“The limit can be set at a variety of levels according to the ultimate risk judged to be acceptable and we suggest that it should not be set higher than 90dB(A) for normal continuous daily exposure which is likely to persist for many years.”
“Above 85dB(A) the risk accelerates up to 90dB(A). In the high 80s, given long enough exposure, significant hearing loss may be expected in at least a substantial minority of individuals.”
“No large company who responded to the consultation document (HSC 1981) or read the background document and was aware of the EEC proposals in 1982, and one that then took part in the debates trying to fend off compulsory protection at 85dB(A) on economic grounds, but not on grounds that such levels of exposure were not harmful, could be said to be ignorant of the facts by the beginning of 1983 at the latest.”
“…but it does not provide the information that means that management at Nottingham Manufacturing were in a position of knowledge and understanding that set them apart from what I take to be the understanding of the great majority of employers, that 90dB(A)lepd was the official limit that had to be worked to. I do not think it is shown that Nottingham Manufacturing had a greater than average degree of knowledge.”
“If we as a company feel that we require a zero risk of hearing damage for our employees, then no person should be exposed to a noise level of more than 80dB(A) for an 8 hour day.”
“There is no evidence that anyone at Pretty Polly turned their mind towards any evaluation of the risks below 90dB(A) before 1982. It is not really likely that they did so. It is plain from Mr Butler’s documents that by that year he had done so. Indeed, it is unlikely that a company of that size where there had been some collection of materials and where they cannot have been unaware of the EEC proposals and the very public debate that followed, could not have known that there was a real case to be made that exposure below 90dB(A) could cause levels of hearing damage that should be guarded against. I would put actual awareness of the nature of the real risk below 90dB(A), as with Courtaulds, as having arisen by the beginning of 1983.”
“ The evidence does not show that at any time the cost of implementing a policy of voluntary hearing protection at levels below 90dB(A) was such that a reasonable employer could use cost or difficulty as a valid reason for not having such a policy.”
‘what do I have to do to comply with the legislation and guidance?’ but ‘what do I have to do to avoid foreseeable risk of injury to my employees?’
“From these authorities I deduce the principles that the overall test is still the conduct of the reasonable and prudent employer, taking positive thought for the safety of his workers in the light of what he knows or ought to know; where there is a recognised and general practice which has been followed for a substantial period in similar circumstances without mishap, he is entitled to follow it, unless in the light of common sense or newer knowledge it is clearly bad; but where there is developing knowledge, he must keep reasonably abreast of it and not be too slow to apply it; and where he has in fact greater than average knowledge of the risks, he may be thereby obliged to take more than the average or standard precautions. He must weigh up the risk in terms of the likelihood of injury occurring and the potential consequences if it does; and he must balance against this the probable effectiveness of the precautions that can be taken to meet it and the expense and inconvenience they involve. If he is found to have fallen below the standard to be properly expected of a reasonable and prudent employer in these respects, he is negligent.”
“87. There is no doubt that research into the question of what risks to the hearing of employees exposure below 90dB(A)leq posed would have yielded the answer that 90dB(A) was not a natural cut off point, and that there were risks to susceptible individuals below that level. Indeed, the 1972 Guidelines themselves made that clear. From the early 1970s, certainly by 1976, with the publication of BS5330 and of ISO99 in the previous year, the information was available if researched to give an indication of the level of the risk. It was a level of risk that came, by the end of the 1980s, to be seen as unacceptable if not accompanied by at least voluntary protection, though the 90dB(A) limit had remained, both in 1975 and in 1981, the proposed regulatory standard in England. In the end though, I am not persuaded that employers in industry who conformed to the maximum acceptable level of exposure in the 1972 Guidelines were in breach of their duty of care to the employees who were exposed over 80 dB(A)lepd. In rejecting the primary case for the claimants, I acknowledge that I do not see the issue as only one of foreseeability. It would, in my judgment, be futile to hide behind the 1972 Guidelines for that purpose, or behind the third edition of ‘Noise and the Worker’, when the documents themselves proclaim that the level proposed will not be safe for all workers. But good practice as informed by official guidance has in my view to be taken into account as well. The guidance as to maximum acceptable levels was official and clear. It would in my view be setting too high a standard to say that it was incumbent on employers to ignore it and to reach and act, even as early as the 1960s, on a view that the standard set was inadequate to discharge their duty to their employees. To put it in the context of Swanwick J’s judgment, complying with 90dB(A)lepd as the highest acceptable level was, I think, meeting the standards of the reasonable and prudent employer during the 1970s and 1980s certainly until the time when the terms of the 1986 directive became generally known in the consultative document of 1987. I accept that this means that employers were not bound in the discharge of their duty to ask the question “Who are those at risk in my factory and how big is the risk?”
“There shall, so far as is reasonably practicable, be provided and maintained a safe means of access to every place at which any person has at any time to work, and every such place shall, so far as reasonably practicable, be made and kept safe for any person working there.”
“…the question of whether a place of work is safe is really a jury question, to be answered in the light of all the circumstances prevailing at the time including what might reasonably have been foreseen by an employer.”
“The question is did the defendants, by reference to the standards which ought reasonably to have been adopted by them at the relevant time, expose the plaintiff to noise which they ought reasonably to have anticipated would or might, by reason of its level and duration, damage his hearing. ”
“The occupier’s duty in respect of working places is not to prevent accidents occurring to persons working at them but to take all such measures as are reasonably practicable to make and keep the working place safe for such persons. ‘Safe’ is the converse of ‘dangerous’. A working place is safe if there is nothing there which might be a reasonably foreseeable cause of injury to anyone working there, acting in a way in which a human being may reasonably be expected to act, in circumstances which may reasonably be expected to occur.”
“Every dangerous part of any machine …shall be securely fenced unless it is in such a position of such construction as to be as safe to every person employed or working on the premises as it would be if securely fenced…”
“To treat the onus as being on the pursuer seems to equiparate the duty under the statute to the duty under common law, namely, to take such steps as are reasonably practicable to keep the working place safe. I cannot think that the section was intended to place such a limited obligation on employers.”
“The initial part of the section is, in my view, clear. The duty is to make the working place safe. That means that there is a duty to prevent any risk of injury arising from the state or condition of the working place. There is nothing whatever in the section to suggest that the obligation is only to prevent any risk arising if that risk is of a reasonably foreseeable nature. Had that been the intention of Parliament it would have been perfectly simple for Parliament to have said so. If the duty had only been to take reasonably practicable precautions against reasonably foreseeable risks it is difficult to see how this section would have added anything to the common law. Where the statute is designed to protect the safety of workmen it is in my view not appropriate to read into the statute qualifications which derogate from that purpose. It cannot be said that this reading of section 29 imposes an intolerable or impossible burden upon employers. They have the opportunity of establishing that there were no practicable precautions which could have been taken to prevent their breach of the obligation.”
“I think that the section requires the occupier to make it 100 per cent safe (judged of course by a reasonable standard of care) if that is reasonably practicable and, if it is not, to make it as safe as is reasonably practicable to a lower percentage.”
“ ‘Reasonably practicable’ is a narrower term than ‘physically possible’ and seems to me to imply that a computation must be made by the owner in which the quantum of risk is placed on one scale and the sacrifice involved in the measures necessary for averting the risk (whether in money, time or trouble) is placed in the other, and that, if it be shown that there is a gross disproportion between them – the risk being insignificant in relation to the sacrifice – the defendants discharge the onus on them.”
“It follows from the passages which I have quoted that, for the purpose of considering whether the defendant has discharged the onus which rests upon him to establish that it was not reasonably practicable for him, in the circumstances, to eliminate the relevant risk, there has to be taken into account (inter alia) the likelihood of that risk eventuating. The degree of likelihood is an important element in the equation. It follows that the effect is to bring into play foreseeability in the sense of likelihood of the incidence of the relevant risk and that the likelihood of such risk eventuating has to be weighed against the means, including cost, necessary to eliminate it.”
“Above 85dB(A) the risk accelerates up to 90dB(A). In the high 80s, given long enough exposure, significant hearing loss may be expected in at least a substantial minority of individuals.”