" 36. The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the "principal important controversial issues", disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inference will not readily be drawn. The reasons need refer only to the main issues in the dispute, not to every material consideration. They should enable disappointed developers to assess their prospects of obtaining some alternative development permission, or, as the case may be, their unsuccessful opponents to understand how the policy or approach underlying the grant of permission may impact upon future such applications. Decision letters must be read in a straightforward manner, recognising that they are addressed to parties well aware of the issues involved and the arguments advanced. A reasons challenge will only succeed if the party aggrieved can satisfy the court that he has genuinely been substantially prejudiced by the failure to provide an adequately reasoned decision."
"The main point here is whether the Council should be made to keep its word or whether it is acceptable for any Council to lie through its teeth and cheat. There have been many Court cases to establish that this behaviour is unacceptable and that the public is entitled to rely on the spoken word of a Council official, but in this case it is backed up with a letter from the Council's environmental department."
"'27. Submissions were made by the appellant relating to Articles 1 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, although it was not expanded upon at the Hearing. However, this consideration must be balanced against the wider public interest. For the reasons given above, I have found that the proposal would be harmful to the character of the area, sustainability and highway safety and I am satisfied that these legitimate aims can only be safeguarded by the refusal of permission. On balance, I consider that the dismissal of the appeal would not have a disproportionate effect on the appellant. ... With specific regard toArticle 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights , as I found no disproportionate effect in relation to Article 1, there is no breach of Article 14. 28. The appellant has also set out his particular personal circumstances which he states should be taken into account in reaching a conclusion on this matter. I have carefully read the statements made by the appellant and the Council and I note that there is a level of basic disagreement relating to the direct cause of cessation of the pig rearing use and other matters. Having taken these matters into account, I consider that the circumstances of the appellant are insufficient to outweigh the harm that would arise from the proposed development."
"39. I consider that the Claimant's 'personal circumstances' and human rights grounds were important issues in the appeal. The parties, and in particular the Claimant, were entitled to know what the Inspector's reasons were for rejecting both grounds which, at least in principle, could have affected the outcome. The Inspector did give his reasons, in paragraphs 27 and 28, and so the only issue is whether they were adequate. 40. I accept the Claimant's submission that it was necessary for the Inspector to inform the parties whether or not he accepted the Claimant's submission that he had closed the pig rearing unit on the understanding that the Council had agreed to give permission for alternative development on the appeal site. The Inspector did not do so, merely referring to the evidence and the dispute between the parties. This issue was central to the Claimant's case on 'personal circumstances' and human rights. If correct, it would be bound to affect the weight which the Inspector afforded to this aspect of the Claimant's case, particularly when considering proportionality under his human rights claim. Although the evidence in support of any such agreement by the Council was tenuous, and any such agreement might well have been unlawful, I would be usurping the role of the Inspector if I absolved him of the obligation to reach a conclusion on this issue, purely on the basis that I could readily substitute my own conclusion on the evidence for his. 41. The Inspector could permissibly have assumed the facts in favour of the Claimant when considering the weight to be given to these issues, without deciding them. Regrettably, I have not been able to make the assumption that this is what the Inspector meant, even on the most generous interpretation of paragraph 28. He simply did not say this in paragraph 28. The uncertainty as to the factual basis upon which he was making his decision in paragraph 28 raises doubts as to the factual basis for his consideration of proportionality in paragraph 27, as the factual issues are the same. 42. The Inspector on the previous appeal had properly reached a conclusion on the factual issue. Unfortunately, it was demonstrably inaccurate, as both parties now agreed, and could no longer be safely relied upon by the Council. It prejudiced the Claimant's subsequent applications for planning permission. This was an added reason why the Inspector on this occasion needed to place on record his own conclusions, based on the evidence which was now before him, but most probably had not been available to the previous Inspector."