Shamim Anwar v London Borough of Ealing Council [2025] EWCA Civ 813

[2025] EWCA Civ 813Case No CA-2022-001644
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
[2022] EWHC 2464 (KB)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING’S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
DEXTER DIAS KC (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge)
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 30/06/2025
Before
LADY JUSTICE ANDREWSLORD JUSTICE LEWISLORD JUSTICE HOLGATE
Between
MRS SHAMIM ANWARClaimant/LONDON BOROUGH OF EALING COUNCILRespondent
Francis Hoar (instructed on direct access) for AppellantGuy Williams KC (instructed by Legal Services, London Borough of Ealing) for RespondentHearing Hearing date: 4 June 2025
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 30 th June 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................

INTRODUCTION

[1]This is a sad case, in which the process of judicial review of decisions made by a public body has been used as a means of ventilating what is quintessentially a private law dispute between neighbours about actual or potential acts of trespass and alleged antisocial behaviour.[2]“Crossover” is an expression used to describe a vehicular access from the carriageway of a public road across a footway or verge to adjacent land (typically, an extended driveway to private property fronting the pavement). The carriageway, the footway and the verge are all parts of the public highway, and the crossover is constructed on the public highway, which is maintained at public expense by the responsible highway authority.[3]The Appellant, Mrs Anwar, has a long leasehold interest in a property in Southall owned by a Mr Caan, which is and has been her home for many years. The owner of the detached neighbouring property (on the left if the houses are viewed from across the road, which is the perspective I will use throughout this judgment) is a Mr Johal. Unfortunately, the two neighbours do not get on. The source of much of the friction between them is the common means of vehicular access to and from their respective properties to and from the road across the fronting pavement, which is configured in a way that enables each of them to drive into the area in front of their own house, but also enables each of them to drive across the boundary of the other’s land. Such a trespass is possible (though not inevitable) if a car driver wishes to gain access, via the crossover, to the paved area in front of Mr Johal’s house where it is possible to park.[4]Mrs Anwar is aggrieved, among other matters, about vehicles being parked on the driveway in a manner which she claims impedes access to her own property. However, the resolution of disputes of that nature is outside the scope of these proceedings.[5]The Respondent (“the Council”) is the local highway authority. Its contractors constructed the crossover back in December 2015 or January 2016 following an application made by Mr Johal. They did so despite the fact that Mr Johal had not obtained the prior consent of the owner of the neighbouring property, as the Council had asked him to do. The circumstances in which that came about and the reasons why it happened are lost in the mists of time. What is clear, however, is that Mr Johal paid the full fee that the Council requested for its contractors to carry out the work, and neither Mr Caan nor Mrs Anwar was required to contribute financially.[6]In February 2021, the Council’s Chief Executive refused a request by Mr Caan to remove the crossover and reinstate the kerb which had been lowered to permit vehicles to drive across the pavement and access both properties. Mr Caan has been treated for the purposes of these proceedings as acting both on his own behalf and on behalf of Mrs Anwar when he made that request.[7]On 28 May 2021 Mrs Anwar, then acting as a litigant in person, filed her claim for judicial review of that decision (“the 2021 decision”). Permission to proceed with the claim was refused on the papers. The application for permission was renewed to an oral hearing and granted by HH

Judge Alice Robinson (sitting as a deputy High Court Judge) on the single ground that:

“The decision of the Chief Executive not to remove the crossover was unlawful because he had no, or no adequate, regard to a relevant consideration, namely that the crossover had been unlawfully constructed in the first place.”
The judge on that occasion refused permission to proceed with all the other grounds for judicial review pleaded in the Statement of Facts and Grounds, many of which, though expressed as challenges to the 2021 decision, were in truth extremely belated attempts to challenge the lawfulness of the Council’s original decision in around December 2015 to permit the construction of the crossover (“the 2015 decision”).[8]It is not possible to get around the time constraints for challenging a decision made by a public body by seeking the reconsideration, withdrawal or reversal of that decision and then challenging the decision maker’s refusal to do so. Mrs Anwar would have required a very lengthy extension of time to raise a challenge to the 2015 decision, and none was sought.[9]In fact, Mrs Anwar could not establish the premise upon which the ground for which permission was granted was based, for reasons which Mr Williams KC, on behalf of the Council, clearly articulated in his skeleton argument for the judicial review hearing. Irrespective of whether there may have been arguable grounds for impugning it in 2015 or 2016, the Council’s decision to construct the crossover was never the subject of a permitted challenge in proceedings before a court. There was no court order quashing it. Therefore, the crossover was lawfully constructed, and the Chief Executive was obliged to treat it as such: see e.g. Smith v East Elloe RDC [1956] AC 736, per Lord Radcliffe at 769; R (Noble) v Thanet DC [2005] EWCA Civ 782; [2006] 1 P&C R 13, per Auld LJ at [42] to [43], and the cases therein cited.[10]Consequently, it could never have been a relevant consideration at the time when the Chief Executive took the 2021 decision “that the crossover had been unlawfully constructed in the first place,” because the time for establishing that had long since passed and it was no longer open to Mrs Anwar to seek to do so. The claim for judicial review could and should have been dismissed in short order on that simple basis, without any need to address the submissions as to why the initial decision was alleged to have been unlawful.[11]Instead, Mr Dexter Dias KC (as he then was), sitting as a deputy High Court Judge (“the Judge”), delivered a judgment in which he addressed at some length the question whether the initial construction of the crossover was unlawful because the consent of Mrs Anwar had not been obtained, having regard to the proper interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Highways Act 1980 (“the 1980 Act”), namely, section 184 and Schedule 14. He ultimately concluded that those provisions were not to be construed in the manner contended for by Mrs Anwar, and that the Council acted in accordance with the law. He also found that there was no flaw in the evaluative exercise undertaken during the Chief Executive’s decision-making process.[12]Mrs Anwar appeals to this court with the permission of the single judge. She takes issue with the Judge’s interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions. In his order granting permission to appeal, the single judge said, among other things, that he saw some force in the point that section 184 of the 1980 Act is potentially of wide application and that a dispute about its proper construction raised issues of public importance, which in itself was a compelling reason to grant permission.[13]I understand why the single judge thought it would be helpful for this Court to resolve the issues of statutory construction, notwithstanding that the only surviving ground for judicial review was bound to fail even if the construction of the statute urged upon us by Mrs Anwar’s counsel, Mr Hoar (who did not appear in the court below) was correct. Since we heard full legal argument on those matters, we will determine them.[14]Having carefully considered Mr Hoar’s arguments, which included points on Article 1 of Protocol 1 (“A1P1”) to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) and section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998, which were not raised before the Judge, I have concluded that the statutory provisions are not to be interpreted in the manner for which he contended. As I shall explain, the Judge was right to conclude that where a request for the construction of a crossover is made under section 184(11) (as it is now common ground was the case here) there is no obligation on the highway authority to consult a non-requesting owner or occupier of adjacent land, let alone obtain their consent, before constructing a crossover which could serve both properties. As the Judge recognised, it may be good practice to do so, but that does not mean that it was a legal requirement.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

[15]In 2015 the Council decided to carry out resurfacing work to the footway outside the neighbouring properties belonging to Mr Johal and Mr Caan, as part of its rolling programme of planned highway maintenance works. On 10 December 2015 the Council wrote a letter to Mr Johal informing him of the scheduled work, which stated as follows:
“The reduced cost of a standard 3.6m wide shared vehicle crossover is £575, which represents a significant saving on the average cost of a one off domestic vehicle crossover. Should you wish to take up this offer, please proceed to make full payment for the construction of the vehicle crossover and provide written approval from your neighbour at [Mrs Anwar’s address] for its construction.”
[16]Mr Johal applied for the crossover and paid the money to the Council, but he did not tell Mrs Anwar about the proposed works, let alone obtain her written approval. The first Mrs Anwar knew about the matter was when the work was carried out by contractors engaged by the Council, sometime in late December 2015 or January 2016. This involved lowering the kerb outside Mr Johal’s front driveway and Mrs Anwar’s front driveway and constructing a gentle slope on the roadway to permit vehicles to drive across the pavement to access both those properties.[17]The width of the crossover meant that it overlapped to an extent with the boundary to Mrs Anwar’s property. No measurement of the degree of the overlap has been adduced in evidence, although there is a photograph reproduced within the judgment at [11] which indicates that the width of the crossover is 2.7 metres (i.e. less than the 3.6 metres originally indicated in the Council’s letter to Mr Johal). The Judge estimated that approximately 25% of the width of the crossover fronted Mrs Anwar’s home. As he explained at [12], this configuration was dictated by the position of a mature tree and a street lamp to the left. He found that it was inevitable that the crossover would have to front Mrs Anwar’s home to some extent.[18]The configuration of the crossover means that vehicles can drive across the pavement into the area in front of either property. Some neighbours might have regarded this as beneficial, given the scarcity of on-street parking in the area, but Mrs Anwar did not. She became extremely distressed at the prospect of someone trespassing on her side of the boundary. She wants the crossover to be removed and the raised kerbs to be reinstated.[19]It would have been open to Mrs Anwar to challenge the lawfulness of the Council’s decision to construct the crossover (“the 2015 decision”) by bringing judicial review proceedings. The maximum time allowed for the commencement of such proceedings is usually three months. However, since judicial review is a measure of last resort, if Mrs Anwar had initiated the Council’s internal grievance resolution procedure shortly after becoming aware that the kerb had been lowered, the Administrative Court would no doubt have viewed with sympathy any necessary application to extend time for a judicial review claim until after that procedure was exhausted.[20]In the event, nothing of significance occurred until May 2020, when Mr Caan filled in an online complaint form. He complained to the Council that the crossover had been placed “on a shared drive” without his consent as the owner of the neighbouring property and that the Council had failed to consider the impact on his property (or upon Mrs Anwar, the occupier) before granting the application for a crossover. He asked that the kerb be reinstated.[21]The complaint was not dealt with to Mr Caan’s satisfaction, and it was eventually escalated to stage 3 (the final stage of the Council’s complaints procedure) culminating in the letter of 11 February 2021 from the Council’s Chief Executive to Mr Caan, conveying the decision which is now under challenge. The Chief Executive apologised for the fact that in earlier responses to the complaint some factual errors had been made by officers of the Council. The Council now accepted, in consequence of further investigations, that the crossover appeared to have been constructed during the planned footway maintenance works in December 2015 or January 2016 following an application from Mr Johal. The letter confirmed that the Council had no evidence that the consent of Mr Caan or Mrs Anwar had been obtained before that work was carried out.[22]Turning to the request that the crossover be removed, the Chief Executive pointed out that Mr Caan’s concerns had not been raised at or near the time of its construction. If the crossover were removed, his neighbour would no longer be able to park on his forecourt as he had done since 2015/2016. There was a shortage of parking in the road. The Council had considered the repositioning of the crossover towards the front of Mr Johal’s property but there were a number of reasons why this would not be possible. First, there was insufficient space to comply with policy; secondly there was a mature tree whose roots would impede construction, and thirdly there was a streetlight which would also impede construction, and which would be both difficult and costly to relocate.[23]As an alternative to relocation of the crossover, the Council could put a bollard at the edge of the footway to prevent someone from driving into any part of Mr Caan’s property, whilst retaining access to and from Mr Johal’s property. The Chief Executive concluded that he had decided to retain the crossover but offered to put up the bollard. That offer, however, was unacceptable to Mrs Anwar.[24]A complaint to the Local Government and Social Care Ombudsman was rejected on 8 April 2021 as being out of time. The Ombudsman decided there was no good reason to investigate a complaint about what had happened some six years previously. It was only after that complaint had been rejected that Mrs Anwar commenced the current proceedings for judicial review.

THE RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS

[25]There is no dispute that the Council is responsible in law for the maintenance and repair of the public highway in the London Borough of Ealing, which expression includes the carriageway, the pavement and the verges fronting these two neighbouring properties. The crossover that was constructed in the present case was a modification by the Council of its own highway, which it maintains at public expense, and not a modification of any land adjoining the highway. It is important to bear this in mind when considering Mrs Anwar’s arguments about the construction of the statute. The Judge was right to emphasise this at [60].[26]A person has a right of access to their property at common law: Marshall v Blackpool Corporation [1945] AC 16, per Lord Atkin at 22. However that right is not absolute. Mr Williams drew our attention to Lord Radcliffe’s observations in Ching Garage Ltd v Chingford Corporation [1961] 1 WLR 470 at 478:
“… in any built-up area, there are numerous rights of access to the streets from adjoining premises … they are rights derived from common law or statute, general or local, or perhaps, from a combination of the two sources. In my opinion it is well-settled law that a highway authority exercising statutory powers to improve or maintain a street or highway, such as to raise or lower its level, form a footpath, to pave or kerb or to erect omnibus shelters, is empowered to carry out its works even though by so doing it interferes with or obstructs frontagers’ rights of access to the highway.”
This case is about the converse situation, in which the highway authority is using its statutory powers to improve or maintain the highway to facilitate the exercise of a right of access to property.[27]Vehicle crossings over footways and verges are provided for in section 184 of the 1980 Act, which is among the “miscellaneous” provisions. As the Judge said at [30], the purpose of that section is to ensure that, where appropriate, there is safe access to and egress from premises adjoining and having access to the public highway by constructing crossovers across footways and verges. A secondary purpose is to prevent damage to the footways and verges being caused by vehicles being driven over them to gain access to such premises.[28]Section 184 provides, so far as is relevant, as follows:
“184. Vehicle crossings over footways and verges. (1) Where the occupier of any premises adjoining or having access to a highway maintainable at the public expense habitually takes or permits to be taken a mechanically propelled vehicle across a kerbed footway or a verge in the highway to or from those premises, the highway authority for the highway may, subject to subsection (2) below, serve a notice on the owner and the occupier of the premises— (a) stating that they propose to execute such works for the construction of a vehicle crossing over the footway or verge as may be specified in the notice; or (b) imposing such reasonable conditions on the use of the footway or verge as a crossing as may be so specified. (2) A highway authority is not entitled by virtue of subsection (1) above to construct a vehicle crossing on, or on any part of, the site of a made-up vehicle crossing which has been constructed either under this section or under section 40 of the Highways Act 1971 (which this section replaces) or before the commencement of the said section 40, or to impose conditions on the use of such a crossing. (3) Where any land is being, or is to be, developed in accordance with a planning permission granted, or deemed to have been granted, under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, and it appears to the highway authority for a highway maintainable at the public expense that the development makes it necessary — (a) to construct a crossing over a kerbed footway or a verge in the highway so as to provide an access for mechanically propelled vehicles to or from the carriageway of the highway from or to premises adjoining or having access to the highway; or (b) to improve or otherwise alter a made-up vehicle crossing that provides such an access as is mentioned in paragraph (a) above (whenever constructed), that authority may serve on the owner and the occupier of the premises a notice stating that they propose to execute such works for the construction or, as the case may be, alteration of the crossing as may be specified in the notice. (4) … (5) In determining whether to exercise their powers under subsection (1) or (3) above, a highway authority shall have regard to the need to prevent damage to a footway or verge, and in determining the works to be specified in a notice under subsection (1)(a) or (3) an authority shall have regard to that and the following other matters, namely— (a) the need to ensure, so far as practicable, safe access to and egress from premises; and (b) the need to facilitate, so far as practicable, the passage of vehicular traffic in highways. (6) Schedule 14 to this Act has effect with respect to the making of objections to a notice under subsection (1) or (3) above and to the date on which such a notice becomes effective. (7) Where a notice under subsection (1)(a) or (3) above has become effective, the highway authority by whom the notice was served may execute such works as are specified in the notice, subject to such modifications (if any) as may have been made by the Minister, and may recover the expenses reasonably incurred by them in so doing from the owner or occupier of the premises in question. (8) A notice under subsection (1) or (3) above shall inform the person on whom it is served of his right to object to the notice and (except in the case of a notice under subsection (1)(b)) shall state the effect of subsection (7) above. (9) … (10) … (11) Any person may request the highway authority for a highway maintainable at the public expense to execute such works as are specified in the request for constructing a vehicle crossing over a footway or verge in the highway, and the authority may approve the request with or without modification, or may propose alternative works or reject the request; and in determining how to exercise their powers under this subsection an authority shall have regard to the matters mentioned in subsection (5) above. (12) An authority to whom a request under subsection (11) above is made shall notify the person making the request of their decision and if they approve, with or without modification, the works proposed in the request or propose alternative works, they shall supply him with a quotation of the cost of the works as approved or proposed by them, and he may, on depositing with them the amount quoted, require them to execute those works. (13) As soon as practicable after such a deposit has been made with an authority the authority shall execute the works as approved or proposed by them.” (1) Where the occupier of any premises adjoining or having access to a highway maintainable at the public expense habitually takes or permits to be taken a mechanically propelled vehicle across a kerbed footway or a verge in the highway to or from those premises, the highway authority for the highway may, subject to subsection (2) below, serve a notice on the owner and the occupier of the premises— (a) stating that they propose to execute such works for the construction of a vehicle crossing over the footway or verge as may be specified in the notice; or (b) imposing such reasonable conditions on the use of the footway or verge as a crossing as may be so specified. (2) A highway authority is not entitled by virtue of subsection (1) above to construct a vehicle crossing on, or on any part of, the site of a made-up vehicle crossing which has been constructed either under this section or under section 40 of the Highways Act 1971 (which this section replaces) or before the commencement of the said section 40, or to impose conditions on the use of such a crossing. (3) Where any land is being, or is to be, developed in accordance with a planning permission granted, or deemed to have been granted, under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, and it appears to the highway authority for a highway maintainable at the public expense that the development makes it necessary — (a) to construct a crossing over a kerbed footway or a verge in the highway so as to provide an access for mechanically propelled vehicles to or from the carriageway of the highway from or to premises adjoining or having access to the highway; or (b) to improve or otherwise alter a made-up vehicle crossing that provides such an access as is mentioned in paragraph (a) above (whenever constructed), that authority may serve on the owner and the occupier of the premises a notice stating that they propose to execute such works for the construction or, as the case may be, alteration of the crossing as may be specified in the notice. (4) … (5) In determining whether to exercise their powers under subsection (1) or (3) above, a highway authority shall have regard to the need to prevent damage to a footway or verge, and in determining the works to be specified in a notice under subsection (1)(a) or (3) an authority shall have regard to that and the following other matters, namely— (a) the need to ensure, so far as practicable, safe access to and egress from premises; and (b) the need to facilitate, so far as practicable, the passage of vehicular traffic in highways. (6) Schedule 14 to this Act has effect with respect to the making of objections to a notice under subsection (1) or (3) above and to the date on which such a notice becomes effective. (7) Where a notice under subsection (1)(a) or (3) above has become effective, the highway authority by whom the notice was served may execute such works as are specified in the notice, subject to such modifications (if any) as may have been made by the Minister, and may recover the expenses reasonably incurred by them in so doing from the owner or occupier of the premises in question. (8) A notice under subsection (1) or (3) above shall inform the person on whom it is served of his right to object to the notice and (except in the case of a notice under subsection (1)(b)) shall state the effect of subsection (7) above. (9) … (10) … (11) Any person may request the highway authority for a highway maintainable at the public expense to execute such works as are specified in the request for constructing a vehicle crossing over a footway or verge in the highway, and the authority may approve the request with or without modification, or may propose alternative works or reject the request; and in determining how to exercise their powers under this subsection an authority shall have regard to the matters mentioned in subsection (5) above. (12) An authority to whom a request under subsection (11) above is made shall notify the person making the request of their decision and if they approve, with or without modification, the works proposed in the request or propose alternative works, they shall supply him with a quotation of the cost of the works as approved or proposed by them, and he may, on depositing with them the amount quoted, require them to execute those works. (13) As soon as practicable after such a deposit has been made with an authority the authority shall execute the works as approved or proposed by them.”
[29]As section 184(6) indicates, Schedule 14 makes provision for a person upon whom a notice has been served under section 184(1) or 184(3) to object to the notice. It provides as follows: “(1) A person on whom a notice under section 184(1) or (3) of this Act is served may within 28 days from the date of his being served therewith object to the notice on any of the following grounds which are appropriate in the circumstances of the particular case:—(a) that the notice is not justified by the terms of section 184(1) or (3);(b) that there has been some defect or error in, or in connection with, the notice;(c) that the proposed works are unreasonable in character or extent, or are unnecessary;(d) that the conditions imposed by the notice are unreasonable;(e) that some other person having an interest in the premises also habitually takes or permits to be taken a mechanically propelled vehicle across the footway or verge and should be required to defray part of the expenses of executing the proposed works;(f) that the authority are not entitled to serve the notice by reason of section 184(2);(g) that a person carrying out or proposing to carry out such a development as is referred to in section 184(3) offers to execute the works himself. (2) An objection under paragraph 1 above shall be made by notice to the highway authority, and the notice shall state the grounds of objection. (3) Where objection is made to a notice given by a local highway authority under section 184(1) or (3), that authority shall send a copy of the notice and of the notice of objection to the Minister. (4) If objection is made to such a notice and the objection is not withdrawn the notice does not become effective until it has been confirmed by the Minister, and the Minister after considering the objection may confirm the notice without modification or subject to such modifications as he thinks fit. (5) Subject to paragraph 4 above, such a notice becomes effective at the expiration of the period during which the person served therewith may object to it.” (a) that the notice is not justified by the terms of section 184(1) or (3); (b) that there has been some defect or error in, or in connection with, the notice; (c) that the proposed works are unreasonable in character or extent, or are unnecessary; (d) that the conditions imposed by the notice are unreasonable; (e) that some other person having an interest in the premises also habitually takes or permits to be taken a mechanically propelled vehicle across the footway or verge and should be required to defray part of the expenses of executing the proposed works; (f) that the authority are not entitled to serve the notice by reason of section 184(2); (g) that a person carrying out or proposing to carry out such a development as is referred to in section 184(3) offers to execute the works himself.

CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 184

[30]The principles of statutory construction are well established. The Judge set them out at [33] to [38] of his judgment. As the Supreme Court has recently confirmed in R(O) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 3; [2023] AC 255 at [29] to [31] and For Women Scotland Ltd v Scottish Ministers [2025] UKSC 16 at [9] to [14], statutory interpretation involves making an objective assessment of the meaning which Parliament intended to convey in using the words which are being considered; the controversial provisions should be read in the context of the statute as a whole, and the statute should be considered in its historic context. Whilst the starting point is the words used, and words should generally be given their ordinary meaning, a literalist approach should be eschewed in favour of a purposive construction that gives effect to the basic objectives of the legislation.[31]Mr Hoar’s submissions focused on two phrases in particular. First, he submitted that the words “any person” in section 184(11) cannot mean any person in the world, but by necessary implication must be confined to an owner or occupier of premises adjoining or accessing the footway or verge over which the crossover is requested. Secondly, he submitted that the phrase “a vehicle crossing” means a single crossing from a carriageway to a “premises” which he contended means a single estate in land. Although the word “premises” does not appear in subsection (11), Mr Hoar submitted that it was necessarily implicit in that subsection that the requested vehicle crossing can only serve one set of premises adjoining or having access to the highway (owned or occupied by the person making the request). He contended that it is therefore not possible for a request to be made under section 184(11) for a vehicle crossing serving two or more adjoining premises (for example, two semi-detached houses with a common driveway). If the owners of adjoining premises wanted a “joint” crossing they would need to make applications to the highway authority for two separate vehicle crossings – though this could be done in “a joint submission”.[32]Mr Hoar placed particular emphasis upon the presumption that a construction of a statute that produces an absurd result cannot have been intended by the legislature. It made no sense, he argued, for a person who has no direct interest in a property which might be affected by the siting of the crossover to be able to apply for a vehicle crossing outside someone else’s home. He submitted that were the Judge’s construction to be accepted, “the careful statutory scheme Parliament has created to protect owners and occupiers from an unwanted vehicle crossing adjoining their premises would apply only sometimes and at random”. He further submitted that it makes no difference to an occupier of adjacent property whether the vehicle crossing is constructed at the request of the highway authority or of “any person”, and yet Mrs Anwar would only have the statutory right to object and the right for her objection to be considered by the Minister if the proposal was made by the highway authority.[33]I have no hesitation in rejecting those submissions. The construction of section 184(11) for which Mr Hoar contends flies in the face of the plain and obvious meaning of the statutory provisions. It also involves reading words into the statute which are not there, and which are not a matter of necessary implication.[34]The first obvious difficulty with that construction is that when the drafter of the provisions of section 184 intended them to apply only to an owner or occupier of premises adjoining or having access to a public highway, they said so – as they did in subsections (1), (3), and (7). By contrast, subsection (11) refers to “any person”. On the face of it, that is a deliberate distinction made within the same section of the statute. Thus it appears to have been Parliament’s express intention that a wider section of the public than those who are directly affected by the exercise of the highway authority’s powers of compulsion under subsections (1) and (3) can request the authority to exercise its discretion to put in a crossover.[35]The reason for making that distinction is easy to discern when section 184 is read as a whole and its provisions are put in context. Although, as the Judge recognised, the overarching concern is achieving safe access to and egress from premises to the carriageway and vice versa, the specific mischief at which section 184(1) is addressed is the habitual driving of vehicles over a kerbed footway or verge in the highway to or from “any premises adjoining or having access to a public highway” (e.g. via a forecourt or a private driveway or lane) that are occupied by the person doing or permitting the driving.[36]If vehicles are habitually driven over a kerbed footway or verge in the public highway, the type of damage this is likely to cause to those parts of the highway (and the danger this may pose to pedestrians) will be the same irrespective of whether the destination on the other side of the verge or pavement is one house, several houses, a block of flats, or a line of garages in a back alley. The need to ensure safe access between the premises to which the vehicles are gaining access and the carriageway, will also be the same irrespective of how many buildings are being accessed in this manner. There is therefore no reason to interpret section 184(1) as excluding the scenario where the occupiers of two neighbouring properties each habitually drive over the kerb or verge in the same location in order to gain access to the frontages of their respective properties.[37]If the highway authority wishes to use its statutory powers under subsection (1)(a) to construct a crossover it may compel certain people to pay or contribute towards the reasonable expenses of doing so. Those people are(a) the occupier of anypremises adjoining the highway or having access to the highway who is causing or allowing vehicles to habitually drive over the kerb or verge to gain access to those premises - i.e. the person or persons who is or are causing the mischief that the authority wishes to address (I shall refer to such a person as “a qualifying occupier”) and(b) the owner of those premises. “Owner” is a defined term in section 329 and means, in relation to any premises, any person other than a mortgagee not in possession who, whether in his own right or as trustee or agent for any other person, is entitled to receive the rack rent of the premises (or would be so entitled if the premises were so let).[38]The persons who can be compelled to pay for the construction of the crossover are specifically identified because Parliament has required that they be notified of the authority’s intention to exercise its powers of compulsion, and once notified, they have a statutory right to object on the grounds set out in Schedule 14 within the time and in the manner prescribed in that Schedule. Those grounds, and the obligation of the Minister to adjudicate upon them, were first introduced by the Highways Act 1971, at the same time as the provisions concerning new developments of land which are now in section 184(3). This self-contained statutory code replaced a former right of appeal to a magistrates’ court, which was not tied to any specific grounds of objection.[39]As a general rule of statutory interpretation, the singular will be read as extending to the plural unless the context suggests otherwise. On that basis, notice could be served on more than one qualifying occupier, and on the owner(s) of any premises being accessed by vehicles in this fashion, requiring each of them to contribute to the cost of the vehicle crossing. However, a person falling outside those categories cannot be served with a notice under subsection (1) and cannot compel the highway authority to serve them with such a notice.[40]“Premises” is also expressly defined in section 329. The definition is a wide one:
“premises includes land and buildings”
. The expression “premises” is therefore capable of referring to more than one building which fronts the pavement, as well as to a building which has been divided into self-contained units in which different people have different proprietary interests. It clearly does not mean a single estate in land.[41]That interpretation is supported by the fact that if another person “with an interest in the premises” to which access is being gained by vehicles in this manner is also responsible for the fact that vehicles are being habitually driven over the kerb or verge, an owner or occupier on whom notice has been served under section 184(1)(a) may use the process of objection under subsection (6) and Schedule 14 to draw that fact to the attention of the highway authority, and suggest that that other person should be made to share in the cost of construction of the crossover. Those provisions seek to prevent someone from being unfairly made to shoulder the whole financial burden of the works because they are not the only person using that means of access. They also demonstrate express recognition by Parliament that more than one person may have an interest in the “premises”.[42]The underlying intention is plainly that, insofar as this can be achieved, all those contributing to the damage to the kerb or verge or benefiting from the existing habitual means of access to their property should contribute to the cost of the crossover, from which they are also likely to benefit, as it will provide a safer means of vehicular access to their properties. A can justifiably complain if they are being made to shoulder the whole burden of paying for works that would also give B access to B’s property, when B is just as responsible as A for letting vehicles drive over the kerb. However A has a limited time in which to voice that complaint and if A fails to object within 28 days of notification, they may have to shoulder the burden alone.[43]Parliament must have envisaged that subsection (1) would apply to a situation in which, for example, a large Victorian property has been subdivided into self-contained flats, and more than one flat owner or tenant is regularly driving cars across the verge to gain access to that building. But there is no meaningful distinction to be drawn in this context between that scenario and one in which cars are regularly being driven over the kerb or verge to gain access to each of two neighbouring properties fronting the pavement, or to any one of a group of garages in a back lane accessed via the same long driveway on the far side of the verge or pavement. It cannot have been Parliament’s intention to preclude the highway authority from serving notice on all the owners or qualifying occupiers informing them that it proposes to construct a crossover that will serve all the premises concerned, and requiring all of them to contribute to the cost, just because there is a separate legal estate vested in the owner of each of those properties. Nor could it have been Parliament’s intention to preclude A, upon whom such a notice is served, from objecting to that notice on the basis that neighbour B is also driving their car over the same kerb or verge to access B’s property and ought to make a financial contribution to the proposed crossover. On the contrary, properly construed, section 184(1) makes provision for both these scenarios.[44]Thus the expression “any premises” in subsection (1) must mean any (and therefore all) of the premises, including land, “adjoining or having access to a public highway” to which access is being gained by vehicles being driven across the kerb or verge.[45]Unlike “premises” the expression “a vehicle crossing” is not defined. The ordinary understanding of that expression would be “a crossing for vehicles”. “A crossing” is singular, but that says nothing about its dimensions. Although in context it is self-evident that this must be a modification to the verge or kerbed footway to enable vehicles to cross over it from the road to the “premises,” and vice versa, its specification will depend upon the terms of the notice served by the highway authority under section 184(1)(a). That subsection empowers the highway authority to serve a notice on qualifying occupiers and owners of such premises which states that they propose “to execute such works for the construction of a vehicle crossing over the footway or verge as may be specified in the notice.” Therefore the design, dimensions and location of the proposed “vehicle crossing” are matters for the highway authority alone to determine and specify. That is understandable, since they are proposing to undertake modifications to part of the highway, which is their statutory responsibility.[46]Parliament must have envisaged that the statute would operate in practical terms so as to enable the highway authority to design the crossover in such a way as would remedy the problem of vehicles driving over the kerb or verge. In an appropriate case, it could decide to locate the crossover further down the street, where it might then benefit the owners and occupiers of a property who have never driven vehicles over the kerb. Those persons could not be made to contribute to the cost. They would have no statutory right to object even if they disliked the idea of a crossover being constructed outside their property and thought that there was no need to put one there.[47]When determining the nature of the works, the highway authority must have regard to the factors specified in subsection (5), but subject to that, they have complete autonomy over the specification (and, like any other public body exercising a statutory discretion, may have regard to any other matters that they consider to be material). The criteria specified in section 184(5) are non-exhaustive, as Maurice Kay J. confirmed in R v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea ex parte Eminian (No. CO/733/2000) unreported, 19 July 2000.[48]In the light of that, it makes no sense to interpret “a vehicle crossing” as meaning a crossing over a particular part of a footpath or verge serving only one premises, let alone one premises in which there is a single legal estate. As my Lord, Lord Justice Lewis, pointed out in the course of the hearing, there is nothing in subsection (1)(a) or (5) to limit the width of the proposed vehicle crossing to that of an existing driveway.[49]Because of their exposure to making a compulsory financial contribution to the works, any person served with a notice under subsection 1(a) will have a right to object on any of the grounds set out in Schedule 14. The right to object is granted to such persons not because the proposal “potentially affects their properties,” as Mr Hoar submitted, but because it potentially affects their purses. The fact that they can object on grounds that are not directly linked to cost – e.g. that a crossing is not necessary or is unreasonable in character – does not affect the justification for the existence of the right to object.[50]The grounds in Schedule 14 are comprehensive – the statute permits objection on “any of the following grounds” that may apply in the circumstances of the case, thereby excluding any other grounds. However, the specified grounds are wide enough to cover most, if not all, pertinent reasons for objection that could arise, including objections as to cost, location, and dimensions as well as the more fundamental objections that the preconditions for exercise of the statutory power are not met or that the proposed works are prohibited by section 184(2). If an objection is made, the Minister must consider it. The Minister will have the final say about whether the notice served on the objector takes effect, and about any modifications to it if it does take effect (subject to challenge on public law grounds by way of judicial review).[51]Tellingly, Schedule 14 gives no right to a person who has not been served with such a notice – e.g. a neighbour who is not responsible for vehicles being driven across the kerb or verge, or whose property is not being accessed by such vehicles - to object to the authority’s proposal, even if the design of the proposed crossover might involve lowering of a section of the kerb in front of their property. As I have already pointed out, far from being mandated to serve a notice on a person falling outside the two categories specified in subsection (1), the highway authority is not empowered to do so. There is also no statutory requirement to obtain such a person’s consent. Since the work is being carried out on the highway and they are not being required to contribute financially, that is unsurprising.[52]The same analysis and rationale apply to the identification of the persons on whom a notice can be served under section 184(3). That subsection addresses a different situation, namely, where planning permission has been granted for a development of land, and the highway authority takes the view that this development makes it necessary to construct a crossover to provide vehicular access between the carriageway and “premises adjoining or having access to the highway.” [Emphasis supplied]. In many, possibly most, cases where section 184(3) operates, the development will not yet have been carried out.[53]The “premises” to which the crossover will give access under subsection (3) do not have to be the land which is to be developed, or even buildings situated on that land, and the land which is to be developed need not adjoin nor have access to the highway (though the premises to be accessed via the proposed crossover must do so). The subsection is therefore couched in terms that are deliberately wide in scope and give the highway authority considerable flexibility. By contrast with the powers under subsection (1)(a), which cannot be used to improve a pre-existing crossover because of the express prohibition in section 184 (2), subsection (3)(b) expressly empowers the highway authority to improve an existing crossover - typically, a crossover that is already providing access to the land which is being developed, or part of it.[54]In a subsection (3) scenario, the impetus behind the construction of the vehicle crossing is the perceived need for provision of a safe means of access (including by construction traffic) from the carriageway to or from the development itself, or to and from other premises fronting or having access to the highway that may be affected by the development. The crossing is proposed by the highway authority in order to meet that need for it; consequently, road safety and the safe passage of traffic along the highway will be matters of primary concern and damage to the kerbs or verges will probably be of less importance. The highway authority again has a statutory power to compel those falling within a restricted and identified group to pay for the construction or improvement of the crossover.[55]Subsection (3) operates in a similar way to subsection (1)(a). Notice may be served on the owner or occupier of the “premises” for which the proposed crossover is going to be providing vehicular access, and who is going to be required to contribute financially to the cost of the works. That person then has an opportunity to object on the grounds set out in Schedule 14 within the prescribed time and by the prescribed means, and if they do, the Minister takes the final decision. In this scenario, Schedule 14 makes specific provision for an objection on the basis that the developer intends to carry out the work themselves (and thus control the expenditure). In such event, subsections (9) and (10), which are not relevant to the issues of construction in this case, make provision for the highway authority to authorise the developer to carry out such works under plans approved by the authority, and to take over the works if the developer does not execute them satisfactorily.[56]As with subsection (1) the nature of the works for the construction of “the crossing” is as specified by the highway authority in the notice, and the authority must have regard to the matters specified in subsection (5). Again, in this context, “premises” must be read consistently with its wide statutory definition. It could include, for example, a plot of land on which there is or was previously a single property, on which the developer has obtained permission to build more houses. If the Highway Authority takes the view that an existing crossover servicing the original property needs to be widened or relocated in order for vehicles to travel safely between the new houses and the carriageway of the main road, it may serve a notice on any person identified in subsection (3). As with subsection (1), a person who has not been served with a notice has no right to object, and there is no statutory requirement to obtain anyone’s consent to the works.[57]Mr Hoar submitted that Mrs Anwar would only have the statutory right to object and the right to have her objection considered by the Minister if the proposal were made by the highway authority. That is true only up to a point. She would have no right to object even then, unless she were an owner or occupier upon whom a notice had been served under section 184(1) or (3) and was therefore at risk of having to pay for the proposed crossover. Section 184 is not concerned with protecting the rights or interests of occupiers or owners of neighbouring land.[58]Turning to section 184(11), if a request is made to the highway authority by “any person” to construct a crossover under that subsection, the highway authority has an absolute discretion to grant or refuse that request or to propose an alternative crossover. The request is for “a vehicle crossing over a footway or verge in the highway”. It is implicitly incumbent on the applicant to put forward a proposal for the crossover because the section states that the authority may then “approve the request with or without modification, or propose alternative works, or reject the request”.[59]Subsection (11) contains no language confining the location of the proposed crossover to the highway outside any particular premises. As I have already pointed out, the word “premises” does not appear in the subsection. Nor is there any sound basis for implying that the crossover must be to a premises owned or occupied by the person making the request. There is no language controlling the dimensions of the crossover. The highway authority is entrusted by Parliament to decide upon the design and location of any works that it is prepared to carry out in response to the request. Subsection (11) is in line with the statutory purpose of facilitating crossovers, subject to the works being appropriate in highways terms.[60]Mr Hoar postulated that if the words “any person” were given their natural meaning, without restriction, “a vindictive neighbour or acquaintance” might apply for a vehicle crossing, knowing that the occupier of the adjacent premises may be particularly opposed to one. Whilst theoretically possible, I regard that hypothesis as far-fetched, particularly since the person requesting the crossover will be obliged to pay for its construction if the authority agrees to the request. That would no doubt create a practical inhibition upon the making of officious requests. It is unlikely that someone would be willing to pay around £500 for works to be carried out on the public highway just to spite someone with a property fronting the pavement in question. Even if that scenario were to arise, the authority, which is not obliged to accede to the request, would be likely to question why someone with no interest in having vehicular access across the footpath in that location would volunteer to pay to have work carried out on the public highway. A rejection of the request in those circumstances is highly unlikely to be the subject of a successful judicial review. In the present case, of course, Mr Johal did have an interest in having a crossover to gain access to his own home, as the Council recognised when they invited him to apply for one.[61]In any event, and quite apart from the clear distinction between the language used in the subsections relating to compulsion cases and in subsection (11), there does seem to me to be good reason for giving the words “any person” their natural meaning. Someone other than an owner or occupier of premises fronting the pavement may well have a legitimate interest in requesting the highway authority to construct a new vehicle crossing over a particular section of a kerbed footway. For example, parents of children attending a nursery school currently accessible by vehicles only from the busy main road, might get together and request the highway authority to put in a crossover to enable vehicles to drive into the school forecourt directly from a much quieter side road. Requests of that nature might also be made by members of a local community group campaigning for enhanced road safety.[62]Mr Hoar submitted that such persons could not use subsection (11). They would have to resort to asking the highway authority to exercise its powers under subsections (1) and (3). That would be most unsatisfactory, since the authority may not have a power under those subsections to address the concerns raised by the parents or community group, because the statutory preconditions for its exercise may not be met. It also seems fanciful that Parliament would have intended that, where a person with a legitimate concern about road safety is able and willing to pay for a crossover, they should not be allowed to ask for one and have the application determined on its own merits, but must instead seek to initiate a process by which the highway authority must compel someone else to pay for it. That is truly an example of the application of the presumption that Parliament did not intend a statute to have absurd consequences.[63]Mr Hoar supported his restrictive interpretation of “any person” by the submission that as a matter of necessary implication the subject of the request under subsection (11), namely, “a vehicle crossing over a footway or verge in the highway” must mean a crossing serving a single premises owned or occupied by the applicant. Thus he contended that Mr Johal could only make a request in respect of a crossing serving his premises alone. Without a separate request from Mrs Anwar relating to the crossing which served her premises, the highway authority had no power to agree to the works. It was not so much a question of the statute requiring her consent, as a question of it mandating that she should make her own request before any construction could take place on any part of the highway fronting her land. However, that involves reading language into the subsection which is not there and which cannot be implied.[64]If a request is made under section 184(11) the highway authority has a discretion which, subject to its obligation to take account of the matters specified in subsection (5), and the obligation to act rationally, is otherwise unfettered. R v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, ex parte Eminian (above) is the only case that either party was able to find in which section 184(11) has previously been considered by a court. In that case it was held that the highway authority was entitled to refuse a request made under section 184(11) because the proposed crossover would result in the loss of around six metres of kerb-side parking for residents in a controlled parking zone. One of the factors in subsection (5) to which the authority must have regard is “the need to ensure, so far as is practicable, safe access to and egress from premises”. There is no justification for interpreting this as confining that consideration to individual premises, let alone to premises owned or occupied by the person making the request. The expression “premises” is deliberately not confined to any particular land or building, which is understandable given that the highway authority will be considering the factors in subsection (5) regardless of whether the case is one of compulsion or request.[65]There is no mechanism within the statute itself for objecting to the works proposed under section 184(11). That too is unsurprising. As the Judge observed at [62], it “would be an absurdity to have the right to object to something that you have requested yourself”. Of course, in responding to the request, the highway authority could propose an alternative layout or location for the crossover that the applicant dislikes, or impose conditions which they consider unnecessary, or set a fee which they think is too high. The applicant has no statutory means of resolving a dispute with the authority over matters of that nature, equivalent to the Schedule 14 procedure. The Minister does not become involved. But there is no need for such a process because Parliament has given the authority the final say, subject only to any judicial review of its decision. Since the authority is responsible for maintaining the highway and making any modifications to it, and is not obliged to accede to a request of that nature, that is wholly unsurprising.[66]Mr Hoar submitted that the absence of a right to object in subsection (11) points towards the right to request being restricted to the owner of the premises in front of which the crossing is to be constructed. If he wants a crossing there, it would be nonsensical for him to be given a right to object to it. I agree with Mr Williams KC that the absence of a right to object tells one nothing about the purpose of section 184(11) or the meaning of “any person.” Any person requesting something is not going to object to it happening. In any event, once it is appreciated that a neighbour in Mrs Anwar’s position would have no right to object even in a case of a crossover constructed under compulsion by virtue of subsections (1) or (3), the foundation for Mr Hoar’s argument that the natural construction of subsection (11) would deprive her of a protection intended by Parliament is fatally undermined. The rationale for the existence of the right to object in compulsion cases reinforces the point that there is no read across from subsections (1) or (3) to a subsection (11) scenario.[67]In my judgment, therefore, the Judge was right in his construction. He correctly described the Council’s internal practice of seeking consent from neighbours who are likely to be affected by a crossover proposed under subsection (11) as being “not a matter of law, but … a matter of good public relations with residents and, indeed, between them”.

THE A1P1 ARGUMENT

[68]Having determined the meaning of section 184 of the 1980 Act as a matter of ordinary statutory construction, the next question which arises is whether that interpretation would lead to a breach of a Convention right (in this case or in another). If so, section 3 of the Human Rights Act requires, so far as possible, that the legislation is interpreted in a way that does not give rise to a breach of a Convention right: see Poplar Housing & Regeneration Community Assn Ltd v Donoghue [2001] EWCA Civ 595; [2002] QB 48 at [75]; Re S (Children) [2002] UKHL 10;[2002] 2 AC 291 at [41].[69]A1P1 provides, so far as is relevant, that:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.”
The issue is therefore whether construing section 184(11) as permitting any person to request the highway authority to construct a vehicle crossing in the public highway, and as giving the highway authority a wide discretion to approve that request with or without modifications, or to propose alternative works or to reject the request, which is the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used, would have the effect of depriving anyone of their possessions or of the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions. The answer is plainly no.[70]The interpretation of section 184 which I consider to be correct does not give rise to a breach of a Convention right in this case, nor necessarily in any other case. There are a number of reasons for this, but I need mention only two. First, the section enables the highway authority to carry out works in the public highway when it considers it appropriate (or, in a subsection (3) case, necessary) to do so. It does not involve encroachment on any private land, unlike the case of Field Common Ltd v Elmbridge BC [2008] EWHC 2079 (Ch); [2009] 1 P&C R 1 upon which Mr Hoar sought to rely. That was a case in which the local authority trespassed on private land by putting down tarmac over a private road and part of the claimant’s land without its consent.[71]The Strasbourg cases cited by Mr Hoar concern very different scenarios such as the expropriation of land belonging to an individual, or the deprivation of their property rights pending the outcome of criminal proceedings. As Mr Williams pointed out, they are of no relevance to a situation where a highway authority is exercising powers provided for expressly under statute to undertake works within the public highway maintainable by them at public expense, especially where those works are not impeding Mrs Anwar’s access to her property (quite the reverse). Since Mrs Anwar’s (and Mr Caan’s) rights of ownership or control over their property have not been interfered with in any way by the lowering of the kerbs on the footpath outside it, A1P1 is not engaged.[72]Secondly, and equally fatally for this argument, the proper construction of section 184(11) does not limit the rights of a private landowner under the law governing trespass to stop a trespass on private land. The carrying out of the works in part of the public highway merely facilitates the exercise of a private law right of access to property. It neither authorises someone to trespass on the land which is accessible via the crossover, nor encourages them to do so. Whilst someone could drive across Mrs Anwar’s boundary on their way in to Mr Johal’s forecourt, or park on the driveway across the boundary, Mrs Anwar retains all her private law rights to secure the peaceful enjoyment of her land if that occurs.

CONCLUSION

[73]Accordingly, even if it had been open to Mrs Anwar to challenge the 2015 decision, that challenge would have failed. The construction of the crossover was lawful. The Judge was right so to find. I would therefore dismiss this appeal.[74]I agree.[75]I also agree.