have the same opportunities to assess the risk to which he would be exposed in his country of origin as does an applicant who has recently left his country of origin. 88. By contrast, the standard which must then guide the assessment of the elements present does not vary, either at the stage of the examination of an application for refugee status or at the stage of the examination of the question of whether that status should be maintained, when, after the circumstances which led to the granting of that status have ceased to exist, other circumstances which may have given rise to a well-founded fear of acts of persecution are assessed. 89. At both of those stages of the examination, the assessment relates to the same question of whether or not the established circumstances constitute such a threat that the person concerned may reasonably fear, in the light of his individual situation, that he will in fact be subjected to acts of persecution. 90. That assessment of the extent of the risk must, in all cases, be carried out with vigilance and care, since what are at issue are issues relating to the integrity of the person and to individual liberties, issues which relate to the fundamental values of the Union. 91. The answer to Question 3(a) is therefore that, when the circumstances which resulted in the granting of refugee status have ceased to exist and the competent authorities of the Member State verify that there are no other circumstances which could justify a fear of persecution on the part of the person concerned either for the same reason as that initially at issue or for one of the other reasons set out in Article 2(c) of the Directive, the standard of probability used to assess the risk stemming from those other circumstances is the same as that applied when refugee status was granted.”
“… The circumstances in connection with which a person has been recognised as a refugee are likely to be a combination of the general political conditions in that person’s home country and some aspect of that person’s personal characteristics. Accordingly, a relevant change in circumstances for the purposes of article 1C(5) might in a particular case also arise from a combination of changes in the general political conditions in the home country and in the individual’s personal characteristics, or even just from a change in the individual’s personal characteristics, if that change means that he now falls outside a group likely to be persecuted by the authorities of the home state. The relevant change must in each case be durable in nature.”
“36. In my view … it is correct to say that for the purposes of article 1C(5) of the Refugee Convention, the onus is on the Secretary of State to show, in relation to a person previously recognised by her as a ‘refugee’ under article 1A, that there has been a relevant change in circumstances such that the Refugee Convention ceases to apply to them. Moreover, that interpretation of the Refugee Convention is reinforced by article 14(2) of the EU Qualification Directive. … 37. However, in practice this difference may … have little impact since it will usually be appropriate to expect an individual to call attention in his evidence or representations to any aspect of his particular circumstances which would tend to show that he would be subject to a real risk of ill-treatment if deported (as article 4(1) of the Qualification Directive also confirms) and to draw adverse inferences on the facts if he does not.”
“For the reasons given below, and in the light of the careful submissions that we have had on the important decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union … in Abdulla v Bundesrepublik Deutschland …., I have concluded that: (1) a cessation decision is the mirror image of a decision determining refugee status. By that I mean that the grounds for cessation do not go beyond verifying whether the grounds for recognition of refugee status continue to exist. Thus, the relevant question is whether there has been a significant and non-temporary change in circumstances so that the circumstances which caused the person to be a refugee have ceased to apply and there is no other basis on which he would be held to be a refugee. The recognising state does not in addition have to be satisfied that the country of origin has a system of government or an effective legal system for protecting basic human rights, though the absence of such systems may of course lead to the conclusion that a significant and non-temporary change in circumstances has not occurred.”
“47. I accept that it would be inconsistent with the purposes of refugee status, whether under the Refugee Convention or the QD, if protection could be too easily ceased while a person was still in need of international protection or it was not reasonably clear that the need for it had gone. That would hardly solve the problem of persecution and displacement which those instruments are intended to address. Equally, as it seems to me, there is no necessary reason why refugee status should be continued beyond the time when the refugee is subject to the persecution which entitled him to refugee status or any other persecution which would result in him being a refugee, or why he should be entitled to further protection. There should simply be a requirement for symmetry between the grant and cessation of refugee status. … 49. Another way of putting the point is that the Refugee Convention and the QD are not measures for ensuring political and judicial reform in the countries of origin of refugees. The risks which entitle individuals to protection are risks which affect them personally and individually. It is an individualised approach. Just as it is no answer to an asylum claim that there is a legal system which might in theory be able to protect them, so conversely the absence of such a system is not an answer to a cessation decision if it is shown that the refugee has sufficient, lasting protection in other ways or that the fear which gave rise to the need for protection has in any event been superseded and disappeared.”
“47. In my judgment, this court should follow the mirror image approach endorsed in MA (Somalia), if and in so far as it is not bound so to do. It should do so for the reasons set out in MA (Somalia) and, in particular, because it reflects the language ofarticle 1C(5) of the Convention and article 11 of the Qualification Directive, which link cessation with the continued existence of the circumstances which led to the recognition of refugee status. It is also consistent with the approach of the CJEU in Abdulla. 48. As the House of Lords made clear in Hoxha, the mirror image approach is subject to the qualification that the requisite ‘strict’ and ‘restrictive’ approach to cessation clauses means that it must be shown that the change in circumstances is fundamental and durable in the equivalent wording of the Qualification Directive, ‘significant’ and ‘non-temporary’. In addition, the burden of proof on all issues will be on the SSHD. 49. In summary, in a case in which refugee status has been granted because the person cannot reasonably be expected to relocate, a cessation decision may be made if circumstances change, so as to mean that that person could reasonably be expected to relocate, provided that the change in circumstances is, in the language of the Qualification Directive, ‘significant and non-temporary’. …”
“As this court made clear in MM (Zimbabwe), given that the respondent has been granted refugee status, the onus of proving that the circumstances in connection with which he was recognised as refugee have ceased to exist lies on the Secretary of State. He must show that, if there were any circumstances which in 1994 would have justified the respondent fearing persecution in DRC, those circumstances have now ceased to exist and that there are no other circumstances which would now give rise to a fear of persecution for reasons covered by the Refugee Convention. As stated by Sales LJ in MM (Zimbabwe), the circumstances under consideration are likely to be a combination of the general political conditions in the individual’s home country and some aspect of his personal characteristics. What is clear from that decision … is that the focus of the investigation must be on the current circumstances of the individual and conditions in his home country.”
“Considering representations submitted Where the individual submits evidence in response to the notification of intention to revoke protection status, you must give careful consideration to all the points raised as well as the initial information that led to the decision to consider revocation. It is important to keep in mind that the burden of proof rests on the Home Office when making a decision to revoke protection status and, as with first instance decisions, the relevant standard of proof is a relatively low one. See Assessing credibility and Refugee Status and Humanitarian protection for further details on the standard and burden of proof requirements. You must consider if: • the individual has a reasonable explanation which directly addresses the proposal to revoke protection status • there are any compassionate reasons as to why protection status should not be revoked • it is necessary to contact the individual for further details • the individual has raised any other protection-based grounds, such that it would be appropriate to allow the individual to retain protection status Where it is accepted that someone still needs protection after having reviewed the case, even if the reasons differ from those which gave rise to the original grant of protection status, revocation action should not normally be pursued on cessation grounds. This includes where you decide that there are grounds to revoke refugee status but identify that the individual would qualify for humanitarian protection, or vice versa. In this circumstance, revocation on cessation grounds is not usually required.”
“(i) We confirm as continuing to be a risk category those with a nationality or perceived nationality of a state regarded as hostile to the DRC and in particular those who have or presumed to have Rwandan connections or are of Rwandan origins. (ii) We consider that in light of recent developments there is now a risk category consisting of those who are Tutsi (or Banyamulenge) or are perceived to be Tutsi (or Banyamulenge). … We accept that in practice there is considerable overlap with (i) since, as a result of the events of 2004 ‘Rwandan’ and ‘Tutsi’ are more often regarded as the same by the DRC authorities and civilian population and as a result Tutsis and those perceived as such face higher risks than before. However, they are distinct categories, one nationality based, the other ethnicity-based. (iii) We also confirm as an existing risk category those having or being perceived to have a military or political profile in opposition to the government. The risk fluctuates in accordance with the political situation. …”