“(4) The valuation shall take into account the following assumptions, bases and footings: (i) that there was a debt due from the Company to Global Radio Services Ltd of£527,643 as at31st December 2007 , subject to any subsequent payments (ii) that there was a debt due from Club Concorde Ltd to Asian Broadcasting Corporation Ltd, now called Litt Corporation Ltd (”
“As regards CCL [Club Concorde Ltd] and LMC,£270,000 and£180,000 respectively were invoiced by ABC down to the end of December 2007. These are significantly less in each case than the maximum chargeable over the 18 months in question. As in the case of GRS, I see no warrant for increasing the accruals down to that date. As the actual accruals were within the Limits, they were authorised.”
“16. Having heard the evidence, which, as I say, consisted solely of 2 experts, Mr Hanke for the petitioner, at my request, came up with an alternative calculation of value, which it seems to me forms a proper basis for the valuation in this case, though I do not, as will appear, accept every part of it. The basis of his approach was that liabilities of the company's subsidiaries would only be taken into account if there was a legal obligation upon the company to meet them. That, it seems to me, is correct, because loss-making subsidiaries can be liquidated or otherwise shed. It does, however, as Mr. Hanke recognised, involve payment off, or taking into account, of the full bank liability of£9.539 million . He said that one must then value the separate profitable businesses upon the footing that it will be open to the purchaser to close down or get rid of all the rest without cost. I accept that that is a permissible and correct approach. The only four profitable group companies were Sunrise, Club Concorde Limited, Kismat Radio Limited and Sunrise TV Limited. 17. Mr. Hanke also said that the other assets available to satisfy the bank debt should be taken into account, and that relevantly included a property charged to the bank called Hayes Gate House, which in 2009 had a substantial value, though on one view of the matter slightly less than its book value. As that was charged to the bank, I agree that it is appropriate to take the availability of that capital asset into account.”
“3. He pointed out that what I had done is deduct only from the valuation of Sunrise the amount of the Allied Irish Bank debt and not, as Ms Hindson (his expert) had done when valuing Sunrise as a whole, including all its subsidiaries, the net liabilities of either the group or of the particular companies which I took into account when making the valuation. He contended that that was absurd. When I read that submission in the skeleton argument I was initially attracted by it and, therefore, invited further argument as to whether I should make a deduction for all of the net liabilities within the companies that were being valued. It seemed to me then, though I did not have the papers before me, that Mr Griffiths’ submission might logically follow from the approach I had adopted. However, Mr Hanke has pointed out that the experts were agreed that a price-earnings multiple was appropriate, which had no necessary reference to net liabilities. The only reason that a net liability was brought in by Ms Hindson was because of the interdependency of all the companies and the existence of guarantees across the board. That feature disappeared once I approached the issue on the basis that all the bank indebtedness would in fact be paid off on completion. That, Mr Hanke correctly pointed out, was the only reason for bringing in that indebtedness at all and, that being so, on the evidence before me, the only debt which had to be repaid on a hypothetical sale of Sunrise was the bank debt. Mr Griffiths pointed in further argument to what appeared to be other inter-company indebtedness, but there was in fact no evidence at the hearing before me as to the nature of that inter-company indebtedness and whether it would have to be repaid on completion. That was a point which could have been made additionally by Ms Hindson, but was not, and, more importantly, could have been made by any of the Sunrise witnesses, no one in fact, for good reason or bad, being available to give evidence at the quantum hearing. 4. One of the problems that has bedevilled this case, and in particular the quantum hearing, is the lateness at which the evidence was prepared, despite the substantial lapse of time between the liability hearing and the quantum hearing. However, what was clearly in issue, as is evident from the joint statement of the experts, is whether or not the subsidiaries could be discarded if they were not profitable. It was clearly Mr Thompson's view, with which Ms Hindson disagreed, that they could. It was for the Sunrise parties (as I shall call the respondents) to consider what the consequences were if Mr Thompson’s view should prevail, and it was for them to put evidence before the court to show that some further deduction over and above the Allied Irish Bank indebtedness would be appropriate. They had, after all, put in detailed evidence of the Allied Irish Bank indebtedness and of the particular terms upon which it was made. They did not put in any evidence about the terms upon which other indebtedness was incurred. In those circumstances, it was appropriate to make a distinction between the Allied Irish Bank indebtedness and other indebtedness, and it does not therefore seem to me that I should re-visit my earlier ruling on that ground. This is not a case, in my judgment, where it is appropriate to have any regard to net indebtedness as I am adopting a multiple of earnings basis for valuation. It was only because of the special features that presented themselves to Ms Hindson that she brought in all the net indebtedness, those features having now disappeared. Once the Allied Irish Bank indebtedness is treated as paid off, there is no longer any basis for bringing net indebtedness in at all. It is common to see, as indeed one sees from Ms Hindson’s individual valuations of Sunrise and Concorde, valuations on a price-earnings multiple without regard to net assets. Sometimes the net assets or liabilities may have a significant impact, but there is nothing in the evidence to suggest that they should have a significant impact in this case. Mr Griffiths says that the result of the omission of other indebtedness is absurd, because if (he says hypothetically) a million pounds’ worth of the bank indebtedness had been paid off a week before the valuation date, with, let us suppose, third party money or intercompany indebtedness, then the valuation would be higher, even though the net indebtedness would be no different. It is always possible when one is dealing with a price-earnings multiple to make points of that sort. However, I would expect, in those circumstances, that the indebtedness which would hypothetically be created in relation to the third party instead of the bank would, in the event of an immediate sale, also be repayable, and so it is not likely in practice that the example that Mr Griffiths gives would be significant. In all events, those are different facts from the facts that I am dealing with. Had those been the facts, I would have had to consider those facts and the significance of the newly substituted indebtedness in the context of the particular circumstances in which it was incurred. That would have required proper evidence, just as Mr Griffiths’ point required evidence in this case.”
“3.21 By [carrying out multiplier exercise] I arrive at a starting point for the valuation of the business of the company at19 October 2005 of£15,375,000 (a date which was relevant to unravelling the effects of the disputed rights issue). However, there are a number of factors that should be considered before arriving at a final valuation, which I discuss below. SRL group assets and liabilities 3.22 For the purposes of arriving at a valuation of the entire share capital of SRL it is necessary to consider the assets and liabilities held on the company's balance sheet that are surplus to the trading activities. These include the company's investments in subsidiary companies ...”
“4.22 By applying the p/e ratio of 8.44 to SRL's maintainable earnings of£293,000 , I arrive at a value for the business at November 2009 of approximately£2,459,000 . 4.23 However, in order to arrive at a valuation of the SRL group it is necessary to consider the assets and liabilities held on the company’s balance sheet that are surplus to its trading activities. These include the company's investments in subsidiary companies.”
“4.48 However, as explained earlier, when assessing the value of the entire issued share capital of SRL at13 November 2009 it is also necessary to consider the assets and liabilities held on the company’s balance sheet that are surplus to its trading activities.”
“22. So far as bank loan interest is concerned, Mr Griffiths [counsel for the respondents to the petition] submitted throughout the hearing, very forcibly and correctly, in my judgment, that a purchaser would have to deal with the bank loan of£9.35 million , the more so as on the then terms of borrowing they were only short-term facilities to be met out of the proceeds of any sale of the business. I should mention that at that stage Dr Lit was trying, so it would appear, to sell Sunrise as a whole, unsuccessfully as events turned out. Any purchaser would know that and would have to fund it. Therefore, there will be, at the end, a deduction of the full amount of the debt, as Mr Hanke himself accepted, to eliminate it. In those circumstances, the debt having been eliminated, the bank loan interest, save in respect of such borrowings as are necessary for Sunrise's business, as opposed to such sums as are necessary to fund historic eliminated debt, will not be incurred and the profit will be higher, a point correctly recognised by Mr Thompson in his report, though he did not deduct the interest charges – unsurprisingly, as he did not deduct the bank debt either. I therefore accept that, upon the footing that the bank debt will be repaid, it is appropriate to eliminate the continuing bank interest. Just as it would not be appropriate to allow as a deduction against maintainable profits the funding costs referable to funding the purchase price, so too it would not be appropriate to allow as a deduction from maintainable profits of the funding costs of paying off the historical debt, as the true value of Sunrise without that debt is necessarily higher, and could, for example, be achieved by selling off Sunrise's business whilst retaining that historical debt and paying off the debt (putting an end to funding costs) out of the proceeds, or by capitalising the paid-off debt. It has always been clear that Sunrise is substantially under-capitalised. 23. The interest figures for Sunrise are as follows [and he sets out figures]. There is no evidence that the underlying borrowings, or anything like that, or indeed any borrowings, were needed for the ordinary day-to-day operations of Sunrise.”
“4. I am asked to clarify one point in my judgment. I adjusted the Kismat valuation down to nil. This was because in her valuation Ms Hindson had added back management charges. I have not, however, deducted management charges from the Sunrise valuation, i.e. management charges paid by its subsidiaries, including Kismat. 5. Mr Hanke accepted during argument that, assuming management charges were not, as Mr Griffiths was seeking to argue, deductible, they should, in order to avoid double counting, be taken out of the Kismat valuation, which reduced the Kismat valuation to nil. That did not, however, explain why I did not deduct the management charges. 6. Ms Hindson in her report said: “Management charges are generally intended to reflect the cost of the provision of management time to the subsidiary companies by the directors of [Sunrise radio]. I have been instructed that the amounts charged for directors’ remuneration do not include an additional increment to reflect their services to [Sunrise Radio’s] subsidiary companies. On this basis I consider that no further adjustment is required in this regard.”
“ … just put through for convenience more than actually relating to anything in particular.”
“28. I then have to consider the value of the second valuable subsidiary, Club Concorde Ltd. Club Concorde Ltd was dealt with in Ms Hindson’s report, and she produced a valuation of something like£2.3 million . Mr Hanke adjusts consultancy fees and takes out substantial amounts relating thereto, upon the footing that perusal of the accounts shows that this company is fully managed at a modest rate. I am bound to say that I consider that Mr Hanke is right about this. The evidence at the trial over 2 years ago before me was that Dr Lit had put in an immense amount of effort into bringing Club Concorde round and had now established it as a successful venue. Having brought it round in that way, I have heard no evidence to persuade me that it now needs continued supervision by Dr Lit to a high degree, or by anyone else in a like position, with corresponding consultancy fees of something in the order of£120,000 per year. It seems to me also that the fees payable by the parent (Sunrise) should be sufficient to extend to any incidental consideration of the businesses of subsidiaries, especially given that the Group would be slimmed down following a takeover. Making those adjustments, Mr Hanke calculated, again utilising Ms Hindson’s price earnings ratio and methodology, there being none from Mr Thomson, who chose to pretend that the subsidiaries did not exist except when it came to paying tax, that the resulting figure is£2,820,566 . I accept that as the value of Club Concorde Limited.”
“17. Criticism was also made of my treatment of Club Concorde. It is said that that was in sharp contrast and contradicted by my approach to consultancy fees as regards Sunrise Radio Limited itself. I refused to alter the consultancy fees in relation to Sunrise Radio Limited upon the footing that there was no evidence as to what an appropriate consultancy fee was, and that, therefore, I was left with the consultancy fees in fact paid. When it came to Club Concorde, however, I reduced the consultancy fees in fact now paid of£180,000 to£60,000 . However, that was based upon my finding that the degree of supervision previously given by Dr Lit was, in November 2009, no longer necessary. I should add that the evidence now is that club Concorde is not doing so well. But that is today and not as of November 2009. Having reached that conclusion, I might logically have taken the whole of the£180,000 out, and certainly my reasoning points in that direction. However, Mr Hanke, in the course of his submissions, no doubt not wishing to venture into the area of ‘babies and bathwater’, prudently left in£60,000 . As that was conceded by Mr Hanke, I was not going to [go] further that he was inviting me to do. I do consider, however, that that is an ample allowance, indeed generous, for any overriding management responsibilities not covered in the accounts which demonstrated, as I noted in my previous judgment, that Club Concorde was fully managed.”