‘I reach similar conclusions with regard to the claims in the Intrigue action for similar reasons. The parties’ submissions mirrored those in the Fiona actions. I consider that, in so far as the claims are made on the basis that Mr Izmaylov was party to schemes with Mr Nikitin and others, the issues relating to those claims are governed by Russian law. The collusion between Mr Nikitin and Mr Izmaylov, which according to the claimants’ primary case is the crucial relationship that involved NSC in the impugned transactions, took place in Russia, and Mr Izmaylov worked in Russia to give effect to what they had arranged. In so far as commission claims are pursued on the alternative basis that, notwithstanding there was no relevant breach of duty on the part of Mr Izmaylov, Mr Nikitin and the Standard Maritime defendants are liable for their part in schemes involving the brokers, I conclude that the issues between the parties are to be determined in accordance with English law.’
‘… accepted that I should make one composite order in respect of the two Fiona actions as between all the claimants on the one hand and Mr Nikitin and the Standard Maritime defendants on the other hand, and a single separate order in the Intrigue action.’
‘47. In order to reach a fair determination upon costs as between the claimants and Mr Nikitin and the Standard Maritime defendants, I must particularly consider (i) the extent to which the claimants were successful and (ii) the conduct of these parties before and after the proceedings were brought. I have already said that the claimants’ success was limited. The defendants defeated entirely the claims relating to these schemes: the RCB claim, the SLB arrangements scheme, the termination of the SLB arrangements scheme, the newbuildings scheme, the Sovcomflot time charters scheme, the Sawyer commissions scheme, the NSC time charters scheme and the “Romea Champion” commissions scheme. The claimants were successful in respect of the Sovcomflot Clarkson commissions scheme, the Tam commissions scheme, the hull no 1231 commission scheme, the Norstar commissions scheme, the NSC Clarkson commissions scheme and the Galbraith’s commissions scheme. One measure of the claimants’ success is that, as Mr Berry observed, in the Fiona actions the claimants recovered something less than 5% of the amounts that they claimed and in the Intrigue action the claimants recovered some 12% of their total claims. As I have said, where the claimants succeeded in respect of a scheme, they did so only on their secondary case: I rejected in respect of all the schemes their primary allegations that Mr Skarga and Mr Izmaylov were involved in collusion. I observe that, apart from the evidence of Russian law, all or practically all of the expert evidence adduced in the main actions (as opposed to the part 20 claims) was directed to allegations upon which the claimants failed. 48. The aspects of the claimants’ conduct which seem to me most importantly relevant to this decision about costs are these: i) Mr Frank, who was largely responsible for the conduct of the main Fiona actions on behalf of the claimants, was, as I concluded in the main judgment, dishonest. I give two examples here: before bringing the proceedings, the claimants arranged for private investigators to examine the affairs of Mr Skarga, Mr Nikitin, Mr Borisenko and Mr Privalov: see paras 219ff. Mr Frank dishonestly denied knowing about these investigations and any involvement with the investigators. (The defendants alleged that these investigations involved unlawful and illegal activities in different countries, including the United Kingdom, but I did not need to determine that.) Secondly, he dishonestly supported Mr Borisenko’s untruthful account about Mr Skarga being party to bribing him: para 303. ii) Mr Oskirko, part of whose duties as NSC’s Vice-President of Corporate Affairs from December 200 was to deal with the litigation on behalf of the claimants in the Intrigue action, also gave thoroughly dishonest evidence: para 317. iii) As I explained at para 36, without any significant exception the claimants’ witness statements were shown to be misleading. I could not rely upon the statements even of honest witnesses because their oral evidence departed so far from them. This affected the presentation of important issues at trial: see, for example, paras 254 and 1081. iv) The claimants’ disclosure was unsatisfactory, as I explained at paras 41-43. The claimants made and pursued allegations that were obviously unsustainable when proper disclosure was eventually made, often during the trial: see, by way of example, paras 1040 and 1404. The claimants made further disclosure of significant documents after the close of final submissions, as a result of which a further hearing on9 July 2010 was required. v) The key witnesses called by the claimants gave dishonest evidence, in particular Mr Borisenko and Mr Privalov in the Fiona actions and Mr Oskirko and Mr Privalov in the Intrigue action. Mr Popplewell [leading counsel for the claimants at the trial] submitted that I should distinguish between the conduct of parties and the conduct of witnesses, and I accept thatCPR 44.3 (4)(a) refers to the conduct of “the parties”. However, Mr Borisenko was a member of Sovcomflot’s Executive Board when the Fiona action was brought. Moreover,CPR 44.3 (4) requires the Court to have regard to “all the circumstances”, and I consider it relevant that the claimants’ primary contentions of corrupt conspiracies were pursued almost entirely on the basis of dishonest evidence. Further, as I stated at para 1450, many specific allegations that had been pleaded and relied upon in the claimants’ opening submissions were either not developed or not supported by evidence that survived cross-examination. … 50. I must also weigh Mr Nikitin’s conduct both before and during the proceedings. (It was not suggested that his conduct should not, for these purposes, be attributed to the Standard Maritime defendants.) The main judgment explains the nature and extent of his dishonesty in his dealings with Sovcomflot and Intrigue, and it shows the extent of his dishonest evidence. I need not list all the relevant findings: he paid substantial bribes to Mr Privalov, including payments under sham agreements, and, while it was not possible from the evidence to discern the reason for all the payments, he secured Mr Privalov’s assistance in conducting the dishonest commissions schemes; he was party to creating forged and back-dated documents and to other dishonest devices; and his evidence on many matters was shown to be dishonest, both in relation to the commissions claims and about other schemes where the claims were dismissed. 51. The claimants urge that I should also have regard to my finding that Mr Nikitin conferred on Mr Skarga benefits which English law regards as bribes. I do not consider this an important consideration for present purposes: I have not found that this involved dishonesty on Mr Nikitin’s part (or on Mr Skarga’s part), and the significance of this conduct is dwarfed by the dishonest conduct and evidence both of Mr Nikitin and of the claimants. 52. I bear in mind that the claimants have recovered some part of their costs under the settlement agreement with Clarkson and Galbraith’s. 53. Balancing these considerations I conclude that I should not order any payment of costs as between the claimants on the one hand and Mr Nikitin and the Standard Maritime defendants on the other hand. They should all bear their own costs. This involves a major departure from the general rule, but I consider that it is justified particularly (i) because the claimants failed in their primary case, and (ii) because of the conduct of the claimants before and during the proceedings.’
‘Para 1504 does not identify all my findings of dishonesty on the part of Mr Nikitin in relation to commissions. There were others: for an example relating to Galbraith’s, see para 633. Para 1504 is largely directed to dishonesty relating to the Sovcomflot Clarkson commissions scheme, but it was never suggested during the trial that, if this scheme was dishonest, the NSC Clarkson commissions scheme or the Galbraith’s commissions scheme arrangement might nevertheless have been honest. On the contrary, in their closing submissions Mr Nikitin and the Standard Maritime defendants said: a) Of the NSC Clarkson commissions arrangement: “It is common ground that the Clarkson Agreement was extended to the Novoship business and that the nature of the agreement as it applied to Novoship was materially the same as it was with Sovcomflot”: part IX para 199; and b) Of the Galbraith’s arrangement: “Again, there is no suggestion that the Galbraith’s Agreement was conceptually any different from the SCF Clarkson Agreement”: part IX para 206.’
‘In October 2005 Mr Mednikov instructed Mr Piers Erskine of Corporate Intelligence Services Ltd … to investigate Mr Izmaylov’s affairs. Mr Frank denied that he was aware of this, but I reject that evidence. Mr Frank, together with Mr Terekhin and Mr Mednikov, had a meeting about the investigation with Mr Erskine on23 February 2006 .’