“Dealing with the preliminary issue relating to costs, the Claimant’s position is that ordinarily this would be a fixed costs case but matters have arisen which mean that there are exceptional circumstances which warrant this matter falling out of the fixed costs regime. One of the key issues is the lack of negotiation or attempts at negotiation by the Defendant or lack of engagement in correspondence until very recent times ... Offers have been made by the Claimant, neither of which bites for today’s purposes in terms of Part 36 offers, but taking all those matters into the round the Claimant submits that this is a case which warrants the case falling out of the fixed costs regime. Mr Kay, on behalf of the Defendant, said there is nothing exceptional about this case. None of the offers, albeit made, have come close to fruition today in terms of the settlement and the matter is a very standard case which would be dealt with on the fixed costs regime. I have to say I am more persuaded by Mr Kay’s submissions on that point. There are perhaps matters where the Defendants ought to have engaged further with the Claimants but, ultimately, they were effectively at loggerheads in terms of liability and quantum and both matters were properly taken through to court. I do not think it was unreasonable for the Defendants to import their defence all the way to today for purposes of assessment and it is not unusual for matters of this nature to settle at the door of the court. I also bear in mind that the settlement sum is much lower than was ever proposed on behalf of the Claimant. In all those circumstances I allow the fixed costs as ordinarily would be sought.”
“……upon the parties having agreed damages (subject to approval) at£2,650 but asking the Court to determine the issue of costs…. IT IS ORDERED THAT: 1. The Claimant may accept the sum of£2,650.00 in satisfaction of the claim. 2. The Defendant shall pay the Claimant’s fixed costs of the action summarily assessed in the sum of£7,114,50 . 3. The Defendant shall pay both damages and costs to the Claimant’s solicitors by 4 pm on18 December 2020 .”
“I am unpersuaded this rejected 90:10 liability offer can be fitted into the terms ofCPR 36.17 (1)(b) consistently with the wording, integrity and practicality of theCPR 36.17 mechanism. Trying to do so strains the language of the provision, undermines its careful balance, and introduces a degree of complexity and uncertainty which I am not persuaded is within its contemplation. It is a provision that relies on its clarity, simplicity and predictability for the incentivising effects which put it at the heart of the Part 36 code.”
“In my judgment, I am bound by the decision in the Mundy case. The defendant never conceded liability. A global settlement was put to the deputy district judge, albeit without any discussion of discounts from full liability damages. Had the claimant wished to protect his position, he could have made a realistic global Part 36 offer but, in my judgment, DDJ Khan was right to find that the Part 36 offer on liability did not bite.””
“Failing to award the Claimant all, or any, of the consequences provided for under Part 36.17 (4), when, the Claimant contends, the order made by the judge was a judgment which was at least as advantageous to the Claimant as a Part 36 offer which the Claimant had made and there was no finding such consequences would be unjust.”
“contain some genuine element of concession on the part of the claimant, to which a significant value can be attached in the context of the litigation… which it is in the [offeror’s] power to give up at the time when the offer is made.”
“46. In the White Book commentary toCPR 40.1 there is a discussion as to the meaning of a "judgment" or "order" under the RSC and the CPR. It is pointed out that although the CPR refers to the two terms, sometimes in conjunction and sometimes not, "no basis for distinguishing between them can be derived from the rules themselves". ………………. 49. If one has regard to what the Consent Order does rather than what it says it requires Bolton to pay a specified sum in respect of Vanden's claims. As far as those claims are concerned it is a final order. If there was judgment for Vanden on its damages claims following a trial a court order for payment in similar terms would be likely to be made. Although the Consent Order does not use the wording of adjudication or judgment, the order it makes is to the same effect as one which would be made following a judgment. 50. Since in substance and in effect the order for payment made by the Consent Order is the same as would be made following a judgment I consider that the judge was correct to conclude that it is to be treated as a judgment for the purpose of the rule that satisfaction of a judgment bars claims against tortfeasors liable for the same damage.”
“70. ... I do not think that the court is required to measure the offer against the likely outcome in a case such as this. In this type of litigation a claimant with a strong case will often be prepared to accept a discount from the full value of the claim to reflect the uncertainties of litigation. Such offers are not usually based on the likely apportionment of liability but merely reflect the reality that most claimants prefer certainty to the ordeal of a trial and uncertainty about its outcome. If such a discount is offered and rejected there is nothing unjust in allowing the claimant to receive the incentives to which he or she is entitled under the Rules. On the contrary, I would say that this is a just result. 71. I would however add that if it was self-evident that the offer made was merely a tactical step designed to secure the benefit of the incentives provided by the Rule (e.g. an offer to settle for 99.9% of the full value of the claim) I would agree with Jonathan Parker L.J. that the judge would have a discretion to refuse indemnity costs. But that cannot be said of the offer made in this case, which I think did provide the Defendant with a real opportunity for settlement even though it did not represent any possible apportionment of liability. I would therefore allow this appeal.”
“I do not regard this outcome as surprising or so unfair to the Defendant that it requires the court to equate fixed costs with costs assessed on the indemnity basis. As Mr Williams [counsel for the Claimant] says, a generous outcome in such circumstances is consistent with Rule 36.14(3) [now Rule 36.17] as a whole and its policy of providing claimants with generous incentives to make offers and defendants with countervailing incentives to accept them.”