“276ADE(1) The requirements to be met by an applicant for leave to remain on the grounds of private life in the UK are that at the date of the application, the applicant: … (vi) subject to sub-paragraph (2), is aged 18 years or above, has lived continuously in the UK for less than 20 years (discounting any period of imprisonment) but there would be very significant obstacles to the applicant’s integration into the country to which he would have to go if required to leave the UK.”
“… However, for the reasons stated above, I do not find that it is reasonably likely that [CH] or her associates were attempting to harm the appellant during any of these shooting incidents. If this was their intention, then I do not think the appellant would have escaped unharmed and subsequent attempts would have been made to harm her. However, her partner and two of his friends who were present at each of the three shootings were all either killed or seriously injured. Therefore, I do believe it is reasonably likely that all the incidents, including the attempted abduction of the appellant’s son, are due to [CH]’s criminal associations.”
“43. I do not conclude therefore that it is reasonably likely that the appellant would face a real risk of substantial harm from [CH] or her associates were she to return to Saint Kitts.”
“44. … I have accepted that the appellant has a genuine subjective fear for herself and her children in Saint Kitts. While I have not found the appellant has met the evidential burden to show that there is any real connection to [CH], I have found that the appellant subjectively believes she is in danger. I accept that subjectively she believes the authorities are not willing to protect her. I think it is likely on the balance of probabilities that this would have a significant impact on the appellant’s ability to conduct a normal life in St Kitts and Nevis. I do agree therefore that the appellant would be likely on the balance of probabilities to be unable to integrate into life in Saint Kitts. She therefore meets the Immigration Rules. The appellant claimed asylum shortly after arriving in the United Kingdom. In applying the test of proportionality I therefore do not find that the balance of proportionality weighs against her in this case.”
“20. In summary therefore, although an appellant’s state of mind might be relevant to an ability to integrate, it is not suggested for example that the Appellant has any mental health issues arising from her fear which might then prevent her integration. In any event, her subjective fear (not objectively well-founded) is but one factor. If, as the Judge has found, the fear is also not objectively well-founded and if there is in any event objectively a sufficiency of protection (which the Judge did not consider), it is difficult to see how the subjective fear could prevent reintegration. The Judge has failed to provide adequate reasons to explain how she reached the conclusion that it could. 21. The error is therefore one of failing to take into account relevant considerations (such as whether the fear is objectively well-founded and other integrative links) and has taken into account the Appellant’s own subjective perception of her ability to reintegrate. The Judge has erred by failing to ask herself the right question whether, objectively, there are very significant obstacles to reintegration. The Judge has also failed to provide adequate reasons for her conclusion.”
“14. In my view, the concept of a foreign criminal’s “integration” into the country to which it is proposed that he be deported, as set out in section 117C(4)(c) and paragraph 399A, is a broad one. It is not confined to the mere ability to find a job or to sustain life while living in the other country. It is not appropriate to treat the statutory language as subject to some gloss and it will usually be sufficient for a court or tribunal simply to direct itself in the terms that Parliament has chosen to use. The idea of “integration” calls for a broad evaluative judgment to be made as to whether the individual will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in the society in that other country is carried on and a capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the individual’s private or family life.”
“18. There is no special rule regarding the reasons to be given by a tribunal deciding an immigration appeal. The conventional approach applies. The UT’s decision is to be read looking at the substance of its reasoning and not with a fine-tooth comb or like a statute in an effort to identify errors. In giving its reasons, a tribunal is entitled to focus on the principle issues in dispute between the parties, whilst also making it clear that it has considered other matters set out in the legislative regime being applied.”
“22. … On the footing that it did have regard to them, [counsel for the Secretary of State] did not suggest that the tribunal’s decision that the deportation of Mr Kamara to Sierra Leone would be in breach of his rights under article 8 could be regarded as irrational or perverse.”
“9. … The task of the Secretary of State, or the Tribunal, in any given case is simply to assess the obstacles to integration relied on, whether characterised as hardship or difficulty or anything else, and to decide whether they regard them as “very significant”.”
“36. In applying this test, a logical approach is first of all to decide whether the alleged obstacle to continuing family life outside the UK amounts to a very significant difficulty. If it meets this threshold requirement, the next question is whether the difficulty is one which would make it impossible for the claimant and their partner to continue family life together outside the UK. If not, the decision-maker needs finally to consider whether, taking account of any steps which could reasonably be taken to avoid or mitigate the difficulty, it would nevertheless entail very serious hardship for the claimant or their partner (or both). 37. To apply the test in what Lord Reed JSC in the Agyarko case[2017] 1 WLR 823 , para 43 called “a practical and realistic sense”, it is relevant and necessary in addressing these questions to have regard to the particular characteristics and circumstances of the individual(s) concerned. Thus, in the present case where it was established by evidence to the satisfaction of the tribunal that the claimant’s partner is particularly sensitive to heat, it was relevant for the tribunal to take this fact into account in assessing the level of difficulty which Mr Wilmshurst would face and the degree of hardship that would be entailed if he were required to move to India to continue his relationship. We do not accept, however, that an obstacle to the claimant’s partner moving to India is shown to be insurmountable - in either of the ways contemplated by paragraph EX.2. - just by establishing that the individual concerned would perceive the difficulty as insurmountable and would in fact be deterred by it from relocating to India. The test cannot, in our view, reasonably be understood as subjective in that sense. To treat it as such would substantially dilute the intended stringency of the test and give an unfair and perverse advantage to a claimant whose partner is less resolute or committed to their relationship over one whose partner is ready to endure greater hardship to enable them to stay together.”