“Whether or not the Claimants have a right to damages for breach of their procedural rights underArticle 3 ECHR in light of the Defendant’s imposition of NRPF conditions on them pursuant to the application to them of the NRPF scheme found by the Divisional Court in Wto breach the procedural right underArticle 3 of the ECHR .”
“The essential question in this case is whether the Home Office can be made liable in damages undersection 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998 for applying an unlawful scheme to the claimants which could have resulted in a breach of their Article 3 right not to be subjected to degrading or inhuman treatment in the form of extreme destitution.”
"You can exercise discretion not to impose, or to lift, the no recourse to public funds condition code only where the applicant meets the requirements of paragraph GEN.1.11A of Appendix FM or paragraph 276A02 of the Immigration Rules on the basis of the applicant: • having provided satisfactory evidence that they are destitute or there is satisfactory evidence that they would be rendered destitute without recourse to public funds • having provided satisfactory evidence that there are particularly compelling reasons relating to the welfare of a child on account of the child's parent's very low income • having established exceptional circumstances in their case relating to their financial circumstances which, in your view, require the no recourse to public funds condition code not to be imposed or to be lifted. You must consider all relevant personal and financial circumstances raised by the applicant, and any evidence of these which they have provided. In cases where the circumstances suggest that further evidence is available but has not been provided, you should be prepared to write out and seek that additional evidence. Whether to grant leave subject to a condition of no recourse to public funds, or whether to lift that condition where it has been imposed, is a decision for the Home Office decision maker to make on the basis of this guidance."
“The NRPF regime, comprising paragraph GEN 1.11A and the Instruction read together, do not adequately recognise, reflect or give effect to the Secretary of State's obligation not to impose, or to lift, the condition of NRPF in cases where the applicant is not yet, but will imminently suffer inhuman or degrading treatment without recourse to public funds. In its current form the NRPF regime is apt to mislead caseworkers in this critical respect and gives rise to a real risk of unlawful decisions in a significant number of cases. To that extent it is unlawful.”
“this way of formulating the test involves significant movement from the proper approach to be derived from Gillick. However, the way in which the court decided the case is consistent with the approach in Gillick. Having identified at paras 60-61 what would be unlawful conduct in an individual case, at paras 62-66 the court construed the relevant rules and the policy as a complete set of instructions to officials of the Secretary of State (of the kind referred to by Rose LJ in Bayer at para 214: see para 45 above) which required them to impose or maintain the no recourse to public funds condition in cases where that would be unlawful.”
“Thus section 55(5)(a) authorised the Secretary of State to provide or arrange for the provision of support to a late applicant for asylum to the extent necessary for the purpose of avoiding a breach of that person's Convention rights. But the Secretary of State's freedom of action is closely confined. He may only exercise his power to provide or arrange support where it is necessary to do so to avoid a breach and to the extent necessary for that purpose. He may not exercise his power where it is not necessary to do so to avoid a breach or to an extent greater than necessary for that purpose. Where (and to the extent) that exercise of the power is necessary, the Secretary of State is subject to a duty, and has no choice, since it is unlawful for him under section 6 of the 1998 Act to act incompatibly with a Convention right. Where (and to the extent) that exercise of the power is not necessary, the Secretary of State is subject to a statutory prohibition, and again has no choice. Thus the Secretary of State (in practice, of course, officials acting on his behalf) must make a judgment on the situation of the individual applicant matched against what the Convention requires or proscribes, but he has, in the strict sense, no discretion.”
“[7] As in all article 3 cases, the treatment, to be proscribed, must achieve a minimum standard of severity, and I would accept that in a context such as this, not involving the deliberate infliction of pain or suffering, the threshold is a high one. A general public duty to house the homeless or provide for the destitute cannot be spelled out of article 3. But I have no doubt that the threshold may be crossed if a late applicant with no means and no alternative sources of support, unable to support himself, is, by the deliberate action of the state, denied shelter, food or the most basic necessities of life. It is not necessary that treatment, to engage article 3, should merit the description used, in an immigration context, by Shakespeare and others in Sir Thomas More when they referred to "your mountainish inhumanity". [8] When does the Secretary of State's duty under section 55(5)(a) arise? The answer must in my opinion be: when it appears on a fair and objective assessment of all relevant facts and circumstances that an individual applicant faces an imminent prospect of serious suffering caused or materially aggravated by denial of shelter, food or the most basic necessities of life. Many factors may affect that judgment, including age, gender, mental and physical health and condition, any facilities or sources of support available to the applicant, the weather and time of year and the period for which the applicant has already suffered or is likely to continue to suffer privation. [9] It is not in my opinion possible to formulate any simple test applicable in all cases.”
“Where the inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment results from acts or omissions for which the state is directly responsible there is no escape from the negative obligation on states to refrain from such conduct, which is absolute. In most cases, of course, it will be quite unnecessary to consider whether the obligation is positive or negative.”
“that the European Court has all along recognised that ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of the expression "inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment …… the assessment of this minimum is relative, as it depends on all the circumstances of the case such as the nature and context of the treatment or punishment that is in issue. The fact is that it is impossible by a simple definition to embrace all human conditions that will engage article 3.”
“[58]……..I think that it is necessary therefore to stick to the adjectives used by article 3, and to ask whether the treatment to which the asylum-seeker is being subjected by the entire package of restrictions and deprivations that surround him is so severe that it can properly be described as inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of the article. [59] It is possible to derive from the cases which are before us some idea of the various factors that will come into play in this assessment: whether the asylum-seeker is male or female, for example, or is elderly or in poor health, the extent to which he or she has explored all avenues of assistance that might be expected to be available and the length of time that has been spent and is likely to be spent without the required means of support. The exposure to the elements that results from rough-sleeping, the risks to health and safety that it gives rise to, the effects of lack of access to toilet and washing facilities and the humiliation and sense of despair that attaches to those who suffer from deprivations of that kind are all relevant.”
“It may be, of course, that the degree of severity which amounts to a breach of article 3 has already been reached by the time the condition of the asylum-seeker has been drawn to his attention. But it is not necessary for the condition to have reached that stage before the power in section 55(5)(a) is capable of being exercised. It is not just a question of "wait and see". The power has been given to enable the Secretary of State to avoid the breach. A state of destitution that qualifies the asylum-seeker for support under section 95 of the 1999 Act will not be enough. But as soon as the asylum-seeker makes it clear that there is an imminent prospect that a breach of the article will occur because the conditions which he or she is having to endure are on the verge of reaching the necessary degree of severity the Secretary of State has the power under section 55(5)(a), and the duty undersection 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 , to act to avoid it.”
“[78] The only question, therefore, is whether the degree of suffering endured or imminently to be endured by these people reaches the degree of severity prohibited by article 3. It is well known that a high threshold is set but it will vary with the context and the particular facts of the case. There are many factors to be taken into account.”
“I repeat, it seems to me generally unhelpful to attempt to analyse obligations arising under article 3 as negative or positive, and the state's conduct as active or passive. Time and again these are shown to be false dichotomies. The real issue in all these cases is whether the state is properly to be regarded as responsible for the harm inflicted (or threatened) upon the victim.”
“as soon as the [claimant with LLTR with a NRPF condition] makes it clear that there is an imminent prospect that a breach of the article will occur because the conditions which he or she is having to endure are on the verge of reaching the necessary degree of severity the Secretary of State has…. the duty undersection 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 , to act to avoid it.”
“Judicial remedies. (1) In relation to any act (or proposed act) of a public authority which the court finds is (or would be) unlawful, it may grant such relief or remedy, or make such order, within its powers as it considers just and appropriate. (2) But damages may be awarded only by a court which has power to award damages, or to order the payment of compensation, in civil proceedings. (3) No award of damages is to be made unless, taking account of all the circumstances of the case, including— (a) any other relief or remedy granted, or order made, in relation to the act in question (by that or any other court), and (b) the consequences of any decision (of that or any other court) in respect of that act, the court is satisfied that the award is necessary to afford just satisfaction to the person in whose favour it is made.”
"There are also preconditions to an award of damages by a domestic court under section 8: (1) that a finding of unlawfulness or prospective unlawfulness should be made based on breach or prospective breach by a public authority of a Convention right; (2) that the court should have power to award damages, or order the payment of compensation, in civil proceedings; (3) that the court should be satisfied, taking account of all the circumstances of the particular case, that an award of damages is necessary to afford just satisfaction to the person in whose favour it is made; and (4) that the court should consider an award of damages to be just and appropriate. It would seem to be clear that a domestic court may not award damages unless satisfied that it is necessary to do so, but if satisfied that it is necessary to do so it is hard to see how the court could consider it other than just and appropriate to do so."
“[60] The analysis begins with three propositions of law, which, as we understand it, are not in dispute in these proceedings: (a) There are some cases in which the Secretary of State is not only entitled, but legally obliged, not to impose a condition of NRPF or to lift such a condition. (b) These include cases where the applicant is suffering inhuman and degrading treatment by reason of lack of resources. (c) They also include cases where the applicant is not yet suffering, but will imminently suffer, such ill-treatment without recourse to public funds.”
“[42]. There is nothing in the judgment which I consider can be taken as authority for the propositions that: (a) There were relevant procedural rights; (b) Which had been breached; (c) Which gave the victims a right to damages. I do not consider that I can place any weight at all on the subsequent agreement reached on damages in that case which were made expressly with no admission of liability on the part of the Defendant.”
“… It is common ground between Mr Goodman and Mr Tabori that an investigative duty is parasitic on the duty to protect but it cannot be said that the investigative duty arose only once the substantive duty has been breached; there needed to be an arguable case that the substantive right arose on the facts of their cases. I do not take Gentle as authority for the proposition that a claim for breach of procedural rights cannot succeed absent a breach of the relevant substantive right.”
“[178]….We do not consider it arguable that a section 3 investigative duty has been triggered by the fact that the policy has been operated for several years in a way which may well have led to breaches of article 3 because applicants have had to wait longer than they should have had to in order to be given recourse to public funds. The policy has been found to have been unlawful, and that has been corrected. That means that the purposes which, it is said, would be served by an article 3 investigation, could not be usefully served in this case. There is no 'culpable and discreditable conduct to expose to public view', for example; there are no covert 'processes to be discovered or rectified', and there are now no relevant lessons to be learnt. We dismiss this ground of challenge.”
“[53] Mr Goodman’s case rests upon an argument that an Article 3 systems duty to protect against destitution arose at the time the NRPF condition was imposed as a condition of LLTR. This must be, in effect, what the judge below decided, since he awarded damages calculated from the date of the CoC applications, on the basis that each Claimant must have been imminently destitute at least by then. [54] As Mr Thomann pointed out, if such an obligation were found to exist it would represent a significant extension of the class of Article 3 systems duties. I do not believe that such an extension is justified in principle, or that W is authority for a duty arising at the point of imposition of the NRPF condition. Where an individual is not destitute/imminently destitute at the time of being granted LLTR it is not unlawful to impose a NRPF condition. Nor is it unlawful to require a person in respect of whom a NRPF condition subsists to make an application to have it lifted if their circumstances deteriorate. In STthe court rejected a submission to the effect that delays in dealing with CoC applications gave rise to a systems breach (at [177]), it had not been suggested that the requirement to make such an application was itself unlawful. [55] It follows that there could be no violation of any Article 3 duty before a CoC application has been made, bringing the circumstances of destitution/imminent destitution to the attention of the SSHD. There is then the question of whether a violation occurs only upon IDT being sustained, or whether it could arise earlier.”
“[65] Persons with LLTR subject to a NRPF condition are in a very different position to asylum-seeker claimants such as those in DMAand Limbuela. Whilst it may properly be said of the latter that the restrictions imposed upon them have thrust them into destitution, the same is not true of the former class of persons. They are entitled to work and provide for themselves. Most persons with LLTR subject to a NRPF condition will work and will never need state support; that is the policy intention. But some may find themselves struggling, as these Claimants did. At that point, unlike asylum-seekers, they are able to make a CoC application to have the NRPF condition lifted. [66] The ability to work and to apply, if necessary, to have the NRPF condition lifted are key when considering whether it is right to expand the class of low-level systems duties to encompass a duty to protect persons subject to a NRPF condition from destitution. In MG, Johnson J declined to find an Article 3 systems duty owed by the SSHD to asylum-seekers living in a hostel to protect them from attack by fellow-inhabitants, reasoning as follows (at [59]): “Here, there was no relevant removal of the claimant’s autonomy or that of [his attacker]. Neither of them was reliant on the defendant for their own wellbeing, save to the extent of avoiding destitution and providing access to medical care. Everybody is at residual risk from the violent and criminal actions of others. The risk that materialised in this case was no different in principle from the risk that might impact on anybody.” [67] Unlike asylum-seekers, the Claimants here were able to work and could make an application for lifting of the NRPF condition at any time. They were in no sense reliant on the SSHD for their own well-being. To adapt the above reasoning, losing employment or home, or otherwise facing destitution without state support, is a residual risk which everyone faces. Whilst the categories of Article 3 systems duties are never closed, in my view the Claimants’ circumstances were not such as to call for an extension of a systems duty owed to them at the point of imposition of the NRPF condition. [68] Having said this, I cannot accept that there can be no violation of a systems duty owed to persons subject to an NRPF condition unless or until they can show that they have sustained IDT. The decision in Wwas based upon an obligation to lift the NRPF condition at the point where a person is imminently destitute, that is to say at a point before actual destitution. The SSHD is not entitled to wait for a person subject to a NRPF condition to sustain actual IDT before lifting the condition, her duty is to act to prevent that point being reached. It follows that I reject Mr Thomann’s “higher line” argument to the effect that a violation can only be said to have occurred if a person subject to an NRPF condition can show that they have sustained IDT. [69] I prefer Mr Thomann’s alternative, “lower line” submission, as being more consistent with the reasoning of the court in W, that a violation of an Article 3 duty owed to persons with LLTR subject to a NRPF condition will occur if, having made a CoC application, the SSHD either wrongly refuses it, or deals with it unreasonably. What is unreasonable will depend upon the circumstances of a particular case. This seems to me also in keeping with the decision in DMA, where the systems duty held to have been breached concerned the regime applied to the provision of accommodation once the need for it had been identified and accepted. …. [71] In my view the only right which persons subject to the NRPF scheme had was to have their applications, whether for a NRPF condition not to be imposed or an existing condition to be lifted, heard and decided in a reasonable time in such a way as to avoid their falling into destitution to the point of IDT. The unlawfulness identified in W went solely to the approach taken by the SSHD’s caseworkers when deciding such applications. [72] It follows, in my view, that if these Claimants are to identify a relevant violation of their Article 3 right then they must show that the SSHD wrongly decided their applications to have the NRPF condition lifted i.e. that in their case(s) the risk of an unlawful decision identified by the court in Wactually materialised, either because their CoC application was wrongly refused, or because there was unreasonable delay in deciding it. [73] Whether, in the case of a person who can show that their CoC application was not properly determined, either because it was refused or a decision was unreasonably delayed, that person will be entitled to an award of damages under section 8 of the 1998 Act will depend upon the particular circumstances of the case, applying the principles discussed by Green J in D. It is impossible, and would be inappropriate, to lay down any hard or fast rule.” “Here, there was no relevant removal of the claimant’s autonomy or that of [his attacker]. Neither of them was reliant on the defendant for their own wellbeing, save to the extent of avoiding destitution and providing access to medical care. Everybody is at residual risk from the violent and criminal actions of others. The risk that materialised in this case was no different in principle from the risk that might impact on anybody.”
“177. The obligation of the High Contracting Parties underArticle 1 of the Convention to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention, taken together with Article 3, requires States to take measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to ill-treatment, including ill-treatment administered by private individuals… Children and other vulnerable individuals, in particular, are entitled to effective protection … 178. It emerges from the Court’s case-law as set forth in the ensuing paragraphs that the authorities’ positive obligations underArticle 3 of the Convention comprise, firstly, an obligation to put in place a legislative and regulatory framework of protection; secondly, in certain well-defined circumstances, an obligation to take operational measures to protect specific individuals against a risk of treatment contrary to that provision; and, thirdly, an obligation to carry out an effective investigation into arguable claims of infliction of such treatment. Generally speaking, the first two aspects of these positive obligations are classified as “substantive”, while the third aspect corresponds to the State’s positive “procedural” obligation.”
“[14] Thus, Article 3 prohibits a state from inflicting inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. It also imposes certain positive obligations on the state. These include putting in place a legislative and regulatory system for protection (often referred to as the “systems duty”). They also include an obligation to take operational measures to protect specific individuals from a risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 (often referred to as “the operational duty”). They also include an obligation to carry out an effective investigation into arguable claims that treatment contrary to Article 3 has been inflicted (often referred to as the “investigative duty”).”
“[50] Article 3 has been interpreted as charging public authorities with certain obligations. The nature and scope of these obligations is still developing and the manner of describing them has not always been consistent. However they fall into three broad categories of "systems", "operational" and "procedural/investigative", helpfully set out with reference to relevant authorities by Johnson J in the case of R (MG) v SSHD[2022] EWHC 1847 (Admin) at [6] to [8].”
“[50] …. The "procedural" obligation contended for by the Claimants in the present case appears to me to fall into the "low-level systems" category identified by Johnson J in MG….”
“I cannot accept that there can be no violation of a systems duty owed to persons subject to an NRPF condition unless or until they can show that they have sustained [inhuman and degrading treatment]. The decision in Wwas based upon an obligation to lift the NRPF condition at the point where a person is imminently destitute, that is to say at a point before actual destitution. The SSHD is not entitled to wait for a person subject to a NRPF condition to sustain actual [inhuman and degrading treatment] before lifting the condition, her duty is to act to prevent that point being reached.”
“In my view the only right which persons subject to the NRPF scheme had was to have their applications, whether for a NRPF condition not to be imposed or an existing condition to be lifted, heard and decided in a reasonable time in such a way as to avoid their falling into destitution to the point of [inhuman and degrading treatment].”
“The Claimants have a right to damages for breach of their rights underArticle 3 ECHR if, as a result of the conditions imposed upon them by the Home Office of having no recourse to public funds: (a) they have suffered inhuman and degrading treatment; or (b) they have been at immediate risk of inhuman and degrading treatment; have notified the Home Office of this by making a CoC claim; have not had a positive and prompt response to that claim; and have suffered severe distress during the period before the claim is resolved. Such damages must be awarded by applyingsection 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998 in light of all the facts found to apply in each of their individual cases.”