“that there are cogent grounds to suspect that Mr Charman abused his position as a police officer by colluding with Brennan in the commission of substantial fraud by Geoffrey Brennan from whom he and Mr Redgrave received corrupt payments totalling£50,000 ”
“The case, and the grounds of appeal, raise important issues about the steps required of an author and publisher in order to qualify for a defence of the “Reynolds” type of qualified privilege, when the publication in question is a book and not a newspaper article, where the topic is one of public interest but is also complex, and where the author has made attempts to obtain the claimant’s side of the story.”
“This is a story that deserves to be told – warts and all”
“This is the inside story of the ‘Ghost Squad’ and how it broke into the secret world of police corruption. … Graeme McLagan’s gripping account reveals the ugly underside of London’s police force and why teams from America and Australia have now come to Britain to find out how the Met is winning the battle against bent coppers.”
“Although Gaspar believed him, what Brennan had said amounted to no more than simple allegations of police wrongdoing. Such allegations had no chance of standing up in court without corroboration, even if Brennan agreed to appear as a witness and he was refusing to do that. It would simply be Brennan’s word, that of the criminal, against the word of two honest detectives with distinguished records.”
“… Redgrave and Charman were suspended, their homes having been raided three days before. From the outset the pair have denied receiving money from Brennan, or indeed any corruption at all.”
“Deeply aggrieved at what had happened to them, the three (i.e. Charman, Redgrave and Ms Cahill) then counter-attacked, making official complaints against CIB officers. Redgrave’s MP, Andrew McKinlay, raised the case in a 15 minute speech in the House of Commons.”
“CIB officers hoped that Redgrave and Charman would give evidence for Geoffrey Brennan at his trial in 2001. The pair could have used the proceedings as an opportunity to set the record straight, to deny Brennan’s original allegations that he had bunged them£50,000 to cover up his theft of£400,000 from the Chinese-American businessman, Sam Wang. They could also have backed Brennan’s later claims that the police operation mounted by the pair into gun-running and money-laundering had been entirely legitimate and not a smokescreen, as was being suggested by the CIB. If the pair had appeared in the witness box, they would have been open to cross-examination by the CIB prosecution team, determined to get at the truth of Brennan’s allegations. But it was not to be. Although Redgrave and Charman’s names were continually mentioned throughout the trial, the two suspended officers did not appear at the Old Bailey.”
“Latham chose his words with care. They were damning: ‘I am not going to bring in criminals to give evidence’.”
“Although Redgrave and Charman were not on trial, for much of the time it was as if they were in the dock with Brennan. In Latham’s closing speech to the jury much play was made of their alleged corruption. He repeated that the prosecution case was that a total of£50,000 had been paid to the two detectives to provide a smokescreen for the theft of Wang’s money …”
“It was unquestionably the case that Redgrave and Charman were in contact with him at the time of the offence and were aware of what was taking place.”
“Nor need the report be accurate in every detail. If the report be as a whole a substantially fair and accurate account of the proceedings, a few slight inaccuracies will not deprive it of protection, but where the inaccuracies are of a substantial kind, there is no immunity.”
“In the light of Bonnick, I accept that the issue of responsible journalism falls to be determined by reference to the meaning subjectively intended by the defendant. However, in the present case I had to decide whether the book was “reportage”
“115. … an imputation that there were cogent grounds to suspect a police officer of corruption comes somewhere between a Chase level one and two meaning. Such an imputation may not amount to an unequivocal adoption of the charge of corruption but it does not to my mind constitute neutral reportage. It is partial adoption of a serious charge.”
“117. … I think that the reader would take away from the passages of the book which deal with the Brennan affair that it was more probable than not that Charman was guilty of corruption.”
“131. The reasons why I have rejected the suggestion that the passages in question were reportage are firstly, that to an extent it appears to me that McLagan adopted the allegation of corruption against Charman and, secondly, that the relevant facts are not presented in the full, fair and disinterested fashion which is required of reportage. Very similar reasons led me to reject McLagan's claim to have written a "balanced" account of the Brennan allegations directed at Charman and Redgrave.”
“Repeating someone else’s libellous statement is just as bad as making the statement directly.”
“58. … It seems to us that the judge was right to hold that the headlines and articles complained of went further than simply stating that Mr Galloway was taking money from the oil-for- food programme for his political and charitable purposes but meant that he was taking money for personal gain and that that allegation was seriously defamatory of Mr Galloway. … 59. It appears to us that the newspaper was not merely reporting what the Baghdad documents said but that, as the judge held, it both adopted and embellished them. It was alleging that Mr Galloway took money from the Iraqi oil-for-food programme for personal gain. That was not a mere repeat of the documents, which in our view did not, or did not clearly, make such an allegation. We agree with the judge that, although there were some references to allegations, the thrust of the coverage was that The Daily Telegraph was saying that Mr Galloway took money to line his own pockets. In all the circumstances we answer the question whether the newspaper adopted and embellished the statements in the Baghdad documents in the affirmative.”
“20. … Language is inherently imprecise. Words and phrases and sentences take their colour from their context. The context often permits a range of meanings, varying from the obvious to the implausible. Different readers may well form different views on the meaning to be given to the language under consideration. Should the law take this into account when applying the objective standard of responsible journalism? Or should the law simply apply the objective standard of responsible journalism to the single meaning the law attributes to the offending words, regardless of how reasonable it would be for a journalist or editor to read the words in a different, non-defamatory sense? 21. At first sight there might seem to be some legal logic in applying the latter approach. The “single meaning” rule adopted in the law of defamation is in one sense highly artificial, given the range of meanings the impugned words sometimes bear: see the familiar exposition by Diplock LJ in Slim v Daily Telegraph Ltd[1968] 2 QB 157 , 171-172. The law attributes to the words only one meaning, although different readers are likely to read the words in different senses. In that respect the rule is artificial. Nevertheless given the ambiguity of language, the rule does represent a fair and workable method for deciding whether the words under consideration should be treated as defamatory. To determine liability by reference to the meaning an ordinary reasonable reader would give the words is unexceptional. 22. At first sight it might seem appropriate to apply the same principle when considering whether Reynolds privilege affords a defence. This might appear to have the merit of consistency. But that would be to apply the “single meaning” principle for a purpose for which it was not designed and for which it is not suitable. It is one matter to apply this principle when deciding whether an article should be regarded as defamatory. Then the question being considered is one of meaning. It would be an altogether different matter to apply the principle when deciding whether a journalist or newspaper acted responsibly. Then the question being considered is one of conduct.”
“120. … "Balanced" in this context must mean balanced in relation to Charman and the allegations levelled against him.”
“125. Finally, in connection with the question of balance, I am bound to say that McLagan is in my view open to criticism for the manner in which he reported in Bent Coppers the pre-trial hearings in Brennan's criminal case and the trial which followed. … it is my conclusion that McLagan did not achieve the balanced approach which he set himself.”
“130. … a responsible journalist should evaluate with some care the material on which that imputation [that there were cogent grounds for suspecting a police officer to be guilty of corruption] is based. Such a journalist should in my view subject the material to a degree of critical analysis. Although there were passages where the reader was told that Redgrave and Charman strenuously denied all allegations of wrongdoing, there were no references in the book to the discrediting of officer Smith. “137. In my opinion McLagan is open to criticism for failing to inform his readers that, far from being "reliable", Smith was profoundly tainted by his answers during cross-examination in the Phillips trial [when he refused to answer questions about his relationship with and his ‘moonlighting’ for Brennan].”
“142. I bear in mind that, whilst he is a highly experienced journalist with considerable experience of court reporting, McLagan is not a lawyer and is therefore not to be taken to be familiar with the practices and procedures of criminal trials.”
“145. The criticism which I make of this passage is that it treats matters which McLagan ought to have realised were of marginal relevance and which he knew had taken up no more than a few minutes of court time as if they formed a major part of the hearing. The references to "unexplained income" and "an unusual spending pattern" are damning. No balancing reference is made to other evidence given at the pre-trial hearing which tended to exonerate Charman.”
“Although Redgrave and Charman’s names were continually mentioned throughout the trial, the two suspended officers did not appear at the Old Bailey”, the judge said: “147. As McLagan ought to have appreciated, there was in fact no possibility of Charman or Redgrave giving evidence at Brennan's trial. The issue for the jury was whether Brennan had stolen money from the Wangs. It was no part of the prosecution case to say that Brennan's allegations of corruption against Charman and Redgrave were true. Besides, those allegations had been withdrawn. I do not think it is accurate to say that the names of Redgrave and Charman were "continually mentioned throughout the trial". They were referred to on two days after the trial had been running (with interruptions) for a month.”
“150. … McLagan's quotations are accurate. There nevertheless appears to me to be considerable force in the criticism made by Mr Tomlinson that McLagan should have made clear that the alleged criminality of Charman and Redgrave had no bearing on the issues which the jury had to decide. I accept that at the end of the passage which I have quoted McLagan informs readers that in his closing speech Trollope told the jury that there was no evidence the officers had been paid money. McLagan does not mention the fact that Latham accepted that there was no direct evidence that corrupt payments were made to the officers. A more serious omission is the failure to refer to the judge's advice to the jury in his summing up to ignore suggestions made that any money was taken by Charman or Redgrave to assist Brennan. He told the jury that they ought to put that out of their minds. In the context of the trial as a whole it is difficult to understand how, as McLagan claims, for much of the time it was as if Charman and Redgrave were in the dock with Brennan.”
“151. I have taken some time with the account in Bent Coppers of the Brennan trial because it marks the culmination of McLagan's account of one of the major characters in the book. One of the questions which I have to decide is whether this is a fair account of what took place at Brennan's trial. For the reasons which I have given, I have concluded that it is not.”
“48. … I think that one should consider the article as a whole and not isolate the defamatory statement. … 51. If the article as a whole concerned a matter of public interest, the next question is whether the inclusion of the defamatory statement was justifiable. The fact that the material was of public interest does not allow the newspaper to drag in damaging allegations which serve no public purpose. They must be part of the story. And the more serious the allegation, the more important it is that it should make a real contribution to the public interest element in the article.”
“107. … Context is important too when the standard [of responsible journalism] is applied to each piece of information that the journalist wishes to publish. The question whether it has been satisfied will be assessed by looking to the story as a whole, not to each piece of information separated from its context. 108. … I do not believe that [Lord Nicholls] was intending … to indicate that the public's right to know each piece of information in any given article should be assessed, piece by piece, without regard to the whole context. On the contrary, each piece of information will take its colour and its informative value from the context in which it is placed. A piece of information that, taken on its own, would be gratuitous can change its character entirely when its place in the article read as a whole is evaluated. The standard of responsible journalism respects the fact that it is the article as a whole that the journalist presents to the public.” (2) Taking steps to verify the information is given added emphasis. Lord Bingham said: “32. … The rationale of this test is, as I understand, that there is no duty to publish and the public have no interest to read material which the publisher has not taken reasonable steps to verify. As Lord Hobhouse observed with characteristic pungency (238), "[n]o public interest is served by publishing or communicating misinformation". But the publisher is protected if he has taken such steps as a responsible journalist would take to try and ensure that what is published is accurate and fit for publication.”
“149. … the publisher must have taken the care that a responsible publisher would take to verify the information published. The actual steps taken will vary with the nature and sources of the information. But one would normally expect that the source or sources were ones which the publisher had good reason to think reliable, that the publisher himself believed the information to be true, and that he had done what he could to check it. We are frequently told that "fact checking" has gone out of fashion with the media. But a publisher who is to avoid the risk of liability if the information cannot later be proved to be true would be well-advised to do it. Part of this is, of course, taking reasonable steps to contact the people named for their comments.” (3) If the public interest is engaged, the report is privileged if it satisfies the test of responsible journalism. The House had, in Reynolds, refused to follow the Australian and South African approach in considering the reasonableness of the conduct in publishing the information: see page 199. The House preferred the “elasticity” of a test of responsible journalism. Lord Hoffmann expressed himself in these terms: “53. If the publication, including the defamatory statement, passes the public interest test, the inquiry then shifts to whether the steps taken to gather and publish the information were responsible and fair”
"Stated shortly, the Reynolds privilege is concerned to provide a proper degree of protection for responsible journalism when reporting matters of public concern. Responsible journalism is the point at which afair balance” [again the emphasis is added] “is held between freedom of expression on matters of public concern and the reputations of individuals. Maintenance of this standard is in the public interest and in the interests of those whose reputations are involved. It can be regarded as the price journalists pay in return for the privilege." 54. Lord Nicholls was speaking in the context of a publication in a newspaper but the defence is of course available to anyone who publishes material of public interest in any medium. The question in each case is whether the defendant behaved fairly and responsibly in gathering and publishing the information. But I shall for convenience continue to describe this as "responsible journalism".” "
“33. Lord Nicholls (at 205) listed certain matters which might be taken into account in deciding whether the test of responsible journalism was satisfied. He intended these as pointers which might be more or less indicative, depending on the circumstances of a particular case, and not, I feel sure, as a series of hurdles to be negotiated by a publisher before he could successfully rely on qualified privilege.”
“56. In Reynolds, Lord Nicholls gave his well-known non-exhaustive list of ten matters which should in suitable cases be taken into account. They are not tests which the publication has to pass. In the hands of a judge hostile to the spirit of Reynolds, they can become ten hurdles at any of which the defence may fail. That is how [the judge] treated them. The defence, he said, can be sustained only after "the closest and most rigorous scrutiny" by the application of what he called "Lord Nicholls' ten tests". But that, in my opinion, is not what Lord Nicholls meant. As he said in Bonnick (at 309) the standard of conduct required of the newspaper must be applied in a practical and flexible manner. It must have regard to practical realities.” (5) In assessing the responsibility of the article, weight must be given to the professional judgment of the journalist. This is a very important point to emphasise in our appeal. Lord Bingham said: “33. … Lord Nicholls recognised (at 202-203), inevitably as I think, that it had to be a body other than the publisher, namely the court, which decided whether a publication was protected by qualified privilege. But this does not mean that the editorial decisions and judgments made at the time, without the knowledge of falsity which is a benefit of hindsight, are irrelevant. Weight should ordinarily be given to the professional judgment of an editor or journalist in the absence of some indication that it was made in a casual, cavalier, slipshod or careless manner.”
“51. … But whereas the question of whether the story as a whole was a matter of public interest must be decided by the judge without regard to what the editor's view may have been, the question of whether the defamatory statement should have been included is often a matter of how the story should have been presented. And on that question, allowance must be made for editorial judgment. If the article as a whole is in the public interest, opinions may reasonably differ over which details are needed to convey the general message. The fact that the judge, with the advantage of leisure and hindsight, might have made a different editorial decision should not destroy the defence. That would make the publication of articles which are, ex hypothesi, in the public interest, too risky and would discourage investigative reporting.”
“108. The standard of responsible journalism respects the fact that it is the article as a whole that the journalist presents to the public. Weight will be given to the judgment of the editor in making the assessment, as it is the article as a whole that provides the context within which he performs his function as editor. 109. … The cardinal principle that must be observed is that any incursion into press freedom that the law lays down should go no further than is necessary to hold the balance between the right to freedom of expression and the need to protect the reputation of the individual. It must not be excessive or disproportionate. Mr Robertson's test which introduces the criterion of "high quality journalism", especially if it is applied to each particular piece of information that is published, would contravene that principle.”
“140. … In deciding whether or not the criterion of responsible journalism had been met, the court should apply the standard of conduct expected of the journalist "in a practical and flexible manner" (emphasis added).” (6) The test is not intended to present an onerous obstacle to the media in the discharge of their function. This is another important point to note. As Lord Hope said: “105. … common law does not seek to set a higher standard than that of responsible journalism. … 107. Any test which seeks to set a general standard which must be achieved by all journalists is bound to involve a degree of uncertainty, as Lord Nicholls recognised in Reynolds at 202D-E. But, like him, I think that the extent of this uncertainty ought not to be exaggerated. "Responsible journalism" is a standard which everyone in the media and elsewhere can recognise. The duty-interest test based on the public's right to know, which lies at the heart of the matter, maintains the essential element of objectivity. Was there an interest or duty to publish the information and a corresponding interest or duty to receive it, having regard to its particular subject matter? This provides the context within which, in any given case, the issue will be assessed.” (7) Reynolds must been seen as the House’s attempt “to redress the balance [between Article 8 andArticle 10 of the ECHR ] in favour of greater freedom for the Press to publish stories of genuine public interest”, per Lord Hoffmann, (38). Lord Bingham’s criticism of the Court of Appeal was that its “ruling subverts the liberalising intention of the Reynolds decision”, (35), concluding that, “It might be thought that this was the sort of neutral, investigative journalism which Reynolds privilege exists to protect.”
“24. To be meaningful this standard of conduct must be applied in a practical and flexible manner. The court must have regard to practical realities. Their Lordships consider it would be to introduce unnecessary and undesirable legalism and rigidity if this objective standard, of responsible journalism, had to be applied in all cases exclusively by reference to the "single meaning" of the words. Rather, a journalist should not be penalised for making a wrong decision on a question of meaning on which different people might reasonably take different views. Their Lordships note that in the present case the selfsame question has resulted in a division of view between members of the Court of Appeal. If the words are ambiguous to such an extent that they may readily convey a different meaning to an ordinary reasonable reader, a court may properly take this other meaning into account when considering whether Reynolds privilege is available as a defence. In doing so the court will attribute to this feature of the case whatever weight it considers appropriate in all the circumstances. 25. This should not be pressed too far. Where questions of defamation may arise ambiguity is best avoided as much as possible. It should not be a screen behind which a journalist is "willing to wound, and yet afraid to strike". In the normal course a responsible journalist can be expected to perceive the meaning an ordinary, reasonable reader is likely to give to his article. Moreover, even if the words are highly susceptible of another meaning, a responsible journalist will not disregard a defamatory meaning which is obviously one possible meaning of the article in question. Questions of degree arise here. The more obvious the defamatory meaning, and the more serious the defamation, the less weight will a court attach to other possible meanings when considering the conduct to be expected of a responsible journalist in the circumstances. … 27. … The defamatory meaning of the words used was not so glaringly obvious that any responsible journalist would be bound to realise this was how the words would be understood by ordinary, reasonable readers. The failure to make further enquiry, and the omission of Mr Bonnick’s explanation of his dismissal, although unfortunate, have to be evaluated, and their compatibility with responsible journalism considered, against this background.”
“33. … a general requirement for journalists systematically and formally to distance themselves from the content of a quotation that might insult or provoke others or damage their reputation is not reconcilable with the press’s role of providing information on current events, opinions and ideas (see Thoma v Luxembourg …). The court finds that in the present case the article remained within the limits of acceptable comment on court proceedings.”
“The press plays an essential part in a democratic society. Although it must not overstep certain bounds, in particular in respect of the reputation and rights of others, its duty is nevertheless to impart – in a manner consistent with its obligations and responsibilities – information and ideas on all matters of public interest. Not only does it have the task of imparting such information and ideas: the public also has a right to receive them. Were it otherwise, the press would be unable to play its vital role of “public watchdog”
“59. … The methods of objective and balanced reporting may vary considerably, depending among other things on the medium in question; it is not for the court, any more than it is for the national courts, to substitute its views for those of the press as to what techniques of reporting should be reported by a journalist … Reading the articles as a whole, the court cannot find that this statement was excessive or misleading.”
“130. It seems to me that where, as I have found, the imputation conveyed to readers in relation to Charman was that cogent grounds exist for suspecting that in his capacity as a police officer he had been guilty of corruption, a responsible journalist should evaluate with some care the material on which that imputation is based. Such a journalist should in my view subject the material to a degree of critical analysis.”
“the journalist should not be penalised for making a wrong decision on meaning on which reasonable people might take different views.” [24]. It was conceded in paragraph 12.2 of Charman’s skeleton argument that: “Readers would have understood the words to bear a range of meanings from “grounds to investigate” to “guilt” – all of which are defamatory.”
“Readers would in my view hesitate before accepting the truth of an allegation of corruption on the part of a police officer emanating from such a man.”
“We make reference to “status” bearing in mind the use of that expression in some of the more recent authorities to denote the degree to which information on a matter of public concern may (because of its character and known provenance) command respect.”
“The court should be slow to conclude that a publication was not in the public interest and, therefore, the public had no right to know … Any lingering doubts should be resolved in favour of publication.”
“It might be thought that this was the sort of neutral investigative journalism which Reynolds privilege exists to protect.”
‘I looked at Mick and Mick went, “Don’t worry.” I went: “No Mick. What is all this?” Then Redgrave said, “I’ve got a pension to worry about, and I ain’t being fucked. I ain’t being fucked by you or anybody.” I said: “Well, if you’re worried about a set-up, you’re a friend of Mick’s and Mick’s given me that you’re OK.” He said there was no problem. He’s trying to defuse the situation, ‘cos I’m now up in the air about it. Mick’s going, “Calm down, calm down.”’
‘It was a case of how long you could play it out for… The fanny would go on till eventually Wang would go to Hong Kong and wait for the shipment to arrive and it was never going to fucking arrive. It was as simple as that.’
‘I am not guilty of this offence. At all times I acted with the knowledge of the Metropolitan Police as part of a police operation… Prior to attending here [a police station] I had protection status. That’s now changed. My family are in jeopardy.’
‘Brennan joined a huge undercover operation to trap American mobsters who wanted to sell Ulster Protestant terrorists an arsenal of machine guns and explosives. Plans were made to switch cash to a secret police bank account while Brennan introduced an undercover cop into the crooked American cartel.’
‘I risked my life to help the police with some of the most important cases of recent years. Now I am being thrown to the wolves.’
“Scotland Yard mounted one of its most daring undercover investigations to stop the mafia from supplying arms to Irish terrorists. But Operation Nightshade had ended in a corruption inquiry that is shaking the Metropolitan police.”
“say they reported every detail of the way the money was handed to their superiors at the time.” “Scotland Yard mounted one of its most daring undercover investigations to stop the mafia from supplying arms to Irish terrorists. But Operation Nightshade had ended in a corruption inquiry that is shaking the Metropolitan police.”
“say they reported every detail of the way the money was handed to their superiors at the time.”
“I have been suspended in relation to a complaint that is six years old. This has caused the complete destruction of every aspect of my personal and professional life, friends, financial security, family, marriage, career and reputation…. The building blocks of life have all gone with no hope of recovery.”
‘there has been widespread misfeasance at the highest level in the Metropolitan Police. I again demand a full judicial inquiry into Operation Nightshade [the gunrunning and money-laundering investigation mounted by Redgrave and Charman] and the consequent malevolence and corrupt practice of those who served, and serve, in the CIB against my constituent and other officers. Referring to Redgrave’s claim that CIB were not interested in following up his allegations of a police cover-up over the Stephen Lawrence murder investigation, McKinlay said: ‘The CIB is riddled with people who want to stop further light being shed on those relationships.’
“Investigation by the SAC - special customs - in Houston has determined that the targets have made specific inquiries with US arms dealers... further, the co-conspirators have been recorded alluding to the undercover officers that some of the material requested by them will be taken from US military installations. Guinn ended by saying that the Government attorney handling the case had expressed a desire to pursue prosecution of suspects and believed conviction to be "very likely". In another south-east regional crime squad police report, Crooks is described as the head of the organisation, a high-profile fraudsman, diamond smuggler and arms dealer known to the American authorities and fully researched by the US Customs.”
“Roger again said he had no problem in selling weapons to our organisation but he could only get it out of the United States to, say, Nigeria or Sierra Leone. However, he could put us in contact with the right people who would facilitate its onward shipment to the United Kingdom...Roger again said that we would not have a problem getting it from Sierra Leone as he had all the right contacts, in fact he even had a diplomatic passport for that country - and indeed he has. There are sensitive diplomatic reasons why that aspect of Operation Nightshade has been fudged, which I may make available to the House on another occasion. Crooks and his outfit had high-level contacts in the United States and I believe that political leverage was used. The Operation Nightshade papers show that both the United States and British officers wanted to arrest Crooks and his gang by the middle of 1994 and that opportunity was botched. It is not clear whether MI5 was involved. It is of course unanswerable and unaccountable to Parliament.”
“The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis tells me that no such details were revealed as a result of Operation Nightshade. - [Official Report,16 March 2000 ; Vol. 346, c. 268W.] In other words, no details were revealed of arms deals via west Africa. However, in answer to another question, the Minister conceded that Crooks was interviewed by the anti-terrorist branch in London on24 June 1993 about matters that involved the supply of firearms. - [Official Report,3 April 2000 ; Vol. 347, c. 379W.] Answers from the Foreign Office were equally revealing. I was told that Crooks had been known to various members of the High Commission for some time. - [Official Report,16 March 2000 ; Vol. 346, c. 287W.] “He had provided assistance in the evacuation of the United States hotel in Freetown in May 1997. The Foreign Office also confirmed that Crooks had had contact with unnamed Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence personnel during the past few years - but not about arms or military matters. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office confirmed that Crooks was expelled from Sierra Leone; but he has now been reinstated. The website of the Sierra Leone news agency said that he had been expelled for trying to arrange the trafficking of arms between Northern Ireland and Sierra Leone. As we know, he also had discussions with Peter Penfold, our controversial high commissioner in Sierra Leone, who was aware of the Sandline plan to arm a counter-coup to restore Kabbah to power.” ... I apologise for having detained the House, but I think that you will realise that, prima facie, the case stinks. (Underlining added) [There then follows an account of what happened that day and of the aftermath] “Investigation by the SAC - special customs - in Houston has determined that the targets have made specific inquiries with US arms dealers... further, the co-conspirators have been recorded alluding to the undercover officers that some of the material requested by them will be taken from US military installations. Guinn ended by saying that the Government attorney handling the case had expressed a desire to pursue prosecution of suspects and believed conviction to be "very likely". In another south-east regional crime squad police report, Crooks is described as the head of the organisation, a high-profile fraudsman, diamond smuggler and arms dealer known to the American authorities and fully researched by the US Customs.” “Roger again said he had no problem in selling weapons to our organisation but he could only get it out of the United States to, say, Nigeria or Sierra Leone. However, he could put us in contact with the right people who would facilitate its onward shipment to the United Kingdom...Roger again said that we would not have a problem getting it from Sierra Leone as he had all the right contacts, in fact he even had a diplomatic passport for that country - and indeed he has. There are sensitive diplomatic reasons why that aspect of Operation Nightshade has been fudged, which I may make available to the House on another occasion. Crooks and his outfit had high-level contacts in the United States and I believe that political leverage was used. The Operation Nightshade papers show that both the United States and British officers wanted to arrest Crooks and his gang by the middle of 1994 and that opportunity was botched. It is not clear whether MI5 was involved. It is of course unanswerable and unaccountable to Parliament.” “He had provided assistance in the evacuation of the United States hotel in Freetown in May 1997. The Foreign Office also confirmed that Crooks had had contact with unnamed Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence personnel during the past few years - but not about arms or military matters. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office confirmed that Crooks was expelled from Sierra Leone; but he has now been reinstated. The website of the Sierra Leone news agency said that he had been expelled for trying to arrange the trafficking of arms between Northern Ireland and Sierra Leone. As we know, he also had discussions with Peter Penfold, our controversial high commissioner in Sierra Leone, who was aware of the Sandline plan to arm a counter-coup to restore Kabbah to power.”
“I am not going to bring in criminals to give evidence.”
“Be very careful what you say about these two officers.”
"Although Redgrave and Charman's names were continually mentioned throughout the trial, the two suspended officers did not appear at the Old Bailey". 147. As McLagan ought to have appreciated, there was in fact no possibility of Charman or Redgrave giving evidence at Brennan's trial. The issue for the jury was whether Brennan had stolen money from the Wangs. It was no part of the prosecution case to say that Brennan's allegations of corruption against Charman and Redgrave were true. Besides, those allegations had been withdrawn. I do not think it is accurate to say that the names of Redgrave and Charman were "continually mentioned throughout the trial"