Damilare Ajao v Commerzbank AG [2026] EWCA Civ 147

[2026] EWCA Civ 147Case No CA-2025-002752
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
[2025] EWHC 2904 (KB)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE KING’S BENCH DIVISION
MR JUSTICE MARTIN SPENCER
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 19 February 2026
Before
LORD JUSTICE LEWISLORD JUSTICE MILES
Between
DAMILARE AJAOAppellantCOMMERZBANK AGRespondent
Liam Walker KC and Natalie Lucas (instructed by Veja and Co Solicitors) for AppellantLouis Browne KC (instructed by Littler UK) for RespondentHearing Hearing dates: 19 February 2026
Approved Judgment
[1]This is an appeal against a decision of Martin Spencer J. (“the judge”) finding the appellant, Damilare Ajao, guilty of 12 allegations of contempt of court, and committing the appellant to 20 months’ imprisonment.[2]In essence, the allegations arose out of proceedings in an employment tribunal. The appellant brought proceedings against his former employer, and six individuals. Those proceedings included allegations of discrimination on grounds of race and sex and sexual harassment. He sought damages in excess of £160,000 with a claim for more than £50,000 per year for continuing loss. Those claims were dismissed.[3]The respondent, who was his former employer, applied for permission to bring contempt proceedings against the appellant. There were 31 allegations put forward. The allegations in essence were that the appellant had deliberately made false statements in his witness statements and had deliberately adduced false evidence on oath. The respondent had to obtain permission from the High Court to bring contempt proceedings: see CPR 813(5). That was granted by Eady J. in relation to 13 of the 31 allegations following a two-day hearing.[4]The allegations were then heard by the judge sitting in the High Court. The appellant was represented by leading and junior counsel. He gave evidence. Other witnesses gave evidence. The hearing took 6 days. The judge handed down a written judgment. In that judgment, the judge concluded that he was satisfied to the criminal standard of proof that 12 allegations had been proved and that the appellant was in serious contempt of court in making false statements and giving false evidence on oath or on affirmation. The judge said he was sure that the appellant’s allegations were fictitious and that the appellant knew they were fictitious.[5]The appellant is entitled to appeal as of right pursuant to section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960. Originally, by a document dated 7 November 2025, he put forward 7 grounds of appeal. The appellant has withdrawn those grounds. He has applied to amend to advance 11 new grounds of appeal. Those are contained in a document dated 3 February 2026 which runs to 78 paragraphs. By order dated 5 February 2026, the Court ordered that the application to amend the grounds of appeal, and the appeal itself, if permission to amend was granted on any or all of the grounds, would be heard at the hearing listed for 19 and 20 February 2026.[6]On the morning of the hearing, that is 19 February 2026, a skeleton argument was filed on behalf of the appellant. It was prepared by leading and junior counsel whom the appellant had only recently instructed. That skeleton does not on analysis address the proposed amended grounds of appeal. The proposed amended grounds of appeal sought to challenge the findings of contempt. The skeleton argument focusses on whether the sanction imposed by the judge was wrong in principle or manifestly excessive and whether a lesser penalty or a suspended sentence should have been imposed. We are grateful to Mr Walker KC and Ms Lucas for their assistance. As explained in a short judgment given at the outset of the hearing on 19 February 2026, Mr Walker suffered a medical emergency which required him to go to hospital. Having heard submissions we were satisfied that, consistent with the overriding requirement of fairness to the appellant, it was appropriate to continue with the hearing. We gave our reasons for refusing the application for an adjournment in a judgment given orally and that should be read with this judgment. Ms Lucas made concise and cogent submissions on behalf of the appellant. We also took the unusual course of hearing from the appellant himself on one of the proposed grounds.[7]Counsel explained that the appellant was no longer pursuing proposed grounds 2, 4, 8 and 11. We will therefore say no more about them. We will deal with the remaining proposed grounds of appeal put forward by the appellant. We will also consider in this judgment the issue of sanction. Counsel for the appellant explained that while there was no formal notice of appeal concerning sanction, we consider it right, given the seriousness of the sanction imposed, that the Court reviews that sanction. Counsel for the respondent did not object to this course. THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY The bringing of contempt proceedings

THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[8]As indicated above, the appellant brought proceedings in the employment tribunal seeking damages from his former employer and six individuals. Those claims were dismissed. The employer applied to the High Court to bring contempt proceedings. For present purposes, it is necessary only to identify the allegations for which permission was granted to bring proceedings. They are referred to as grounds with a particular number. That reflects the way in which the allegations were set out in an affidavit of Philip Ross Cameron, of the solicitors for the employer. The grounds of allegation may be summarised as follows:(1) Grounds 2-6: Making false allegations of sexual harassment by another employee of the respondent, referred to in the proceedings as Mrs Q;(2) Grounds 24-25: Falsely asserting that a delay in reporting Mrs Q’s alleged actions was out of concern for Mrs Q’s welfare following the death of her mother;(3) Ground 26 Falsely alleging that he had brought a Nigerian dish to the workplace and Mrs Q had asked to taste it and that he had invited his work colleagues to visit a Thai restaurant;(4) Ground 29: Fabricating a false entry in a work diary to bolster other false claims;(5) Ground 30: Falsely asserting that he had contacted a particular employee by telephone on 19 November 2019; and(6) Grounds 10, 11 and 31: Falsely alleging that Lola Ogunfowara made unwanted physical contact with the appellant and referred to him as “this boy”.[9]As noted, the application for permission to bring contempt proceedings was heard by Eady J., who had been President of the Employment Appeal Tribunal and was familiar with proceedings in the employment tribunal. In granting permission, Eady J. said this: “36. In considering these questions, I accept that the wider public interest requires that the court must guard carefully against the risk of allowing litigants to use committal proceedings to harass those against whom they have a grievance, or simply to re-litigate matters that have been determined elsewhere: I must exercise great caution before giving permission, and should not do so unless there is a strong prima facie case. I also recognise, however, that there is a legitimate public interest in drawing attention to the dangers of making false statements: if the courts are seen to treat serious examples of false evidence as of little importance, they run the risk of encouraging witnesses to regard the statement of truth as a mere formality (see KJM Superbikes at paragraphs 17 and 24). As Marcus Smith J observed in Patel v Patel: "25 …As is self-evident, and as cases make clear, evidence given to a court, whether it be in a pleading supported by a statement of truth, by witness statement, affidavit, or in oral testimony, this evidence should be true. Such evidence absolutely should not be deliberately false. There is an obvious and clear public interest in holding to account those who deliberately tell lies in court and during the course of the litigation process." "25 …As is self-evident, and as cases make clear, evidence given to a court, whether it be in a pleading supported by a statement of truth, by witness statement, affidavit, or in oral testimony, this evidence should be true. Such evidence absolutely should not be deliberately false. There is an obvious and clear public interest in holding to account those who deliberately tell lies in court and during the course of the litigation process."[10]Eady J. found that there was no prima facie case in relation to some of the 31 allegations and that that there was no public interest in bringing contempt proceedings for other allegations. She found that there was a prima facie case in the case of 13 of the allegations. She also held that it was in the public interest for contempt proceedings to be brought in relation to those 13 allegations. By way of example, she considered that there was a “strong public interest” in determining whether or not the appellant had manufactured evidence by falsifying entries in his work diary. Similarly, in relation to the allegations concerning sexual harassment, she said at paragraph 58 of her judgment:
“…I also bear in mind the serious nature of allegations of discrimination of this form; just as it is right to recognise the need for such complaints to be the subject of public adjudication, it is also important that an allegation of making a false complaint of this nature is similarly the subject of public judicial determination. Balancing the different interests in this regard, I am satisfied that it is in accordance with the overriding objective, and is both proportionate and in the public interest for these matters to proceed.”

The contempt proceedings

[11]The proceedings for committal for contempt were heard before Martin Spencer J. over 6 days in June and October 2025. The appellant was represented by leading and junior counsel. The judge heard evidence from Mrs Q and Mr Booth (who was a deputy operations manager at the respondent). The judge heard evidence from the appellant.[12]The judge handed down his judgment on 27 November 2025, having circulated the draft judgment to counsel in advance. In his judgment, the judge summarised the allegations. He summarised the evidence of the principal witnesses including Mrs Q, and the appellant. He summarised the submissions on behalf of the appellant and the respondent.[13]In his ruling, the judge reminded himself that he had to be satisfied to the criminal standard of proof in relation to each matter. He set out the relevant principles determining what amounted to a contempt in this context. He then set out his assessment of the witnesses. He recorded the substance of their evidence in considerable detail. He said that he found Mrs Q to be “an entirely honest and credible witness and I am sure that she came to court to tell the truth and did so”. He accepted her evidence in its entirety and rejected the evidence of the appellant on matters on which she gave evidence. He found Mr Booth to be an “entirely straightforward, truthful witness” and accepted his evidence in its entirety. In particular, he accepted the evidence that there was no meeting between the appellant and Mr Booth on 19 November 2019 and found that the appellant had falsified, at a later date and in a different pen, the entry in his work diary that recorded such a meeting. In relation to the appellant’s evidence (whom he referred to as the defendant, as he was in the High Court proceedings), the judge concluded:
“95. Quite apart from my acceptance of the evidence of Mrs Q and Mr Booth, there were such discrepancies, inconsistencies and impossibilities in the Defendant's evidence that it was quite incapable of acceptance and the more I heard of his evidence, the more I became sure that his evidence was untrue, and deliberately so.”
[14]The judge then considered the individual allegations. He gave detailed reasons as to why he was sure that the allegations in grounds 2-6 were established. These concerned the allegations that he had been subject to sexual harassment by Mrs Q and she had made comments on various occasions about his nipples and attempted to grab his crotch. The judge found that there was no room for misinterpretation or erroneous perception of what was allegedly said or done by Mrs Q. The judge concluded that “there was not a shred of truth in any of the allegations”. He was sure that the allegations made by the appellant “were both untrue (and deliberately so) and a deliberate attempt to deceive the Tribunal into awarding him damages”, compounded by the lies told to the court and in his affidavit. The judge gave examples. The judge found that, in the light of his findings on grounds 2-6, grounds 24 to 25 were also untrue. Those allegations concerned false assertions that the appellant had not reported Mrs Q’s conduct because she had suffered a bereavement. As the judge explained, the appellant’s evidence was that he had learned of the bereavement much later than the harassment was said to have occurred, and so could not have been a reason for the appellant not to report the conduct. The judge found that “the conduct alleged against Mrs Q never occurred and therefore the Defendant has invented an excuse for not reporting it”. He found that ground 26 concerning a Nigerian dish that he had brought to the office and which he said Mrs Q had wanted to taste, and the circumstances of a visit to a restaurant, were also proven. He found that grounds 10 and 11, which were allegations that the appellant had falsely alleged that a work colleague had referred to the appellant (who is a black British male and was then in his thirties) as “that boy” were made out. The judge found that grounds 29 and 30, which concerned the falsification of diary entries in the appellant’s work diary and falsely alleging that a telephone call had been made were proven. The judge found that one other allegation, ground 31, was not proven. He therefore found that 12 of the 13 allegations were proven.[15]Following the handing down of the judgment, there was a hearing on 7 November 2025 to deal with sanctions. The appellant was again represented by leading counsel who made submissions in mitigation. In addition a character reference had been provided the day before on the appellant’s behalf and which the judge confirmed that he had read. It was accepted that the conduct passed the custody threshold, that is, it was so serious that only a custodial sentence was justified although the appellant’s counsel submitted that it could be suspended. The judge committed the appellant to prison for 20 months and declined to suspend the sentence, having had regard to relevant Sentencing Council Guidelines, as appropriate punishment could only be achieved by immediate imprisonment.

Subsequent events

[16]There have been numerous applications, directions and orders made in these proceedings. It is only necessary to set out the main events.[17]The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal by an appellant’s notice dated 7 November 2025 containing seven grounds of appeal. He also sought bail pending the appeal. By order of 7 November 2025, Males LJ ordered that the appeal be expedited and heard in the week commencing 8 December 2025. Males LJ granted bail. At that stage, it seems, the appellant was no longer represented by his legal team and was representing himself. In his reasons for granting bail, Males LJ noted that the appellant was entitled to legal representation and indicated that he would be well advised to take advantage of that. As he was not legally represented, however, and Males LJ accepted that it would be difficult for him to conduct the appeal in person if he were imprisoned, he granted the appellant bail.[18]The appellant was granted legal representation but for some reason his lawyers were not able to continue to represent him. The hearing of the appeal, fixed for 16 December 2025, was converted to a directions hearing. It took place on 16 December 2025. Phillips LJ made directions for the provision of audio files from the contempt hearing in the High Court, and made orders for disclosure from the appellant’s former solicitors. He gave directions for the filing of written skeleton arguments with a view to the appeal being listed for a hearing in February 2026. At that stage, it appears that the appellant was contemplating applying to amend his grounds of appeal. Further directions were given in January 2026. The appeal was listed for hearing on 19 and 20 February 2026.[19]The appellant decided to prepare the appeal himself but instructed counsel by direct access to represent him at the hearing. An application for an adjournment was made by his counsel on the grounds that counsel would not have time to prepare for the hearing of the appeal. That application was refused on 28 January 2026. The appellant applied on 30 January 2026 for an adjournment. That application was refused by order of 2 February 2026. The order pointed out that the material provided had not included any proposed amended grounds. The appellant then provided proposed amended grounds dated 3 February 2026. By order of 5 February 2026, Lewis LJ and Miles LJ ordered that the application for permission to amend be dealt with at the hearing on 19 February 2026 together with the appeal on any proposed amended grounds of appeal for which permission to amend was granted. The reasons in the order made it clear that the application to amend and the substantive hearing would take place on 19 and 20 February 2026. Orders were given to enable the appellant to waive privilege and for the appellant’s former solicitors to comment on the proposed grounds of appeal. Other directions were given to ensure that the hearing could take place on 19 and 20 February 2026.[20]On 6 February 2026, the appellant confirmed that he was no longer relying on the grounds of appeal dated 7 November 2025 and subsequently filed a skeleton argument confirming that. The appellant was to serve any fresh evidence by 4 p.m. on 12 February 2026. He subsequently applied for an extension saying that he needed 24 hours more to file the bundle of fresh evidence. The time was extended to 2 p.m. on 13 February 2026. In the event no further evidence has been filed.[21]The appellant notified the Court of Appeal office on 12 February 2026 that he had instructed solicitors and junior counsel and applied for an order enabling him to select leading counsel, to represent him on the appeal. By order dated 12 February 2026, Lewis LJ and Miles LJ granted that application.

THE APPELLANT’S PROPOSED GROUNDS OF APPEAL

[22]As noted, of the 11 proposed amended grounds of appeal, grounds 2, 4, 8,11 have been withdrawn. It is sensible to consider the remaining either individually, or in some cases, together, where the grounds raise the same or related issues.

Grounds 1 and 7

[23]Ground 1 alleges that the judge treated an allegation that Mrs Q deliberately failed the appellant’s work as revenge for the rejection of sexual advances very seriously. It asserts that this allegation was a material component of the allegations in grounds 2 to 6 and it was referred to in paragraph 4.1.3.6 of the appellant’s further and better particular in the employment tribunal proceedings. It asserts that the judge failed to deal with that allegation, failed to comply with its duty to give reasons and violated Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.[24]The premise underlying this ground is that Mrs Q made sexual advances to the appellant, those were rejected by him and in retaliation Mrs Q failed the appellant’s work.[25]First, the judge did deal with this. He found that Mrs Q had not made sexual advances towards the appellant. Consequently, the premise underlying the argument – that Mrs Q was retaliating because sexual advances were rejected – was a false one. He dealt with that at paragraph 85 of his judgment where he said:
“85. In relation to the allegation that the Defendant was risk failed because he had rejected Mrs Q's sexual advances, Ms Wass rationalised this in the following way: the Defendant could not understand how he could have been risk failed on the merits, and so concluded that it must have been because he rejected Mrs Q's advances. All the Defendant was saying was: I should not have been risk failed, it must have been because Mrs Q was upset with me and the only reason I can think of is that I rejected her sexual advances. Of course, this rationalisation only stands up if the Defendant had in fact rejected Mrs Q's sexual advances: if I find that there were no such sexual advances and therefore he did not reject them, then the "house of cards" upon which this rationalisation is based collapses.”
[26]The judge did reject the rationalisation and found that Mrs Q had not made sexual advances to the appellant. Secondly, in any event, the judge dealt expressly with the circumstances in which Mrs Q had failed the appellant’s work on one occasion in paragraph 28 of his judgment. Mrs Q explained that she had failed the appellant’s work in relation to one client because a money laundering letter that she thought was required was not in the file. In fact, the procedure had changed. When the e-mail change referring to the change in procedure was drawn to her attention, she accepted the position and revised her view of the appellant’s work to a pass. The judge said that he accepted the evidence of Mrs Q in its entirety.[27]The appellant complained that the judge had failed specifically to address para 4.1.3.6 of the further and better particulars despite reference being made to it in Mr Cameron’s affidavit. He was the solicitor for the respondent in whose affidavit the allegations of contempt were set out. There is nothing in this point. The reason why Mr Cameron referred to para 4.1.3.6 was that it included the appellant’s allegation that Mrs Q had made inappropriate sexual advances to him. The judge found that this allegation was concocted. The judge did not need to address the remainder of the allegations in para 4.1.3.6.[28]There is no proper basis for considering that the judge erred in relation to the matters referred to in this ground of appeal.[29]Ground 7 adds nothing of substance to ground 1 and, for the same reasons, it has no merits.

Ground 2

[30]This has been withdrawn. However, since ground 5 substantially overlaps with this ground, we will analyse it here. Ground 2 asserts, on analysis, that there was a procedural error by the judge as he failed to deal with two witness statements from former employees of the respondent, one made by a Mr Olejabi, and one by another employee. The background appears to be a suggestion about whether Mrs Q had said that she had risk failed others. The implication is that Mr Olejabi’s statement and the other employees shows that that is not true and that should have been taken into account in assessing the credibility of Mrs Q.[31]First, the evidence of Mr Olejabi and the other employee was not adduced on behalf of the appellant. A witness statement from Mr Olejabi was served on solicitors for the respondent. However, the respondent’s solicitors drew attention to the fact that Mr Olejabi had been dismissed by the respondent for gross misconduct including dishonesty. In the light of that, the appellant instructed his legal representatives not to call Mr Olejabi as a witness and his statement was not given in evidence. This is explained in detail in the letter from his former solicitors. No witness statement was even served for the other employee. In the circumstances, there was no relevant evidence before the judge. There was, therefore, no failure to address material oral evidence or supporting evidence and no failure to give reasons. This material was not evidence in the case.[32]Secondly, on analysis, the question whether or not Mrs Q reviewed and failed two other workers is not material to certain of the issues on the contempt allegations. Any issue about Mrs Q failing other employees on risk reviews was of no relevance to the allegations that the appellant fabricated the claim that Mrs Q had sexually harassed him. The issue was whether Mrs Q had said or done the things that she was accused of doing. Having heard both Mrs Q and the appellant, the judge was sure that Mrs Q was telling the truth.

Ground 3

[33]Ground 3 concerns one allegation, count 26, where it is alleged that the appellant falsely stated that he had taken a Nigerian dish into work, and that Mrs Q had not been there but said later she would have liked to try the dish. It also included the allegation that the appellant had falsely alleged that he had invited the entire team to a Thai restaurant.[34]The ground is that the allegation about the Nigerian dish was unproven allegation or was one that the respondent had conceded was not proven. The ground is that, despite the concession, the allegation was found proven.[35]We agree concerning the Nigerian dish. The material we have seen shows that the respondent’s solicitor did indicate that the allegation about the Nigerian dish in ground 26 would not be relied upon. The other evidence in the case does not, of itself, prove so that the court could be sure, that the appellant had fabricated a story in relation to this matter.[36]Counsel for the respondent maintained that even if the ground concerning the Nigerian dish was not proven, the judge had accepted Mrs Q’s evidence about the circumstances in which there had been a restaurant visit. We are unable to accept this distinction. It appears to us that the gravamen of ground 26 was the allegation about the Nigerian dish and that the remainder of the ground was a makeweight.[37]We will, therefore, grant permission to allow the appellant to amend his grounds of appeal to include ground 3. We allow the appeal on that ground in relation to ground 26 only. We will set aside the finding of contempt in relation to ground 26 only. This was, however, a small, indeed essentially trivial, part of broader, discrete allegations concerning fabrication of diary entries, the making of false allegations in relation to another employee, and making false allegations of sexual harassment against Mrs Q. The fact that there was no proper basis for a finding in relation to ground 26 is no basis for doubting the findings on the other grounds. The reality is, reading the judgment, that this relatively minor allegation was caught up with the others. Once the judge was satisfied that the appellant was not telling the truth, and was not to be believed, on the other much more serious allegations, he treated ground 26 as being proven without further analysis. Furthermore, given the minor nature of this ground, compared with the other grounds, we do not consider that the finding on this ground had any material impact on the sentence. Ground 4 38. This ground has been withdrawn. Grounds 5 and 6

Ground 4

[38]Grounds 5 and 6 again raise an alleged inconsistency between the evidence of Mrs Q on whether or not she had failed the work of two other reviewers and the evidence of two other reviewers. That is dealt with above when dealing with grounds 1 and 2. In ground 6, there is complaint about the lateness of a request for disclosure by his former solicitors. The response by those solicitors, following the appellant’s waiver of privilege, explains that the appellant was advised about the fact that the respondent in these proceedings (the claimant in the court below) had to prove its case and if the claimant needed documents to do so and did not produce them, it could not prove the case. After he had been cross-examined, the appellant insisted a request was sent. None of that has any material bearing on the findings of the judge that the allegations had been proven.

Ground 8

[39]Ground 8 has been withdrawn.

Ground 9

[40]Ground 9 refers to paragraph 102(iii) of the judgment, which says that the judge has no doubt that the allegations were serious, that the proceedings were proportionate and that there was no evidence that they were being pursued for improper ends. The appellant invites the court to conclude that there was a failure to engage with evidence which he says did support a finding that the respondent was acting for an improper purpose or collateral motive which is said to be an abuse of process. The improper purpose is said to be that the appellant had made a whistleblowing complaint to his former employer and they learned of this on 23 January 2023 and the committal claim was issued on 8 March 2023. We are satisfied that there is no merit in this allegation.[41]First, before proceedings may be brought in this type of case, permission must be obtained. A judge has to be sure that the bringing of proceedings is in the public interest and is proportionate. That is what Eady J. decided when granting permission to bring proceedings for contempt in respect of 13 out of the 31 allegations. That is sufficient of itself to establish that there was a public interest in contempt proceedings being brought.[42]Secondly, what Martin Spencer J. was dealing with was whether the 13 allegations had been proved to the criminal standard. He was sure that 12 had been. There is nothing in the claim about alleged whistleblowing which properly casts any doubt upon that conclusion.[43]Thirdly, there was no evidence adduced before Martin Spencer J. of the allegations of improper purpose. If there had been, the appropriate application would have been to stay the proceedings as an abuse of process. No such application was made. It appears that the appellant knew of such a possibility. There is a reference in paragraph 61 of the proposed amended grounds to a stay of proceedings in 2023 where, it is said, the appellant submitted that the contempt proceedings was launched as a collateral attack. Again, no further details are given. If an application to stay was made, then it seems logically it must have been refused as all parties, with leading and junior counsel, continued with the proceedings. Ground 10[44]This alleges that the appellant did not have adequate time to prepare for the sanctions hearing. In particular, the draft judgment was sent his legal representatives but the appellant was only permitted to see the draft one hour before the sanctions hearing.[45]However, the appellant had leading counsel representing him at the sanctions hearing. Material in the form of a character witness statement had been provided the day before which the judge had confirmed that he had read. There was no suggestion on the part of leading counsel that there had been no time to prepare or that an adjournment was needed. There is no proper basis for concluding that the appellant was unable to deal with sanction. That is sufficient to deal with this ground. However, we will consider the question of the correctness of the sanction in the light of the written and oral submissions made by Mr Walker and Ms Lucas on behalf of the appellant in relation to sanctions. Ground 11[46]Ground 11 has been withdrawn. Conclusion on the findings of contempt[47]We grant permission to amend in relation to grounds 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10. We allow the appeal in relation to ground 3 (concerning ground 26 of the allegations of contempt). We dismiss the appeal on all other grounds. SANCTION[48]There was no formal appeal against the sentence imposed but written submissions have now been made in relation to whether the sanction of 20 months’ imprisonment was wrong in principle or manifestly excessive and whether the judge was wrong in not suspending it. At the hearing, Ms Lucas applied orally to amend the grounds of appeal to include an appeal against the sanction imposed on the grounds that:(1) It was wrong in principle and manifestly excessive;(2) The custodial sanction imposed by the judge, or any sanction imposed by us, should have been or be suspended.[49]We grant permission to amend the grounds of appeal in those terms. In their written skeleton argument for the appellant, Mr Walker KC and Ms Lucas identified the relevant principles governing sanction. They submitted that the judge erred in that:(1) He did not adequately consider the Sentencing Guidelines on the imposition of community and custodial sentences;(2) He erred in referring to the definitive Guideline for Assault as the basis for categorising harm:(3) The categorisation of culpability and harm was flawed.(4) The combination of immediate custody and a substantial costs order resulted in undue and oppressive cumulative punishment resulting in a manifestly excessive sentence.[50]Ms Lucas elaborated on those grounds orally. We are very grateful to both Mr Walker and Mr Lucas for their very real and considerable assistance in dealing with this matter. They were able to ensure that, in fairness to the appellant, who as a litigant in person had not appealed against the sanction, the appropriateness of the sanction was considered by this Court.[51]We adopt the approach set out by the Supreme Court in Attorney General v Crosland [2021] UKSC 15 at paragraph 44. We bear in mind the observation of Dingemans LJ in Macpherson v Sunderland City Council [2023] EWCA Civ 574 that the Court of Appeal may allow an appeal in relation to the sentence for contempt of court if it was wrong in principle of manifestly excessive. We also bear in mind the three objectives of sentencing in contempt cases as identified by Pitchford LJ in Willoughby v Solihull Metropolitan Borough Council [2013] EWCA Civ 699 at paragraph 20 and the observations in Liverpool Victoria Insurance Company v Dr Zafar [2019] EWCA Civ 392.[52]In his judgment on sanction, the judge began by setting out the approach in Crosland. He considered that a financial penalty was not appropriate and noted that it had not been suggested by counsel for the appellant that it would be. The judge emphasised the seriousness of false and lying claims which undermined the administration of justice.[53]The judge found that culpability was high. He found that the appellant’s lies were deliberate and perpetuated over a significant period and included the giving of false evidence on oath. They represented an attempt to deceive the court into awarding the appellant substantial damages. He also noted that the appellant had had no regard to the effect on Mrs Q but had deliberately and willingly victimised her, sacrificing her in his dishonest pursuit of damages.[54]In considering the effect on Mrs Q, the judge adopted the Sentencing Council Guidelines on Assault. He said he would have approached the matter as a category 1 offence under those guidelines as it involved high culpability and serious psychological harm and a substantial impact on the victim.[55]He considered that the appropriate sentence before any reduction for mitigation would have been at the maximum permitted – two years’ imprisonment. The judge identified the mitigation as follows. First, the appellant had no previous convictions. Secondly the appellant was a well-qualified individual who had destroyed his career prospects as the result of the case. Thirdly, the appellant was the father of two children aged six and nine. The children lived with their mother but the appellant lived nearby and the appellant had a close relationship with them and saw them every weekend. Any immediate sentence of imprisonment would have an impact on the two children. Fourthly, the appellant had been diagnosed as having type 2 diabetes. Finally, the appellant had lost everything as a result of this case and, from having been in good employment with a bank, was now unemployed and living on universal credit.[56]The judge considered that appropriate reduction to reflect the mitigation was four months. He, therefore, fixed the sentence as being 20 months’ imprisonment.[57]The judge considered whether to suspend the sentence. He had regard to the Sentencing Council Guidelines on the imposition of community and custodial sentences. In terms of the factors indicating that it would not be appropriate two were not relevant – the appellant did not present a risk to the public and there was no history of poor compliance with court orders. The third factor, which was relevant, was whether appropriate punishment could only be achieved by immediate custody. The judge did not consider that any of the three factors indicating that a suspended sentence was appropriate, namely whether there was a realistic prospect of rehabilitation, strong personal mitigation or that immediate custody would result in significant harmful impact on others. The judge concluded that appropriate punishment could only be achieved by immediate custody. He declined therefore to suspend the sentence. He also ordered the appellant to pay costs of £150,000.[58]We deal first with the second and third submissions advanced by counsel in their written skeleton argument and elaborated in oral submissions. First, we consider that the judge did err in having regard in this case to the Sentencing Council Guidelines on Assault. We accept that it is appropriate to refer to relevant Sentencing Council Guidelines. However, the offences in this case were contempt. They involved the making of false allegations and the fabrication of evidence in tribunal proceedings. Those are offences which undermine the administration of justice. We accept the impact on individuals may be an aggravating feature particularly as here, where the false statements were made about a person who was a party and a witness. But this was not an offence of assault. It was wrong, therefore, to use the Sentencing Council Guidelines on Assault. Further the Guideline used, although not specifically identified, appears (judging from the language used) to be that for inflicting grievous bodily harm where the maximum sentence is five years’ imprisonment, with a starting point of four years’ imprisonment in the circumstances identified by the judge. That is at least double the maximum sentence for contempt which stands at two years. That was an error and appears to have influenced the judge in reaching a decision that the sentence for these contempts should be the maximum available in law subject to any reduction for mitigation. We, therefore, consider that the judge has erred.[59]We have considered matters afresh. We bear in mind the approach in Crosland. We agree entirely with the judge that these were very serious contempts. As the judge said, the appellant’s lies were deliberate and perpetuated over a significant period and included the giving of false evidence on oath. They represented an attempt to deceive the court into awarding the appellant substantial damages. We regard the impact of these false allegations against Mrs Q, who was one of the parties and a witness, to be serious.[60]We are satisfied that a fine would not be an appropriate penalty. It is clear that only a custodial sentence is appropriate. We consider that it is appropriate to impose a sentence which reflects the entirety of the 11 allegations that are proven (and we bear in mind that we have allowed the appeal in relation to one allegation although, as we have said, we regard that as a relatively minor matter in comparison to the other contempts).[61]We are satisfied that a sentence before any reduction for mitigation in the region of 12 months would be appropriate for the contempts committed here. We accept that the judge correctly identified the five mitigating factors, as summarised above, and we agree that a reduction of four months to reflect those mitigating factors is appropriate. We note that the appellant has shown no remorse for his actions. There would be no justifiable basis, therefore, for treating remorse as an additional mitigation.[62]We regard a sanction of eight months’ imprisonment, having regard to the seriousness of the offences, the aggravating factor (of the severe impact on one of the parties to the tribunal proceedings, who was also a witness) and the mitigating factors as the shortest that can be imposed.[63]We do not accept the fourth submission advanced on behalf of the appellant in the skeleton argument and elaborated in oral argument. The judge approached the matter of sanctions first, irrespective of the question of any application for costs. Costs was an incidental matter dealt with separately and, it seems, it was accepted that the appellant had no assets available to meet the costs order (or an earlier order). It was not imposed as a fine or punishment but to reflect costs incurred. We have taken a similar approach when dealing with the appeal against sanction. We have determined the appropriate sanction by reference to the seriousness of the contempts, having regard in particular, to culpability and harm in the way described above. There is no separate appeal against the costs order.[64]We turn then to ground 1 and the question of whether or not the sentence can be suspended. We recognise that the judge considered that appropriate punishment could only be achieved by a sentence of immediate custody, but that was in a context where he considered the appropriate sanction was 20 months’ imprisonment and we consider it is 8 months’ imprisonment.[65]We have had regard to the Sentencing Council Guideline on the Imposition of Community and Custodial Sentences. We agree that the factors pointing towards suspending the sentence do not apply. There is no evidence from which we could infer that there was a realistic prospect of rehabilitation. The appellant has shown no remorse or any indication that what he did was wrong. Whilst there is mitigation, as we have said, we do not regard it as strong personal mitigation within the meaning of this guideline. We recognise that there will be an impact on the appellant’s two children. But we do not regard this as a case where immediate custody will result in significant harm to the children. They live with their mother. They do have a close relationship with their father and the material before us indicates he sees them at weekends. That will not happen during the period of custody. That is an adverse impact on two entirely innocent children. But we do not consider that this will result in significant harm.[66]For completeness, we do not consider that the judge overlooked this factor, as submitted on behalf of the appellant. The judge referred to it at paragraph 9 – he said the separation would have an impact on the children in terms of real and serious upset. But it is implicit that he did not consider that this would result in significant harm. We have, in any event, formed our own view on this matter.[67]In terms of the factors pointing to an immediate custodial sentence, the relevant factor of the ones mentioned in the Sentencing Council Guideline is whether appropriate punishment can only be achieved by immediate custody. We have considered this matter very carefully. We do regard these as very serious contempts. The appellant made false allegations deliberately, and over a period of time, and fabricated evidence, in order to obtain damages. Those false allegations were made without regard to their impact on the individuals concerned. These actions strike at the heart of the administration of justice. They would, if not detected, have undermined the system of justice in our country. We are sure that appropriate punishment can only be achieved by immediate custody.[68]We are informed that the appellant has spent three days in custody before being released on bail pending this appeal. We will take that into account in the sanction.[69]Accordingly, we will commit the appellant to prison for a period of eight months less three days.

Conclusion

[70]In relation to the appeal against the findings of contempt, we grant permission to amend in relation to grounds 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10. We allow the appeal in relation to ground 3 (concerning ground 26 of the allegations of contempt). We dismiss the appeal on all other grounds.[71]In relation to sanction, we allow the appeal against the sanction of imprisonment for 20 months. We substitute a sanction of eight months’ imprisonment less three days.