“In this connection the Court refers to its above finding that there is no evidence before it to suggest that the applicant is at particular risk of public humiliation or attack as a result of his obligations under the Act. Thus, it will examine the proportionality of the impugned measures on the basis that the interference with private life in issue in the present case extends only to the requirement to register with the police. The Court notes that the Act requires the applicant, upon being released from prison, to inform the police of inter alia his name, any other names he uses, his date of birth and his home address, and, during an indeterminate period, to notify them of any subsequent changes of name or home address within 14 days of any change. It is necessary to weigh against this the importance of the aims pursued by the Act. The Court has previously referred to the gravity of the harm which may be caused to the victims of sexual offences (see the Stubbings and Others v. the UnitedKingdom judgment of22 October 1996 , Reports 1996-IV, p. 1505, § 64) and has held that States are under a duty under the Convention to take certain measures to protect individuals from such grave forms of interference (ibid., §§ 62 and 64). Against this background, the Court does not consider that the requirement to provide information to the police can be said to be disproportionate to the aims pursued.”
“(iii) The applicant complains that the registration requirements, to which he is subject according to theSex Offenders Act 1997 , interfere with his right to respect for private and family life. In Adamson v. the United Kingdom ((dec.), no. 42293/98, unreported), the Court considered that the requirement to provide information to the police under theSex Offenders Act 1997 did constitute an interference with the applicant’s private life but that they were “in accordance with the law” and pursued legitimate aims, namely, the prevention of crime and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. The Court found that the requirements placed upon the applicant were proportionate to the aims pursued by the legislation in view of the gravity of harm which may be caused to victims of sexual offences and the earlier statement of the Court that States have a duty under the Convention to take certain measures to protect individuals from such grave forms of interference (Stubbings and Others v. United Kingdom, judgment of22 October 1996 , Reports 1996-IV, p. 1505, §§ 62 and 64). The Court concludes that the same assessment applies on the facts of the present case.”
“23. It is inevitable that a scheme which applies to sex offenders generally will bear more heavily on some individuals than others. But to be viable the scheme must contain general provisions that will be universally applied to all who come within its purview. The proportionality of the reporting requirements must be examined principally in relation to its general effect. The particular impact that it has on individuals must be of secondary importance. 24. The gravity of sex offences and the serious harm that is caused to those who suffer sexual abuse must weigh heavily in favour of a scheme designed to protect potential victims of such crimes. It is important, of course, that one should not allow revulsion to colour one's attitude to the measures necessary to curtail such criminal behaviour. A scheme that interferes with an individual's right to respect for his private and family life must be capable of justification in the sense that it can be shown that such interference will achieve the aim that it aspires to and will not simply act as a penalty on the offender. 25. The automatic nature of the notification requirements is in my judgment a necessary and reasonable element of the scheme. Its purpose is to ensure that the police are aware of the whereabouts of all serious sex offenders. This knowledge is of obvious assistance in the detection of offenders and the prevention of crime. If individual offenders were able to obtain exemption from the notification requirements this could – at least potentially - compromise the efficacy of the scheme. 26. By the same token the fact that the notification requirements persist indefinitely does not render the scheme disproportionate. While this is unquestionably an inconvenience for those who must make the report, that inconvenience must be set against the substantial benefit that it will achieve of keeping the police informed of where offenders are living and of their travel plans so that further offending may be forestalled both by rendering detection more easily and deterring those who might be tempted to repeat their offences. 27. I am therefore satisfied that the notification requirements are proportionate and the application for judicial review must be dismissed.”
“We respectfully adopt this [Kerr J’s] analysis of the principles which underpin and justify the notification requirements. Their objective is to provide children, wherever in the world they may live, with such protection as the law in this country can offer them against exploitation for sexual purposes. In any civilised country it is elementary. Article 19 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child, to which the United Kingdom is a party, provides, in unequivocal terms, that "all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse …." should be taken.”
“[49] In my opinion it is incorrect to describe the present scheme as one which applies by general application of law and in a blanket fashion. There is sufficient discrimination within the scheme, both in respect of the criminals to whom it applies and in the way in which the application of the requirements are linked to the severity of the crime committed, to render this criticism unwarranted. Nor is it difficult for the petitioner to comply with the legislative requirements. Other than as a consequence of changes to his circumstances which he chooses to bring about his responsibility is discharged annually. …I agree with the respondents that it is not for me to adjudicate upon whether a different or better scheme might have been implemented. The question is whether the measures complained of fall within the umbrella of proportionality. If they do it is for Parliament to decide which of a range of measures to implement. [50] In my assessment I require to bear in mind the obligation on the state to take positive measures to provide protection for the public from the serious harm of sexual crime. I require to examine the effect of the particular provisions upon the present petitioner. I then require to assess the balance struck between the respective interests in light of the guidance given by the cases referred to above… [51] …the question of proportionality falls to be assessed in light of the particular pressing social need being addressed by the restriction in question and in light of the nature of the particular interference with the right in question. The weight to be given to the interference requires to be weighed against the importance of the aim being pursued (Adamson). Thus the stronger the legitimate aim being pursued the greater may be the proportional interference with the rights of the individual concerned. … [52] In light of the importance of the aims being pursued I am satisfied that the rigid and indeterminate nature of the scheme under discussion does not result in this petitioner having to bear an individual and excessive burden. That is not to say that if the facts of the case were different the same view would necessarily be arrived at. For example, the proportionality of an indefinite interference with the art 8 rights of an elderly man who had been in no trouble for very many years might cause the issue to be focused in quite a different way …. [53] This analysis is also consistent with the ways in which other Courts have considered the question of the proportionality of this legislation... [58] …in arriving at my own decision, I have not proceeded upon the view that the outcome should be determined by any of these cases. I have sought to recognise the intensity of review which is available when the question of the proportionality of a breach of a convention right is under challenge. I have proceeded upon the view that the onus lies on the respondents to show that the legislative provisions are compatible with the Convention and that this burden cannot be discharged unless they show that the means adopted were no greater than necessary to achieve the aims pursued. As Lord Hope pointed out in Shayler at paragraphs 75 to 83 this exercise involves attention being directed to the relative weight which is to be accorded to different interests and considerations, an examination of the alternatives available and an assessment of the choice made by the legislature. I have endeavoured to undertake this as explained above. As Lord Bingham of Cornhill put it at paragraph 26 of his speech in Shayler: “The acid test is whether in all the circumstances, the interference with the individual's Convention right prescribed by national law is greater than is required to meet the legitimate object which the state seeks to achieve.”
“My client’s parents are of the view that my client’s self esteem and confidence is very low. Although it is clear that he is desperate to make a fresh start, it is also clear that being subject to notification requirements makes him feel that this is almost impossible. He has complained that he feels as though people are watching him and talking about him all the time. The knowledge that this will never be subject to change or review, regardless of the risk he may pose is extremely distressing for my client. In particular, in October of last year, my client’s consultant forensic clinical psychologist – who originally assessed him prior to sentence in July 2005 and who had continued to work with my client on release from custody – wrote to me confirming that my client was making significant progress in addressing the underlying issues behind his offending behaviour. However, regardless of the progress my client makes, at the moment there is no mechanism for this to be reflected in any change to the notification requirements.”
“Counsel for the appellants submitted that the legislative aim could be achieved by less intrusive means. It became clear that this contention would require a case by case consideration of the circumstances of alleged offences of which the individual has been acquitted… In my view this would not confer the benefits of a greatly extended database and would involve the police in interminable and invidious disputes (subject to judicial review of individual decisions) about offences of which the individual had been acquitted. In any event, Waller LJ pointed out (para 66, at 3242): “… to introduce a concept of a Chief Constable having to consider whether a person is free of any taint of suspicion has great difficulties…” 40. These observations were made in the context of the issue of discretion but are apposite to the question whether there are less intrusive but realistic means available to achieve the legislative purpose. In my view the answer is that there are not.” “… to introduce a concept of a Chief Constable having to consider whether a person is free of any taint of suspicion has great difficulties…”
“There will necessarily have to be a debate about what an offender should have to prove in order to enable him or her to be discharged from the notification requirements and when he should be entitled to make any necessary application”
“19 The courts have consistently approached consideration of measures which are to be applied to children on the basis that the immaturity of a child offender must be taken into consideration as being of prime importance. This recognises the fact that a child well may change as he or she matures so that any problems or dangers which may have been apparent at the time of the commission of the offence may ultimately no longer be present. That principle was recently applied by the House of Lords in the context of a child offender convicted of murder. The House considered that the tariff set for the period to be served before release on licence necessarily had to be kept under review: R (Smith) v. the Secretary of State for the Home Department[2006] 1 AC 159 . Parliament must have had the same principle in mind in the present context when providing that the determinate notification periods under the Act should be halved in the case of offenders under the age of 18. 20 The analogy with sentences of detention during Her Majesty's pleasure is not exact, because even if the custody period requires review, the licence period is not subject to review. The offender remains subject to licence for the rest of his or her life. But the principle, namely that the measure imposed should reflect the fact that the offender is a child must, in my view apply by analogy to the notification requirements imposed on F. In the absence of authority, it is difficult to see how a lifelong requirement to register is proportionate. An offender who is on licence for life has his or her conditions periodically reviewed as a matter of course, and ultimately may well be on unconditional licence, in other words subject only to the risk of recall. He or she ultimately suffers little if any interference with Article 8 rights. If the question is whether the requirements, at least in the context of a child, are the minimum necessary to achieve the legislation legitimate objective, it seems to me that in the absence of an opportunity for review, the only answer must be no. Mr Kovats, however, on behalf of the Secretary of State submits that that answer is not open to us on the authorities. I turn therefore to those authorities.”
“…The requirement to impose a sentence of HMP detention is based not on the age of the offender when sentenced but on the age of the offender when the murder was committed, and it reflects the humane principle that an offender deemed by statute to be not fully mature when committing his crime should not be punished as if he were. As he grows into maturity a more reliable judgment may be made, perhaps of what punishment he deserves and certainly of what period of detention will best promote his rehabilitation. It would in many cases subvert the object of this unique sentence if the duty of continuing review were held to terminate when the child or young person comes legally of age.”
“1. Without prejudice to the provisions on travel documents applicable to national border controls, all Union citizens with a valid identity card or passport and their family members who are not nationals of a Member State who do hold a valid passport shall have the right to leave the territory of a Member State to travel to another Member State. 2. No exit visa or equivalent formality may be imposed on the persons to whom paragraph 1 applies. 3. Member States shall, acting in accordance with their laws, issue to their own nationals, and renew, an identity card or passport stating their nationality. 4. The passport shall be valid at least for all Member States and for countries through which the holder must pass when travelling between Member States. Where the law of a Member State does not provide for identity cards to be issued, the period of validity of any passport on being issued or renewed shall be not less than five years.”
“Article 1 1. The member states shall, acting as provided in this Directive, abolish restrictions on the movement and residence of: (a) nationals of a member state who are established or who wish to establish themselves in another member state in order to pursue activities as self-employed persons, or who wish to provide services in that state; (b) nationals of member states wishing to go to another member state as recipients of services… Article 2 1. Member states shall grant the persons referred to in article 1 the right to leave their territory. Such right shall be exercised simply on production of a valid identity card or passport. Members of the family shall enjoy the same right as the national on whom they are dependent. ”
“1. Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, Member States may restrict the freedom of movement and residence to Union citizens and their family members, irrespective of nationality, on grounds of public policy, public security or public health. Theses grounds shall not be invoked to serve economic ends. 2. Measures taken on grounds of public policy or public security shall comply with the principle of proportionality and shall be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned. Previous criminal convictions shall not in themselves constitute grounds for taking such measures. The personal conduct of the individual concerned must represent a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society. Justification that are isolated from the particulars of the case or that rely on consideration of general prevention shall not be accepted.”