“(1) It is a term of every secure tenancy that the tenant- (a) may allow any persons to reside as lodgers in the dwelling-house, but (b) will not, without the written consent of the landlord, sublet or part with possession of part of the dwelling house. (2) If the tenant under a secure tenancy parts with the possession of the dwelling-house or sublets the whole of it (or sublets first part of it and then the remainder), the tenancy ceases to be a secure tenancy and cannot subsequently become a secure tenancy.”
“1. Meaning of “disability” and “disabled person” (1) Subject to the provisions of Schedule 1, a person has a disability for the purposes of this Act if he has a physical or mental impairment which has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on his ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities. (2) In this Act “disabled person” means a person who has a disability.” (1) Subject to the provisions of Schedule 1, a person has a disability for the purposes of this Act if he has a physical or mental impairment which has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on his ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities. (2) In this Act “disabled person” means a person who has a disability.”
“6. - (1) An impairment which would be likely to have a substantial adverse effect on the ability of the person concerned to carry out normal day-to-day activities, but for the fact that measures are being taken to treat or correct it, is to be treated as having that effect. (2) In sub-paragraph (1) "measures" includes, in particular, medical treatment and the use of a prosthesis or other aid….”
“22 Discrimination in relation to premises … (3) It is unlawful for a person managing any premises to discriminate against a disabled person occupying those premises- (a) in the way he permits the disabled person to make use of any benefits or facilities; or (b) by refusing or deliberately omitting to permit the disabled person to make use of any benefits or facilities; or (c) by evicting the disabled person, or subjecting him to any other detriment.” … (3) It is unlawful for a person managing any premises to discriminate against a disabled person occupying those premises- (a) in the way he permits the disabled person to make use of any benefits or facilities; or (b) by refusing or deliberately omitting to permit the disabled person to make use of any benefits or facilities; or (c) by evicting the disabled person, or subjecting him to any other detriment.”
“24. Meaning of “discrimination”- (1) For the purposes of section 22, a person ("A") discriminates against a disabled person if- (a) for a reason which relates to the disabled person's disability, he treats him less favourably than he treats or would treat others to whom that reason does not or would not apply; and (b) he cannot show that the treatment in question is justified. (2) For the purposes of this section, treatment is justified only if- (a) in A's opinion, one or more of the conditions mentioned in subsection (3) are satisfied; and (b) it is reasonable, in all the circumstances of the case, for him to hold that opinion. (3) The conditions are that- (a) in any case, the treatment is necessary in order not to endanger the health or safety of any person (which may include that of the disabled person); …” (a) for a reason which relates to the disabled person's disability, he treats him less favourably than he treats or would treat others to whom that reason does not or would not apply; and (b) he cannot show that the treatment in question is justified. (a) in A's opinion, one or more of the conditions mentioned in subsection (3) are satisfied; and (b) it is reasonable, in all the circumstances of the case, for him to hold that opinion. (3) The conditions are that- (a) in any case, the treatment is necessary in order not to endanger the health or safety of any person (which may include that of the disabled person); …”
“A1. The requirement that an adverse effect be substantial reflects the general understanding of ‘disability’ as a limitation going beyond the normal differences in ability which may exist among people. A ‘substantial’ effect is more than one than would be produced by the sort of physical or mental conditions experienced by many people which have only minor defects. A ‘substantial’ effect is one which is more than ‘minor’ or ‘trivial’. A4. The Act provides that an impairment is to be taken to affect the ability of a person to carry out normal day to day activities only if it affects that person in one (or more) of the respects listed in paragraph C4 ( Sch 1, Para 4). An impairment might not have a substantial adverse effect on a person in any of these respects, but taken together could result in a substantial adverse effect on the person's ability to carry out day to day activities…. A11. The Act provides that where an impairment is being treated or corrected the impairment is to be treated as having the effect it would have without the measures in question (Sch 1, Para 6(1)). The Act states that the treatment or correction measures to be disregarded for these purposes include medical treatment and the use of a prosthesis or other aid (Sch 1, Para 6(2)). A12. This applies even if the measures result in the effects being completely under control or not at all apparent… Effects of treatment B6. If medical or other treatment is likely to cure an impairment, so that recurrence of its effects would then be unlikely even if there were no further treatment, this should be taken into consideration when looking at the likelihood of recurrence of those effects. However, as Section A describes, if the treatment simply delays or prevents a recurrence, and a recurrence would be likely if the treatment stopped, then the treatment is to be ignored and the effect is to be regarded as likely to recur… C5. In many cases an impairment will adversely affect the person’s ability to carry out a range of normal day-to-day activities and it will be obvious that the overall adverse effect is substantial or the effect on at least one normal day-to-day activity is substantial. In such a case it is unnecessary to consider precisely how the person is affected in each of the respects listed in paragraph C4. For example, a person with a clinically well-recognised mental illness may experience an adverse effect on concentration which prevents the person from remembering why he or she is going somewhere; the person would not also have to demonstrate that there was an effect on, say, speech. A person with an impairment which has an adverse effect on sight might be unable to go shopping unassisted; he or she would not also have to demonstrate that there was an effect on, say, mobility. C7. Where a person has a mental illness such as depression account should be taken of whether, although that person has the physical ability to perform a task, he or she is, in practice, unable to sustain an activity over a reasonable period…. C21. This includes both the under estimation and over estimation of physical danger, including danger to well-being. Account should be taken, for example of whether the person is inclined to neglect basic functions such as eating, drinking, sleeping, keeping warm or personal hygiene; reckless behaviour which the ports the person or others at risk; or excessive avoidance behaviour without a good cause… ”
“Democracy is founded on the principle that each individual has equal value. Treating some as automatically having less value not only causes pain and distress to that person but also violates his or her dignity as a human being.”
“But I have no hesitation in saying that issues of discrimination, which it is conceded we are concerned with in this case, do have high constitutional importance, and are issues that the courts should not shrink from. In such cases, deference has only a minor role to play. ”
“63. It will be evident that the 1995 Act does not explicitly provide a defence for a disabled person who wishes to assert that the reason his landlord brought possession proceedings related to his disability. On the other hand, it is open to him to counterclaim for a declaration that he has been unlawfully discriminated against and/or counterclaim for injunctive relief. Furthermore, as David Steel J observed in the North Devon Homes Ltd v Brazier 35 HLR 905, if the tenant can prove that the landlord’s conduct amounts to unlawful discrimination, this is bound to be a relevant factor when the court is determining whether it is reasonable to make an order for possession. 64. In our judgment, it would be preferable in a case involving a secure tenancy or an assured tenancy for the tenant to assert the matter on which he relies as part of his case that it would be unreasonable for the court to make a possession order, rather than to complicate the proceedings by adding a formalistic counterclaim for a declaration or an injunction.”
“1453. Illegality Unless the contrary intention appears, an enactment by implication imports the principle of legal policy embodied in the maxim allegans suam turpitudinem non est audiendus (a person alleging his own wrongdoing is not to be heard). Contravention of a statutory requirement is an unlawful act. This illegality taints the act, precluding the doer from relying on the act to found an action or establish a defence. It makes it possible for tax to be levied on unlawful gains, since the taxpayer cannot resist an assessment by setting up his own wrong. However a person will not be precluded from relying on his or her illegality if to do so would deprive innocent third parties of legal rights. The effect of illegality is not substantive but procedural. “Unless the contrary intention appears, an enactment by implication also imports the principle of legal policy embodied in the maxim nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria (no one should be allowed to profit from his own wrong). The most obvious application of this principle against wrongful self-benefit relates to murder and other unlawful homicide.”
"wish to examine how the applicants abilities had actually been affected at the material time, whilst on medication, and then to address their minds the difficult question as to the effects which they think there would have been but for the medication: the deduced effects. The question is then whether the actual and deduced effects on the applicants ability to carry out normal day to day activities [are] clearly the more than trivial."
“When I saw Mr Malcolm on1 April 2004 , he was noncompliant with his oral antipsychotic for a few months, and became dysfunctional at work, eventually, simply sitting at his desk. He was losing weight, not sleeping or eating. He demonstrated marked psychomotor retardation, associated with impoverished concrete thinking. He seemed guarded regarding his psychotic experiences. Although he had agreed to restart his oral medication we found a problem with his compliance … When he was unwell during this period, he lost his employment with the Housing Association where he worked. His girlfriend and his mother supported him, both physically and emotionally, during this difficult period. In particular his mother who has had regular contact with our services was instrumental in persuading Courtney to go back to the depot medication. I am sure that, as a result of his being unwell between October 2003 in June 2004, he would have been unlikely to make decisions that were in his best interests as well as not having the full capacity to understand the consequences of such decisions… I have discussed this letter with his care coordinator Patrick Clifford and the team and they are in agreement with its contents. ”
“There is evidence available to the court, aside from the medical evidence which, to an extent, goes to the issues the court has to look at, and that is evidence from the defendant's family. In their written statements they refer to the fact that the defendant lost weight and looked dishevelled, that he had mood swings and was unpredictable. In the course of their oral evidence that was expanded somewhat in that the defendant's mother said that he was not exactly the same throughout any 24-hour period. His brother said that he could conduct a normal day-to-day activities as well as not being able to; in other words, it was variable. His sister said that even when the defendant was extremely [unwell], he was able to carry out certain day-to-day activities. ”
“42. Looking at those various bits of evidence - I am tempted to call them fragments of evidence – the conclusion must be that the defendant’s illness had an adverse effect on his ability to carry out day-to-day activities, although that adverse effect was variable in degree. The question which I have to answer is: was it a substantial adverse effect? There is some evidence which suggests that at times it was but other evidence that shows that it was not, certainly not consistently so. In the light of the evidence to which I shall be referring shortly in relation to actual activities undertaken by the defendant, my finding is that I am unable to say on the balance of probabilities (although it is a fairly knife-edge decision) that this was actually a substantial adverse effect. Therefore my conclusion is that the defendant does not come within the definition of the DDA 1995.”
“In the context of the special sense in which "discrimination” is defined in section 5 of the Act of 1995 it is more probable that Parliament meant "that reason" to refer only to the facts constituting the reason for the treatment, and not to include within that reason the added requirement of a causal link with disability: that is more properly regarded as the cause of the reason for the treatment rather than a reason for the treatment.”
“56. The claimant also says that the Local Authority had no knowledge of the defendant’s disability which means that they could not have acted in a discriminatory way. That raises an interesting point. It is true that lack of knowledge of as disability is not a defence to an act of discrimination in relation to a service provider. This is set out in the Romano case at para.121 by reference to the code of practice which is another document (not the code of guidance to which I have referred) which has been prepared to be used with the DDA 1995. However, the claimant says – and it seems to me that there is some force in this argument – that the landlord of premises let to a disabled person is not a service provider. The duties of a service provider are set out in section s 19 to 21 of the DDA 1995. Section 19(3) sets out examples of services which include accommodation in an hotel, boarding house or other similar establishment, but not by way of accommodation as part of a tenancy. No doubt that is not included in section 19(3) because section 22 deals specifically with discrimination in relation to premises. It therefore seems to me that the code of practice would need to be more explicit if lack of knowledge is to be irrelevant to discrimination in relation to the letting of premises.”
“(a) for a reason which relates to the disabled person’s disability, he treats him less favourably than he treats or would treat others to whom that reason does not or would not apply; and, (b) he cannot show that the treatment in question is justified.” (Emphasis added)
“121. One final word. We wish to emphasis again what we said in paragraphs 67 and 68, namely that Parliament ought to review this legislation at an early date. That it can lead to absurd and unfair consequences as its stands may be illustrated by one further example, taken from another topic within Part III of the 1995 Act. The Code of Practice issued by the DRC, under the heading “Must a service provider know that a person is disabled?” states, it would seem accurately, that: “A service provider may have treated a disabled person less favourably for a reason related to their disability even if it did not know the person was disabled.” 122. The Code goes on to give the following example: “A pub employee orders a customer who is lying prone on a bench seat to leave the premises because he assumes she has had too much to drink. However, the customer is lying down as a result of a disability rather than alcoholic consumption. The refusal of further service [which we take to mean further service of drink] is for “a reason which relates to the disabled person’s disability”