“Was it unreasonable/disproportionate for the defendant to reject the claimant’s tender for Northamptonshire?”
“15. The claimant submits that the error in the ITT was both trivial and obvious and could have been corrected without prejudice to other bidders and without the need to restructure the application. Admittedly, the ITT was headed Wiltshire when it was intended for Northamptonshire; it did not contain the address and post code of the claimant’s office in Northamptonshire, and it inaccurately stated that the tender bid would be serviced by a part-time office to be established there. The claimant relies on 15.15 of the IFA that in the event of any conflict of information the conflict would be resolved by accepting the information [least] favourable to the applicant organisation. On that basis the claimant could have been awarded matter starts appropriate to a part-time office even though it maintained a full-time office there. 16. The defendant submits that the error with the claimant’s ITT was fundamental rather than marginal. In particular, the ITT for Northamptonshire cannot be read in isolation from the other ITTs for the other areas bid for. The defendant makes an assessment of the ratio of new matter starts to staff employed based upon the information supplied by the tenderer as a whole. Taking the bids as a whole the claimant was bidding for far too many matter starts than they have staff to service. If alternatively, the number of staff that the claimant proposed to employ (four), was used as the minimum basis for the calculation of the maximum number of new matter starts that could be taken on, then on the basis of the claimant’s application in 125 areas, there would be insufficient new matter starts at each of the regions bid for to qualify for a tender. There was no ambiguity or inconsistency in the application in the tender bid made by the claimant but even ignoring the misleading header Wiltshire on their face and read as a whole the application was incomplete and the information provided insufficient for the claimant to be eligible for a contract under the tender terms. As the Court of Appeal had recognised the defendant could not use information it had about the claimant firm extraneous to the tender itself to benefit them in assessing the bid. 17. In my judgement there is no answer to the submissions of the defendant. The defendant’s approach to accessing eligibility of bids accords with what it said it would do in the IFA. It means that Northamptonshire cannot be separated from the other bids on a stand alone basis. To do so would not be to cure an ambiguity in the application or correct an obvious unintended error but fundamentally to reconstruct the tender bids that the claimant made. 18. It is common ground and if it were not it is in any event clear on the authorities, that making a fresh application after closure of the tender period in April, 2010 is not permitted under the applicable legal principles. Equally, whatever else the defendant may be able to do without offending the principle of equality and transparency in the tender terms, it is not permitted to give a tenderer an opportunity to improve a bid by supplying information in the ITT that it had previously completely omitted. 19. Deleting Wiltshire and substituting Northamptonshire would not have cured the defect in the claimant’s application and rendered it eligible for a contract. It is undoubtedly the case that the claimant failed to provide an office address in Northamptonshire and that part of the ITT was deliberately left blank because she was adopting the same approach for all the areas in which the firm was bidding. The IFA makes plain that information must be supplied even if it is already known to be LSC extraneously. Having premises in the relevant contract area is clearly an important part of the criteria for award of a contract at all. On either of these bases and both of them, therefore, the defendant was entitled and indeed bound to reject the application. 20. In addition, I consider there is substance in the defendant’s further point that as the application form for Northamptonshire contained no ambiguity as to whether a part-time or a full-time office was intended there, it would be wrong for the claimant to be awarded a contract on a fundamentally false premise. It was for the claimant to warrant the accuracy of the information provided, and although it is apparent that the means by which this error came about was an unintended consequence of the claimant’s approach to bidding for all areas by the same form, it is nevertheless unrealistic for the defendant to award a contract on a false basis. I therefore conclude it was reasonable and proportionate for the defendant to reject the claimant’s tender for Northamptonshire made as it was as part of a great many other bids containing in fact the same information.”
“Was it unreasonable for the defendant not to seek to clarify the claimant’s tender given the nature of the mistake made?”
“54 It should also be noted that Article 148(3) of the Implementing Regulation empowers the institutions to contact tenderers in the event that some clarification is required in connection with a tender, or if clerical errors contained in the tender must be corrected. It follows that that provision cannot be interpreted as imposing, in the exceptional, limited circumstances which it identifies, a duty on the institutions to contact tenderers (see, by analogy,Case T-19/95 Adia interim v Commission[1996] ECR II-321 , paragraphs 43 and 44). 55 It can be otherwise only if, by virtue of the general principles of law, that power has evolved into an obligation on the part of the Commission to contact a tenderer (see, to that effect and by analogy, Adia interim v Commission, paragraph 54 above, paragraph 45). 56 That is the position, inter alia, where a tender has been drafted in ambiguous terms and the circumstances of the case, of which the Commission is aware, suggest that the ambiguity probably has a simple explanation and is capable of being easily resolved. In principle, it would be contrary to the requirements of sound administration for the Commission to reject the tender in such circumstances without exercising its power to seek clarification. It would be contrary to the principle of equal treatment to accept that, in such circumstances, the Commission enjoys an unfettered discretion (see, to that effect,Case T-211/02 Tideland Signal v Commission[2002] ECR II-3781 , paragraphs 37 and 38). 57 In addition, the principle of proportionality requires that measures adopted by the institutions do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives legitimately pursued, it being understood that, where there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous and that the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (Case C-157/96 National Farmers’ Union and Others[1998] ECR I-2211 , paragraph 60). That principle requires that, when the contracting authority is faced with an ambiguous tender and a request for clarification of the terms of the tender would be capable of ensuring legal certainty in the same way as the immediate rejection of that tender, the contracting authority must seek clarification from the tenderer concerned rather than opt purely and simply to reject the tender (see, to that effect, Tideland Signal v Commission, paragraph 56 above, paragraph 43). 58 However, it is also essential, in the interests of legal certainty, that the Commission be able to ascertain precisely what a tender submitted in the course of a procurement procedure means and, in particular, to determine whether the tender complies with the conditions set out in the contract documents. Thus, where a tender is ambiguous and the Commission is not in a position to establish, quickly and efficiently, what it actually means, that institution has no choice but to reject the tender (Tideland Signal v Commission, paragraph 56 above, paragraph 34). 59 Lastly, it is ultimately for the Court to determine whether a tenderer’s replies to requests from the contracting authority for clarification can be regarded as explanations of the terms of the tender or whether those replies go beyond clarification and modify the substantive terms of the tender in relation to the conditions laid down in the contract documents (see to that effect, Esedra v Commission, paragraph 49 above, paragraph 52).”
“An imprecise tender or one which does not meet the technical requirements of the tender specifications 35 In this regard, it must be noted that, in contrast to the situation concerning abnormally low prices, Directive 2004/18 does not contain any provision which expressly sets out the procedure to be followed in the event that the contracting authority finds, in a restricted public procurement procedure, that the tender submitted by a tenderer is imprecise or does not meet the technical requirements of the tender specifications. 36 By its very nature, the restricted public procurement procedure means that, once the tenderers have been selected and once their respective tenders have been submitted, in principle those tenders can no longer be amended either at the request of the contracting authority or at the request of the tenderers. The principle of equal treatment of tenderers and the obligation of transparency resulting therefrom preclude, in that procedure, any negotiation between the contracting authority and one or other of the tenderers. 37 To enable the contracting authority to require a tenderer whose tender it regards as imprecise or as failing to meet the technical requirements of the tender specifications to provide clarification in that regard would be to run the risk of making the contracting authority appear to have negotiated with the tenderer on a confidential basis, in the event that that tenderer was finally successful, to the detriment of the other tenderers and in breach of the principle of equal treatment. 38 In any event, it does not follow from Article 2 or from any other provision of Directive 2004/18, or from the principle of equal treatment or the obligation of transparency, that, in such a situation, the contracting authority is obliged to contact the tenderers concerned. Those tenderers cannot, moreover, complain that there is no such obligation on the contracting authority since the lack of clarity of their tender is attributable solely to their failure to exercise due diligence in the drafting of their tender, to which they, like other tenderers, are subject. 39 Article 2 of Directive 2004/18 does not therefore preclude the absence, in national legislation, of a provision which would oblige the contracting authority to request tenderers, in a restricted public procurement procedure, to clarify their tenders in the light of the technical requirements of the tender specifications before rejecting them because they are imprecise or do not meet those requirements. 40 None the less, Article 2 of that directive does not preclude, in particular, the correction or amplification of details of a tender where appropriate, on an exceptional basis, particularly when it is clear that they require mere clarification, or to correct obvious material errors, provided that such amendment does not in reality lead to the submission of a new tender. Nor does that article preclude a provision of national legislation such as Article 42(2) of Law No 25/2006, according to which, in essence, the contracting authority may ask tenderers in writing to clarify their tender without, however, requesting or accepting any amendment to the tender. 41 In the exercise of the discretion thus enjoyed by the contracting authority, that authority must treat the various tenderers equally and fairly, in such a way that a request for clarification does not appear unduly to have favoured or disadvantaged the tenderer or tenderers to which the request was addressed, once the procedure for selection of tenders has been completed and in the light of its outcome. 42 In order to provide a useful answer to the national court, it must be added that a request for clarification of a tender may be made only after the contracting authority has looked at all the tenders (see, to that effect, Lombardini and Mantovani, paragraphs 51 and 53). 43 Furthermore, that request must be sent in an equivalent manner to all undertakings which are in the same situation, unless there is an objectively verifiable ground capable of justifying different treatment of the tenderers in that regard, in particular where the tender must, in any event, in the light of other factors, be rejected. 44. In addition, that request must relate to all sections of the tender which are imprecise or which do not meet the technical requirements of the tender specifications, without the contracting authority being entitled to reject a tender because of the lack of clarity of a part thereof which was not covered in that request.”
“21. … The problems with the claimant’s tenders were not ambiguities or inconsistencies between two sets of data. The clarification that the claimant submits should have been made goes beyond clarification of an ambiguity and extends to reconstructing the essence of the application made. 22. … If the claimant was seeking an opportunity to withdraw the 124 applications apart from Northamptonshire on the basis of an indication to what the fate of the application would be without withdrawal, this would be something different from clarification of ambiguity.”
“… it is settled case-law that the principle of equal treatment requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified (Case C-434/02 Arnold André[2004] ECR I-0000 , paragraph 68 and the case-law cited there, andCase C-210/03 Swedish Match[2004] ECR I-0000 , paragraph 70 and the case-law cited there).”
“Having reviewed the original tender response I am satisfied that the tender response completed by the Applicant was correctly refused as the Applicant failed to meet the supervisor requirements in the Essential Criteria for publicly funded legal services, as outlined in Section 7 and the annexes of the Information for Applicants document (IFA). … I note that the Applicant included the same caseworkers and supervisors as full time employees at each of the offices that it was tendering to deliver work from. The IFA expressly prohibits this action, and at paragraph 12.23 states: “Where you are tendering for Matter Starts in a particular Category across more than one Office, you must not duplicate your staff members’ capacity across multiple Offices.”