“. . . Section 5A(2), which requires the terms of the proposed disposal to be summarised, is a requirement that is incorporated into section 5 of the Act, but section 5(3) requires the transaction to be severed for the purposes of the notices. That is how the Act works. If block A was one building, and blocks B, C and E were another, the proposed transaction was correctly severed. It is not the case that if the offers to the lessees are not accepted, the landlord then has to sell on a severed basis to the proposed purchaser. It can proceed with the unsevered transaction. The section 5 notices do not have to contain the terms that the purchaser agreed but rather the severed terms that section 5.3 (sic) requires, which often require the consideration to be apportioned. . . .”
“THIS NOTICE CONSTITUTES AN OFFER by the landlord to enter into a contract on the principal terms mentioned in paragraphs 3 to 6 of this notice. This offer may be accepted by the requisite majority of qualifying tenants of the constituent flats.”
“Purchase Price means£1,600,000 (exclusive of VAT), being the aggregate of the following amounts of consideration attributable to the five blocks comprising the Property: Block A£350,000 Blocks B, C and E£1,050,000 Block D£200,000 ”
“(1) . . . (a) references to a disposal of any description shall be construed as references to a contract to make such a disposal; (b) references to making a disposal of any description shall be construed as references to entering into a contract to make such a disposal; and (c) references to the transferee under the disposal shall be construed as references to the other party to the contract and include a reference to any other person to whom an estate or interest is to be granted or transferred in pursuance of the contract.”
“Where a landlord proposes to effect a transaction involving the disposal of an estate or interest in more than one building (whether or not involving the same estate or interest), he shall, for the purpose of complying with this section, sever the transaction so as to deal with each building separately.”
“An “acceptance notice” means a notice served on the landlord by the requisite majority of qualifying tenants of the constituent flats informing him that the person by whom it is served accept the offer contained in his notice.”
“(a) to give particulars of the terms on which the original disposal was made (including the deposit and consideration required) and the date on which it was made, and (b) where the disposal consisted of entering into a contract, to provide a copy of the contract.”
“The presumption that different words have different meanings will generally be easiest to rebut since ‘the use of the same expression is more likely to be deliberate’.”
“Sometimes, the fact that Parliament uses one formula in one part of an Act and a different formula in another part shows that a different meaning was intended, but that is not invariably so.”
“29. The courts in conducting statutory interpretation are “seeking the meaning of the words which Parliament used”: Black-Clawson International Ltd v Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg AG[1975] AC 591 , 613 per Lord Reid of Drem. More recently, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead stated: “Statutory interpretation is an exercise which requires the court to identify the meaning borne by the words in question in the particular context.” (R v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, Ex p Spath Holme Ltd[2001] AC 349 , 396). Words and passages in a statute derive their meaning from their context. A phrase or passage must be read in the context of the section as a whole and in the wider context of a relevant group of sections. Other provisions in a statute and the statute as a whole may provide the relevant context. They are the words which Parliament has chosen to enact as an expression of the purpose of the legislation and are therefore the primary source by which meaning is ascertained… 30. External aids to interpretation therefore must play a secondary role. Explanatory notes, prepared under the authority of Parliament, may cast light on the meaning of particular statutory provisions. Other sources … may disclose the background to a statute and assist the court to identify not only the mischief which it addresses but also the purpose of the legislation, thereby assisting a purposive interpretation of a particular statutory provision. The context disclosed by such materials is relevant to assist the court to ascertain the meaning of the statute, whether or not there is ambiguity and uncertainty, and indeed may reveal ambiguity or uncertainty: Bennion, Bailey and Norbury on Statutory Interpretation, 8th ed (2020), para 11.2. But none of these external aids displace the meanings conveyed by the words of a statute that, after consideration of that context, are clear and unambiguous and which do not produce absurdity. 31. Statutory interpretation involves an objective assessment of the meaning which a reasonable legislature as a body would be seeking to convey in using the statutory words which are being considered. Lord Nicholls, again in Spath Holme[2001] 2 AC 349 , 396, in an important passage stated: “The task of the court is often said to be to ascertain the intention of Parliament expressed in the language under consideration. This is correct and may be helpful, so long as it is remembered that the ‘intention of Parliament’ is an objective concept, not subjective. The phrase is a shorthand reference to the intention which the court reasonably imputes to Parliament in respect of the language used. It is not the subjective intention of the minister or other persons who promoted the legislation. Nor is it the subjective intention of the draftsman, or of individual members or even of a majority of individual members of either House. … Thus, when courts say that such-and-such a meaning ‘cannot be what Parliament intended’, they are saying only that the words under consideration cannot reasonably be taken as used by Parliament with that meaning.””