“(1) Subject to paragraph (5), an application for an order for reconsideration must be made by filing an application notice- (a) during a period in which the filter provision has effect with the Tribunal at the address specified in the relevant practice direction; and (b) at any other time, at the Administrative Court Office. (a) during a period in which the filter provision has effect with the Tribunal at the address specified in the relevant practice direction; and (b) at any other time, at the Administrative Court Office. (4) Where the applicant- (a) was the respondent to the appeal; and (b) was required to serve the Tribunal’s determination on the appellant, the application notice must contain a statement of the date on which, and the means by which, the determination was served.”
“If r 23 applies to this appeal, The Home Office failed in its duty to send the determination to the appellant on the day the application for reconsideration was made. In those circumstances the question arises whether the application can be considered to be validly made. This is not easy to answer; but two things are clear. The first is that the terms of r 23 are intended to give the respondent an advantage not normally available to a party to litigation. The second is that r 23(5)(i) is intended to ameliorate the appellant’s position in a case where the respondent seeks to challenge a decision in favour of the appellant. Before the appellant even knows it has been made. Strictly speaking, the appellant is unlikely to be prejudiced by knowing about the reconsideration application only later, because the next possible act by him for which a time is fixed would be the service of a ‘reply’ under r 30, which does not have to be done until a week before the hearing of the reconsideration. Nevertheless, the possibility that the respondent will challenge a determination in favour of the appellant without notifying the appellant of the determination or the challenge is not clearly envisaged by the Rules and could only add to the apparent unfairness of r 23. In these circumstances we incline to the view that the requirements of r 23(5)(a)(i) are mandatory, and compliance with them is a precondition of a valid application for reconsideration at the instance of the respondent. Mr Walker did not dissent from that view. We should emphasise that we do not mean to indicate any similar view in respect of sub-subparagraph (a)(ii) or subparagraph (b) of r 23(5), where the unfairness is significantly less apparent. It follows from the foregoing that if r 23 applies to this appeal, our view is that the respondent’s application for reconsideration was not validly made.”
“the determination of the AIT was served on the appellant by first class post on23 November 2006 ”
“our client has received a letter confirming the acknowledgement of an application for a review of the tribunal’s determination. Nevertheless neither ourselves nor our client has received a copy of the tribunal’s determination”
“1. The I.J accepted at para.18 that the appellant was arrested in 2003 and again in 2006; that she was taken to the Conakry prison where she was ill-treated and sexually abused and interrogated about the strikes. It was not clear on what basis the I.J accepted this evidence. At para. 16 the I.J had recorded that Dr. Gill’s report consisted of a repeat of what the appellant told her concerning what happened to her in Guinea and Dr. Gill had diagnosed PTSD brought on by the rape. It was not clear whether the I.J accepted the appellant’s account because it was consistent with what she told Dr. Gill. The I.J should have identified his reasons for accepting the appellant’s account. 2. At para. 19 the I.J said that he had no evidence of the respondent’s assertion that political detainees were only kept for a few days. The I.J’s finding was wrong, because Ms Meher drew my attention to evidence contained in USSD report that the detainees were kept for a few days. 3. The I.J at para. 19 found that the evidence relied on by the respondent for his assertion above, related to political detainees and opposition parties. It did not relate to people perceived by the authorities as leaders, organisers of the demonstration. However, nowhere in the determination had the I.J found that the appellant was a leader or organiser of the demonstrations. 4. At para. 20 the I.J noted that the respondent did not believe that the appellant would have been kept in a cell on her own when prison conditions were reported to have vast overcrowding. Whilst accepting this evidence, the I.J found that it was also stated in the USSD report that prisoners of political importance were held in separate cells. Again, there was no finding by the I.J that the appellant was an important political prisoner. I note according to the appellant’s evidence recorded at para. 9 that her role in the UFR was in connection with art and sport and enrolling new members. The HOPO below had submitted that the appellant was at the most a low level member of the UFR. The I.J did not make a finding on this issue.”
“In practice political detentions rarely exceeded a few days and those persons were generally extended more protections than other detainees because of the attention to their cases by the NGO’s and the media. In high profile detentions the persons were often held separately from other detainees and prisoners and access to them was unrestricted”