“in the absence of some other identifiable error, such as (without attempting an exhaustive account) a material error of law, or the making of a critical finding of fact which has no basis in the evidence, or a demonstrable misunderstanding of relevant evidence, or a demonstrable failure to consider relevant evidence, an appellate court will interfere with the findings of fact made by a trial judge only if it is satisfied that his decision cannot reasonably be explained or justified.”
“It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appellate court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.”
“It is also important to have in mind the role of a judgment given after trial. The primary function of a first instance judge is to find facts and identify the crucial legal points and to advance reasons for deciding them in a particular way. He should give his reasons in sufficient detail to show the parties and, if need be, the Court of Appeal the principles on which he has acted and the reasons that have led him to his decision. They need not be elaborate. There is no duty on a judge, in giving his reasons, to deal with every argument presented by counsel in support of his case. His function is to reach conclusions and give reasons to support his view, not to spell out every matter as if summing up to a jury. Nor need he deal at any length with matters that are not disputed. It is sufficient if what he says shows the basis on which he has acted. These are not controversial observations: see Customs and Excise Commissioners v A[2002] EWCA Civ 1039 ; [2003] 2 W.L.R. 210; Bekoe v Broomes[2005] UKPC 39 ; Argos Ltd v Office of Fair Trading[2006] EWCA Civ 1318 ; [2006] U.K.C.L.R. 1135.”
“where a tribunal has correctly stated the legal principles to be applied, an appellate tribunal or court should, in my view, be slow to conclude that it has not applied those principles, and should generally do so only where it is clear from the language used that a different principle has been applied to the facts found. Tribunals sometimes make errors, having stated the principles correctly but slipping up in their application, as the case law demonstrates; but if the correct principles were in the tribunal’s mind, as demonstrated by their being identified in the express terms of the decision, the tribunal can be expected to have been seeking faithfully to apply them, and to have done so unless the contrary is clear from the language of its decision.”
“91.1 Did Mr Brown have available to him an up to date, independent valuation of New Court when he approved the sale by CSI to NCP at a price of£65m ? 91.2 If not, did he nonetheless consider that the transfer price of£65m reflected the market value of the property? 91.3 Even if he did, did he have a firmly grounded suspicion that the market value was higher than this but deliberately refrain from obtaining an up to date, independent valuation so that his suspicions were not confirmed?”
“123. In my view, the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from these facts is that, whilst Mr Brown was aware that a higher valuation was possible and that a lower valuation was preferrable from a tax perspective, based on guidance provided by Buckingham, a transfer price of£65m was a justifiable market value. In these circumstances it cannot be said that Mr Brown acted in a way which he knew was contrary to the interests of CSI, nor can he be said to have been reckless as to whether his actions were contrary to the interests of CSI as he clearly turned his mind to the question as to what the appropriate transfer price should be. 124. In cross examination, Mr Brown accepted that Buckingham were not valuation experts. However, as he pointed out, they were nonetheless property specialists. In these circumstances, it does not in my view follow (as the claimants have suggested) that Mr Brown could not have honestly believed that the transfer price was an appropriate market value for the purposes of the transaction. 125. [Counsel for the claimants] draws attention to the 2004 accounts for CSI which Mr Brown signed in September 2005, approximately six weeks after the transfer of New Court. As I have mentioned, those accounts contained a note to the effect that the directors believed the value of New Court to be in excess of£65m . 126. However, in my view, little can be read into this. Mr Brown clearly could not recall his thinking and the circumstances in which those accounts were signed. As noted above, Mr Sihra was asked to comment on the value used in the accounts and, it is to be inferred, approved the proposed wording. Given that the concern in relation to the accounts clearly related to the Project Ocean borrowing, the statement in the accounts is perhaps not surprising given Mr Sihra’s apparent use of a range of values. It does not therefore follow from this that Mr Brown must have thought that, in July 2005, when the transfer took place, a figure of£65m was below the market value of New Court. 127. The documentary evidence makes it clear that it was anticipated that, following the hive up of New Court to NCP and the subsequent refinancing (Project Ocean) which took place shortly afterwards, CSI would be put into solvent liquidation. Taking this into account and looking at the interests of the members of CSI as a whole, this reinforces my conclusion that Mr Brown did not believe that his actions were contrary to the interests of CSI ….”
“I should say that I have no doubt that Mr Brown was in breach of his fiduciary duties as a director of CSI. He should have made sure that CSI obtained an up to date, independent valuation, as he had been advised to do. However, any breach of these duties was not fraudulent for the purposes ofs 21 Limitation Act 1980 and, as the claimants accept, he can therefore have no liability in respect of a claim which was made so long after the events in question.”
“207.1 Did Mr Brown have an up to date, independent valuation of Ludgate House when he approved the sale by BRP to LPH at a price£78m ? 207.2 If not, did he nonetheless consider that the transfer price of£78m reflected the market value of the property? 207.3 Even if he did, did he have a firmly grounded suspicion that the market value was higher than this and deliberately refrain from obtaining an up to date, independent valuation so that his suspicion was not confirmed?”
“Since the UK Companies do not have distributable reserves my understanding is that the property needs to be transferred up to the Jersey Company at market value; however a price above£148m will not be protected by the SPA and this should be considered in determining the relevant market value. In relation to Ludgate, the property can be transferred up for a value of up to£78m in circumstances where tax up to that level should be protected by the SPA. The original loan (including unpaid interest) was£76,985,535 . Again, to the extent that the property is transferred up for more than this there will need to be an outstanding loan of money owed by the Jersey Company to the UK Company ….”
“249. Turning to Mr Brown, he was not directly involved in the preparatory work relating to the proposed transfer of Ludgate House to LPH. However, he received the briefing from Mr Pollard which confirmed that valuation advice had been received from Buckingham and that the transfers of Ludgate House and Sampson House should take place at a combined value of£226m . He would of course have understood this to be£78m for Ludgate House at£148m for Sampson House, as confirmed in the board minutes. Mr Pollard’s comment was ‘I see no reason not to proceed’. 250. It is accepted on both sides that Mr Brown would have discussed the position with Mr Pollard who would no doubt have informed him of his discussions with Mr Sihra and SJ Berwin. I accept that the question of tax on capital gains is likely to have formed part of that discussion but, in line with the findings I have made, Mr Sihra’s advice that£78m was an appropriate figure for the market value would also have been relayed. 251. In the light of this briefing, it cannot be inferred that Mr Brown knew that the market value of Ludgate House was in excess of£78m despite his knowledge that the total purchase cost had been£78.5m and his general understanding that prices had been increasing over the previous year. Although, as I have said, Mr Brown accepted in cross-examination that Buckingham were not valuers, he certainly took the view that they were significantly more qualified than he was to express an opinion on values. 252. There is no evidence that, in August 2006, Mr Brown had in mind the Colliers valuation of March 2006 which valued Ludgate House at just under£76m . However, he was clearly aware of the existence of the valuation and in the absence of any clear recollection of events on the part of Mr Brown, this is in my view a relevant factor to take into account in determining whether it is right to infer that Mr Brown knew that the transfer price was less than the market value of Ludgate House. I do not however place any great weight on this point as the other evidence in my judgment provides sufficient grounds for inferring that Mr Brown did believe the transfer price of£78m to reflect the market value of Ludgate House.”
“As was the case in relation to New Court, I accept that Mr Brown would no doubt have had a suspicion (based on his knowledge of the total price paid for BRP/Ludgate House, the Colliers valuation of£80m produced for Project Ocean and his understanding that property prices had increased since then) that the transfer price was less than the market value of Ludgate House. However, there is simply no evidence that Mr Brown consciously refrained from getting an up to date, independent valuation for fear that it might confirm his suspicion. On the contrary, he was told that valuation advice had been obtained from Buckingham and he relied on that advice.”
“My conclusion therefore is that, in approving the transfer of Ludgate House at a price of£78m , Mr Brown did not act in a way which was knowingly or recklessly contrary to the interest of BRP. It may be that he should have asked more questions than he did but that is a different matter. Any breach of duty was not fraudulent for the purposes ofs 21 Limitation Act 1980 and he therefore has no liability in respect of this element of the claim.”
“As regards Mr Brown, subparagraph (1) is denied: (1) Mr Brown authorised the relevant transfers because, having exercised independent judgment, he considered it in good faith to be in the interests of the property holding company for him to do so; (2) Further or alternatively, Mr Brown believed the consideration payable … for New Court and Ludgate House to reflect the value of those properties. Paragraph 14 above is repeated.”
“64. … Read as a whole, it is quite clear from the pleadings that the key question in issue is whether Mr Brown acted honestly. Although I accept the CPR (Rule 16.5) requires a defendant, in their defence, not only to deny an allegation but also to put forward their own version of events where appropriate, the failure to do so cannot relieve the claimant from having to prove their case. As Mr Norbury pointed out, if Mr Brown had simply denied dishonesty (and had not referred to any up to date valuation) it would still be up to the claimant to prove, based on the available evidence and on the balance of probabilities, that Mr Brown had been dishonest. 65. Although a finding that Mr Brown did not have an up to date valuation available to him would be a significant factor to take into account, it cannot in my view be conclusive as to whether or not Mr Brown acted dishonestly which must be judged in the light of all of the relevant circumstances.”
“this was a point which was canvassed as part of the opening submissions. It was therefore open to the claimants to tailor their cross-examination of Mr Brown accordingly and to deal with any necessary issues in their closing submissions (and indeed they did so).”
“171. I should also note that the claimants make the point that, if Mr Brown knew that the transfer of New Court to NCP was at an undervalue, there would be an additional corporation tax liability on the increased gain. This is of course correct, but the comments made above apply in exactly the same way. Mr Brown would still not have appreciated that the omission of any provision for the tax from the balance sheet was a problem given his expectation that the liability would be met through the mechanism of the share subscription agreement. 172. Even if I am wrong and Mr Brown knew that the interim accounts available to him at the board meeting on3 August 2005 were defective, I do not in any event consider that he acted dishonestly for the purposes ofs 21 Limitation Act 1980 . It was clearly everybody’s understanding and expectation that CSI would end up in a position where it could be put into solvent liquidation. This was the entire purpose of the share subscription agreement which had been put in place on the advice of Olswang.”
“1. The loan from [NCP to CSI] is effectively a low-ranking junior loan and should accrue interest at 12% p.a. The fact that the loan agreement says it is interest-free should be assumed to be an error which should be rectified retrospectively by both parties. 2. We should accrue management charges from [NCP] to [CSI] of£150,000 p.a. for provision of investment and financial advice relating to the property, the tenant, future prospects and development opportunities (and also for the provision of directors and officers for the company, admin servicers, etc.)”
“Mr Brown may have been in breach of his duties as a director but did not act knowingly or recklessly contrary to the interests of CSI and any breach was not therefore fraudulent for the purposes ofs 21 Limitation Act 1980 .”
“I accept Mr Norbury’s submission that this part of the claim can therefore only succeed if it is shown that Mr Brown knew that the transfer was at an undervalue and that there would therefore be a tax liability. As I have found that this was not the case, there can be no fraudulent breach of duty.”