“497. For reasons which I have sought to set out at some length, I have reached the conclusion that the challenge to the detailed assessment of EWC’s bid against the individual parameters promulgated in the ITT fails in the sense that no serious or manifest error has been shown to have affected any specific aspect of the assessment process, save to a very limited degree which could not have affected the outcome. But I have nonetheless also concluded that there was a breach of duty on the part of LCC by reason of its failure to observe the principles of equality, non-discrimination and transparency imposed upon it by regulation 4(3) of thePublic Contract Regulations 2006 in that it took into account concerns as to EWC’s financial standing and the price at which it had tendered which it ought not to have taken into account in considering the competing bids. I have also found that this is likely to have influenced the assessment process and rendered it unfair resulting in serious and manifest error. I am satisfied that, in consequence, EWC has suffered loss and damage in the form of the loss of a real or substantial chance of being the successful tenderer; and I have assessed the chance which it has lost at 50%. 498. Accordingly, EWC has a private law cause of action for damages under Regulation 47 of the Regulations. It is common ground that those damages fall to be assessed by reference to the profits (if any) which EWC would have made if it had been awarded the contract; but I have concluded that this must be on the assumption that the contract would have been for a period of three years only and would not have been extended to five years.”
“(1) Subject to regulation 18(27) [award under the competitive dialogue procedure] and to paragraphs (6) and (9) [abnormally low offers] of this regulation, a contracting authority shall award a public contract on the basis of the offer which - (a) is the most economically advantageous from the point of view of the contracting authority; or (b) offers the lowest price. (2) A contracting authority shall use criteria linked to the subject matter of the contract to determine that an offer is the most economically advantageous including quality, price, technical merit, aesthetic and functional characteristics, environmental characteristics, running costs, cost effectiveness, after sales service, technical assistance, delivery date and delivery period and period of completion.”
“(3) A contracting authority shall (in accordance with Article 2 of the Public Sector Directive)- (a) treat economic operators equally and in a non-discriminatory way; and (b) act in a transparent way.” (a) treat economic operators equally and in a non-discriminatory way; and (b) act in a transparent way.”
“Financial (50%) • Management Fee • Adjustment (Lot B only) • Transport Cost Adjustment Service Delivery and Experience (40%) • Experience of Running Similar Facilities • Methods of Acceptance of Waste • Experience of sourcing markets for recyclables • Transportation Provision • Supervision and Management Provision (including Technically Competent manager (TCM) • Quality, Environmental, Safety and Staff Training Systems • Operative Incentives • Best Value and Continuous Improvements • Suitability of proposed sites (Lot (C) and Lot (D) only) Health and Safety (H&S) (10%)”
“35. The court must carry out its review with the appropriate degree of scrutiny to ensure that the above principles for public procurement have been complied with, that the facts relied upon by the Authority are correct and that there is no manifest error of assessment or misuse of power. 36. If the Authority has not complied with its obligations as to equality, transparency or objectivity, then there is no scope for the Authority to have a ‘margin of appreciation’ as to the extent to which it will, or will not, comply with its obligations. 37. In relation to matters of judgment, or assessment, the Authority does have a margin of appreciation so that the court should only disturb the Authority's decision where it has committed a ‘manifest error’.”
“The question is whether the assessment of the rival bids against the published criteria is likely to have been influenced by Mr Birch’s concerns about the financial position of EWC . . .”
“So I conclude that EWC has shown that the process was influenced by extraneous considerations of which EWC was never made aware and that its tender was not, therefore, fairly and properly evaluated.”
“The evaluation of the method statement indicates that SITA has the most experience out of the 4 companies that bid and that its proposed method of working not only meets or exceeds the Specification requirements, but exceeds the method statements submitted by EWC, Neales and Greencyle in most areas. The following information did not form part of the evaluation process but is considered of material interest, and as such has been included in this report for information. Although EWC is significantly cheaper than the other 3 bidders there are concerns over EWC’s ability to provide an uninterrupted service whilst meeting the demanding specification. These reasons are outlined below.”
“He did, however, inevitably, accept that there were serious concerns about EWC’s financial strength which were referred to in his various drafts and, ultimately, in the final report to Cabinet.”
“He said that he was aware of Mr Birch’s concerns about EWC’s financial strength and the possibility that they might have under-priced their bid but that he told him to ignore those concerns and carry on with a full evaluation of its tender.”
“But beyond Mr Birch’s denials and the wording of the final report, there was an almost total lack of evidence as to how and why Mr Birch had felt it necessary to disregard these matters and how he had felt able to do so . . . Neither Mr Birch nor Mr Ellis seemed to be able to go beyond the mere assertion that he was told to ignore these concerns and that he did so.”
“On the other hand, there is a wealth of evidence to show that, from the outset of the evaluation process, Mr Birch had serious doubts and concerns about EWC’s financial strength, the level of which it had fixed its tender price and its ability to provide the requisite services if it had been awarded the contract. It also seems fairly plain that he took the view that, in the light of these concerns, it would not be appropriate to recommend the award of the contract to EWC.”
“Though I have dealt with this evidence in detail earlier in this judgment, it is as well to recall some of its salient features. The documentary trail is very telling. In his initial appraisal of EWC’s tender, Mr Birch commented upon EWC’s apparent financial standing and expressed concerns about the profitability of the contract in view of his analysis of various ‘extra costs’. Furthermore, he clearly sought advice about these matters from Mr Holden-Ross and others; and it will be recalled that such advice was given in the form of an e-mail of26th October 2007 .”
“In the event that SITA’s bid is not accepted it is recommended that this procurement exercise is abandoned and that the service is re-tendered, using different evaluation methodology.”
“It was clearly a matter of great importance to [Mr Birch] and, no doubt to his superiors; and it is obvious that neither he nor, for that matter Mr Ellis and Mr Browne, would have wished to put forward a recommendation that the contract should be awarded to EWC.”
“454. On the other hand, the assessment of the competing bids against the qualitative criteria cannot be regarded as a precise science. On the contrary, there is considerable scope for the exercise of discretion and judgment at every stage. Furthermore, it is clear that the race was extremely close. It will be recalled that, on his initial evaluation of26th October 2007 , both tenders were awarded precisely the same mark; and, even on the final evaluation, the difference between them was no more than some 23 points out of a possible 325 points which together contributed only 40% of the total score. It must have been extremely difficult at the best of times to discriminate between the two tenders; and Mr Birch himself accepted in cross-examination that he had not found it easy to differentiate them. 455. I simply do not think that it would have been possible for Mr Birch, no matter how hard he tried, to put these concerns, which he had so clearly and fully articulated, entirely out of his mind for the purposes of the assessment exercise. Nor do I think he could have avoided being influenced by what must have seemed to him so clearly to have been the desired outcome. If these concerns had been of a comparatively trivial or minor nature, it might not have been too difficult for him to have put them to one side. But they were clearly regarded as being of such fundamental importance as to justify the inclusion of a lengthy commentary in the various draft assessments and in the final version of the report itself. 456. Once it had been decided that concerns about EWC’s financial position should not be directly taken into account as a reason for rejecting its bid, it is difficult to see why this detailed analysis was retained in the final report. The very fact that it was still included seems to me to lend additional weight to the inference that it is likely to have influenced Mr Birch’s assessment of the bids against the published criteria. Indeed, it was specifically stated in the final version of his report that this information, though excluded from the evaluation process, was nonetheless ‘of material interest’. The logical and practical consequence of such a decision would have been to have wholly excluded these matters from the report and to have had the assessment process carried out by someone else, whose approach could not have been influenced by such concerns, and not by Mr Birch, who had been so heavily involved in this aspect of the process form the beginning. . . .”
“I am not prepared to hold that Mr Birch or any of his colleagues deliberately manipulated the scores awarded to EWC and SITA respectively in order to bring about this desirable result. Though it was suggested to Mr Birch in cross-examination that these e-mails showed that he had been ‘looking for the green light’ to allow him to take such matters into account and that he had done so because he wanted SITA to win, no case of deliberate manipulation was ever clearly and directly put to him; nor was any such case fully articulated in opening or closing submissions. But, in any event, the way in which Mr Birch’s treatment of the financial standing issue was segregated from the assessment process with effect from6th November 2007 onwards, and in particular his comment as to the scores which would otherwise have been awarded to EWC, provide support for the proposition that he at least attempted to carry out the assessment independently of these concerns. 451. I conclude, therefore, that, at least from 6th November onwards, Mr Birch did his honest best to assess the rival bids against the published criteria without regard to the serious concerns which he so clearly had as to EWC’s financial position. . . .”
“The tendering exercise was clearly a two-horse race. Neither Neales nor Greencyle were contenders. I cannot re-mark bids; and I do not know how the assessment process would have ended if the bids had been marked by someone other than Mr Birch and in the absence of any concerns about EWC’s financial position. Nor do I know whether LCC might legitimately have decided to put the contract out for re-tender and, if so, how the bids might have been reformulated. Doing the best I can on such exiguous material, I have come to the conclusion that I cannot say whether, but for the breach of duty, EWC or SITA would have won the contest. Both would have been a substantial chance of doing so. Accordingly, I would assess the loss of the chance at 50%.”