“3. —Universal credit – standard allowance modification (1) Regulation 36 (table showing amounts of elements) of the Universal Credit Regulations, as amended by article 33 of, and Schedule 13 to, theSocial Security Benefits Up-rating Order 2020 ("the 2020 up-rating order") is to be read as if the following amounts were substituted for the amounts of the standard allowance— (a)£342.72 for a single claimant aged under 25; (b)£409.89 for a single claimant aged 25 or over; (c)£488.59 for joint claimants both aged under 25; (d)£594.04 for joint claimants where either is aged 25 or over. (2) This regulation takes effect in relation to each award of universal credit [in the first assessment period that ends on or after6th April 2020 ] and continues to have effect only for the remainder of the tax year beginning with6th April 2020 . …”
“… calculated by reference to — (a) a standard allowance, (b) an amount for the responsibility for children or young persons, (c) an amount for housing, and (d) amounts for other particular needs or circumstances.”
“To strengthen the safety net, I'm increasing today the Universal Credit standard allowance, for the next 12 months, by£1,000 a year. For the next twelve months, I'm increasing the Working Tax Credit basic element by the same amount as well. Together these measures will benefit over 4 million of our most vulnerable households. And I'm strengthening the safety net for self-employed people too, by suspending the minimum income floor for everyone affected by the economic impacts of coronavirus. That means every self-employed person can now access, in full, Universal Credit at a rate equivalent to Statutory Sick Pay for employees. Taken together, I'm announcing nearly£7bn of extra support through the welfare system to strengthen the safety net and protect people's incomes. And to support the self-employed through the tax system, I'm announcing today that the next self-assessment payments will be deferred until January 2021. As well as keeping people in work and supporting those who lose their jobs or work for themselves, our Plan for Jobs and Incomes will help keep a roof over your head. We've acted already to make sure homeowners can get a three-month mortgage holiday if they need it. I'm announcing today nearly£1bn of support for renters, by increasing the generosity of housing benefit and Universal Credit so that the Local Housing Allowance will cover at least 30% of market rents in your area. The actions I have taken today represent an unprecedented economic intervention to support the jobs and incomes of the British people. A new, comprehensive job retention scheme. And a significantly strengthened safety net.”
“41. First, the role of the social security system for those of working age is, fundamentally, to assist (within certain constraints) those with no or low incomes. The Government decided to provide further support for individuals and businesses through a broad package of measures, including through the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (“CJRS”) and the Self-Employed Income Support Scheme (“SEISS”), which are explained in the witness evidence of Lindsey Whyte. These measures, alongside the UC uplift, are directed at preserving the stability of the economy and labour market in the short-term, so as to allow for a rapid recovery from the pandemic. 42. Second, the approach taken by DWP has been to adapt existing schemes, where options exist at the time of the decisions, rather than create new systems or embark upon the redesign of existing schemes. UC has been designed to allow for such flexibility. This approach has been adopted to ensure that social security provision can be of material support to the greatest number of people in the shortest possible time with the lowest amount of risk as possible. It is neither possible nor sensible to attempt significant, complex or risky alterations to the social security system in the middle of a pandemic given (a) the time that is required to design and implement such alterations (both at a policy and an operational level) and (b) the fact that much of social security policy is complex and inter-related. Social security policy involves balancing a wide range of incentives so as best to achieve the outcomes that the Government seeks (within the inevitable constraints that arise in any large-scale system). A change to incentives in one area can have a ‘knock-on’ effect in other areas. 43. Third, given that DWP has primary responsibility for ensuring that people who need financial support from the benefits system are able to access it, DWP has sought to ensure practical, effective and efficient delivery of financial support. This has meant focusing DWP resources on those who were likely to face the most financial disruption from the start of the pandemic, and also adopting a flexible approach to the way that benefits are administered. This has meant targeting support at those who have lost income as a result of the pandemic, rather than those who may have faced increased costs (which could not have been accurately calculated by the Government). I note that the Claimants’ evidence is that they have faced increased costs because of the pandemic. The Government recognises that this may be the case, but it is likely to be so for very many individuals. The Government focused its response on those who had lost income (who would likely also face increased costs during the pandemic), as it considered they were likely to face the greatest financial disruption. This also assists in providing a cushion to individuals who have suffered short-term loss of employment or reduction in employment, but who would be expected to return quickly into the labour market. 44. It is essential that any short-term measures are capable of being delivered efficiently, otherwise they simply could not be implemented. By way of illustration: 44.1 The pandemic has led to an unprecedented increase in the overall number of benefit claims being made. At the peak of the outbreak in early 2020 the department received 10 times the normal daily number of UC claims on the benefits system. There were 2.2m UC declarations between 16 March and19 May 2020 , with over 500,000 in the single week when the country went into lockdown (w/c23 March 2020 ). The high numbers claiming UC has continued into 2021, with 39,000 UC claims per week in the four weeks to8 April 2021 . As a result, there were 6 million people on UC by8 April 2021 . At the same time, across DWP we were experiencing a significant reduction in staffing levels as a result of absences due to COVID-19. 44.2 A number of policy and operational easements have been made to enable the system to continue to cope with this increased volume of claims, and in response to the lockdown measures which by necessity reduce face-to-face contact.” 44.1 The pandemic has led to an unprecedented increase in the overall number of benefit claims being made. At the peak of the outbreak in early 2020 the department received 10 times the normal daily number of UC claims on the benefits system. There were 2.2m UC declarations between 16 March and19 May 2020 , with over 500,000 in the single week when the country went into lockdown (w/c23 March 2020 ). The high numbers claiming UC has continued into 2021, with 39,000 UC claims per week in the four weeks to8 April 2021 . As a result, there were 6 million people on UC by8 April 2021 . At the same time, across DWP we were experiencing a significant reduction in staffing levels as a result of absences due to COVID-19. 44.2 A number of policy and operational easements have been made to enable the system to continue to cope with this increased volume of claims, and in response to the lockdown measures which by necessity reduce face-to-face contact.”
“51. First, the financial support measures were primarily designed to assist those likely to face the most significant financial disruption during the pandemic, for example, those who had lost or were at risk of losing employment or significant income, and who as a result were making new claims for social security benefits for the first time having previously been financially self-sufficient. This objective was not considered to apply in the same way to those who had already been on existing income-related DWP benefits for some time and were less likely to have any reduction in income (as is the case for the claimants). This, therefore, was specifically designed to cushion the impact of sudden unemployment or reduced employment with the objective of facilitating a rapid return to the labour market (thereby benefitting the economy and tax base in general). However, the Government was required to consider which investments would be most efficient and represent the best use of taxpayers’ money. Although the investments made were substantial, that in turn simply highlighted the need to ensure that public money was being spent for the best possible effect. 52. Second, the Universal Credit service has been developed by an in house product team using agile principles, this means that the service can be very adaptive to change. At the height of the pandemic we were able to introduce changes such as the£20 uplift very quickly so that the changes could reach our claimants immediately. The change to UC could be rapidly implemented and safely introduced without risk to the stability of the system, or delays (in contrast with changes to the legacy systems which I deal with below). Indeed, this was one of the reasons why UC was originally introduced. The substantial IT investment was intended to deliver a system that could adapt rapidly and, therefore, it made sense to use that system. 53. Third, the change provided a clear and strong message which the Government could deliver at a time of crisis to provide reassurance to society and improve morale. The Government’s aim in responding to the pandemic was to identify policy changes that could swiftly and safely be implemented so as to provide support to the greatest number of people in the shortest possible time. The policy changes also had to be clear and capable of being simply presented to the public. This is often a consideration when announcing policy, but it was especially important at the time of the decisions (shortly before20 March 2020 ) because of the very substantial (and understandable) concern amongst society as the pandemic unfolded. The concern about uncertainty also applied to businesses and the announcement helped to provide macroeconomic stability by confirming the public would have access to additional funds. The Government needed a clear and reassuring message to address this concern and to emphasise the message that, in a time of acute need, the Government was prepared to make a substantial investment of public monies in the short term, so as to ensure the stability of the economy for when the pandemic recedes.”
“57. … overwhelmingly new and existing Universal Credit claimants and existing Working Tax Credit claimants who were most likely to have experienced an unexpected loss of income, having previously been financially self-sufficient. The overwhelming majority of legacy benefits recipients were unlikely to experience similar disruption (namely a significant loss of income) especially given the very narrow circumstances in which new claims for legacy benefits could be made at that time. 58… Sudden and short-term unemployment is capable of triggering other social problems and affecting mental health. This can result in a situation in which a person becomes dependent on welfare, and hamper a return to employment, even where there are vacancies. Those effects are likely to be exacerbated by the pandemic. It follows that seeking to prevent these social problems from arising following sudden unemployment can benefit individuals and society.”
“72. The Government ultimately decided on a temporary extension of the UC uplift of an equivalent of£20 per week for 6 months, until October 2021. It was implemented through theUniversal Credit (Extension of Coronavirus Measures) Regulations 2021 . The Government decided that although some groups with protected characteristics might benefit to a lesser extent from the changes than other groups, any differential impact was justified due to the aims of the measure and its importance. The 6 month extension of the£20 per week uplift gave economic reassurance and financial support to those likely to experience the most financial disruption due to the pandemic, including a significant number of people only making benefit claims due to a loss of, or significant reduction in their income due to Covid-19 restrictions. As the pandemic and its effects were continuing, it was not considered an appropriate time to withdraw that support. 73. It was not known in November 2020 whether the uplift would be continued, how long the Covid-19 restrictions were due to last and the progress on the vaccination programme. By the time these facts were known and a decision on the future of the uplift was taken, it would not have been possible operationally to include new legacy rates into the benefit system by April 2021. In any event, the extension of the uplift was temporary and not for a full financial year. The extension of the uplift to legacy benefits would be an extension of the policy intent. Legacy claimants would not now be facing a drop in the benefits they receive as they were never in receipt of the£20 uplift and all existing legacy benefit claimants in Great Britain are able to make a new Universal Credit claim at any time to benefit from the temporary uplift (as the Severe Disability Premium (SDP) gateway which prevented claimants who received SDP from making a new Universal Credit claim was removed on27 January 2021 , which I explained at paragraphs 12, 21.2 and 25 above). 74. The reasons for this matched the original reasons for the UC uplift (which I addressed at paragraphs 49-53 above). Further, for the reasons I explained at paragraph 70 above, it was not possible to make changes to the rates of legacy benefits for 2021/2022 as part of the budgetary process in spring 2021. In addition, even if changes could have been made to the legacy benefit rates at that time, it would not have been possible to make an equivalent decision to that made in respect of UC (a 6-month uplift). This is because it is practically difficult and operationally risky to change benefit rates in-year (i.e. to move from an uplifted rate to a default rate in October 2021): 74.1 Once rates have been input into the legacy IT systems, they cannot be changed until the following year without a very significant risk to the safety and stability of the IT system. Such risks would include IT system failure, the risk of payments not being made to claimants or incorrect claims being made to claimants. These risks arise because of the ageing nature of the legacy IT system and complex interactions and interdependencies between different parts of the system, together with the fact that programming an up-rating to legacy benefits outside of the annual up-rating exercise is un-tested. 74.2 Given that DWP was experiencing a significant increase in claims since the start of the pandemic, the Government’s priority was to make sure it could continue paying legacy benefits. Changing legacy benefits outside of the annual up-rating exercise would present an unacceptable risk to the safety and stability of the benefits system overall.” 74.1 Once rates have been input into the legacy IT systems, they cannot be changed until the following year without a very significant risk to the safety and stability of the IT system. Such risks would include IT system failure, the risk of payments not being made to claimants or incorrect claims being made to claimants. These risks arise because of the ageing nature of the legacy IT system and complex interactions and interdependencies between different parts of the system, together with the fact that programming an up-rating to legacy benefits outside of the annual up-rating exercise is un-tested. 74.2 Given that DWP was experiencing a significant increase in claims since the start of the pandemic, the Government’s priority was to make sure it could continue paying legacy benefits. Changing legacy benefits outside of the annual up-rating exercise would present an unacceptable risk to the safety and stability of the benefits system overall.”
“40. I consider that this description of the decision challenged side-steps the fact that this is a challenge to the 2020 Regulations commenced over a year after those Regulations were made. It is not accurate to describe the decision as an "ongoing" decision. The 2020 Regulations represent a discrete decision, albeit a decision with continuing consequences. Nor is the present case a situation in which any of the Claimants can contend that it was only sometime later they were affected by the decision under challenge. The Claimants have provided no reason for commencing their challenge to the 2020 Regulations so late in the day.”
“158. …A low intensity of review is generally appropriate, other things being equal, in cases concerned with judgments of social and economic policy in the field of welfare benefits and pensions, so that the judgment of the executive or legislature will generally be respected unless it is manifestly without reasonable foundation.”
“62. The legislation must not only have a legitimate policy objective. It must also satisfy a "proportionality" test. The court must decide whether the means employed by the statute to achieve the policy objective is appropriate and not disproportionate in its adverse effect. This involves a "value judgment" by the court, made by reference to the circumstances prevailing when the issue has to be decided. It is the current effect and impact of the legislation which matter, not the position when the legislation was enacted or came into force.”
“144. … The question of justification and proportionality has to be answered by reference to the time the events took place to which the statutory provision is being applied. … But as circumstances change so the justification or the absence of it may change. Merely to examine the situation at the time the Act in question was passed and treat that as decisive is wrong in principle…”
“53. It is well established that, under the HRA, the question of justification for an interference with a Convention right is a substantive question and not merely a process question: see e.g. R (SB) v Governors of Denbigh High School[2006] UKHL 15 ;[2007] AC 100 , at paras. 29-31 (Lord Bingham of Cornhill) and para. 68 (Lord Hoffmann). In this regard it differs from conventional grounds of domestic public law: for example, it will not suffice that a decision-maker has taken a relevant consideration into account. What matters is whether the ultimate decision taken is or is not objectively justified. Conversely, unlike in domestic public law cases, it will not necessarily be fatal if a decision-maker has failed to take into account an issue under the Convention. It is the compatibility of the outcome of the process with Convention rights which has to be assessed by the Court, not the process by which that outcome was reached.”