“[28] The second causal question has to be understood as being implicit if absurd consequences are to be avoided. The elderly man in my example, who is homeless after his care home closes, is undoubtedly someone who, in his student days, did something in consequence of which he ceased to occupy accommodation which was available for his occupation and which it would have been reasonable for him to continue to occupy. The causal question arising under s 191(1) must therefore be answered in the affirmative. But, if that were the only causal question which arose, the legislation would have absurd results. Absurdity is avoided by asking the second question, which arises under s 193(1): the authority are satisfied that he is homeless following the closure of the home, but cannot be satisfied that he became homeless intentionally, since his homelessness was not caused by his holding rowdy parties in his student digs. He would have been homeless following the closure of the home in any event. [29] On the other hand, in my example of the person who intentionally gave up his accommodation and moved into temporary accommodation and waited to be evicted, both questions would be answered in the affirmative. He deliberately did something in consequence of which he ceased to occupy accommodation which was available for his occupation and which it would have been reasonable for him to continue to occupy. The causal test under s 191(1) is therefore satisfied, even though he did not at that stage become homeless. When he did become homeless, following his eviction from the temporary accommodation, he could properly be said under s 193(1) to have become homeless intentionally, since the effective cause of his homelessness was his previous intentional conduct, but for which he would not be homeless. That conduct was a “but for” cause of his homelessness, and no unconnected event had intervened to break the causal connection. …. [63] These decisions are consistent with what was said about causation in Din, leaving out of account the aspect of Lord Lowry's reasoning which was disapproved in Awua. As counsel for the Appellant submitted, the decision whether an Applicant is intentionally homeless depends on the cause of the homelessness existing at the date of the decision. That has to be determined having regard to all relevant circumstances and bearing in mind the purposes of the legislation. As I have indicated, a later event constituting an involuntary cause of homelessness can be regarded as superseding the Applicant's earlier deliberate conduct, where in view of the later event it cannot reasonably be said that, but for the Applicant's deliberate conduct, he or she would not have become homeless. Where, however, the deliberate conduct remains a “but for” cause of the homelessness, and the question is whether the chain of causation should nevertheless be regarded as having been interrupted by some other event, the question will be whether the proximate cause of the homelessness is an event which is unconnected to the Applicant's own earlier conduct, and in the absence of which homelessness would probably not have occurred.”
“To remove his self-imposed disqualification, he must therefore have achieved what can be loosely described as a ‘settled residence’, as opposed to what from the outset is known (as in Dyson's case[1980] 1 WLR 1205 ) to be only temporary accommodation. What amounts to ‘a settled residence’ is a question of fact and degree depending upon the circumstances of each individual case.”
“The distinction between a settled residence and temporary accommodation is thus being used to identify what will break the causal link between departure from accommodation which it would have been reasonable to continue to occupy and homelessness separated from that departure by a period or periods of accommodation elsewhere. This jurisprudence is well-established (it was approved by this House in Din's case) and nothing I have said is intended to cast any doubt upon it, although I would wish to reserve the question of whether the occupation of a settled residence is the sole and exclusive method by which the causal link can be broken. It is the importation of the distinction between settled and temporary accommodation into other questions arising under Part III of the Act which seems to me unwarranted.”
“For this purpose the distinction is between “settled” in the sense of reasonably secure or permanent accommodation and insecure accommodation in the sense of precarious, temporary or transient accommodation. The epithet “secure” connotes accommodation in respect of which there are solid grounds for the reasonable expectation of continuance of occupation for the foreseeable future or for a significant period of time. There is no legal requirement as to the form of or the label that designates the legal character of the occupation. What matters is whether as a matter of fact the required security is available. For the purpose of determining whether accommodation is secure it is relevant whether the occupation is under a lease or a licence, but the fact that occupation is under a lease or licence is in no way decisive. Relevant circumstances also include (amongst others) the terms of the lease or licence, whether the grantor of the lease or licence could lawfully grant it, the relationship between the lessor and licensee and the lessee and the licensee (e.g. parent and child or husband and wife or partners or employer and employee), the nature of the accommodation and the period for which the accommodation may be expected to continue and for which it has continued.”
“11. By your own admission, you stayed elsewhere on these occasions. Therefore, it is evident that you were only occupying Mr Theobald’s son’s room at his and his family’s convenience, when he did not need his room. 12. I have considered whether it could be argued that you willingly gave up your room to help your friend because he had been supportive of you. However, your representatives stated that, “Mr Theobald had a spare room as his son had gone to university and no longer needed the room apart from the occasional overnight visit when our client would stay elsewhere…”
“The phrase “settled accommodation” is an ordinary English expression and not a term of art. When the respondent referred in the decision letter to the accommodation being of a temporary nature, it was using the word “temporary” in the sense of precarious (see the penultimate paragraph of the letter). In so doing it adopted an approach similar to that suggested in ex parte Graham. It impliedly concluded that the licence to occupy would not continue for years. It may even be that the statement that the accommodation was not an open-ended licence was an express conclusion to that effect. The authority did not misunderstand what was meant by “settled accommodation” nor is there substance in the submission that it failed to take into account material considerations. The reference to ex parte Shah is, in my judgment, misconceived. That case was concerned with the meaning of “ordinarily resident” insection 1 of the Education Act 1962 . I see no warrant for importing the interpretation of different statutory words into the consideration of what is meant by “settled accommodation” in homeless housing legislation. As for the applicant's assertion that the accommodation at both addresses was to be for an indefinite period, I have already summarised the relevant facts. It is true that at the outset the duration of the accommodation was uncertain, but having regard to all the circumstances, the respondent was entitled to regard it as precarious. I have in mind, in particular, the fact that the licensors in each case were not members of the applicant's family or close friends. And the arrangement at 54, Landcroft Road could come to an end, as it did, merely because the parties tired of each other, and that at 14, Portlet Court, merely because the applicant had become pregnant.”