Zahra Fatolahzadeh v London Borough of Barnet [2025] EWCA Civ 1174

[2025] EWCA Civ 1174Case No CA-2024-002169
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE COUNTY COURT
AT CENTRAL LONDON
His Honour Judge Hellman
K40CL184
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 18 September 2025
Before
LORD JUSTICE SINGHLORD JUSTICE BAKERLORD JUSTICE STUART-SMITH
Between
ZAHRA FATOLAHZADEHAppellantLONDON BOROUGH OF BARNETRespondent
Iain Colville (instructed by Oliver Fisher Solicitors) for AppellantGenevieve Screeche-Powell (instructed by HB Public Law) for RespondentHearing Hearing date: 1 July 2025
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on Thursday 18 September 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................

Introduction

[1]On 26 September 2022 the respondent [“Barnet”] accepted that it owed the appellant a prevention duty pursuant to section 195(2) of the Housing Act 1996 [“the Act”]. On 17 March 2023 Barnet offered the appellant a two-bedroom flat at 124 Kenilworth Road in Edgware [“the Property”], which it considered suitable for her needs. The appellant accepted that offer but requested that the Respondent review the suitability of the Property pursuant to section 202 of the Act. On 4 August 2023, Barnet gave its decision on the requested review [“the Review decision”], which was that the Property was suitable.[2]The appellant brought an appeal to the Central London County Court pursuant to section 204 of the Act challenging the Review decision. That appeal came before HHJ Hellman [“the Judge”] on 30 April 2024 and led to a judgment dated 29 July 2024 [“the Judgment”] and an order dismissing the appellant’s appeal, dated 17 October 2024.[3]The appellant now brings a second appeal to this court advancing two grounds, namely: i) Ground 1 is that “the Judge erred in law in finding that, where a local housing authority fails to discharge the duty to assess an applicant’s housing needs pursuant to section 189A(2) of the Act, such breach does not invalidate a purported discharge of duty through offering accommodation because of their assessment of suitability. In error the Judge concluded [that Barnet’s] review of the property’s suitability on review superseded the assessment duty”; ii) Ground 2 is that “further or in the alternative, the Judge erred [in] concluding [that] the personal housing plan prepared in the absence of any discharge of the assessment duty, lack of reasoning and in the absence of any review, was immaterial since the reviewing officer could find the property was suitable”.[4]As will appear, Ground 1 does not accurately reflect the issues that arise in this case. I would dismiss the appeal on both grounds for reasons that I shall explain. First, and although the appeal is primarily concerned with questions of principle, it is necessary to outline some of the facts in rather greater detail. The summary is taken largely from the Judgment.

The factual background

[5]The appellant approached Barnet in July 2022 because she had been issued a notice seeking possession of the property in which she was then living with her adult son. The case was assigned to a tenancy sustainment officer to explore ways to prevent the loss of accommodation. On 12 September 2022 the appellant and her son completed medical self-assessment forms in which each outlined their significant health issues and consequential difficulties. On the same day they each completed affordability assessment forms.[6]On 21 September 2022, a housing worker employed by Barnet conducted a telephone interview about the appellant and her son’s circumstances and needs, the details of which were recorded by Barnet in its “Jigsaw notes”. The officer recorded details of the appellant’s reason for making a homelessness approach. Their present accommodation (a two-bedroom first floor flat with access via stairs and a lift), special educational needs for her son, the appellant’s diagnosed conditions, the location of her appointments and her son’s medical and disability information were also recorded. The notes recorded that the appellant had a support network where they currently lived. The following day, the appellant and her son were provided with a copy of that record of interview.[7]In the light of that interview, Barnet prepared a document that described itself as a personal housing plan [“PHP”]. It recorded that the appellant had attended on Barnet and that “a personal assessment of your current housing circumstances was undertaken” by the housing worker which took into account the circumstances causing her homelessness, the housing needs of the appellant and her household, the type of accommodation her household requires, and any support needs that she and her household needed in order to secure and retain accommodation. It recorded the appellant’s wish to have assistance with long term temporary accommodation; and it set out various action types with target dates to be achieved. It also recorded information that had been provided, such as the self-assessment medical and special needs forms and supporting medical information from the appellant’s GP or consultant. It stated that it was to be reviewed by Barnet and the appellant at 9.15 am on 21 October 2022.[8]On 26 September 2022, both the appellant and her son signed post-interview declaration forms, as had been requested by Barnet. On the same day the housing worker contacted Barnet’s Housing Medical Team and asked them to assess for vulnerability, future housing and banding recommendations.[9]Also on 26 September 2022, Barnet wrote to the appellant accepting a duty pursuant to section 195(2) of the Act to help prevent her from becoming homeless. It referred to her PHP being either attached or to be sent shortly, and said that it contained Barnet’s assessment of her housing circumstances, housing need and any support needs. The letter informed the appellant of her right to request a review pursuant to section 202(1)(bc)(i) of any decision of the authority as to the steps the authority were to take. No review was requested.[10]On 13 October 2022, Barnet’s Housing Medical Team forwarded to the housing worker a response to her request for a medical assessment. The response was compiled by a doctor and was in the following terms:
“Housing needs First floor max. or lifted Shower with seat Nil else specific … Given [the son’s disability] I’d consider him vulnerable if homeless. I make no other housing recommendation.”
This recommendation was added to the Jigsaw notes on 4 December 2022 and was repeated in a further entry in the notes on 17 March 2023. First floor max. or lifted Shower with seat Nil else specific I make no other housing recommendation.”

Nil else specific

[11]Meanwhile, on 28 October 2022 the appellant was assessed by Barnet as falling into Band 3 under its allocation scheme. However, the Barnet’s officer recommended that she be treated as falling into Band 2 (the second highest priority band) because of advice from Barnet’s medical team. Accordingly, on 5 December 2022, Barnet sent a “banding” letter to the appellant setting out that she had been placed into band 2 as from 28 October 2022 and that Barnet would now start looking for suitable properties for her. The letter stated that a property would be suitable for her if it met criteria including(a) no more than two bedrooms and(b) compliance with the medical recommendations that the accommodation should be first floor maximum or lifted and a shower with a seat. She was asked to contact Barnet if she did not agree with these criteria.[12]The appellant was unhappy with the banding allocation and raised this with Barnet, complaining that her existing flat was uninhabitable. On 6 January 2023 Barnet wrote, having completed its enquiries into her application. It rejected the appellant’s concerns and concluded that there should be no change in the appellant’s banding for reasons set out in its letter.[13]On 6 February 2023 Barnet offered the appellant housing at an address in Avondale Avenue, London N12. After viewing the accommodation with her Social Prescribing Link Worker the appellant said that she did not think it suitable. Having discussed it internally, on 13 February 2023 Barnet accepted and acted on the advice of the Social Prescribing Link Worker that the accommodation was unsuitable and withdrew the offer for that accommodation.[14]By a letter dated 17 March 2023, Barnet then offered the Property to the appellant by a letter that described itself as a final Part 6 Offer of suitable accommodation. In what was plainly an implicit reference to section 195(5) and (8) of the Act, the letter said that acceptance of the offer would end the housing duty that Barnet owed to the appellant. The letter described the Property as a two-bedroom flat on the ground floor and said that a level access shower would be installed to meet the appellant’s medical needs. The letter stated that Barnet considered the Property to be suitable and reasonable for her, and therefore reasonable for her to accept.[15]The appellant accepted Barnet’s offer and moved in when the Property was ready for occupation. However, as she was entitled to do, she requested Barnet to carry out a review of the suitability of the Property. Barnet acknowledged that request for a review of the Property’s suitability by a letter dated 24 March 2023, which informed her of her opportunity to submit further representations with regard to the review. The appellant took advantage of that opportunity by a letter from her solicitors on 21 April 2023 which stated that the Property was not suitable for two reasons. First, it was too far from the appellant’s and her son’s support network. The appellant currently lived in Hendon close to Finchley. Her GP, social prescriber, close friend, community and church were all located on the other side of Barnet. It was not reasonable to expect the appellant, who suffered from several physical and mental health conditions, to travel to and from her support network by public transport. Second, the appellant’s son suffered from a hearing impairment which caused him to suffer from tinnitus, dizziness and migraines. The Property was located off a busy motorway. This was not suitable for his medical conditions as exposure to loud noise exacerbated his tinnitus and dizziness. Furthermore, he required regular support from his network to ensure his mental and physical wellbeing.[16]The solicitor’s letter included a number of supporting letters from friends and family regarding the suitability or otherwise of the location of the Property. In chronological order, the letters were a supporting letter from the Jewish Deaf Association; a supporting letter from the appellant’s close friend, Ms Noushin Tejad; a supporting letter from the North London Iranian Church; a letter from the appellant’s social prescriber; and a supporting letter from the appellant’s GP.[17]On 25 May 2023 the housing officer who had been primarily dealing with the appellant and her housing needs wrote to the appellant to let her know that the duty under section 195(2) of the Act to help prevent her from becoming homeless had ended because Barnet had been able to help her to find other accommodation, namely the Property. The letter said that the appellant had a reasonable prospect of having the suitable accommodation provided by the Property for at least 12 months and that Barnet’s duty under section 195(2) had come to an end because(a) the appellant had suitable accommodation available for her occupation, and(b) there was a reasonable prospect of having suitable accommodation available for occupation for at least 6 months. The letter drew the appellant’s attention to the possibility of asking for a review of the current decision (i.e. that Barnet’s section 195(2) duty had come to an end) if she thought the accommodation secured or offered wasn’t suitable for her. The appellant has not at any stage requested a review of or challenged the decision that Barnet’s section 195(2) duty had come to an end.[18]On 14 June 2023, Barnet wrote to the appellant regarding her request for a review of suitability of the offer of accommodation made by the Respondent. The letter stated that the reviewing officer was minded to make a decision upholding the offer of the Property. The letter stated that the reviewing officer was satisfied that there was no irregularity in the original decision or the manner in which it was made, that the Property was suitable, and that the decision that the section 195(2) duty had ended was safe.[19]On 28 June 2023 the appellant’s solicitors made further written representations and provided further evidence in response to Barnet’s “minded to” letter. The solicitors also sent further representations on 11 July 2023.[20]On 4 August 2023 Barnet issued the Review decision which is under appeal in these proceedings. It is detailed and thorough, running to 90 paragraphs and 11 pages, and it addresses the suitability of the Property and the appellant’s challenges to suitability in considerable detail taking into account all of the information that had been made available to the reviewing officer by the appellant and from other sources. It is not necessary to provide further details about the contents of the letter because there is no substantive criticism of the Review decision, its terms, reasons or conclusions, including the conclusion that the Property was suitable for the appellant’s housing needs. What is said is that the Review decision is invalidated and rendered unlawful by Barnet’s alleged failure at an earlier stage to carry out an assessment of the appellant’s housing needs as required by section 189A of the Act.

The Judgment

[21]The Judgment is well-structured and clearly expressed. Having set out the factual background, the Judge identified that there were before him three grounds of appeal. Ground 3 concerned the application of the PSED contained in the Equality Act 2010 and is not pursued in the present appeal.[22]Grounds 1 and 2(a) were founded on the contention that Barnet had failed to prepare and keep under review its assessment of the appellant’s housing needs and her PHP. As summarised by the Judge, the appellant’s case was simply that by section 195(3) of the Act Barnet was bound to have regard to the housing needs assessment in the discharge of its duty; and, in the absence of any assessment, its decision on suitability and its application of the criteria in Article 2 of the Homelessness (Suitability of Accommodation) (England) Order 2012 was unlawful.[23]The Judge addressed Grounds 1 and 2(a) together at [34]-[43] of the Judgment. In the course of doing so he conducted a short but appropriate review of the relevant statutory provisions and the authorities that were before him, including UO v Redbridge LBC [2023] HLR 39 H), XY v Haringey LBC [2019] EWHC 2276 (Admin), and R(ZK) v Havering LBC [2022] HLR 47 (three cases of Judicial Review); and Abed v City of Westminster [2011] EWCA Civ 1406. Having set out the parties’ submissions, he said, at [52]-[53]:
“52. I find as follows. The Respondent did make an assessment of the Appellant’s housing needs. It used the assessment to allocate the Appellant to the appropriate housing band under Part VI of the Act, and, I draw the reasonable inference, to make an offer of suitable accommodation under Part VII of the Act. The assessment was communicated to the Appellant in writing in the banding letter, albeit the letter was written for the purposes of Part VI, not Part VII, of the Act. It was not contained in the PHP. 53. Insofar as the assessment relates to suitability, it may fairly be criticised as being insufficiently reasoned. In particular, the assessment did not consider how the distance of the Property from the Appellant’s support network might impact upon its suitability. However, this deficiency was remedied in the review decision, which gave full consideration to this point. I shall therefore proceed, without presently deciding, on the assumption that: (i) the Respondent did not carry out a housing needs assessment which as regards suitability complied with the requirements of section 189A; and (ii) apart from the reviewing officer’s failure to identify and give appropriate weight to the section 189A point, the review decision as regards suitability was in all other respects satisfactory.”
[24]It is clear that in reaching this staging post in the Judgment, the Judge accepted the following propositions, which I would respectfully endorse: i) The initial assessment duty entails a duty to take reasonable steps of inquiry so as to be able to identify or assess potential housing needs; and, in doing so a local authority should adopt a positive and collaborative approach towards applicants, taking account of their particular needs and making all reasonable efforts to engage their cooperation: see UO at [59] ii) An assessment and the agreement referred to in section 189A of the Act do not need to be recorded in one document; and, as a practical matter, the housing officer dealing with a particular case would read all of the housing file so as to be fully acquainted with the background and needs of the applicant and her family: see XY at [54]; iii) To decide whether or not the duty on the local authority to provide a lawful housing needs assessment and/or a lawful PHP has been discharged requires an assessment of the totality of the written housing file as it might be viewed by a “reasonable and sensible housing officer”: see ZK at[39].[25]As set out above, the Judge accepted at [53] of the Judgment that the identified deficiency in reasoning in the original assessment was remedied in the Review decision, which gave full consideration to the point. At [55]-[61] of the Judgment, the Judge then considered the issue of legislative intent or, in other words, what should be the effect of the failure provide sufficient reasons in the original assessment, in circumstances where the original deficiency had subsequently been remedied by the Review decision that is not as such subject to any substantive criticism.[26]The Judge cited a passage from Bennion, Bailey and Norbury on Statutory Interpretation on the failure to comply with statutory requirements, which in turn cited a passage from the judgment of Etherton C in Natt v Osman [2014] EWCA Civ 1520 at [25]:
“The modern approach is to determine the consequence of non-compliance as an ordinary issue of statutory interpretation, applying all the usual principles of statutory interpretation. It invariably involves, therefore, among other things according to the context, an assessment of the purpose and importance of the requirement in the context of the statutory scheme as a whole.”
[27]Adopting these principles,

the Judge gave his reasons concisely:

“56. Having regard to the observation of Lloyd LJ in Abed at [26], I am satisfied that Parliament did not intend that an authority’s failure to carry out any or any adequate housing needs assessment under section 189A should invalidate a finding of suitability under a section 202 review. Suitability is a factual assessment which the reviewing officer must consider afresh. Their decision on the point supersedes any earlier decision or failure to decide by the authority. 57. On appeal, the court need not look back beyond the reviewing officer’s decision. However, an adequate housing needs assessment will be likely to assist a reviewing officer when determining suitability. An inadequate housing needs assessment, or no housing needs assessment at all, will be likely to make the reviewing officer’s task in determining suitability more difficult. 58. The present case is not one where the Respondent failed to carry out any assessment of the Appellant’s housing needs or to communicate that assessment to her. If the Appellant wished to argue that the assessment process undertaken and communicated by the Respondent failed to comply with the requirements of section 189A, and that for that reason the Property could not properly be assessed as suitable, then she should have done so during the review process. I do not consider the point as being so obvious that the reviewing officer was bound to consider it in any event. 59. There is another element to the Appellant’s argument under grounds 1 and 2(a). Her PHP, which was based on an assessment carried out on 21 September 2022, states that the PHP is to be reviewed by an officer and with the customer on 21 October 2022 at 9.15am. There is no evidence that any such review was ever carried out. The Appellant submits that the Respondent was therefore in breach of its section 189A(9) duty to keep the PHP under review. 60. I am satisfied there is nothing in this point. Section 189A does not say how often the PHP should be reviewed. In the present case, the interval between the PHP and the review decision was less than a year and the interval between the PHP and the offer of the Property less than six months. There was no material change in the Appellant’s circumstances during that period. 61. The Appellant submits that if the PHP had been reviewed before the property was offered, the housing needs of the Appellant could have been identified and rectified. However, subject to the ground 2(b) point about location, there is no reason to suppose that a further PHP would have led the Respondent to consider that the Property was not suitable. In any event, the objections to the housing needs assessment point taken in grounds 1 and 2(a) apply also mutatis mutandis to the PHP point. I.e., the Court is concerned with whether, in light of the Appellant’s housing needs, the reviewing officer could properly have found that the Property was in fact suitable. If the Appellant wished to take the PHP point, she should have done so before the reviewing officer. 62. For these reasons, grounds 1 and 2(a) are both dismissed.”
[28]In Abed v City of Westminster [2011] EWCA Civ 1406 to which

the Judge referred in [56] of the Judgment, Lloyd LJ identified the issue before the Court at [1]:

“… before us there is only one ground of appeal which contends that Westminster followed an unlawful process in offering accommodation to the appellant at the first stage without having first made an assessment of the suitability of the accommodation for her needs.”
[29]I set out the passage at [26] of Abed to which the Judge referred at [51] below.[30]Having disposed of Grounds 1 and 2(a), the Judge addressed the appellant’s contention under Ground 2(b) that Barnet had failed properly to consider the effects on the appellant and her son of living so far from their support network and the effect of them being unable to access that support. It was the appellant’s case that no reasonable authority would conclude that the Property was suitable for the appellant and her son, given the detriment that was being caused when living in it. The reviewing officer had considered this question in detail at [56]-[58] of the Review decision and had concluded that the property was reasonably located and the offer of the Property suitable to the appellant’s needs. The Judge concluded that the reviewing officer was entitled to reach that conclusion on the evidence before them. That conclusion is not challenged in the present appeal. The availability of other accommodation as at the date of the Review decision was not a point that the Reviewing officer was requested to consider. Ground 1: the competing submissions and resolution The appellant’s submissions

Ground 1: the competing submissions and resolution

[31]The appellant’s submissions are founded on the contention that Barnet carried out no section 189A assessment of the appellant’s case. On that basis it is contended that it was at all material times unable to discharge its prevention duty under section 195(2). In support of that contention the appellant submits that the obligation to carry out a section 189A assessment logically precedes any possible decision on whether a duty is owed and, if it is, how that duty is to be discharged. The assessment must comply with all the requirements of section 189A(2). After the assessment has been made, the applicant must be notified of the authority’s assessment in writing and the authority must try to agree with the applicant what steps should be taken: see sections 189A(3) and (4). Although the assessment does not have to deal with and set out every need that an applicant might possibly have, it should set out the “key needs”, sometimes described as those that would provide the “nuts and bolts” for any offer of accommodation. Until the authority decides that it owes an applicant no duty under Part 7 of the Act, the assessment must be kept under review: see section 189A(9). A failure to carry out any (or any compliant) assessment may properly form the basis for judicial review proceedings, seeking to quash a purported assessment.[32]The appellant accepts (and asserts) that a local housing authority may discharge their housing functions under Part 7 of the Act by securing that suitable accommodation provided by them is available: see section 206(1) of the Act. That applies equally to an authority attempting to discharge its prevention duty under section 195(2) by securing that accommodation is available. However, it remains the appellant’s case that a failure properly to discharge the section 189A(2) obligation has the effect that an authority is not able lawfully to discharge the prevention duty. In oral submissions Mr Colville for the appellant accepted and asserted that the logical conclusion of his argument would be that, where an assessment was either absent or deficient, the provision of suitable accommodation could not amount to a lawful discharge of the authority’s prevention duty. In his words, “a failure to carry out an adequate housing needs assessment would invalidate a finding of suitability” whether or not the issue of suitability was raised as an issue for review and even if a comprehensive section 202 review concluded for unimpeachable reasons after considering all available evidence that the accommodation was in fact suitable.

Barnet’s submissions

[33]Barnet submits that (as found by the Judge) it did assess the appellant’s housing needs, albeit that the assessment is not to be found in a single document. Subject only to the deficiency in the original reasons for the finding of suitability, which was remedied by the Review decision, Barnet submits that it substantially complied with its obligations under section 189A and continued to keep its assessment under suitable review even if there was no meeting to discuss the assessment on 21 October 2022. Having established the system of review pursuant to requests under section 202 of the Act, it cannot have been Parliament’s intention that an otherwise satisfactory review decision is invalidated by any and every prior deficiency in an authority’s section 189A assessment. Rather, a proper appreciation of the consequences of a deficiency should take as its starting point that the Act specifically contemplates that errors can be remedied by a review: this is implicit in regulation 7(2) of the Homelessness (Review Procedure) Regulations 2018, and see [26] of Abed. In the present appeal, the decision under review is the Review decision, which is not substantively challenged. It cannot have been Parliament’s intention that such a review decision is invalidated on the facts of the present case. The purpose of the section 189A duty is to ensure that advice and assistance given to an applicant is tailored to an applicant’s needs and to help them to find accommodation that is suitable for them. That is what happened in the present case.[34]In support of these submissions, Barnet draws attention to the fact that section 202 of the Act does not provide a right of review of a section 189A assessment or a PHP. Barnet submits that the proper route for challenging the validity of either or both would be by judicial review proceedings. Where, however, that is not done, the structure created by Parliament is for challenges to be to specific decisions of the types identified in section 202 of the Act. That provides a structured and proportionate framework of remedies which presupposes that decisions made after properly applying the review process will be valid, with the further protection of the right of appeal to the County Court on a point of law arising from the decision.[35]Barnet submits that there was a continuing process that gave substantial consideration to the appellant’s housing needs and to the other features mandated by section 189A(2); and it submits (correctly) that the appellant has not identified any need that went unassessed. Ultimately, Barnet relies upon the fact that suitable accommodation that met the appellant’s needs was identified by Barnet, which was offered to and accepted by the appellant.

Discussion and resolution

[36]The relevant provisions of Part VII of the Act are well known and do not need to be set out extensively again here. We are primarily concerned with sections 189A, 195 and 202. In briefest outline, the duty with which we are directly concerned is the prevention duty that is owed when a local housing authority is satisfied that an applicant is threatened with homelessness and eligible for assistance: section 195(1). The scope of the authority’s duty in cases of threatened homelessness such as the present is stated in section 195(2):
“the authority must take reasonable steps to help the applicant to secure that accommodation does not cease to be available for the applicant’s occupation.”
Other sections may be seen as ancillary to that duty, in the sense that they make provision affecting how the authority should go about discharging its prevention duty. For present purposes, the relevant provision is section 195(3), which lays down that “in deciding what steps they are to take [i.e. what steps must be taken because they are reasonable within the meaning of section 195(2)] the authority must have regard to their assessment of the applicant’s case under section 189A.”[37]The effect of section 189A(1) in a threatened homelessness case such as the present is that “the authority must make an assessment of the applicant’s case.” Section 189A(2) provides that the assessment must include an assessment of three specific features, though the authority is not precluded from considering others when assessing the applicant’s case. Put briefly, the three specific features are(a) the circumstances that caused the applicant to become threatened with homelessness,(b) the housing needs of the applicant, including what accommodation would be suitable for the applicant and other relevant persons, and(c) what support would be necessary for the applicant and any other relevant persons to be able to have and retain suitable accommodation.[38]The prevention duty may be discharged by attempting to secure the continuation of current accommodation; but it may also be discharged by the authority securing that suitable accommodation provided by the authority is available, or in other ways as outlined in section 206(1) of the Act.[39]Section 202 provides for an applicant to request a review of some but not all decisions that may be made by an authority in a homelessness or threatened homelessness case. For present purposes, the potentially relevant decisions of which an applicant threatened with homelessness may request a review pursuant to section 202(1) are(i) any decision of the authority as to what duty (if any) is owed to the applicant under section 195: section 202(1)(b);(ii) any decision of an authority as to the steps they are to take under section 195(2): section 202(1)(bc)(i); and(iii) any decision of a local authority as to the suitability of accommodation offered to him in discharge of its duty under section 195: section 202(1)(f). There is no provision under section 202 for an applicant to request a review of the authority’s assessment of their case or the PHP produced by the authority. Section 202 does not provide a blanket right to request a general review where an applicant is dissatisfied with the approach or outcome being adopted or proposed by the local authority. The right provided by section 202 to request a review of a decision is specific to the types of decision identified in section 202(1): see Ofori-Addo v Haringey LBC [2025] EWCA Civ 277 at [42].[40]The appellant’s case on Ground 1 is fundamentally flawed because it is based on the assertion that Barnet did not carry out an assessment of her housing needs. That assertion is unsustainable. Having heard all of the evidence, the Judge found that Barnet did make an assessment of the appellant’s housing needs. That finding was not merely one that the Judge was entitled to make – it was plainly right. As summarised above, having gathered preliminary evidence from the appellant and her son, Barnet conducted a telephone interview that addressed each of the three features required by section 189(2) as well as other matters that were relevant to an assessment of the appellant’s housing needs. The record of that interview was then sent to the appellant and her son for their agreement, which was forthcoming when they signed the post-interview declaration forms. The PHP was subsequently sent to the applicant: see [5]-[7] above.[41]It is plain that Barnet’s assessment of the appellant’s case did not end there. Specifically in relation to housing needs, Barnet consulted its Medical Team who provided the recommendations set out at [10]] above. Those recommendations were incorporated in the statement of criteria for suitability in Barnet’s banding letter on 5 December 2022: see [11] above. When asked to do so, Barnet considered the appellant’s objections to her banding allocation: see [12] above.[42]The continuing process of assessment and having regard to that assessment was then illustrated by the steps Barnet took to ensure that the first property offered to the appellant was suitable, leading to the acceptance that it was not and withdrawal of that offer: see [13]. At no stage did the appellant suggest that the assessment disclosed by this course of dealing was deficient in relation to its assessment of her housing needs. Her objection to the proposed banding was not based on assessment of her housing needs; rather it was based on the assertion that her current accommodation (in respect of which she was threatened with homelessness) was uninhabitable. Her objection to the Avondale Avenue property was not based on a contention that her housing needs were wrongly identified; rather it was that the bathroom was on the first floor and she had a fear of chair-lifts. Barnet accepted that this rendered it unsuitable for her: see [13] above.[43]This process, briefly summarised above, to my mind shows Barnet adopting a positive and collaborative approach towards the appellant, taking account of her and her son’s particular needs having regard to their assessment of the case, and making all reasonable efforts over time to engage their cooperation. While I accept that the assessment of the appellant’s case is to be found in more than one document, that does not matter. What matters is the substance of the assessment that was carried out. As to that, the Judge’s rejection of the submission that Barnet made no section 189A assessment at all was and is unimpeachable.[44]The Judge found in the appellant’s favour that Barnet’s assessment was deficient as regards suitability because its reasoning was insufficient about how the distance of the Property from the appellant’s support network might impact upon its suitability. That deficiency was, as the Judge correctly found, remedied by the Review decision. It is that decision that is the subject of these proceedings. Ground 1 therefore requires reformulation. The issue for us is whether, where a request for review of suitability is made and the resulting review decision adequately addresses and thereby remedies the substantive deficiency in the underlying decision, the review decision can be challenged by bringing an appeal to the County Court on a point of law pursuant to section 204 of the Act on the basis of the original deficiency in the assessment of suitability. I am in no doubt that it cannot.[45]I would readily accept that there may be circumstances where a failure to carry out an appropriate assessment of an applicant’s case as required by section 189A may be challenged by way of judicial review proceedings. There are numerous examples at first instance of such challenges being brought and the results of such cases are evidently fact-dependent applying normal public law principles. Where an underlying decision (e.g. the assessment of the applicant’s case) is quashed, subsequent decisions that are dependent upon the underlying decision may have to be set aside. However, that is not the present case. No challenge to Barnet’s assessment has been brought by way of judicial review proceedings. As I have mentioned, section 202(1) identifies specifically the decisions that are susceptible to a request for a review. The present proceedings arise from a suitability challenge pursuant to section 202(1)(f) and come to this court via the County Court pursuant to section 204 of the Act.[46]The absence of judicial review proceedings cannot be glossed over. On established public law principles, administrative acts are valid unless and until quashed by a Court: see Hoffman-La Roche & Co v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [1975] AC 295, at 366 (Lord Diplock), cited in R (Noble Organisation) v Thanet DC [2005] EWCA Civ 782; [2006] Env LR 8, at para 42 (per Auld LJ). In theory, at least, the requirement under section 195(3) for Barnet to have regard to their assessment of the applicant’s case under section 189A is a mandatory relevant consideration, failure to comply with which could found a vires challenge to the validity of the assessment. But the time for bringing such a challenge is strictly limited, no judicial review challenge was brought within time (or at all) and, in any event, it is plain that such a challenge should have failed on its facts, because it is evident on the Judge’s findings that Barnet did have regard to their assessment as required by the Act. In this case the assessment was not challenged at the time and, having not been quashed, it remains valid.[47]There was no challenge to the Judge’s approach in principle to the consequences of non-compliance with an imperative statutory requirement as summarised by Etherton C in Natt v Osman – see [26] above. On established principles, based on R v Soneji [2005] UKHL 49, [2006] 1 AC 340, in A1 Properties (Sunderland) Ltd v Tudor Studios RTM Co Ltd [2024] UKSC 27. [2024] 3 WLR 601 the Supreme Court stated: “[58] … the correct approach to a failure to comply with a provision prescribing the doing of some act before a power was exercised was to ask whether it was a purpose of the legislature that an act done in breach of that provision should be invalid. … [61] The point of adoption of the revised analytical framework in Soneji was to move away from a rigid category-based approach to evaluating the consequences of a failure to comply with a statutory procedural requirement and to focus instead on(a) the purpose served by the requirement as assessed in light of a detailed analysis of the particular statute and(b) the specific facts of the case, having regard to whether any (and what) prejudice might be caused or whether any injustice might arise if the validity of the statutory process is affirmed notwithstanding the breach of the procedural requirement." … [68] In our view the correct approach in a case where there is no express statement of the consequences of non-compliance with a statutory requirement is first to look carefully at the whole of the structure within which the requirement arises and ask what consequence of non-compliance best fits the structure as a whole."[48]In R v Layden [2025] UKSC 12, [2025] 2 WLR 740the Supreme Court also encapsulated the same principle in slightly different terms at [76]-[77]:
"[76] In order to consider whether Parliament can fairly have intended total invalidity to follow it is necessary to identify the alternative to total invalidity. [77] In most cases involving the Soneji principle the alternative will be an evaluation of the consequences of the procedural failure, whether any prejudice might be caused and whether any injustice might arise if the validity of the statutory process is affirmed notwithstanding the breach of the procedural requirement (see, for example, A1 Properties … at para 61)."
[49]We do not start with a blank sheet of paper. Two previous decisions of the Court have considered this question in circumstances that are closely analogous to but not quite congruent with the facts of the present case.[50]In Abed, the duty owed to the applicant was the duty owed pursuant to section 193 of the Act to persons with priority need who are not homeless intentionally. Subject to irrelevant qualifications, the duty is to secure that accommodation is available for occupation by the applicant: section 193(2). The issue for the Court was summarised at [15]:
“The single issue is that Westminster followed an unlawful process in making its offer to the appellant because it did not assess the suitability of the accommodation for her needs before making the offer. Thus the entire focus is on the position on, and before, the date of the offer on 11 February 2010. No criticism is addressed to the review process or to the review decision as such.”
[51]Addressing the origins of the review procedure under Part VII of the Act, Lloyd LJ (with whom Kitchen and Ward LJJ agreed) said at [20]:
“Before this procedure was introduced local authority decisions in this area could only be challenged by way of judicial review. This led to an unmanageable burden of such applications which, if successful, resulted in the local authority having to go through the same decision process again but by a proper method. Instead, in the case of most decisions under this part of the Act, the Act now provides for first of all a right to an administrative review by the authority to be conducted by a different person by or on behalf of the authority; and secondly a right of appeal on a point of law said to be erroneous in the review decision.”
At [26] Lloyd LJ said (in the passage referred to by the Judge):
“On behalf of the appellant Mr Gannon does not challenge any aspect of the review process in the one ground on which the appeal is brought. In my judgment that is fatal to the appeal. The observations in Ojuri have no relevance to a case where a statutory review process is available. In such a case the Act has provided for the applicant to challenge the decision and to have it fully reconsidered, with the opportunity to ensure that the full facts are taken into account. That seems to me to exclude as illegitimate a challenge on the grounds such as the original process was incorrect or even unlawful, because a point of that kind is superseded by the question as to whether the review process was carried out properly and reached a legally correct solution.”
And at [28]-[29] he said:
“28. In my judgment these show that the review process, which is as Lord Slynn said an administrative process, is a continuation or a replacement for the initial decision-making process. It is therefore in a sense analogous to what would have been the result if under the old procedure the judicial review application had been brought and the administrative court had quashed the original decision and required the local authority to come to a fresh decision. If such a process had then been taken the inadequacy or even unlawfulness of the original decision would have been nothing to the point. Likewise under the present regime, for which the review is a matter of right for the disappointed applicant, it seems to me that while of course any point may be taken in the course of the review as to what was or was not said at the stage of the original offer, what really matters is for the issues of substance to be addressed in the course of the review, and to be properly addressed. 29. Accordingly even if the local authority failed in its duty to make proper inquiries on the issues relevant to suitability of the accommodation before making an offer, in my judgment the remedy for a disappointed applicant is to exercise the right of review. The applicant thereby has a second chance to have the matter properly considered with the fullest opportunity for representations to be made and a fresh duty on the local authority to make proper inquiries. Only if the result of that process is flawed so as to be wrong in law is there any further recourse by way of appeal [pursuant to] section 204.”
[52]One point of difference, heavily relied upon by the appellant in the present case, is that there is no provision in relation to the duty owed under section 193 that is equivalent to section 195(3). The appellant points out that provisions equivalent to section 195(3), requiring the authority to have regard to their assessment of the applicant’s case under section 189A are also to be found at sections 189B(3) and 190(4). This is factually correct and enables the appellant to argue that a failure to comply with section 195(3) has some special status that necessarily invalidates all that comes after the initial failure, whatever the quality and outcome of a requested review. However, the observations of the Court of Appeal in Abed are statements of general principle going to the fact of Parliament’s provision of an additional remedy that is different and discrete from what is available in judicial review proceedings.[53]Norton v LB Haringey [2025] EWCA Civ 746 was decided on 17 June 2025, shortly before the hearing of the present appeal. Once again, it was the applicant’s case that the preparation of a lawful section 189A assessment was a condition precedent to a lawful determination of the suitability of offered accommodation. As in Abed, the duty owed by the local authority was the duty under section 193(2) of the Act to a person with priority need who was not homeless intentionally. Once again, the appellant’s case failed.[54]Lewison LJ (with whom Warby and Jeremy Baker LJJ agreed) gave the leading judgment. The central passage of his analysis is at [47] and [49]-[52] and demands close attention: “47. The starting point is the overall structure of this Part of the 1996 Act. As is shown by sections 189B, 190, and 195, when Parliament wished to cross-refer to a section 189A assessment it did so. There is no such cross-reference in section 210 or the Regulations made under it. Section 193B (6) suggests that an authority is not confined to making decisions based on the section 189A assessment. As HHJ Saggerson rightly said, section 210 does not impose any duty on a reviewing officer (or for that matter on the authority) to consider a section 189A assessment, although he is (or they are) of course free to do so if it is relevant. We have also seen that under section 188 a local housing authority may have an interim duty to secure that accommodation is available for an applicant who may be homeless, eligible for assistance and in priority need. That duty arises before a section 189A assessment is made. Nevertheless, the accommodation must be suitable, in order to comply with section 206. As Mr Bowen KC pointed out in YR at [99], the test for suitability is identical whether section 188 is considered in isolation or in the light of a section 189A assessment. Since a decision under section 188 may be made before the making of a section 189A assessment, and the test of suitability is the same, it must follow that a lawful decision under section 188 may be made in the absence of such an assessment. Mr Johnson's argument entails the conclusion that the lawfulness of a decision on suitability fundamentally changes as the sequential duties come into existence. But the Act, in my judgment, gives no clue to such a radical consequence.48. …49. Applying the approach in A1 Properties, [the applicant] has lost nothing of value. He was entitled to, and received, a decision on suitability which contains no legal flaw.50. Applying the approach in Layden, I should evaluate the consequences if the failure to comply with the imperative requirement invalidates what follows. In my judgment the consequences of holding that compliance with the duty under section 189A is a condition precedent are stark; and unlikely to reflect Parliament's intention. Mr Johnson argued that if no section 189A assessment was prepared, it would not be possible to prepare a PHP and consequently no duty under Part 7 (apart, perhaps, for an interim duty under section 188) could arise. Thus, if Mr Johnson's argument is correct, in the absence of any assessment under section 189A: i) The authority would not be entitled to take any steps under section 189B to help an applicant to secure accommodation; ii) The authority would not be entitled to decide what advice or assistance is to be provided to an applicant under section 190; iii) The authority would not be able to discharge the main housing duty under section 193 by making an offer of suitable accommodation; and iv) The authority would not be entitled to take steps under section 195 to prevent an applicant from becoming homeless.51. In addition, as Mr Johnson recognised, the acceptance of his argument would mean that if a local housing authority, in the absence of a section 189A assessment, made an impeccable assessment of suitability, and then offered that accommodation to the applicant the offer would be unlawful. I find it impossible to conclude that Parliament can have intended that an otherwise lawful offer, which would have the direct effect of immediate relief of homelessness, would be invalid and unlawful for lack of a section 189A assessment.52. In short, an authority would be partially paralysed; and prevented from carrying out what would otherwise be some of its duties to help the homeless or those threatened with homelessness. Parliament is unlikely to have contemplated such paralysis as being acceptable.” i) The authority would not be entitled to take any steps under section 189B to help an applicant to secure accommodation; ii) The authority would not be entitled to decide what advice or assistance is to be provided to an applicant under section 190; iii) The authority would not be able to discharge the main housing duty under section 193 by making an offer of suitable accommodation; and iv) The authority would not be entitled to take steps under section 195 to prevent an applicant from becoming homeless.[55]In my judgment, even if these passages from Abed and Norton are not formally binding on us, they provide very strong persuasive arguments by close analogy to which the appellant in the present case has no answer. Parliament has provided an additional remedy (over and above any remedy that may have been available in judicial review proceedings) which is designed to remedy specified deficiencies in decisions made by a local authority. It would, in my judgment be bizarre to the point of incoherence to impute to Parliament an intention that even an entirely faultless review decision could then be set aside because of the earlier deficiency which it has remedied.[56]Subject to one minor gloss, for these reasons I reach the same conclusion in the present case as was reached in Abed and Norton. The one minor gloss is that, at the commencement of [31] of Norton, Lewison LJ said:
“I do not doubt that an assessment of suitability based on an unlawful or otherwise legally flawed assessment under section 189A is itself legally flawed.”
Given the overall context provided by the rest of his judgment, I understand Lewison LJ to be referring to the general proposition that I have outlined in [45] above, namely that when a decision is quashed subsequent decisions that are dependent upon the underlying decision may also fall to be set aside. That proposition I regard as uncontroversial. I do not think that Lewison LJ was lending any support to the proposition for which the appellant contends in this appeal. If he was, I would respectfully demur, for the reasons I have attempted to give in this judgment.[57]I would dismiss the appeal on Ground 1. Ground 2 – the competing submissions and resolution The appellant’s submissions

Ground 2 – the competing submissions and resolution

[58]The appellant submits that, in the absence of any housing needs assessment, the PHP prepared by Barnet is unlawful. Had it been reviewed on 21 October 2022, as it said it would be, what the appellant asserts as Barnet’s error in not assessing the appellant’s housing needs would have been identified. Accordingly, because Barnet failed to have regard to its assessment of the appellant’s case under section 189A, their decision that the Property was suitable was unlawful and their duty pursuant to section 195(2) has not been brought to an end. “The review decision addressing the suitability of the accommodation offered cannot substitute the failure to discharge the duty to undertake and assessment of an applicant’s housing needs and prepare a lawful PHP”.

Barnet’s submissions

[59]Barnet submits that the PHP was adequate, either when read on its own or in the context provided by the other documents that set out Barnet’s assessment of the appellant’s housing needs and the features mandated by section 189A(2). Even if it is not, Barnet submits that this is an appeal from the Review decision and that the decision being reviewed was not the PHP or its adequacy.

Discussion and resolution

[60]In my judgment, the appellant’s submissions on Ground 2 suffer from the same fundamental flaws as those on Ground 1. First, the PHP read in context was an adequate document. Second, even if it had been deficient in some way, the issue that was reviewed at the appellant’s request was the issue of suitability, which was fully investigated and properly dealt with in the Review decision. Third, it would be wrong to impute to Parliament an intention that a deficiency in the PHP, if proved, should lead to invalidation of the Review decision.[61]I would therefore dismiss the appeal on Ground 2 for essentially the same reasons as apply to Ground 1.

Jonathan Baker LJ

[62]I agree.

Singh LJ

[63]I also agree.

Cited in 1 later judgment