Entry Clearance Officer v FA [2026] EWCA Civ 1014

[2026] EWCA Civ 1014Case No CA-2025-002430
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER)
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE DOVE,
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SMITH AND
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE OWENS
AND UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE OWENS AND
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BAGRAL
UI-2024-004205
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 30 July 2026LADY JUSTICE ANDREWSLORD JUSTICE LEWISLORD JUSTICE WARBYENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICERAppellantFARespondent
Zane Malik KC (instructed by Government Legal Department) for AppellantDavid Chirico KC and Catherine Robinson (instructed by Bindmans) for RespondentHearing Hearing date: 26 June 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 2pm on 30 July 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................
[1]This appeal concerns FA, who is a 67 year old Palestinian woman resident in Gaza. FA wishes to travel to the United Kingdom for private medical treatment. FA proposes to stay with her daughter who has lived in the United Kingdom since 2006. FA applied for entry clearance as visitor in order to be able to come to the United Kingdom. This was refused. FA also contends that refusal of leave to enter to enable her to join her daughter and receive private medical treatment in the United Kingdom would be incompatible with her right to respect for her family life guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”). The appellant, an entry clearance officer, refused the application for entry clearance as a visitor as he was not satisfied that FA would leave the United Kingdom and return to Gaza. There is an issue as to whether the officer also refused the claim that refusal of entry clearance would be a breach of FA’s human rights. If the officer had done so, there would be a statutory right of appeal against that refusal to the First-tier Tribunal.[2]The First-tier Tribunal found that there had been no refusal of a human rights claim and it had no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal. In any event, the First-tier Tribunal held that, if it had jurisdiction, it would have dismissed the appeal as FA had not established that she enjoyed family life with her daughter in the sense required by Article 8 of the Convention.[3]On appeal, the Upper Tribunal held, first, that the First-tier Tribunal had erred in law in deciding that the entry clearance officer had not refused a human rights claim. It therefore set aside the decision and remade it. The Upper Tribunal held that FA enjoyed a family life with her daughter as there was “effective, real and committed support both in terms of financial and emotional support”. The Upper Tribunal, disagreeing with the entry clearance officer, decided that FA would have returned to Gaza at the end of her visit to the United Kingdom. As the Upper Tribunal considered that FA was a genuine visitor, she could meet the relevant requirements of the Immigration Rules. There was, therefore, no public interest in refusing her entry to the United Kingdom and to do so was incompatible with Article 8 of the Convention.[4]The entry clearance officer appeals on eight grounds. They can be conveniently summarised as follows, namely, the Upper Tribunal was wrong:(1) to hold that it had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal;(2) to interfere with the First-tier Tribunal’s conclusion that Article 8 was not engaged;(3) to interfere with the First-tier Tribunal’s conclusion that FA was unable to meet the requirements for entry clearance as a visitor;(4) in holding that the family life limb of Article 8 was engaged;(5) in holding that the private life limb of Article 8 was engaged;(6) to assume the role of primary decision-maker and to determine for itself whether FA qualified for entry clearance for the purpose of medical treatment as a visitor;(7) in holding that FA met the requirements for entry clearance as a visitor;(8) in failing to conduct a proportionality balancing exercise and failing to have regard to relevant factors. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK Leave to enter

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

[5]Subject to immaterial exceptions, non-British nationals seeking to enter the United Kingdom require leave. A person may be granted leave to enter for a limited or an indefinite period and the leave may be subject to conditions. The Secretary of State is to lay statements of the rules laid down by her as to the practice to be followed for regulating the entry into, and stay in, the United Kingdom (these are the Immigration Rules). See generally section 3(1) and (2) of the Immigration Act 1971 (“the 1971 Act”).[6]Appendix V to the Immigration Rules sets out the requirements that a person must meet if the person wishes to come to the United Kingdom as a visitor. Individuals seeking to come to the United Kingdom for private medical treatment are eligible to apply for entry clearance as a visitor. They must satisfy the requirements of Appendix V including the requirements in paragraph V.4.2 which provides that:
“V 4.2 The applicant must satisfy the decision maker that they are a genuine visitor. This means that the applicant: (a) will leave the UK at the end of their visit; and (b) will not live in the UK for extended periods through frequent or successive visits, or make the UK their main home; and (c) is genuinely seeking entry for a purpose that is permitted by the visitor routes (these are listed in Appendices 3, 4 and 5); and (d) will not undertake any prohibited activities set out in V 4.5 – V 4.10; and (e) must have sufficient funds to cover all reasonable costs in relation to their visit without working or accessing public funds. This includes the cost of the return or onward journey, any costs relating to dependants, and the cost of planned activities such as private medical treatment.” (a) will leave the UK at the end of their visit; and (b) will not live in the UK for extended periods through frequent or successive visits, or make the UK their main home; and (c) is genuinely seeking entry for a purpose that is permitted by the visitor routes (these are listed in Appendices 3, 4 and 5); and (d) will not undertake any prohibited activities set out in V 4.5 – V 4.10; and (e) must have sufficient funds to cover all reasonable costs in relation to their visit without working or accessing public funds. This includes the cost of the return or onward journey, any costs relating to dependants, and the cost of planned activities such as private medical treatment.”
[7]There is no statutory right of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal against a decision of an entry clearance officer that an applicant does not meet the requirements of Appendix V to the Immigration Rules.

Human rights claims and appeals

[8]An individual may, in addition to applying for entry clearance as a visitor, make what is referred to as a human rights claim, that is, in effect, a claim that the refusal of leave to enter to allow the applicant to join family members in the United Kingdom is incompatible with the right to respect for family life under Article 8 of the Convention. There is a right of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal against the refusal of a human rights claim.[9]Section 82 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”) provides so far as material that: “82 Right of appeal to the Tribunal (1) A person (“P”) may appeal to the Tribunal where— ….., (b) the Secretary of State has decided to refuse a human rights claim made by P …..”.[10]Section 84(2) of the 2002 Act provides that:
“(2) An appeal under section 82(1)(b) (refusal of human rights claim) must be brought on the ground that the decision is unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.”
[11]A human rights claim is defined in section 113 of the 2002 Act as: “a claim made by a person to the Secretary of State at a place designated by the Secretary of State that to remove the person from or require him to leave the United Kingdom or to refuse him entry into the United Kingdom would be unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (c. 42) (public authority not to act contrary to Convention)…”.[12]A decision refusing a human rights claim will be unlawful if is incompatible with a Convention right, that is the rights set out in schedule 1 to the Human Rights Act 1998 (“the 1998 Act”). They include Article 8 which provides that:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
[13]For the purposes of the present case, the important concepts are first, that Article 8(1) guarantees a right of respect for family life. That inevitably raises the question of whether a person has a family life within the meaning of Article 8(1). Secondly, the next question is whether there is “an interference” with that family life within the meaning of Article 8(1). Thirdly, if there has been an interference with a person’s right to respect for family life, then the question is whether that interference is justified under Article 8(2) of the Convention. It is better to use language which identifies clearly which question is being addressed. References to Article 8 being “engaged”, although common, are rarely helpful as they do not indicate whether what is being discussed is whether family life exists, or whether there has been an interference with family life, or whether an interference is justified and proportionate under Article 8(2).[14]A further consideration is that a state is only required to guarantee rights under the Convention for persons within their jurisdiction. Article 1 of the Convention provides that: The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights as defined in Section 1 of this Convention.”[15]A state’s jurisdiction is primarily territorial, that is it exercises jurisdiction throughout its territory. There are exceptional circumstances where acts performed in, or producing effects outside, the state’s territory constitute an exercise of jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention, Consequently, persons resident abroad who have no connection with the United Kingdom will not generally be able to rely on Convention rights as against public authorities here.[16]One situation where persons outside the United Kingdom may try to claim that the United Kingdom is obliged to respect their Convention rights is when they claim that they have family life with persons resident in the United Kingdom and need to be allowed to enter the United Kingdom to resume that family life. The position is explained in IA v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1516 at paragraph 100 where the Court of Appeal said:
“100. It seems to us that all these cases point in the same direction. Whilst persons seeking to enter an ECHR state from outside the jurisdiction of the ECHR will not have their own rights under article 8, if they have pre-existing family life with a person within the territory of the ECtHR, article 8 may impose a positive obligation on a state to admit those people, if they have family life with a person within the territory. That is what is meant by family life being unitary (see para 141 under ground 2 below). The concept of unitary family life does not, however, mean that the state is under a positive obligation to admit every member of the wider family of the person within the territory of the UK.”
[17]That raised the issue in IA, and in this case, of when there is family life within the meaning of Article 8 between a person resident abroad and a person resident in the United Kingdom. I deal with that below.

THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND

[18]The facts can be taken from the decision of the Upper Tribunal. As it noted, the facts were not in dispute.

FA’s history and circumstances

[19]FA is a 67-year-old woman who is a Palestinian resident in Gaza. She was born in Jordan in 1956 and was made to enter an arranged marriage when she was 13 or 14 years old. She and her husband had nine children. At some stage, the husband went to Gaza with their son and four of their daughters. The trip was supposed to last three weeks but they were not able to return after they entered Gaza as they lost their refugee status and were unable to return to Jordan.[20]FA, her daughter, and the three other, younger children remained in Jordan. The daughter started working in a grocery store at the age of 11 to support her mother and siblings while they were living in Jordan. The daughter shared responsibility with FA for bringing up the three younger children.[21]The Upper Tribunal records what happened next in the following paragraphs of their judgment (referring to the daughter as the sponsor as she is the person sponsoring FA’s application for entry clearance as a visitor):
“64. After about five years of separation, the appellant decided to visit Gaza with her four daughters (including the sponsor) to bring her remaining children back to Jordan. She obtained visitor permits. At this point the sponsor was aged 14 or 15. However, their documents were also cancelled as soon as they crossed the border. By this point the appellant’s husband was elderly and unwell and the appellant herself was not able to work because she was lacking in education and looking after the family. The sponsor took a job in Gaza to support her family. She continued to work to support the family throughout her entire childhood and adulthood until she left Gaza. She worked whilst she was at school, whilst she completed her degree in English literature at the University of Gaza and afterwards worked in a charity in Gaza to support her mother and siblings. The only income came from the sponsor and the family were living in poverty and overcrowded conditions, often going without food. There were also bombardments at times.” 65. The appellant was very depressed and unhappy in her marriage and confided in the sponsor from when she was very young child. The appellant shared personal things with the sponsor which she did not share with her other children because the sponsor is the second oldest child and was the oldest child left with her when they were in Jordan (separated from the remainder of the family) for several years and because of the long term financial support that the sponsor has provided to her mother. The appellant continues to share intimate information with the sponsor . For instance she confided to the sponsor that she is incontinent and has confided in the sponsor about her most intimate personal feelings including her suicidal thoughts. 66. The bond between the appellant and the sponsor is stronger than that between the appellant and her other adult children although she does have a strong relationship with her daughters in Gaza and her grandchildren. 67. Eventually the appellant and her husband were divorced. He died of cancer in 2009. 68. The sponsor lived with her mother as part of her household from 1975 when she was born until 2006. 69. The sponsor assisted her mother to purchase a house in Gaza city in August 2006 for USD 35,000 raising USD 10,000 by selling her car, borrowing money and using her savings. The sponsor and appellant went house hunting together and chose the flat because it was near a market the appellant loved, in a lively area. Until they purchased the house the sponsor had always paid the rent on her mother’s property. The family intend to do up the flat after the war. 70. In 2006, the sponsor travelled to the UK to do a Master’s degree for which she had been awarded a scholarship. She was intending to return to Gaza after her degree and move back in with her mother, sisters and brother in law. She was unable to return initially because of the political situation. Hamas had taken over and the borders were blocked and then because she obtained work and met her husband. The couple met in 2008 and married in 2013. The sponsor’s husband has four adult children from a previous relationship. The sponsor and her husband do not have children together. 71. She is not currently able to visit her mother in Gaza. 73. The sponsor and appellant have not lived as part of the same household since 2006. 74. The appellant has only been able to visit her mother three times since she left Gaza. She travelled to meet her mother in Turkey twice and then organised a longer period of time to stay with her mother with extended family members in Jordan between August and November 2022. The appellant had treatment for her spinal condition in Jordan. The sponsor and appellant had daily communication by telephone prior to the current conflict. It has been more difficult to communicate but they continue to communicate as frequently as possible. 75. The family perception is that because the sponsor does not have any other children unlike her siblings and has always been the appellant’s financial provider that she has responsibility for her mother. 76. The sponsor has been providing her mother with financial support since she left Gaza in 2006. She also arranged for her to receive parcels of medication, painkillers, make up and underwear through individuals in her charity. 77. When the war started she was able to get some food and female hygiene products to the appellant and her sisters. 77. The sponsor continues to provide ongoing financial support. When the war first started she made transfers into her sister’s bank account which could be collected through an exchange office for a large fee. She is now sending money through “Wise” which goes through a bank account in Europe and then Jordan to a transfer agency in Gaza. The agency takes a large fee. The sponsor also occasionally sends some money to her sister’s bank account. She also sends money to an individual who has an exchange business in Gaza but has family members in Europe. After the money is deposited in Europe, the exchange in Gaza is notified and he gives the money to the appellant minus the fee. The sponsor is sending increasing amounts because the price of food has increased. The sponsor is currently the only person providing her mother with financial support. Her sister based in Jordan has lost her employment. 78.In the past, the sponsor used to telephone the appellant every week on a Saturday. After the arrival of the internet she called her mother every day until the start of the war in October 2023. The sponsor currently texts the appellant every day even if she cannot respond. She also talks to the appellant as often as possible which is currently difficult as the appellant has to go to a local shop to charge her phone. 79. The sponsor provides her mother with emotional support. Her mother shares with her private and intimate information about her health problems which she does not share with her other children. The sponsor provides her mother with reassurance. 80. The appellant is currently living in her old home in Gaza city with two daughters, one son-in-law and grandson. The building is bomb damaged and there is no electricity or running water. Food is in short supply. Conditions are very poor. The appellant is close to her daughters in Gaza but is closer emotionally to the sponsor. 81 Another daughter is in Turkey, two daughters are in Jordan and her son is in Greece. Two further daughters live in the Al Mawasi camp. They are married with families. After the war started the appellant and her two daughters left their home in Gaza city and moved to the Al Mawasi camp and lived in a temporary shelter.”

FA’s current medical needs

[22]FA has a condition called spinal stenosis which causes her severe and chronic lower back pain and left sided sciatica with numbness as well as paraplegia. A 2020 MRI scan of the lumbar spine showed a lumbar disc prolapse with canal stenosis.[23]The proposal was that FA would receive private medical treatment at a hospital in the United Kingdom. The treatment would initially comprise of physiotherapy, pain management and spinal injections. If this treatment is not effective, the appellant will have decompression surgery. The estimated treatment time is three to six months and if the appellant needs an operation she will need a recovery period of 6 weeks and a further 6 weeks physiotherapy. FA will also receive counselling and medication such as anti-depressants or other medication for her mental health.[24]The cost of the treatment would be provided for by FA’s daughter who will also support her and provide accommodation during FA’s stay in the United Kingdom if she is given leave to enter. The application was for entry clearance for a visit lasting up to six months.

FA’s daughter

[25]As indicated, FA’s daughter has lived in the United Kingdom since 2006. She is married but does not have children.[26]The Upper Tribunal also records the fact that the daughter’s mental health has deteriorated since the beginning of military action in Gaza. It provides details of her condition, and the fact that her mental health may benefit if FA is allowed to come to the United Kingdom for treatment.

The application for entry clearance as a visitor

[27]On 8 December 2023, FA applied for a visitor visa using the relevant application form. That form records that the main purpose of the visit to the United Kingdom was private medical treatment and gave details of the proposed hospital. It also referred to a letter of representation from her solicitors, Bindmans. The form recorded that the proposed date of entry was 1 January 2024 and that FA planned to leave the United Kingdom on 1 July 2024.[28]On 22 March 2024, FA’s solicitors sent a letter before claim in connection with the application for a visit visa. That letter referred to Article 8 of the Convention, but in the context of whether the application should be pre-determined, that is, that the decision as to whether to grant entry clearance should be taken in principle with biometric details being supplied later (when FA arrived in Cairo).[29]There was further correspondence from solicitors. On 17 May 2024, the solicitors wrote a further letter. That said that if FA did not meet the requirements for a visit visa in the Immigration Rules, then the entry clearance officer should exercise his residual discretion to grant permission to enter. The letter then set out detailed reasons as to why FA had a right to respect for family life under Article 8 of the Convention and why the refusal of entry clearance would be incompatible with that right.

The decision

[30]By letter dated 24 May 2024, the entry clearance officer wrote saying that the “application for a visit visa has been refused”. The reasons were set out on the next page. Those reasons note that the visit visa was being refused because FA did not meet certain requirements of the Immigration Rules. It notes that documents sent by FA’s solicitors had been considered including the letter of 17 May 2024. The reasons then deal with why the entry clearance officer was not satisfied that FA would leave the United Kingdom and return to Gaza at the end of the proposed visit.[31]The reasons then say this:
“I note that the ‘Letter before Claim’ provided by Bindmans LLP on your behalf states that Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights is relevant to your application. I have considered statements made in the ‘Letter before Claim’ provided by Bindmans LLP regarding human rights when considering your application and I am satisfied that your application is not capable of engaging human rights and therefore a human rights claim has not been made. To engage Article 8, the claim must demonstrate a family relationship and the relationship in question must be one that can engage the right to respect for family life. Home office guidance “Considering human rights claims in visit applications” states that the only relationship scenarios that may engage Article 8 in visit applications are spouse, parent to a minor or a minor child. Therefore, I am not satisfied that your application can engage the right to respect for family life as the relationship in question is that of a parent (yourself to and adult (your sponsor). Consequently, this decision to refuse your visa application is not a refusal of a human rights claim and there is no right of appeal against this refusal. The additional information provided by Bindmans LLP received by us on 17/05/2024 states that they are of the view that discretion is appropriate and should be exercised in your case. It has been considered whether the particular circumstances set out in your application constitute exceptional circumstances which might warrant a grant of leave to the UK outside the requirements of the Immigration Rules. In support of your application, you have raised circumstances such as your medical condition and conflict. These circumstances have been carefully considered, but your application does not fall for a grant of leave on a discretionary basis. I acknowledge the statements made as a part of your application, however, it is also noted that you have applied to visit the UK and therefore the maximum period of stay would be 6 months. Given that the circumstances laid out in your application appear to be pre-existing and indefinite in length, I am not satisfied that the grant of a temporary visa with limited leave is appropriate regarding the circumstances laid out in your application.”
.

The appeal to the First-tier Tribunal

[32]FA appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. She contended that the entry clearance officer had refused her human rights claim and therefore she was entitled to appeal under section 82(1)(b) of the 2002 Act.[33]FA asked that the First-tier Tribunal accept that she had made a human rights claim and had a right of appeal. On 17 June 2024, a judge at the First-tier Tribunal decided that Article 8 had been raised and considered by the entry clearance officer. The substance, or merits, of the officer’s decision that Article 8 was “not engaged” was a matter for the First-tier Tribunal to consider on appeal.[34]By a decision dated 23 July 2024, a different judge of the First-tier Tribunal reviewed that decision. That judge noted that it was accepted that FA had made a human rights claim. However, the judge concluded that “there has been no substantive engagement by the [entry clearance officer] with the article 8 claim at all”. She, therefore, held that there had not been a refusal of a human rights claim and held that the First-tier Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal. The First-tier Tribunal went on, in any event, to consider the substantive merits of the appeal and held that there had been no interference with FA’s family life. FA had lived in a separate country for 18 years and while there was emotional support from the daughter that was inherent and did not evidence family life between FA and her daughter. The First-tier Tribunal held that the refusal of entry clearance did not interfere with any rights derived from Article 8 as FA and her daughter could continue their relationship in the same way that they had over the previous 18 years. The formal decision was that the “appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction”.

The Upper Tribunal Decision on jurisdiction

[35]The Upper Tribunal considered in its first decision dated 4 March 2025 whether the First-tier Tribunal had erred in law in holding that it did not have jurisdiction because the entry clearance officer had not refused a human rights claim.[36]The Upper Tribunal noted that it was accepted that FA had made a human rights claim. The question was whether the entry clearance officer had refused that claim. It noted that the fact that a person had made a claim did not mean that any reaction to it by the Secretary of State or an entry clearance officer would amount to an acceptance or a refusal of that claim. The entry clearance officer could refuse a human rights claim – or he could decline to deal with it or reject the claim. A decision-maker may not deal with the human rights claim because he had decided to defer consideration of it to a later date or had not realised that a human rights claim had been made. A decision-maker may reject a human rights claim because, for example, the claim was invalid for procedural reasons.[37]The Upper Tribunal held that, in the present case, the decision-maker had not said he was not considering the human rights claim. As it said at paragraph 59:
“However, this is not analogous to the decision in MY. It was not a refusal to engage with the claim but a refusal to accept that the application was capable of engaging Article 8 ECHR. In other words, the decision maker did not accept that Article 8(1) was met. The appellant was not told that it was open to her to make an application on another form or in another way. Instead, the decision maker considered whether the relationship between appellant and Sponsor amounted to family life and decided that it was not capable of doing so. This is in effect a decision that the first stage of the “Razgar” test was not met. That is as much a refusal of a human rights claim as if the decision maker had decoded that there was family life and had then gone on to consider whether interference with it was proportionate. The decision is for that reason a refusal of a human rights claim.”
[38]The Upper Tribunal then went on to consider whether the error was material as the First-tier Tribunal had gone on to make findings in the alternative. It concluded that the error on jurisdiction “may have impacted on the First-tier Tribunal’s consideration of the Article 8 claim, in particular whether family life exists between” FA and her daughter. For that reason, the Upper Tribunal decided to set aside the entirety of the decision with no findings of fact preserved.

The Upper Tribunal decision on Article 8

[39]The Upper Tribunal then held a further hearing, at which it heard evidence, and considered whether the refusal of an entry clearance as a visitor was compatible with Article 8 of the Convention.[40]It considered first whether FA had a family life, within the meaning of Article 8, with her daughter in the United Kingdom. At paragraph 16 of its decision, having reviewed the case law existing at that time, it said that: “As can be seen the test is whether there is “effective or real or committed support”…”.[41]The Upper Tribunal then reviewed the facts which, as it said, were not in dispute. It held that:
“107. Taking into account the evidence in the round, we are satisfied that the relationship between the appellant and sponsor exceeds the normal emotional ties between adult family members and that there is effective, real and committed support both in terms of financial and emotional support. There is the existence of close personal ties. 108. Gathering all of these facts and principles together, on the unique and exceptional facts of this appeal we find that family life exists between the sponsor and the appellant despite them being adult relatives and, despite them not living in a family unit for many years and the small number of visits. We find that the consequences of ongoing separation are of sufficient gravity to engage Article 8 (1) ECHR because of the deteriorating mental health of the sponsor in the UK, and the real possibility that they may never be able to have family life in person together in the future.”
[42]The Upper Tribunal then went on to hold that the refusal of entry clearance amounted to an interference with family life within the meaning of Article 8(1) of the Convention. It then considered whether the interference was proportionate and justified under Article 8(2) of the Convention. It resolved that question by considering first whether FA would return to Gaza at the conclusion of the visit (the entry clearance officer having decided that he was not satisfied that she would leave the United Kingdom and return to Gaza). The Upper Tribunal found that she was a genuine visitor and said:
“117. We find that the appellant is a genuine visitor who will leave at the end of her visit and that she can therefore meet paragraph 4.2 of Appendix V of the Immigration Rules. 118. In our view this is determinative of the appeal as submitted by Mr Chirico in accordance with TZ(Pakistan) and PG (India) [2018] EWCA Civ 1109. The appellant can meet the requirements of the immigration rules and there is therefore no public interest in refusing her entry to the UK. 119. Given that we find that this is determinative of the appeal we see no need to address any of the other submissions made in respect of the wider proportionality exercise.”
[43]The Upper Tribunal therefore allowed the appeal pursuant to Article 8 of the Convention. The entry clearance officer appealed.

GROUND 1 - JURISDICTION

[44]Mr Malik KC, for the appellant, the entry clearance officer, submitted that the Upper Tribunal had erred in concluding that the entry clearance officer had refused a human rights claim. He submitted that an application for a visit visa did not inherently involve a human rights claim, relying on MY (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWCA Civ 1500; [2022] 1WLR 238. In the present case, the entry clearance officer had not been refusing a human rights claim. He had not embarked on any consideration of Article 8 but rather decided that Article 8 was not engaged. He then said in his decision “this decision is not a refusal of human rights”. In that regard, the entry clearance officer was following the relevant guidance which said, at its step 3, that the entry clearance officer should ask “Are the matters raised capable of engaging human rights?” and if the answer was no “then refuse the claim with no right of appeal”.[45]Mr Chirico KC, with Ms Robinson, for the respondent FA, submitted that in order to determine whether the First-tier Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear an appeal under section 82(1)(b) of the 2002 Act two questions arose:(1) has the person made a human rights claim and(2) what has the decision-maker done with the claim? Further, he accepted that it was not the case that an application for a visitor’s visa inherently involved a human rights claim. The decision-maker could accept a human rights claim (in which case, leave would be granted), refuse it (in which case there was an appeal) or not decide the substance of the claim.[46]In the present case, the Upper Tribunal (as had the First-tier Tribunal) correctly accepted that FA had made a human rights claim within the meaning of section 113 of the 2002 Act. Viewed objectively, the entry clearance officer had considered and refused that claim. He had considered whether the relationship between FA and the daughter amounted to family life within the meaning of Article 8 and decided that it did not. That was the refusal of a human rights claim.

Discussion

[47]A human rights claim can include a claim that a decision(a) to remove a person(b) to require him to leave the United Kingdom or(c) “to refuse him entry into the United Kingdom” would be unlawful because it would be incompatible with a Convention right: see section 113 of the 2002 Act. A person has a right of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal where the Secretary of State has decided to refuse a human rights claim: see section 82(1)(b) of the 2002 Act.[48]There is a distinction between a “decision to refuse” a human rights claim and “the non-determination” of the claim. The former involves a conscious consideration of a claim that a particular decision (or a failure to act in a particular way) would be incompatible with a Convention right. The decision-maker will have addressed the question of whether acting, or not acting, in the way requested would be incompatible with a Convention right. If the decision-maker decides that such a decision would not be incompatible with a Convention right, he may decide to refuse the human rights claim. That state of affairs is different from a situation where the decision-maker does not address the question of whether or not action (or inaction) would be incompatible with a Convention right, and declines to decide or determine that question. That would not be a decision refusing a human rights claim: it would be a decision not to determine that question.[49]In that regard, first, a person must have made a human rights claim within the meaning of section 113 which is capable of giving rise to a ground of appeal under section 84(2) of the 2002 Act. A mere assertion that a decision, or a failure to do something (such as a refusal to grant leave to enter) was a breach of that person’s human rights would not necessarily, without more, involve the making of a human rights claim. If there is insufficient information provided about the nature of the human rights claim made, the fact that a decision-maker has not acceded to that claim does not carry with it the inference that a decision-maker has decided to refuse the claim. The decision-maker may have decided he is not in a position to determine the substance of the human rights claim. Whether or not that is the case will depend upon the facts of a particular case.[50]Secondly, the fact that a person has made an application for leave on one basis under the Immigration Rules does not necessarily mean that the application also includes a human rights claim. Refusal of the application may not involve a decision to refuse the human rights claim; that may be left to be determined at a later date. That was the position in MY (Pakistan). There, the applicant made an application for indefinite leave to remain relying on the paragraphs of the Immigration Rules dealing with domestic violence. That application was refused and the decision letter recorded that any submissions relating to the applicant’s human rights “have not been considered” because an application for settlement as the victim of domestic violence was different from a human rights claim. Underhill LJ, with whom Baker and Carr LJJ agreed, distinguished between an application for leave to remain and a human rights claim as they are conceptually distinct. The latter is a claim that removal would be contrary to their Convention rights. Underhill LJ explained that not every application for leave necessarily involves a claim that removal would be a breach of a person’s Convention rights. He said at paragraph 41:
“….Where the application necessarily involves a human rights claim, in the sense discussed above, a refusal of the one must involve the refusal of the other. But where that is not the case there is nothing illogical in the Secretary of State choosing to refuse the application but to defer a decision on the human rights claim.”
[51]In MY (Pakistan), the application for indefinite leave to remain did not necessarily involve a claim that removal would breach the applicant’s Convention rights. It was open to the Secretary of State, therefore, to decide to refuse the application for indefinite leave as the victim of domestic violence but not to refuse the human rights claim and to leave it to be determined at a later date. As Underhill LJ said at paragraph 46:
“46. Of course the fact that the application and the human rights claim are distinct does not mean that the Secretary of State could not in principle have made a decision simultaneously to refuse both, albeit that that would have involved a departure from her one-application-at-a-time policy. But the terms of decision make it quite clear that she did not do so: rather, consistently with that policy, she refused the domestic violence application and said that she would deal with any human rights claim if a separate application were made…..”
[52]It is then a question of applying those principles to the particular facts of this case. First, I am satisfied that an application for leave to enter as a visitor does not inherently involve a claim that a refusal of leave to enter would be incompatible with the applicant’s Convention rights. There are a number of reasons why an individual may wish to travel to the United Kingdom. Many, probably most, of those applications would not involve any claim that the refusal of leave to enter was incompatible with a person’s Convention rights. Refusal of an application for entry clearance as a visitor would not, without more, constitute a refusal of a human rights claim.[53]Secondly, I am satisfied that FA was claiming that refusal of entry to the United Kingdom would involve a breach of Article 8 of the Convention. The letter of 17 May 2024 from FA’s solicitors expressly dealt with the possibility that the entry clearance officer might for some reason take the view that the requirements in the Immigration Rules for the grant of a visitor’s visa might not be satisfied. In which case, the letter said that the decision-maker had a “residual discretion to grant her permission to enter the UK for a temporary period of leave”. The letter then made detailed submissions as to why the refusal to exercise this residual discretion, and to refuse entry clearance, would be incompatible with FA’s right to family life with her daughter in the United Kingdom. FA was, therefore, making a human rights claim. Indeed, I note that both the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal considered that it was clear that FA had made a human rights claim.[54]The critical question then is whether or not the entry clearance considered and refused that human rights claim. The decision letter has to be read fairly and as a whole. It dealt in part with the question of whether FA satisfied the requirements of the Immigration Rules for the grant of a visit visa. But it also went on to consider the question of whether refusal of entry clearance would be compatible with Article 8 of the Convention. The decision letter said that it had considered the documents including the 17 May 2024 letter and the statements made in the pre-action protocol letter “regarding human rights when considering your application”. That indicates that the decision-maker did consider the substance of the representations about Article 8.[55]The reasoning in the decision letter then said two things: the “application is not capable of engaging human rights” and “therefore a human rights claim has not been made”. The letter went on to give further explanation. It said that to “engage Article 8” the claim must demonstrate a family relationship. It then stated that the only relationship scenarios that may, as the decision-maker puts it, “engage Article 8 in visit applications are spouse, parent to a minor or a minor child”. That is, in substance, a decision that the refusal of the claim that has been made would not be incompatible with Article 8 because the decision-maker (relying it seems on guidance) considered that there were only three types of situation which fell within the scope of family life for the purpose of Article 8 and this was not one of them. The suggestion that “Consequently, this decision to refuse your visa application is not a refusal of a human rights claim and there is no right of appeal against this refusal” does not follow from that conclusion. The question of whether the entry clearance officer was right to consider that the refusal of entry clearance did not involve a breach of Article 8, and whether he was right to limit the kind of situations to which Article 8 applied, is the question that the First-tier Tribunal had to determine on an appeal. It does not preclude a right of appeal arising.[56]That the entry clearance officer did decide to refuse a human rights claim follows clearly from the next three paragraphs of the reasoning in the letter. It refers to the information provided on 17 May 2024 (which was the letter making detailed submissions about why refusal of an entry clearance would breach Article 8) and the solicitors’ view that the exercise of a residual discretion to grant a temporary period of leave was appropriate. The entry clearance officer says: “It has been considered whether the particular circumstances set out in your application constitute exceptional circumstances which might warrant a grant of leave to the UK outside the requirements of the Immigration Rules”.[57]The next paragraph refers to circumstances such as FA’s medical condition and the conflict in Gaza. It states that these “circumstances have been carefully considered” but that the application “does not fall for a grant of leave on a discretionary basis”. That again points towards the entry clearance officer refusing the claim that discretionary leave to enter the United Kingdom should be granted as otherwise there would be a breach of Article 8 of the Convention.[58]For those reasons, I am satisfied that the entry clearance officer did decide to refuse a human rights claim. The Upper Tribunal was correct to conclude that the First-tier Tribunal erred when it said it had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. It did, pursuant to section 82(1)(b) of the 2002 Act. I would refuse ground 1 of the appeal. GROUNDS 2 AND 3 – THE UPPER TRIBUNAL WAS WRONG TO DEPART FROM THE ALTERNATIVE FINDINGS OF THE FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL[59]It is convenient to take these two grounds of appeal together. Mr Malik’s submission was that the Upper Tribunal was wrong not to preserve the alternative findings of the First-tier Tribunal. That tribunal had considered the appeal on the basis that it might be wrong on the question of jurisdiction. It had made findings to the effect that FA did not have a family life in the United Kingdom with her daughter and that she was not a genuine visitor.[60]It is possible to deal with this argument shortly. The powers of the Upper Tribunal on an appeal from the First-tier Tribunal are set out in the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (“the 2007 Act”), Section 11 provides for an appeal to the Upper Tribunal on a point of law. Section 12 provides so far as material that: “(2) The Upper Tribunal–(a) may (but need not) set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal, and(b) if it does, must either– (i) remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal with directions for its reconsideration, or (ii) re-make the decision ….. (4) In acting under subsection (2)(b)(ii), the Upper Tribunal– (a) may make any decision which the First-tier Tribunal could make if the First-tier Tribunal were re-making the decision, and (b) may make such findings of fact as it considers appropriate. (a) may (but need not) set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal, and (i) remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal with directions for its reconsideration, or (ii) re-make the decision (a) may make any decision which the First-tier Tribunal could make if the First-tier Tribunal were re-making the decision, and (b) may make such findings of fact as it considers appropriate.[61]It is clear that the Upper Tribunal has a discretion to set aside the decision. If it does so, it may re-make the decision or remit it. If it decides to set aside the decision, it is open to the Upper Tribunal to direct, if it considers it appropriate to do so, that a particular finding, or findings, of the First-tier Tribunal are preserved.[62]In the present case, the Upper Tribunal had found that the First-tier Tribunal had made an error of law (and it was correct in so finding). It expressly considered (as it was then invited to do by the appellant) whether the errors as to jurisdiction were material to the alternative findings. The Upper Tribunal held that the conclusion on jurisdiction may have impacted on the consideration of the Article 8 claim, and in particular whether there was family life within the meaning of Article 8(1) in the present case. Consequently, it decided to set aside the decision and to remake the decision in its entirety. It did not err in law as to the scope of its powers. It did not reach a conclusion that was perverse or not open to it on the material before it. Rather, it was entitled to come to the view that the error may have impacted other aspects of the decision and that the appropriate course was to set aside the First-tier Tribunal decision and to re-make the decision. I would dismiss grounds 2 and 3 of the appeal.

GROUND 4 – THE EXISTENCE OF FAMILY LIFE

[63]Mr Malik submitted that the Upper Tribunal erred in its approach to the meaning of family life in Article 8 of the Convention. The Upper Tribunal considered that the question was whether there was “effective or real or committed support” of the daughter for FA. That was not the test as was now apparent from the decision of this Court in IA. The correct test was whether there were “additional elements of dependency” and that test differed from the “real, committed or effective support test” as appeared from paragraphs 68 and 122 of IA. Mr Malik also relied on the decision in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Onuorah [2017] EWC Civ 1757, and Entry Clearance Officer, Sierra Leone v Kopi [2017] EWCA 1511 as demonstrating that a visit by someone resident abroad to a relative in the United Kingdom did not establish that there was a family life between the relatives within the meaning of Article 8(1) of the Convention.[64]Mr Chirico submitted that, notwithstanding the language used in the decision of the Upper Tribunal, the decision was in fact based on whether there were elements which amounted to additional dependency (in the sense that that term was used in IA). Mr Chirico went through the decision of the Upper Tribunal in detail, drawing attention in particular (but not solely) to paragraphs 116 to 125, and paragraphs 128, 133, 136, 142, 158, 159 and 166. Further, he submitted that the two cases referred to by the appellant on visits not normally giving rise to issues concerning family life were cases involving short visits of a different nature from the visit in this case. In any event, in a note submitted following the hearing, he submitted that the question of whether a family life had been established was a logically prior question, and that the nature and importance of a visit was primarily relevant to the assessment of subsequent questions such as whether there had been an interference with family life and if so was that proportionate. He submitted, however, that the importance (or otherwise) of a particular visit may be one relevant factor when determining whether dependency was established.

Discussion

[65]This ground falls to be assessed in the light of the decision of this Court in IA. As the Court noted at paragraph 1 of its judgment, the appeal in that case concerned the proper meaning of Article 8 of the Convention. It arose in the context of a family of six living in Gaza who applied to enter the United Kingdom to join their sponsor, who had lived and worked in the United Kingdom since 2007.[66]The Court of Appeal reviewed the existing domestic case law and the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. It said at paragraph 10 that:
“10. First, the consistent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (“the ECtHR”) has been that “family life for the purpose of article 8 … is normally limited to the core family and that there will be no family life between parents and adult children or adult siblings unless they can demonstrate ‘additional elements of dependence, involving more than the normal emotional ties’” (see Kumari v The Netherlands (Application No 44051/20) (unreported) 10 December 2024 (“Kumari ”) at para 35 and Beoku-Betts v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] AC 115 (“Beoku-Betts”) at para 39). The FTT did not apply that test, but instead asked itself whether the sponsor had provided “real, effective or committed support” to his brother and the family (see paras 18 and 25 of the FTT decision). The real, effective or committed support test is lower than the additional elements of dependence test. Applying the proper test, neither the brother nor his family had shown that they had family life with the sponsor for the purposes of article 8(1).”
[67]Secondly, the Court accepted that if there had been family life between the sponsor and his relatives, then it would have been appropriate to have regard to the unitary nature of that family life (see paragraph 11).[68]The Court then reviewed the case law of the European Court in detail, including, amongst other cases, Kumari. It said at paragraph 60 that the consistent jurisprudence of that Court had been that family life, within the autonomous meaning of Article 8, “is only to be found between adult siblings where “additional elements of dependence involving more than the normal emotional ties” are demonstrated. It then reviewed the domestic case law. It summarised its conclusions at paragraphs 117 to 125 where it said:
“117. First, this is an area in which the domestic courts have universally demonstrated their willingness to follow the consistent jurisprudence of the ECtHR. Even if some of the domestic decisions may have provided divergent interpretations of the additional elements of dependency test, none has suggested that they wanted to depart from ECtHR jurisprudence. 118. Secondly, many of the cases, both ECtHR and domestic, actually concern family life between parents and adult children, rather than between adult siblings. No case has suggested that the legal test is different in the two types of case. 119. Thirdly, all the cases make clear that the exercise of deciding whether there are the necessary additional elements of dependence involving more than the normal emotional ties is a fact-sensitive exercise that is to be decided on a case-by-case basis. 120. Fourthly, financial dependency and dependency created by physical or mental disability both play a part in the evaluation. It is not, however, necessary to show that one sibling is completely reliant on their care and support in their daily life. In other words, none of the cases go so far as to require exclusive or complete dependency. 121. All these points are, in our judgment, pretty well self-explanatory from our summary of the cases at paras 42–84 above. But there are two points that merit a little more explanation: (a) the meaning and function of what we have described as the “real, committed or effective support” test taken from Sedley LJ’s judgment in Kugathas [2003] INLR 170 at para 17 , and (b) why exclusive or complete dependency is not required. 122. The real, committed or effective support test is, in our judgment, as we have already intimated at para 68, on a proper analysis different from the additional elements of dependency test. Dependency may in one sense be the other side of the support coin. But “real support” may be provided without any serious dependency. Even “effective support” might be provided without there being meaningful dependency. As Sedley LJ himself acknowledged in Kugathas, the real, committed and effective support test was a reading down of the additional elements of dependency test. The FTT said the same at para 25 where it acknowledged that the sponsor’s real, committed and effective support of family was short of the family being dependent on the sponsor. 123. In our judgment, it would be going too far to say that it is wrong to test whether there are additional elements of dependency by reference to the real, committed or effective support provided. But real, committed and effective support is not the test itself, because the level of real support, for example, may be minor or insignificant, whereas the word “dependency” denotes a significant relationship. This is not a semantic point. The ECtHR used the word “dependence” in S v UK (1984) 40 DR 196 in the context of “cohabiting dependents”, which were its starting point (see para 42 above). 124. The domestic cases (eg PT (Sri Lanka) [2016] EWCA Civ 612 at [30]) were not wrong, for example, to point out that a cohabiting child would not necessarily lose their family life with its parents or even their siblings on their 18th birthday. But that is because the relationship of dependence would subsist at that point. 125. In our judgment, it is undesirable to lay down hard and fast rules as to how the additional elements of dependency test should be applied. It obviously requires some dependence, and dependence is more than the existence of support, even if that support is qualified by the adjectives real, committed or effective. Kumari (unreported) 10 December 2024 makes clear that it is harder for adults to demonstrate the necessary dependency because family life is normally limited to the core cohabiting family. The examples in Kumari at paras 38–39 (see para 50 above) make clear the kinds of physical or mental dependency that might qualify. They are not exhaustive, and dependency may take many forms, as Kumari at paras 37 and 41–43 also reminds us. So far as exclusive dependency is concerned, on the particular facts of that case, Alvarado (unreported) 10 December 2024 made clear that it was not always required to establish family life. Moreover, whilst one person being completely dependent on another might normally satisfy the additional elements of dependency test, it is not the only way that the test can be satisfied as the cases we have cited demonstrate.”
[69]I have no doubt that the Upper Tribunal did err in the present case. On a fair reading of the whole of the decision, it is clear that the Upper Tribunal did apply the wrong test. It applied the real, committed and effective support test. It conflated that test on occasions with issues of additional dependency. But the test it identified at paragraph 16 was the one it applied, namely was there real, effective and committed support between the daughter and FA and if so, it regarded that as demonstrating the existence of a family life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention. Having reviewed the evidence, it then applied that test as appears from paragraphs 107 and 108 of its reasoning. That test, however, is not the correct one and is different from, and lower, than the test that needs to be applied, namely whether there are additional elements of dependency in the sense referred to in IA.[70]I would allow the appeal on ground 4. I would set aside the decision of the Upper Tribunal. I would re-make the decision. The facts are not in dispute. Despite Mr Chirico’s submission that it is possible that the facts might have changed I do not consider that there is any prospect that the facts relevant to the relationship between FA and her daughter can have changed. The facts do not demonstrate that there are additional elements of dependency between FA and her daughter such as to amount to family life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention.[71]The position here is that the appeal concerns a mother and her adult daughter. The mother, FA, has lived in Gaza with other members of her family for many years – since well before 2006. Her daughter has lived in the United Kingdom since 2006. She has not lived with her mother since that time. She is married and lives in the United Kingdom with her husband. The daughter has provided financial support for her mother over the years. She has communicated with her mother on a daily basis (until recently when communications became more difficult for reasons to do with the situation in Gaza). I accept that FA shares confidential and personal information with her daughter. I accept that there is emotional support by the daughter for her mother of the sort described in the Upper Tribunal. Considering all the relevant factors cumulatively, the situation falls short of demonstrating the additional elements of dependency required to constitute family life within the meaning of Article 8. GROUND 5 – THE UPPER TRIBUNAL WAS WRONG TO FIND THERE WAS AN INTERFERENCE WITH FAMILY LIFE Submissions[72]Mr Malik submits that the Upper Tribunal was wrong to find that the daughter has a private life in the United Kingdom.[73]Mr Chirico accepted that FA did not have a private life in the United Kingdom. He submitted that, nevertheless, there was no error in referring to the fact that the daughter had a private life in the United Kingdom. He submitted that the impact of an entry clearance decision on the private life of a person in the United Kingdom can be a relevant factor in determining whether the refusal to admit that person’s family members to the United Kingdom breaches Article 8 of the Convention (as explained in paragraphs 58 to 61 of his written skeleton argument, his oral submissions and the note submitted after the hearing).

Discussion

[74]It is possible to deal with this issue relatively shortly. FA did not have a private life in the United Kingdom. Refusal of entry clearance would not involve a failure to respect her private life in the United Kingdom within the meaning of Article 8(1) for the simple reason that FA does not have such a private life here. Article 8(1) of the Convention does not guarantee the opportunity to come to the United Kingdom with a view to establishing a right to private life. It is right that her daughter, who has lived in the United Kingdom since 2006, has a private life here. But refusing her mother entry clearance does not interfere with her private life in a way that falls within Article 8(1) of the Convention. The daughter’s private life can continue as before. For the reasons given above, there is no family life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention between FA and her daughter in the United Kingdom. The Upper Tribunal’s decision is wrong because of its approach to the question of the existence of family life (ground 4 above). The observations made by the Upper Tribunal about the daughter’s private life are, therefore, immaterial. In the circumstances, it is not necessary to allow the appeal on ground 5. GROUNDS 6, 7 and 8 – THE UPPER TRIBUNAL’S DECISION ON WHETHER FA QUALIFIED AS A VISITOR[75]As there is no interference with the right to respect for family life within the meaning of Article 8(1) of the Convention, it is unnecessary to consider whether there was any error in the way in which the Upper Tribunal decided that the refusal of entry clearance was a disproportionate interference which was not justified under Article 8(2) of the Convention. As there was no interference (as there was no family life), there was nothing that needed to be justified.[76]I would, however, make the following observations. The Upper Tribunal considered that the question of whether any interference was justified could be answered by the Upper Tribunal deciding for itself whether or not FA met the requirements of the Immigration Rules for the grant of entry clearance as a visitor. It took the view that if it thought that FA met the requirements (irrespective of what the entry clearance officer decided) that would mean that there was no public interest in refusing entry. It relied on the decision of this Court in TZ (Pakistan) [2018] EWCA Civ 1109.[77]That analysis may not be correct. There are situations where questions of fact are left to the First-tier Tribunal (or Upper Tribunal when re-making a decision) to determine. That arises notably when paragraphs of, or appendices to, the Immigration Rules are meant to ensure respect for Convention rights. The obvious situation where this is so concerns Appendix FM to the Immigration Rules which deals with those seeking to enter or remain on the basis of their family life. That Appendix is intended to ensure that decisions are taken which are compatible with Article 8 of the Convention. Similarly, Parliament may leave matters of fact to be determined by tribunals. Section 117C of the 2002 Act, for example, sets out tests which a court or tribunal must apply when deciding whether the deportation of a foreign criminal is compatible with a person’s right to respect for private and family life.[78]My provisional view, without the benefit of full argument, is that the position in relation to other parts of the Immigration Rules may well be different. The Immigration Rules provide for the grant of leave to enter in a wide variety of situations. The person who decides whether to grant leave to enter will usually be an entry clearance officer (or possibly an immigration officer). In the case of entry clearance for a visit, for example, it is the entry clearance officer who will determine if an applicant satisfies the requirements of the relevant paragraphs of the Immigration Rules. There is no appeal against the decision by an entry clearance officer that a person does not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules. Any claim that the Immigration Rules have been wrongly applied in such cases, or that the decision is perverse, is a matter which may, in appropriate circumstances, be challenged by way of a claim for judicial review not by way of an appeal to the First-tier Tribunal.[79]If the person makes a human rights claim which is refused, he may appeal against that refusal. The task for the First-tier Tribunal will be to determine whether the decision that has been taken is incompatible with the person’s rights under Article 8 of the Convention. It is not for the First-tier Tribunal itself to determine whether the person meets the requirements of the Immigration Rules (or to decide how any discretion conferred by the Immigration Rules is to be exercised). Rather, it determines whether the decision that has been taken interferes with the right to respect for private and family life under Article 8(1) and, if so, is the interference justified under Article 8(2) of the Convention.[80]I note that a similar issue was considered by Elisabeth Laing LJ in Entry Clearance Officer v Spence [2026] EWCA Civ 722 although again the issue did not arise for determination in that case. As Elisabeth Laing LJ observed at paragraph 43, her provisional view was that the role of the Secretary of State or entry clearance officer was different from the role of the First-tier Tribunal. It was not for the First-tier Tribunal to step into the shoes of the Secretary of State and make the assessment of whether a discretion conferred by the Immigration Rules should, or should not, be exercised. Rather, the First-tier Tribunal must first, determine the nature and quality of the appellant's rights under Article 8 of the Convention and then determine whether the decision interferes with those rights, and, if so, to balance the public interest at issue (usually the public interest in immigration control) against those rights in order to decide whether or not that interference is proportionate.[81]In other words, the question for the First-tier Tribunal is whether, given the decision that the Secretary of State or entry clearance officer has made, that decision is a disproportionate interference with a person’s rights under Article 8. That question is not, and should not, be answered by the First-tier Tribunal (or Upper Tribunal when re-making a decision) deciding for itself whether the individual satisfied the relevant requirements in the Immigration Rules.

CONCLUSION

[82]For those reasons, I would allow the appeal on ground 4. I would set aside the decision of the Upper Tribunal. I would re-make that decision. I would dismiss FA’s appeal against the refusal of her human rights claim. The relationship between FA and her daughter does not involve family life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention as the relationship does not demonstrate the additional elements of dependency required in the light of the decision in IA. The refusal of entry clearance as a visitor did not, therefore, involve any interference with the right to respect for FA’s family life within the meaning of Article 8(1) of the Convention. LORD JUSTICE WARBY[83]I agree that this appeal should be allowed for the reasons given by Lewis LJ. I add this in relation to Ground 1. Until 2014, a person refused entry clearance could appeal to the tribunal under s 82(1) and (2)(b) and s 84(1)(c) of the 2002 Act, on the grounds that the decision was unlawful as being incompatible with the appellant’s Convention Rights. The appeal regime was amended by the Immigration Act 2014, which substituted the provisions which Lewis LJ has set out at [9]-[11] above. I have seen nothing to suggest that the amendments were intended to reduce the scope of the right of appeal. The Explanatory Notes tell us that the intention was to create “a clearer package of appeal rights”. In my opinion Lewis LJ’s interpretation of the new provisions is more likely to promote that aim than the interpretation advocated on behalf of the Secretary of State. LADY JUSTICE ANDREWS[84]I agree with Lewis LJ that the Upper Tribunal was right to find that the decision was a decision to refuse a human rights claim, but that it applied the wrong legal test in respect of family life (Ground 4) and that on an application of the correct legal test to the facts of this case, there is no family life between FA and her daughter which is capable of engaging Article 8 of the Convention. I also agree with his analysis and conclusion on the issue of Article 8 private life (Ground 5). Any claim made by FA on that basis was bound to fail for the reasons explained by Burnett LJ in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Abbas [2017] EWCA Civ 1393.[85]The entry clearance officer’s decision, though in the end it turned out to be correct, followed the applicable Home Office guidance which contains two material legal errors. First, it wrongly suggests that where a human rights claim has been made, a decision to refuse entry clearance on the basis that Article 8 is not capable of being engaged is not a decision to refuse a human rights claim, and therefore tells case workers that they should inform the claimant that there is no right of appeal. Secondly, and contrary to IA, it states that only family relationships falling within three specific categories are capable of giving rise to a claim that a person enjoys a “family life” within the UK. I would hope that in the light of our judgments in this case and the judgment in IA, steps will be taken to withdraw the guidance and replace it with something which is legally accurate.