“It was also not in issue that this premium was incorrectly calculated. Instead of applying a 6% rate (for waste risks) a rate of 2.25% was used, and then weighted by 40%, which self-evidently left the premium below the level it would have been if 6% had been used.”
“211. What has troubled me is whether, against this background, the premium he imposed would have been higher. I have concluded that it would have been; that is a conclusion which appears to find support in the independent evidence. Mr Penny reviewed this risk after the event. He went on record at the time and confirmed in evidence that the underwriting of this risk over the years had been substandard. Part of this was (based on clear evidence) that the premium calculated for the 2014 renewal did not apply the rate for waste risks correctly; instead of categorising the trade as waste, with an automatic premium of 6%, it was categorised as contractor’s portable plant, with a premium of 2.25%, to which a loading of 40% was applied. Further the excess of£500 was very low for a risk of this type. 212. As I have indicated I reach the conclusion on the balance of probabilities that Mr Penny would have offered terms for renewal, impelled to that conclusion by a sense of fair play to a long standing assured and given the less than striking nature of the extra information. However, there were limits to Mr Penny's charity. I conclude that Mr Penny would only have underwritten the risk if it was priced at or about the correct price for the risk. (It seems likely that he might have given a little leeway to ease the transition into proper pricing). This approach dovetails exactly with both the fair approach evidenced by Mr Hutchinson and Mr Penny, and Mr Penny's evidence as to how in fact he approached the process of weeding out less desirable waste risks. One can also see something of the same in the history of the buildings cover; the move to Millennium was against a background of changed underwriting criteria by Aviva and forbidding pricing by Catlin. As such it is a conclusion which derives from independent evidence, and the test of logical self-consistency. 213. As I have said above, this was not quite the case advanced for Zurich; its core case was simple – that Mr Penny would not have written the risk. However, on considering the evidence adduced this more subtle approach seems clearly indicated as the answer. 214. I have included this consideration for completeness, because it forms part of the background to the next question. As I have indicated, the case was essentially put on the basis of “write or not write?”, though a reference to terms was made in passing both in opening and in closing. To this binary question, the answer is “write”
“if the misrepresentation or non-disclosure of a material fact did not in fact induce the making of the contract (in the sense in which that expression is used in the general law of misrepresentation) the underwriter is not entitled to rely on it as a ground for avoiding the contract.”
“In all the circumstances I would summarise the relevant principles of inducement in this context in this way. (i) In order to be entitled to avoid a contract of insurance or reinsurance, an insurer or reinsurer must prove on the balance of probabilities that he was induced to enter into the contract by a material non-disclosure or by a material misrepresentation. (ii) There is no presumption of law that an insurer or reinsurer is induced to enter in the contract by a material non-disclosure or misrepresentation. (iii) The facts may, however, be such that it is to be inferred that the particular insurer or reinsurer was so induced even in the absence from evidence from him. (iv) In order to prove inducement the insurer or reinsurer must show that the non-disclosure or misrepresentation was an effective cause of his entering into the contract on the terms on which he did. He must therefore show at least that, but for the relevant non-disclosure or misrepresentation, he would not have entered into the contract on those terms. On the other hand, he does not have to show that it was the sole effective cause of his doing so.”
“The existing rules, coupled with a presumption of inducement are already stern enough, and to enable an underwriter to escape liability when he has suffered no harm would be positively unjust, and contrary to the spirit of mutual good faith recognised by section 17 [of theMarine Insurance Act 1906 ], the more so since non-disclosure will in a substantial proportion of cases be the result of an innocent mistake.”