“1. An insurer domiciled in a Member State may by sued: (a) in the courts of the Member State in which he is domiciled; (b) in another Member State, in the case of actions brought by the policyholder, the insured, or a beneficiary, in the courts for the place where the claimant is domiciled; or (c) if he is a co-insurer, in the courts of the Member State in which proceedings are brought against the leading insurer.”
“…. To deny the injured party the right to bring an action before the courts for the place of his own domicile would deprive him of the same protection as that afforded by the regulation to other parties regarded as weak in disputes in matters relating to insurance and would thus be contrary to the spirit of the regulation.”
“The Working Party therefore requested the United Kingdom and Ireland to provide in their legislation implementing the 1968 Convention … for a concept of domicile which would depart from their traditional rules and would tend to reflect more the concept of ‘domicile’ as understood in the original states of the EC”
“(2) An individual is domiciled in the United Kingdom if and only if- (a) He is resident in the United Kingdom; and (b) The nature and circumstances of his residence indicate that he has a substantial connection with the United Kingdom.” (a) He is resident in the United Kingdom; and (b) The nature and circumstances of his residence indicate that he has a substantial connection with the United Kingdom.”
“My Lords, the word ‘reside’ is a familiar English word and is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as meaning “to dwell permanently or for a considerable time, to have one’s settled or usual abode, to live in or at a particular place.”
“The first principle is that a man can have two residences. He can have a flat in London and a house in the country. He is a resident in both. The second principle is that temporary presence at an address does not make a man resident there. A guest who comes for the weekend is not resident. A short-stay visitor is not resident. The third principle is that temporary absence does not deprive a person of his residence. If he happens to be away for a holiday or away for the weekend or in hospital [I would emphasise that phrase], he does not lose his residence on that account. … I think that a person may properly be said to be ‘resident’ in a place when his stay there has a considerable degree of permanence.”
“I also would begin, when considering what is meant by the word ‘reside’, by observing Viscount Cave’s acceptance of the definition in the Oxford English dictionary…namely ‘to dwell permanently or for a considerable time, to have one’s settled or usual abode, to live in or at a particular place’. That definition is coloured and enlarged by numerous references in the authorities, such as by Lord Coleridge C.J. in Barlow v Smith [1892] 9 T.L.R. 57 where he speaks of a man’s residence as being where he lives and has his home. There are other references to a man’s home, references which I find helpful, because, although I recognise that the word is in some ways an ambiguous word, I think it nevertheless follows that a man cannot be said to reside in a particular place unless in the ordinary sense of the word one can say that for the time being he is making his home in that place. … It is imperative to remember in this context that ‘residence’ implies a degree of permanence. In the words of the Oxford English dictionary, it is concerned with something which will go on for a considerable time. Consequently a person is not entitled to claim to be resident at a given town merely because he pays a short, temporary visit. Some assumption of permanence, some degree of continuity, some expectation of continuity is a vital factor which turns simple occupation into residence.”
“All that is necessary is that the purpose of living where one does has a sufficient degree of continuity to be properly described as settled.”
“Although there was some discussion before us on what is meant by the word ‘resident’ insection 41 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 , it seemed to me that the parties were really little apart on this aspect of the case. The leading case is Levene v Commissioners of Inland Revenue. Although this was a tax case, it is clear that the meaning given to the word in that case was its ordinary meaning, uncoloured by the fact that it was used in a revenue context. … On the basis of Levene it seems to me that a person is resident for the purposes of section 41(3) in a particular part of the United Kingdom if that part is for him a settled or usual place of abode.”
“14. Since 1928, if not before, it has therefore been clear that an individual who has been resident in the UK ceases in law to be so resident only if he ceases to have a settled or usual abode in the UK. Although, as I will explain in para 19 below, the phrase ‘a distinct break’ first entered the case law in a subtly different context, the phrase, now much deployed including in the present appeals, is not an inapt description of the degree of change in the pattern of an individual’s life in the UK which will be necessary if a cessation of his settled or usual abode in the UK is to take place.”
“20. It is therefore clear that, whether in order to become non-resident in the UK or whether at any rate to avoid being deemed by the statutory provision still to be resident in the UK, the ordinary law requires the UK resident to effect a distinct break in the pattern of his life in the UK. The requirement of a distinct break mandates a multifactorial inquiry. … The distinct break relates to the pattern of the taxpayer’s life in the UK and no doubt it encompasses a substantial loosening of social and familial ties; but the allowance, to which I will refer, of limited visits to the UK on the part of the taxpayer who has become non-resident, clearly foreshadows their continued existence in a loosened form. ‘Severance’ of such ties is too strong a word in this context.”
“63. There is an obvious attraction in keeping the test as simple as possible, especially as taxpayers are now responsible for self assessment when making their returns. But the underlying principle that the law has established is that it must be shown that there has been a distinct break in the pattern of the taxpayer’s life in the UK. The inquiry that this principle indicates is essentially one of evaluation. It depends on the facts. It looks to what the taxpayer actually does or does not do to alter his life’s pattern. His intention is, of course, relevant to the inquiry. But it is not determinative. All the circumstances have to be considered to see what light they can throw on the quality of the taxpayer’s absence from the UK. ...”