“2. The procedure for access of the father … to the children … shall be established as follows, until an adjudication terminating/concluding the proceedings of the civil case… has entered into force: 2.1 The father and the children shall meet once per month for up to four hours in the settlement of the children’s place of residence, in the children’s habitual living environment in the presence of a third party, the third party being a competent child welfare authority of the Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, whereas that third party shall have the right to assign a competent natural person to be present.”
“A court may restrict the right of access or the enforcement of the earlier decisions made concerning the right of access or terminate the enforcement of earlier decisions made with respect to the exercise of the right of access or with respect to the right of access. A court may order that a parent or another person has access to a child in the presence of a suitable third person. If the third person is a rural municipality or city government or a legal person in private law, the rural municipality or city government or the legal person shall appoint a competent natural person to perform this duty.”
“52. The Anna Freud Centre would have to consider, indeed the court would expect them to do no less, how contact could take place in a manner which was consistent with the children’s welfare and, indeed, whether it could take place in a manner which was consistent with the children’s welfare. They could not be asked to conduct an abstract exercise based on an instruction “to get the children used to the idea of seeing their father”
“Conventions for international enforcement of contact orders are prone to overreach themselves in their ambitions. Access orders can seldom be written on stone tablets. The orders are peculiarly vulnerable to change of circumstance, the maturation of children, and the dynamics within sometimes the old family and sometimes a newly constituted family. In consequence enforcement, not only after lapse of time but after relocation and in a foreign court, is always likely to be problematic. These realities in my judgment demand a liberal construction of Article 11(2) in order to achieve the overriding objectives of the European Convention, one of which is to ensure that the act of relocation does not avoid the orders for contact made by the court that granted permission.”
“1. A judgment on the exercise of parental responsibility in respect of a child of both parties given in a Member State which is enforceable in that Member State and has been served shall be enforced in another Member State when, on the application of any interested party, it has been declared enforceable there. 2. However, in the United Kingdom, such a judgment shall be enforced in England and Wales, in Scotland or in Northern Ireland when, on the application of any interested party, it has been registered for enforcement in that part of the United Kingdom.”
“1. The procedure for making the application shall be governed by the law of the Member State in which enforcement is sought.”
“2. The application may be refused only for one of the reasons specified in Articles 15, 16 and 17.”
“3. Under no circumstances may a judgment be reviewed as to its substance.”
“12. What, however, does ‘enforce' and ‘enforcement' mean in the context of section 2 and Brussels II as a whole? It does not, in my view, carry the narrow meaning of ‘apply sanctions', rather it means to give force or effect to the underlying judgment or, in plain language, to make it happen. Child contact involves and depends upon the interaction of human beings, including the child himself, and is almost invariably a process (i.e. repeated contact over a period) rather than a single event. To apply a sanction at a particular part of the process, or to insist that a particular part of the process takes place, may be to imperil future parts of the process. In short, to make contact happen in the long term may require restraint in the short term. These are truisms of family law. So, as an integral part of the active function of enforcing – i.e. making happen – the proposed contact in the longer term, a court may have to adapt or show restraint in the shorter term.”
“14. Under section 2, Enforcement, of Brussels II, however, the duty of, and discretion in, the court are different. Under Art 21 there is an overriding duty to enforce. There can be no review as to substance and only limited discretion under Art 24(2). There is no variation power. The duty is to make the foreign judgment happen and there is only such discretion as fulfilment of that duty requires. I agree with Mr Everall that the court has some discretion to ‘phase in', if and to the extent that phasing in will eventually best make the foreign judgment happen. But that is all. The moment the court exercises any more general discretion it would be reviewing the foreign judgment as to its substance or exercising a discretion outside the scope of Art 24(2). The target has to be to make the foreign judgment happen as soon as that can effectively be achieved. The position of the child, and of the adults, and the well-being of the child are all relevant. If, for instance, contact is forced too quickly so the child later refuses to go, that is not effectively to enforce or make the judgment happen. But welfare is not paramount or even the primary consideration.”
“…Art 48 sets out the provision that the court may make practical arrangements for the exercise of the rights of access ordered by the foreign court if that latter order is silent or insufficiently precise as to those necessary practical arrangements.”
“…as I have already emphasised, that provision is limited to the making of practical arrangements for, for example, timings and handovers, et cetera, rather than intervening so as to alter the substantive provisions of the order which Art 26 of the Regulation prohibits. (See in this context the decision of Holman J in Re S (Brussels II Recognition: Best Interests of Child) (No 1)[2003] EWHC 2115 (Fam) ,[2004] 1 FLR 571 et sequenta, and in particular see para [10] …)”
“I have no doubt: (1) that the underlying principles of the Regulation should be respected; (2) that there are many cases dependent upon their facts where the arguments put forward by Mr Harrison would succeed on his interpretation, which I share, of the Regulation and the authorities; (3) that in such cases the court would do its utmost to recognise and enforce those foreign orders. I, nevertheless, decline to enforce this order…”