“86. If it is necessary to prevent development in a village primarily because of the important contribution which the open character of the village makes to the openness of the Green Belt, the village should be included in the Green Belt. … 87. As with previous Green Belt policy, inappropriate development is, by definition, harmful to the Green Belt and should not be approved except in very special circumstances.”
“89. A local planning authority should regard the construction of new buildings as inappropriate in Green Belt. Exceptions to this are: … • limited infilling in villages, and limited affordable housing for local community needs under policies set out in the Local Plan … … .” … • limited infilling in villages, and limited affordable housing for local community needs under policies set out in the Local Plan … … .”
“Infill in a village The Planning [Officer’s] only justification for recommending approval of this application is that it would represent limited infill within a village. The site is 2.5 acres in size[,] does not abound a public road and is situated within the open countryside in an area of housing that has no settlement boundary. Which of these factors does the Planning Officer feel would stand up in front of a High Court Judge? By their own documentation submitted as extra evidence the land owner is only allowing the applicant to own 1/5 of the site. The application site is the existing 0.5 acre clearing in the developed part of Gubeon West. It does not include the 2 acres of external woodland surrounding it, and [is] not owned by the applicant, who therefore has no right of control over it. One would therefore rightly question how does the land owner intend to dispose of the rest of the land? Would this further area be classed as infill by the Planning Officer? The whole scenario is utter nonsense. I have previously highlighted a Planning Inspector’s view on the site as infill and for completeness will repeat it below …”
“It is clear within the report that no mention of this decision is made by the Planning Officer when it is materially relevant to the case. One would have to ask why not?”
“7.18 At [sic] paragraph 89 of the NPPF ‘exception’ is the development of a new building that constitutes limited infilling within a village. It is considered that the proposed development would indeed fall within this prescribed exception, thereby not constituting inappropriate development. It follows that very special circumstances need not be demonstrated in respect of the development. 7.19 For the above purposes, a “village” is not defined under the NPPF. Nor is a “village” specifically defined by the development plan, including the Neighbourhood Plan (which identifies some villages, but does not purport to provide any exhaustive list or definition). The same is true in respect of the phrase “infill development”
“7.64 Full consideration has also been given to the planning history relating to this site and the proposed development, and also to the two subsequent appeals made against the decision of the local planning authority to refuse planning permission … (which were dismissed on08/02/2000 and09/01/2009 ).”
“In response to questions from the Members of the Committee, the following information was noted: – • The Morpeth Neighbourhood Plan did not preclude other statements [sic], and Officers had taken the view that the NPPF allowed for infill in other villages. • The NPPF did not give a definition of a village. • There had been a sub-division of plots where planning had been approved, i.e., Juniper.” • The Morpeth Neighbourhood Plan did not preclude other statements [sic], and Officers had taken the view that the NPPF allowed for infill in other villages. • The NPPF did not give a definition of a village. • There had been a sub-division of plots where planning had been approved, i.e., Juniper.”
“…Where an inspector’s reasons do not indicate whether he has had regard to a material consideration which was placed before him then there must usually be (in Lord Bridge’s words [in Save Britain’s Heritage v Number 1 Poultry Ltd. [1991] 1 W.L.R. 153, at p.167]) “substantial doubt whether the decision [was taken] within the powers of the Act[”.] Accordingly the interests of an applicant will in that circumstance have been substantially prejudiced by the deficiency of reasons, for he is left in doubt as to empowerment and his ability to challenge on that ground. In this case the asserted material consideration is a previous appeal decision. It was not disputed in argument that a previous appeal decision is capable of being a material consideration. The proposition is in my judgment indisputable. One important reason why previous decisions are capable of being material is that like cases should be decided in a like manner so that there is consistency in the appellate process. Consistency is self-evidently important to both developers and development control authorities. But it is also important for the purpose of securing public confidence in the operation of the development control system. I do not suggest and it would be wrong to do so, that like cases must be decided alike. An inspector must always exercise his own judgment. He is therefore free upon consideration to disagree with the judgment of another but before doing so he ought to have regard to the importance of consistency and to give his reasons for departure from the previous decision. To state that like cases should be decided alike presupposes that the earlier case is alike and is not distinguishable in some relevant respect. If it is distinguishable then it usually will lack materiality by reference to consistency although it may be material in some other way. Where it is indistinguishable then ordinarily it must be a material consideration. A practical test for the inspector is to ask himself whether, if I decide this case in a particular way am I necessarily agreeing or disagreeing with some critical aspect of the decision in the previous case? The areas for possible agreement or disagreement cannot be defined but they would include interpretation of policies, aesthetic judgments and assessment of need. Where there is disagreement then the inspector must weigh the previous decision and give his reasons for departure from it. These can on occasion be short, for example in the case of disagreement on aesthetics. On other occasions they may have to be elaborate.”
“26. There are powerful reasons why it is desirable for administrative bodies to give reasons for their decisions. They include improving the quality of decisions by focusing the mind of the decision-making body and thereby increasing the likelihood that the decision will be lawfully made; promoting public confidence in the decision-making process; providing, or at least facilitating, the opportunity for those affected to consider whether the decision was lawfully reached, thereby facilitating the process of judicial review or the exercise of any right of appeal; and respecting the individual’s interest in understanding – and perhaps thereby more readily accepting – why a decision affecting him has been made. This last consideration is reinforced where an interested third party has taken an active part in the decision making-process, for example by making representations in the course of consultations. Indeed, the process of consultation is arguably undermined if potential consultees are left in the dark as to what influence, if any, their representations had.”
“55. … In the application of the principle to planning decisions, I see no reason to distinguish between a ministerial inquiry, and the less formal, but equally public, decision-making process of a local planning authority such as in this case.”
“46. I accept Mr [Juan] Lopez’s submissions [on behalf of the county council] that the strategic planning committee was in no way bound by the Planning Inspector’s earlier decision that development on this site did not amount to infill development. I also accept that it was open to the strategic planning committee to reach a decision which was different to that of the Planning Inspector on this issue. However, given that this was a material consideration and central to the ultimate grant of planning permission, I am satisfied that some reasons should have been given to support the conclusion reached. 47. I have come to the conclusion that, although they need only be limited, reasons should have been given for concluding that the development amounted to limited infill, particularly in the light of the earlier Planning Inspector’s decision to the contrary.”