“Hi Andy, It’s Jez we used to do some tipping with you at Parry’s Quarry through a friend of mine. Just giving you and the Holloway brothers a tip off OGrady and Hughes are going sticking a big claim in against you two for tipping on site, I’ve only just been told by someone close to them. But there’s some big numbers floating about 50 plus million. Be careful.”
“… Been speaking to Andy Jakes and told him what I found out about Mold/Parry’s Quarry. Apparently O’Grady and paddy are sticking in a big claim against you personally and Andy for tipping in Mold there’s been some 8 digit numbers like£50M floating about!!! …”
“Over my dead body am I giving a single Penny away to them pair of [expletive]. [expletive] it the lot can go for auction. Let me know if you know anyone that wants some property half cash half on books. …”
“1. On the balance of probabilities: a. [The screenshots of the WhatsApp Messages] are forgeries; b. [Mr Holloway] did not exchange WhatsApp messages with Jeremy Hazlehurst as alleged in the affidavit of Jeremy Hazlehurst dated7 August 2023 ; c. [Mr Holloway] and Mrs Vicky Holloway did not send the communications referred to as ‘the Malicious Communications’…; d. The said Malicious Communications were in fact concocted by or at the instigation of Sean O’Grady for the purpose of putting false evidence before the Court. 2. [Mold] failed to comply with its duties of fair presentation and full and frank disclosure in connection with the without notice applications (i) heard by Mellor J on9 August 2023 and (ii) heard by Richard Smith J on5 January 2024 in the following respects: a. The reliance upon false evidence as set out in paragraph 1 above; b. The failure to draw the attention of Mellor J to the fact that no metadata existed in relation to [the WhatsApp Messages]; c. The failure to inform Mellor J and Richard Smith J that [Mold] had on2 March 2023 transferred investment properties valued in its accounts at£700,000 to a company then called RJS Civil Engineering Limited; d. The failure to inform Richard Smith J that the methodology adopted in the report prepared by MDR Cyber … was flawed and that such methodology was the subject of criticism by the Court of Appeal in R v Sean Thomas Calland[2017] EWCA Crim 2308 (Crim) .” a. [The screenshots of the WhatsApp Messages] are forgeries; b. [Mr Holloway] did not exchange WhatsApp messages with Jeremy Hazlehurst as alleged in the affidavit of Jeremy Hazlehurst dated7 August 2023 ; c. [Mr Holloway] and Mrs Vicky Holloway did not send the communications referred to as ‘the Malicious Communications’…; d. The said Malicious Communications were in fact concocted by or at the instigation of Sean O’Grady for the purpose of putting false evidence before the Court. a. The reliance upon false evidence as set out in paragraph 1 above; b. The failure to draw the attention of Mellor J to the fact that no metadata existed in relation to [the WhatsApp Messages]; c. The failure to inform Mellor J and Richard Smith J that [Mold] had on2 March 2023 transferred investment properties valued in its accounts at£700,000 to a company then called RJS Civil Engineering Limited; d. The failure to inform Richard Smith J that the methodology adopted in the report prepared by MDR Cyber … was flawed and that such methodology was the subject of criticism by the Court of Appeal in R v Sean Thomas Calland[2017] EWCA Crim 2308 (Crim) .”
“1. [Mr Hazlehurst] and [Mr Holloway] did not know one another (contrary to [Mr Hazlehurst’s] affidavit [and witness statement] …). 2. Prior to July 2023, [Mr Holloway] did not have [Mr Hazlehurst’s] number saved on his phone (contrary to [Mr Hazlehurst’s] [witness statement] …). 3. [Mr Holloway] did not allow Mr Hazlehurst to tip at the Quarry (contrary to [Mr Hazlehurst’s] affidavit …). 4. Mr Hazlehurst did not exchange the WhatsApp [M]essages (contrary to [Mr Hazlehurst’s] affidavit …). 5. The screenshots showing the … WhatsApp [M]essages … were created by one of two alternative methodologies, as set out below. That was done by [Mr Hazlehurst] (or with Mr Hazlehurst]’s connivance) at the instigation of [Mr O’Grady].”
“Case management decisions are discretionary decisions. They often involve an attempt to find the least worst solution where parties have diametrically opposed interests. The discretion involved is entrusted to the first instance judge. An appellate court does not exercise the discretion for itself. It can interfere with the exercise of the discretion by a first instance judge where he has misdirected himself in law, has failed to take relevant factors into account, has taken into account irrelevant factors or has come to a decision that is plainly wrong in the sense of being outside the generous ambit where reasonable decision makers may disagree. So the question is not whether we would have made the same decisions as the judge. The question is whether the judge’s decision was wrong in the sense that I have explained.”
“It is no part of the court’s function at this stage of the litigation to try to resolve conflicts of evidence on affidavit as to facts on which the claims of either party may ultimately depend nor to decide difficult questions of law which call for detailed argument and mature considerations. These are matters to be dealt with at the trial. One of the reasons for the introduction of the practice of requiring an undertaking as to damages upon the grant of an interlocutory injunction was that ‘it aided the court in doing that which was its great object, viz. abstaining from expressing any opinion upon the merits of the case until the hearing’: Wakefield v. Duke of Buccleugh (1865) 12 L.T. 628, 629.”
“What … should not be allowed is (1) any attempt to persuade a court to resolve disputed questions of fact whether relating to the merits of the underlying claim in respect of which a Mareva is sought or relating to the elements of the Mareva jurisdiction such as that of dissipation or (2) detailed argument on difficult points of law on which the claim of either party may ultimately depend.”
“Speaking in general terms, it is inappropriate to seek to set aside a freezing order for non-disclosure where proof of non-disclosure depends on proof of facts which are themselves in issue in the action, unless the facts are truly so plain that they can be readily and summarily established, otherwise the application to set aside the freezing order is liable to become a form of preliminary trial in which the judge is asked to make findings (albeit provisionally) on issues which should be more properly reserved for the trial itself.”
“Inevitably there will be some cases in which a freezing order is granted where it can only be seen with hindsight after judgment in the action that it should not have been and that there were serious and culpable failures of disclosure by the claimant. … That, however, is not a consequence of adopting the disciplined approach proposed by Toulson J [in Crown Resources v Vinogradsky] and adopted by the Court of Appeal in Kazakhstan Kagazy v Arip]. Rather it is a necessary consequence of a system where hotly contested issues of fact can only be fairly and finally resolved at the trial. … The remedy for a defendant who suffers an injustice as a result of a freezing order remaining in position until the trial when in fact it should not have been granted in the first place is to enforce the claimant’s undertaking in damages which, when appropriate, will need to be properly secured to protect a defendant against foreseeable loss.”
“Whether the inter partes hearing takes the form of an application by the defendants to discharge the injunction, as is usual in the Commercial Court, or whether—as in the Chancery Division—the injunction is only granted for a limited time and there is then an inter partes hearing as to whether or not it should be continued, the judge must consider the whole of the evidence as it then stands in deciding whether to maintain or continue, or to discharge or vary, the order previously made.”
“The court may discharge the injunction even if after full inquiry the view is taken that the order made was just and convenient and would probably have been made even if there had been full disclosure”
“Where an ex parte order has been made a party aggrieved by that order may apply inter partes to have the order set aside. He can make that application simply on the material that was before the court on the ex parte application. The court on the inter partes hearing has to consider the matters afresh and may arrive at a different conclusion. Alternatively, application to set aside may be made with the support of additional evidence or material placed before the court on the inter partes hearing. Here again, if the court concludes, having considered all the material including the new material and all the arguments placed before it, that the order should not be made, the order will be discharged. Thus far, what happened on the inter partes hearing was the decision on the merits of the application for the relevant order. If the order is not one which should, on the merits, be made then it will be set aside. If however the result of the inter partes hearing, and the consideration of the totality of the material before the court is that the order is the appropriate one on the merits the party aggrieved may be able to make an application that the order be set aside on the grounds of non-disclosure. This is an application of a different character which relates to the need to preserve the integrity of judicial procedure.”
“Speaking in general terms, it is inappropriate to seek to set aside a freezing order for non-disclosure where proof of non-disclosure depends on proof of facts which are themselves in issue in the action, unless the facts are truly so plain that they can be readily and summarily established, otherwise the application to set aside the freezing order is liable to become a form of preliminary trial in which the judge is asked to make findings (albeit provisionally) on issues which should be more properly reserved for the trial itself.”