“…I accept that the offences he was convicted of, recently and in the past, did not involve violence, sex, arson, drugs or terrorism. This is not the case where the seriousness of the offence is so great as to merit automatic deportation. He has however been convicted of serious offences of handling stolen goods and has shown a propensity to re-offend. He seeks to blame unsavoury associations in the past, rather than take responsibility for his actions. The opportunities to offend are still present and I am not persuaded that the Appellant would not re-offend. What he said in court was that he would not do anything that would land him in prison. 32. The courts have found in the past serious offences involving violence, sex, arson, drugs or terrorism as being so serious that deportation is justified. I bear in mind that the offences of this Appellant involved dishonesty and the loss of property. Whilst these are antisocial offences causing inconvenience and financial loss to law abiding citizens, they are not by their nature offences that strike at the heart of the community in the way that offences involving violence, sex, etc do.”
“34. When I consider all these matters in the round, I come to the conclusion that to deport the Appellant falls on the wrong side in the balance. The offences for which the Appellant was sentenced in 2004 were not of so serious a nature that they in themselves merit deportation. The Appellant has not projected himself as a hard working member of the community who has something positive to contribute, but what I have to consider is not whether he is a good or savoury character, but whether deportation would be conducive to the public good. Is deportation necessary to protect the public from serious harm and has the balance been struck right? 35. The combination of two factors is in my mind decisive. These offences are not so serious that the public need protecting from the Appellant to the extent that he needs to be deported. The decision is not proportionate when placed with the fact that he has been living in this country since 1989 and his personal family circumstances. 36. On the totality of the evidence before me, I find that the Appellant has just about discharged the burden of proof and reasons given by the Respondent do not justify the refusal. Therefore the Respondent’s Decision is not in accordance with the law and the applicable Immigration Rules.”
“11. At paragraphs 32 of the Determination, the Immigration Judge sought to draw a distinction between offences involving violence, sex, etc which she categorised as offences which strike at the heart of the community, on the one hand, and offences involving dishonesty and the loss of property, which she categorised ‘as anti-social offences causing inconvenience and financial loss to law abiding citizens and which do not strike at the heart of the community in the way that offences involving violence, sex, etc do.’ By categorising the offences of which the Appellant has been convicted in this way, the Immigration Judge erred in her approach to the balancing exercise. This error in approach was an error of law. The offences of which the Appellant has been convicted (i.e. offences relating to the cloning of credit cards and the handling of stolen goods) which resulted in a term of imprisonmemnt of 3 1/2 years cannot be marginalised in the way the Immigration Judge suggested. Offences of dishonesty and loss of property can range in seriousness from those which are minor and do not strike at the heart of the community (such as shop lifting) and those which are more serious and do strike at the heart of the community. The fact that the Appellant was sentenced to a term of 3 1/2 years is an accurate hallmark of the seriousness of the offences for which he was sentenced in Reading Crown Court. The Immigration Judge ignored the length of the overall sentence imposed on the Appellant by Reading Crown Court as an indicator of the seriousness of the offences in this particular case, and instead focused on a general categorisation of the offences by stating that the offences were ‘anti-social offences causing inconvenience and financial loss to law abiding citizens and which do not strike at the heart of the community in the way that offences involving violence, sex, etc do.’ Although the Immigration Judge did refer to the seriousness or otherwise of the Appellant’s offences at paragraphs 31, 34 and 35 of the Determination, there is nothing which shows that she appreciated the fact that the sentence of 3 1/2 years is a long sentence considering the offences were offences of dishonesty and loss of property. To the contrary, at paragraphs 34 and 35 of the Determination, the Immigration Judge appears to minimise the seriousness of the offences by referring to them as offences ‘which were not so serious as to merit deportation’. This is not to say that the offences are so serious that the Appellant cannot succeed under the Immigration Rules. The objection to the Immigration Judge’s reasoning is that, by failing to have regard to the length of the sentence as an accurate indication of the seriousness of the offences in this particular case, she erred in her approach to the balancing exercise. 12. At paragraph 36 of the Determination the Immigration Judge stated that, on the totality of the evidence, the Appellant ‘has just about discharged the burden of proof’ [The words just about are emphasised]. This shows that the error of law was material to the Immigration Judge’s decision because, even on the totality of the reasons she gave (which included her reasoning at paragraph 32), she was only able to say that the Appellant ‘just about’ made out his case under paragraph 364 of the Immigration Rules.”
“While we accept that the appellant’s wife was sincere in her belief that her husband genuinely wished to turn his life around, we consider that the appellant is still at high risk of re-offending. That was what his Probation Officer said in section 4 of the report because, he said, ‘of Mr Okwell’s reluctance to take full responsibility for his behaviour’. That was still the appellant’s view in his evidence before us. He said he had not felt remorse at the stage that the probation report was prepared, because he was not involved in, as he said, “any issue to do with why I was arrested”
“43. …It is as follows. On27 January 1992 the appellant was convicted of one offence of handling stolen goods and three offences of obtaining property by deception at the Bow Street Magistrates’ Court. He was fined and ordered to pay costs and compensation. Later that year, on19 August 1992 , he was convicted of handling and aiding and abetting the securing remission of liability by deception by the Brent Magistrates’ Court. Again he was fined and ordered to pay costs and compensation. The next offence was five years later. On17 April 1997 the appellant was convicted of fraud by the Copenhagen City Court in Denmark and sentenced to ten months imprisonment. The appellant said that he had gone to Denmark to buy computers. 44. The next year the appellant was in Australia. He did not give evidence about that but it is there on his criminal record. The appellant makes no mention of it in his statement but we consider that it is quite a significant factor. On the 9th of March 1998 the appellant was convicted of no less than nine offences of handling stolen goods and eleven offences of using a false instrument before the Central Local Court in New South Wales. He was sentenced to six months imprisonment. What was he doing in Australia? The appellant has said nothing of this. 45. The next year the appellant was convicted again of offences of dishonesty. Before the Luton Crown Court on13 August 1999 he was convicted of two offences of false accounting, two of obtaining a money transfer by deception, one of obtaining property by deception, and two of attempting to obtain property by deception. For those offences he was sentenced to fifteen months imprisonment. 46. The appellant’s most recent conviction was before the Reading Crown Court in March 2004. He did not plead guilty. He was found guilty after a trial. He was convicted of nine offences of handling stolen goods. He was sentenced to three and a half years imprisonmemnt although half of that was suspended. He had to pay£500 towards the prosecution costs. Although the judge made no recommendation for deportation, there is nothing to say that he paid any regard to that aspect of the case at all. It is plain from the sentencing remarks that HHJ Playford regarded these as serious offences. He said: I think that you are in the way of being professionally dishonest.”
“As to Article 8 of the Human Rights Convention, we accept that the appellant enjoys a family life with his wife and three children and that to remove him to Nigeria will occasion an interference with his right to respect for family life with those four persons. There is evidence, which we accept, that the wife and two youngest children would not wish to follow him. That interference would be in accordance with the law as it would follow on from a properly conducted judicial procedure. It would have the legitimate aim of the prevention of crime. That interference would, in our judgment, be proportionate to that legitimate aim. The appellant does not fall within the Immigration Rules insofar as we find that the balancing exercise required by paragraph 364 falls in favour of deportation and we can find nothing truly exceptional about this case which might allow the appellant to succeed under Article 8 where he has failed under the Immigration Rules.”