Springhall, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Richmond Upon Thames [2006] EWCA Civ 19

Case No C1/2005/0297

[2006] EWCA Civ 19

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE

COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)

ON APPEAL FROM QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE RICHARDS

CO/1515/2004

Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date Tuesday, 24 th January 2006

Before

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE LORD JUSTICE AULD

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR PETER GIBSON

Between

THE QUEEN ON THE APPLICATION OF SPRINGHALLAppellant

THE LONDON BOROUGH OF RICHMOND UPON THAMESRespondent

(Transcript of the Handed Down Judgment of

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Mr Meyric Lewis (instructed by Rees Freres) for Appellant

Mr Daniel Kolinsky (instructed by George Chesman) for Respondent

Judgment

Lord Justice Auld :

Introduction

[1]This is an appeal by Chris Springhall against the order of the Hon Mr Justice Richards (as he then was) of 18th January 2005 dismissing his claim for judicial review of a decision by an officer of the London Borough of Richmond upon Thames (“the Council”) of 24th December 2003, in the purported exercise of a delegated power, to grant planning permission to his neighbour for demolition of an existing single storey dwelling known as “Ripple” and its replacement by a new single storey dwelling on Eel Pie Island, Twickenham.

[2]“Ripple” is within the Twickenham Riverside Conservation Area and is a “building of townscape merit” within the terms of the relevant development plan and supplemental local policy, both of which contained a presumption against demolition of such buildings.

[3]The claim before Richards J involved two main issues, namely(1) whether the decision to grant planning permission without reference to the Council’s Planning Committee breached Mr Springhall’s legitimate expectation that he would be entitled to participate in the decision-making process by making oral representations to the Committee; and

(2) whether the decision to grant planning permission under delegated powers was ultra vires. The Judge rejected Mr Springhall’s claim on both issues.

[4]On this appeal, Mr Springhall, with the leave of the Judge, pursued the second main issue as to delegation, which, as it was argued before the Court, was presented as three sub-issues, namely: i) the width of the ratio of this Court’s judgment in R(on the application of Carlton-Conway) v London Borough of Harrow

[2002] EWCA Civ 927

as to the exercise by officers of delegated powers in the determination of planning applications; ii) whether the officer acted outside the Council’s scheme of delegation of its powers in planning applications by exercising and determining in the applicant’s favour an application that arguably significantly departed from the Council’s Development Plan or interim polices; and iii) whether the officer acted outside his authority in determining and allowing an application to demolish and rebuild “Ripple”, contrary to the view of Mr Springhall, expressed in writing as an interested party, but where Mr Springhall did not indicate a wish to address the Planning Committee and the officer considered that the application accorded with the Council’s Development Plan and Supplementary Planning Guidance notwithstanding the presumption in them against demolition. The matter is of general importance given that about 90% of planning decisions in England and Wales are delegated to planning officers without referral to committee or to councillors. See the statistics produced by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister on the ODPM website at www.odpm.gov.uk, apparently reflecting government targets for decisions to be made under delegated powers.

[5]The Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (“the 1990 Act”) places the responsibility for determining planning applications upon local planning authorities. By section 101 of the Local Government Act 1972 (“the 1972 Act”) such authorities are empowered, subject to any express provision in the Act, to discharge any of their functions by delegating them to a committee, sub-committee or to an identified officer or officers.

[6]A local planning authority, when making any planning determination, was required by section 54A of the 1990 Act, Now section 38(6) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 to have regard to the local development plan and to make the determination in accordance with the plan unless material considerations indicated otherwise. And, by an overlapping provision in section 70(2) of the 1990 Act, it was required, in dealing with a planning application, to have regard to the provisions of the development plan material to the application and to “any other material considerations”. The weight of each material consideration was and is a matter for the planning decision-maker, as Lord Hoffmann stated in the following much cited passage from his speech in Tesco Stores v Environment Secretary

[1995] 1 WLR 759

at 780, HL, at 780F-G:

“… The law has always made a clear distinction between the question of whether something is a material consideration and the weight which it should be given. The former is a question of law and the latter is a question of planning judgment, which is entirely a matter for the planning authority. Provided that the planning authority has regard to all material considerations, it is at liberty (provided that it does not lapse into Wednesbury irrationality) to give them whatever weight the planning authority thinks fit or no weight at all. The fact that the law regards something as a material consideration therefore involves no view about the part, if any, which it should play in the decision-making process.”

[7]In any particular case involving the inter-play of a policy indicated in a development plan and other material considerations, there may be more than one acceptable interpretation in planning terms of a policy indicated by the plan, and more than one “correct” application of it when set against the other considerations. A planning decision maker’s approach to policy will only be interfered with by the court if it goes beyond the range of reasonable meanings that can be given to the language used; see R v Derbyshire County Council, ex parte Woods [1997] JPL 958, CA, per Brooke LJ at 967-968:

“If there is a dispute about the meaning of the words included in a policy document which a planning authority is bound to take into account, it is of course for the court to determine as a matter of law what the words are capable of meaning. If the decision maker attaches a meaning to the words they are not properly capable of bearing, then it will have made an error of law, and it will have failed properly to understand the policy (see Horsham D.C. v. Secretary of State for the Environment [1993] 1 P.L.R. 81, per Nolan LJ. at 88). If there is room for dispute about the breadth of the meaning the words may properly bear, then there may in particular cases be material considerations of law which will deprive a word of one of its possible shades of meaning in that case as a matter of law.”

The scheme of delegation, planning policies and the facts

[8]The Council adopted a scheme of delegation and allocation of its delegated powers under the 1990 Act between its Planning Committee and officers. The scheme included the following in the category of matters reserved to the Planning Committee:

“(iii) A planning application which significantly departs from the provisions of the adopted Development Plan or interim Policy/ies.” 9. and “(iv) Where officers recommend a decision contrary to the submitted written views of interested third parties or consultees, except when … (c) applications are in accordance with any Supplementary Planning Guidance and third parties expressing a view do not indicate a wish to address the Planning Committee.”

[9]The planning application in the present case was determined by an officer in purported exercise of the delegated power derived from the exception in paragraph (iv) (c). The question is whether, having regard to the terms of the guidance and the circumstances of the case, it was open to him to conclude that the proposal accorded with the Council’s Supplementary Planning Guidance, in particular its presumption against the demolition of building designated under its provisions as “of townscape merit”. As to the latter, the Council’s Development Plan, in its First Review Deposit Draft, provided: “The Council will seek to protect and encourage the preservation and enhancement of buildings of townscape merit and will use its powers where possible to protect their character and setting. … buildings of townscape merit will be identified in supplementary planning guidance and … there will be a presumption against the demolition of buildings of townscape merit but, should it prove necessary, a high standard of design, complementing the surrounding area, will be required in any replacement building.” [the Court’s emphasis]

[10]The relevant passage of the Guidance was in the following terms:

“The Council’s Approach to Buildings of Townscape Merit Within conservation areas, most buildings require Conservation Area Consent for demolition and there will always be a presumption against the demolition of Buildings of Townscape Merit. Consent for demolition will only be granted when the Council is assured that retention and adaptation is not possible and where the proposed replacement is consistent with other policies and exhibits a high standard of design that would complement the surrounding area. Indeed the Council will endeavour to protect the character and setting of all Buildings of Townscape Merit through negotiation of a sympathetic scheme, as far as possible treating proposals for works to or close to them as if they were listed buildings.” [the Court’s emphasis]”

[11]I take the chronology and summary of the facts as to the nature and form of Mr Springhall’s objection to the planning application and of the Council’s treatment of it from the helpful narrative provided by Richards J in paragraphs 8 to 12 of his judgment.

[12]On 13th November 2003, the Council wrote to Mr Springhall notifying him of the planning application for the demolition of “Ripple” and for its replacement with a new building, and inviting his views on it. Mr Springhall replied by letter, objecting to the proposal. In the letter, he drew attention to the status of the existing building on the site as one of townscape merit and to its location within the townscape area and to the presumption against demolition set out in the Supplementary Planning Guidance. He contended that the proposed development by way of a replacement building was unacceptable in scale and detail and drew attention to the effect that grant of permission would have on his own adjacent property and on his privacy. He did not indicate a wish to address the Planning Committee.

[13]The planning application was the subject of an officer’s decision approving the grant of permission, made purportedly under the exception in sub-paragraph (iv) (c) of the Council’s scheme of delegation for applications according with any supplementary planning guidance of the Council. The officer, in a report described as a “delegated report” and, seemingly, containing his decision, gave as his reason that the proposal complied with the Council’s Supplementary Planning Guidance ‘for Small Housing Sites’ and ‘Buildings of Townscape Merit’. The report indicated that the existing property on the application site had been classified as a building of townscape merit and was located in a conservation area. It referred to and summarised Mr Springhall’s written objections, and mentioned that there had been no request for the matter to be put before the Planning Committee. It identified the main matters for consideration as design/conservation area considerations, the impact on neighbouring amenities and the impact on flooding. In its treatment of those considerations, the report contained the following passages:

“Supplementary Planning guidance for Buildings of Townscape Merit states that there is a presumption against the demolition of Buildings of Townscape Merit, except in those circumstances where retention and adaptation is not possible, and where the proposed replacement is consistent with other polices and exhibits a high standard of design. The applicant has submitted financial calculations, showing it as being more expensive to refurbish and extend the existing dwelling than to build a replacement building. Also the existing dwelling has several intrinsic problems such as lack of insulation, which limit the use of the building. The proposed replacement building is for the erection of a single storey timber dwelling with aluminium standing seam roof system, which is typical of other properties in the locality and similar to the dwelling being replaced. The proposed building is larger and higher than the demolished structure extending south-eastwards towards the footpath. The enlarged dwelling will be in keeping with the form of neighbouring properties which have a staggered building line, and will match up with the forward projection and height of the adjoining property at Wyndfall [Mr Springhall’s house]. … I consider that the proposal complies with the supplementary planning guidance ‘Guidance for Small Housing Sites’ and ‘Buildings for [sic] Townscape Merit’. ..”

The reference to financial calculations of the applicant for planning permission was to figures suggesting that the cost of refurbishing and rebuilding would be about £95,000 – some £8,000 or 5% more than that of replacement. The Judge’s judgment

[14]As I have said, the main issue before the Judge was whether the officer’s exercise of the power to make the decision in this case fell within the exception of the requirement in sub-paragraph (iv) (c) of the Council’s scheme of delegation, for reference to the Planning Committee of a recommendation contrary to the submitted views of third parties, namely where, in the absence of an indication by any interested party of a wish to address the Planning Committee, an application accords with any supplementary planning guidance. If it was not in accord with such guidance, the decision of the officer was ultra vires.

[15]Mr Springhall’s case was that the proposal to demolish “Ripple” was contrary to the presumption in the supplementary planning guidance in question against demolition of buildings of “Townscape Merit” and, that given the possibility of refurbishment and extension of the existing building, the presumption was not displaced in the circumstances of this case. He maintained that, in the light of that possibility: 1) it was unreasonable of the officer, acting on behalf of the Council, to regard the proposal as according with the guidance; or 2) at the very least, given his, Mr Springhall’s written objection, if there was any ambiguity about the guidance he should have referred the application to the Planning Committee for decision. He relied upon the reasoning of this Court in Carlton-Conway, in which there was a similar, but more loosely expressed, provision than that in this case, namely for retention of the matter by the planning committee except where the proposal did not conflict with “agreed policies, standards and guidelines”. Pill LJ, who gave the leading judgment, with which Robert Walker LJ (as he then was) and Sir Martin Nourse agreed, held, at paragraphs 21, 22, 24 and 25, that such an exception could only apply where there is clarity as to the policies and facts, and that, as neither was clear in that case, the planning officer, in granting permission, acted beyond his powers.

[16]Before I continue further with Mr Springhall’s case, I should set out verbatim paragraph 1.9 - the relevant provision – of the scheme of delegation under consideration in Carlton-Conway and paragraphs 21, 22, 24 and 25 of Pill LJ’s judgment:

[17]Paragraph 1.9 provided for retention of the matter by the planning committee:

“where approval of development is recommended and a written objection or objections have been received, except where the proposals do not conflict with agreed policies, standards and guidelines;”

[18]Paragraphs 21, 22, 24 and 25 of Pill LJ’s judgment read:

“21. Paragraph 1.9 is, in my judgment, to be construed against a background that it is plainly the policy of the relevant statutory material and the circulars that there should be public participation in planning decisions, including participation by those who are affected by them. Where powers are delegated to a single individual the scope of those powers must be considered carefully. It is important that a planning officer purporting to exercise delegated powers should give careful and genuine consideration to the question whether the particular application with which he is concerned comes within the delegation. The purpose of the exception in paragraph 1.9, when a written objection has been made, is that cases may be dealt with where the relevant polices are clear and the relevant facts are clear. The policies can be applied in a straightforward manner to the facts of the particular case. The exception can only apply, in my judgment, where there is clarity as to the facts and as to the policies. 22. In my judgment, on neither count was the situation clear in this case. The description of the extension in the grant of planning permission, as in the application, was erroneous as is now accepted on behalf of the respondent. The permission involved a serious misdescription of the development. … That led to an obvious difficulty in considering which of the detailed policies to which we have been referred applied to the particular facts. The policies of the council are complex and subtle with respect to extensions of buildings in areas such as this. That is not a criticism of them, but it is necessary for a planning officer to have regard to that complexity and subtlety in deciding whether the application is one which accords with policies. Judgments as to whether a proposal conflicts with policies will often be difficult, and making them should not be treated by a planning officer who has delegated powers as merely routine. The fact that a lengthy and elaborate explanation of those policies was thought appropriate by the planning officer in justifying his conduct in his subsequent report indicates that this was not the straightforward case that the exception in paragraph 1.9 covered. The planning officer has accepted that one of the policies ‘could be confusing’. He took it upon himself to decide that another relevant policy was in error in a material respect. … 24. In my judgment, this was not the type of case which the exception in paragraph 1.9 contemplated. It is not for the court to make the planning judgments, … However on the material before the court, I am satisfied that the planning officer acted beyond his powers in deciding to grant permission. The complexities present were such that the planning officer could not reasonably act upon the exception in paragraph 1.9. The only rational decision would have been to refer the application to the committee to make the appropriate planning judgments in this case. 25. Public policy requires, in my judgment, that the planning officer should be circumspect in exercising powers delegated in the terms that they were in this case. Where there are real issues as to the meaning of planning policies and as to their application to the facts of the case, reference to the appropriate committee is required.”

[19]The Council maintained, in addition to other distinctions between that case and this, that there was no ambiguity here about the policy in question or the facts to which it was to be applied.

[20]Richards J, in his judgment, considered the scheme of delegation and the decision-making process in the present case and compared them with those in Carlton-Conway. He held that the planning officer was reasonably entitled to conclude that the proposal accorded with the Supplementary Planning Guidance and that such a conclusion was itself a matter of planning judgment not susceptible to interference by the court, save, on Wednesbury grounds. This is how he explained that conclusion in paragraphs 31 to 35 of his judgment:

“31. … the relevant question to be addressed under the Scheme of Delegation was whether the proposal was in accordance with the supplementary planning guidance. That, as it seems to me, was a matter on which the planning officer had to form a judgment – a judgment with which this court can interfere only if it was unreasonable. In other words, the question whether the proposal fell within delegated powers turns here on whether the officer was reasonably entitled to conclude as he did that the proposal accorded with the guidance. If the conclusion on that issue was a reasonable one, the officer was entitled to proceed under delegated powers. If it was not, then the exercise of delegated powers was unlawful and the matter ought to have gone before the Planning Committee. …” 32. In my view, the officer had clearly in mind what is said in the guidance about a presumption against demolition. It is clear from the guidance that this is not an irrebuttable presumption, but that the guidance contemplates that consent will be granted where retention and adaptation is not possible and the proposed replacement meets other requirements. The officer plainly had that in mind too. 33. Equally plainly, the reason why the cost differential and the intrinsic problems about the existing building are examined is that the officer is addressing the question whether retention and adaptation are possible within the terms of the guidance. He concludes that they are not, thus the view that the proposal complies with the guidance. In reaching that view, he must have proceeded on the basis that the reference in the guidance to the possibility of retention and adaptation was to realistic or reasonable possibility, rather than simply to whether it could or could not physically be done. In my judgment, that fell within the range of meanings of the policy that was reasonably open. 34. Equally, I take the view that, on the facts, it was reasonably open to the officer to conclude that retention and adaptation was not possible and that the proposal fell within the range of circumstances in which, notwithstanding the presumption against demolition, the guidance permitted demolition and replacement. 35. Accordingly, I hold that the officer was reasonably entitled to conclude that the proposal was in accordance with the supplementary planning guidance. That being so, and there being no request to address the Planning Committee, it could lawfully be dealt with under delegated powers. …”

[21]In so holding, Richards J found and had regard to the following distinctions between Carlton-Conway and this case: 1) in Carlton-Conway, the relevant policy had to be agreed and there was real doubt as to a material term of it, whereas here the applicable policy and its terms were clear; 2) in Carlton-Conway, there was no evidence that the officer had genuinely and carefully considered at the time of deciding the matter whether it was delegable to him, whereas here the officer’s contemporaneous report shows that he did consider that question at the material time; 3) in Carlton-Conway, there was no contemporaneous evidence of the officer’s approach or reason for his decision, whereas here the officer accompanied his decision with a reasoned report; 4) in Carton-Conway, there was general lack of clarity as to the applicable policies and the facts and as to why the officer considered that the former were complied with, whereas here there was no such doubt. As to Pill LJ’s observation in paragraph 25 of his judgment Carlton-Conway of the need for circumspection in the exercise of powers “delegated in the terms they were in …[that] case”, Richards J commented, at paragraph 30 of his judgment:

“What is said in paragraph 25 of Carlton-Conway must also be read in the context of that case. It is concerned with the exercise of powers ‘delegated in the terms they were in this case’; that is, with the specific instrument of delegation, the relevant part of which refers to the absence of conflict with agreed policies. That is the context in which it was said that reference to the Planning Committee was required where there were real issues as to the meaning of the planning policies and their application to the facts. In my judgment, the passage is not to be taken as laying down any general principle that if there is a real issue about the meaning or application of a policy, it is simply unlawful to exercise delegated powers of decision-making and the matter must be referred to a Planning Committee.”

The issues in the appeal

[22]Richards J, in granting Mr Springhall permission to appeal on this issue, did so because: 1) he thought it arguable that the judgment is in Conway-Carlton wider in scope than he had read it; and 2) because he considered, having regard to the apparent growth in importance of the use of delegated powers in the planning field, it would, in any event, be useful for the matter to be clarified by a further decision of the Court of Appeal.

[23]As I have said, the issue of delegation, in its application to the circumstances of the case, has been presented to the Court in the form of three sub-issues, the first and most important of which is whether an officer should purport to exercise delegated power where, in Pill LJ’s words, “there are real issues as to the meaning of planning policies and as to their application to the facts of the case”.

Sub-issue (1) - The width of the ratio of Carlton-Conway

[24]Mr Meyric Lewis, on behalf of Mr Springhall, made two overlapping submissions largely on the strength of Pill LJ’s reasoning in Carlton-Conway and on certain dicta in R(Kides) v South Cambridgeshire District Council [2003] JPL 431, in which the issues were far removed from those here: 1) a planning officer considering whether to exercise delegated power in the making of a planning decision, should exercise great caution before doing so in a case where the relevant planning policies and the facts are not clear; and 2) he should not exercise delegated power unless he is sure in the light of the relevant policies and facts that he can properly do so; in particular, where there is a policy presumption against the planning proposal, he should not consider whether, as a matter of planning judgment, it is rebutted.

[25]It is implicit in those submissions of Mr Lewis that the courts can intervene in some way short of their Wednesbury jurisdiction wherever a planning officer’s decision to exercise delegated power is, in the light of the relevant policies and facts, questionable. Put another way, he submitted that an interested party to a planning application has a “fairly low threshold” of entitlement to a decision by a planning committee on applications putatively coming within a planning authority’s scheme of delegation. He submitted that Richards J wrongly confined the scope of Pill LJ’s judgment in Carlton-Conway to the facts of the case and wrongly held that it did not lay down a general principle that if there is a real issue as to the meaning or application of a policy, it should be referred to the planning committee. The policy behind, and the justification for, such a general rule, Mr Lewis maintained, was intimated by Pill LJ in the opening words of paragraph 21 of his judgment (paragraph 18 above), namely: the interest of the public and the importance of its involvement in the planning control process; the important procedural differences in that respect between public decision-making by committee and by its officers; and the fact that the only effective right of appeal available to third parties is by way of judicial review.

[26]Building on that submission, Mr Lewis contended that the circumstances in Carlton-Conway were merely an example of the application of a general rule to be derived from Pill LJ’s judgment, and that they were not materially different from those in the scheme of delegation under consideration here. He drew attention to factors, which, he contended, are common to both cases. He suggested that Mr Springhall, in raising the important issue of possible retention of the existing building on the site, had raised real doubts on a question central to the applicability of the presumption against demolition in the Development Plan and the Supplementary Planning Guidance, namely as to whether, in the terms of the Council’s policies (see paragraphs 9 and 10 above), it was “necessary” to demolish or whether “retention and adaptation is not possible”. He maintained that there were real doubts as to the rigour of those requirements and their application to the meaning of demolition, and that there were issues and real doubts as to the facts in this case.

[27]Mr Daniel Kolinsky, on behalf of the Council, argued in support of Richards J’s conclusion and his reasons, in particular as to the limitation of the decision in Carlton-Conway to its facts and to the materially distinguishable facts of this case. He drew attention to the distinguishing features identified and relied upon by the Judge: i) The difference in the wording of the scheme of delegation, in particular, the reference in the Carlton-Conway scheme to conflict with “agreed policies …” . ii) The absence in Carlton-Conway of contemporaneous evidence of the basis on which the officer had decided to exercise the delegated power; whereas, here, the officer’s report shows that, in the exercise of the power and in approving the application, he took into account Mr Springhall’s objections, had at the forefront of his mind the presumption against demolition and its application to the scheme of delegation, and was satisfied that it was appropriate for his determination under delegated powers. iii) In Carlton-Conway there was very real uncertainty as to the meaning of the material planning policies and as to the relationship between them; whereas, here, there is no dispute as to what the material planning guidance said or what it meant or did not mean: as to the meaning of the guidance, in particular as to what was meant by the necessity or impossibility of demolition, it could not have been that the existence of presumption rendered demolition in every case contrary to policy; the policy plainly contemplated the possibility of circumstances in which the presumption could be rebutted and demolition would be acceptable. iv) In Carlton-Conway there was confusion or dispute as to the description or underlying facts of the proposed development, which was not the case here.

[28]In Carlton-Conway Pill LJ considered that the only rational decision for the officer in that case would have been to decline to exercise delegated jurisdiction and to refer the matter to the planning committee. Richards J held, rightly in my view, that that decision does not compel the same result in the present case where there is no such uncertainty about the applicable planning policies and the facts to which they had to be applied and where it is plain that the officer had both well in mind in deciding whether to decide the matter for himself and to grant approval.

[29]Mr Lewis’ attempt to extend the reach of the decision of Carlton-Conway to the more clearly expressed policies and undisputed material facts of this case cannot be reconciled with the clear authority of the Court of Appeal in Woods and of Lord Hoffmann in Tesco. Unless the decision-maker attaches a meaning to the words of a planning policy that they cannot reasonably bear, it is not for a court to substitute its own interpretation of the policy. And the application of such policy to the facts of any particular case is a matter of planning judgment for the decision maker, subject only to considerations of Wednesbury irrationality.

[30]Here, for the reasons summarised by Mr Kolinsky, the policies in play are clear. To the extent that the rebuttability of the presumption against demolition of a building of townscape merit turned on “necessity” for demolition or the “impossibility” of its retention and adaptation when considered against replacement, that was, in my view, essentially a matter for planning judgment on the facts of the case, whether decided by an officer exercising delegated powers or by the Planning Committee. Accordingly, I reject Mr Lewis’s submission that, if the officer, when considering whether to exercise delegated power, is not sure that the proposed development satisfied the local policy he should decline jurisdiction and that a court should quash his decision if he does not do so. To adopt such a test would or could involve the court exercising a form of planning judgment in challenges to an officer’s exercise of the delegated power, whereas its only right to intervene, whoever makes the planning decision, is on grounds of Wednesbury irrationality. It is plain from the officer’s wording of his report in this case that he had the highly fact-sensitive notion of “impossibility” of retention and adaptation well in mind, necessarily including in this context relevant economic and environmental and aesthetic considerations . That was a matter for his planning judgment, not a matter of law. But even if it were a matter of law, in my view, the officer’s interpretation and application of it was one that the words of the policy were properly capable of bearing.

[31]I also reject Mr Lewis’s arguments that, if the proposed development does not fall in line with the local planning policy presumption, the presumption is rarely, if at all, rebuttable, that the officer should not go on to consider whether it is rebuttable, that the development should be regarded as contrary to the policy and should, on that account, be left to the council committee.

[32]In my view, it is for local planning authorities to determine the policy or basis of their schemes of delegation, not for courts to gloss them by imposing fetters on them according to the courts’ perception of how the decision-making should be allocated between the council committee and the officer, e.g. according to whether there is an issue as to policy or fact, simplicity/complexity, seriousness or sensitivity or general public importance. Moreover, as Mr Kolinsky pointed out, the very use of the notion of a presumption against development in the wording of the Council’s relevant policies contains within it an acceptance that, even when capable of application, it may, as a matter of planning judgment, be rebutted by the circumstances. Again, I can see no basis upon which the Court could properly interfere with an officer’s decision on that account.

[33]The question of interpretation and application of local planning policies, including the effect to be given to any presumption in them, on the facts of each case goes primarily to the decision whether or not to grant planning permission, not to some threshold question whether an officer should decide for himself whether to exercise delegated power to grant or refuse permission. If such grant or refusal is found to have been wrong in law because of an incorrect interpretation by the officer of the policy and/or because of a Wednesbury misapplication of it to the facts, that may or may not also taint the officer’s decision to exercise delegated jurisdiction, but the planning decision will, in any event - as in Carlton-Conway - be susceptible to judicial review on conventional grounds. But, if and to the extent that Pill LJ contemplated, in paragraph 25 of his judgment, that some special, modified Wednesbury rule should apply to the question of vires of an officer purportedly exercising such jurisdiction in planning matters, as distinct from a question of conventional Wednesbury irrationality or other illegality of the decision itself, I respectfully disagree. In particular, I endorse the observation of Richards J in paragraph 30 of his judgment (see paragraph 21 above) that Pill LJ’s judgment should not be read as laying down any general principle that where there is any real issue about the meaning or application of a planning policy, it is unlawful for an officer to exercise delegated powers of decision–making.

[34]Whilst I am conscious of the important interest of public participation in planning decisions, to which Pill LJ rightly referred in paragraph 21 of his judgment, there is also a strong public interest in the efficient and timely administration of planning control. Parliament, by section 101 of the 1972 Act, has left to local planning authorities how they may discharge their decision-making role in planning matters. Given their extensive delegation of such role, it would be contrary to both public and private interests and cause much delay and expense to subject the system to what could routinely develop into a two-stage challenge of officer decisions. If an officer, assuming delegated powers for the purpose, demonstrates by his conduct or decision that his planning decision is irrational or otherwise unlawful, whether or not it impinges on his decision to deal with the matter himself, the matter is, in any event, remediable by a single judicial review challenge. Mr Lewis’s proposed extension of the Carlton-Conway decision into a general principle does not provide any workable basis for distinguishing between those cases that are determinable under delegated powers and those that must be referred to committee. By contrast, as Mr Kolinsky submitted, the approach of Richards J sets a workable boundary by acknowledging that there will often be more than one perspective as to whether a proposed development would comply with planning policy. Where there is a scheme of delegation, as in this case, the decision of the officer is a planning judgment. The only realistic way in which such a judgment – whoever makes it - can be challenged is on grounds of irrationality, as was the case in the Carlton-Conway, or other illegality, neither of which obtains here.

[35]Accordingly, I am of the view that Pill LJ’s concerns, as expressed by him in paragraphs 24 and 25 of his judgment, while valid in the circumstances of the case before him, in the sense that they went to the legality and rationality of the officer’s decisions both not to refer the matter to the planning committee and to grant permission, should not be taken as a general rule that a planning officer should, as a matter of course, decline to exercise delegated powers available to him only where relevant policies and facts are clear. Equally, I reject Mr Lewis’s argument that an officer’s task in exercising delegated decision-making powers is a “threshold” exercise. His task is the same as that of the planning committee if the matter had been retained by or referred to them, namely whether to grant or refuse planning permission. If an officer is of the view that he can make sense of the policies and identify the relevant facts so as to enable him to apply the former to the latter, there is no basis, short of illegality or Wednesbury irrationality, why the courts should intrude further on the arrangements local planning authorities make for their decision-making. Sub-issues (2) and (3) - whether the officer acted ultra vires in determining an application that arguably significantly departed from the Council’s Development Plan and/ or did not accord with the Supplementary Planning Guidance.

[36]These so-called sub-issues, which I have in large part already considered, may be dealt with together. They are as to whether the officer’s decision in exercising delegated decision-making powers accorded with the Council’s policies that there should be no demolition of a building of townscape merit unless it was necessary because its retention and adaptation were impossible. Put at its lowest, Mr Lewis said that was a matter of interpretation for the Planning Committee rather than the officer. But he put Mr Springhall’s case more highly than that. He submitted that the presumption in the Development Plan against demolition of buildings of townscape merit, could only be rebutted if demolition was necessary in the strict sense indicated for listed buildings in PPG15, paragraphs 3.16 – 3.19, which was not the case here. On the facts, retention and adaptation were possible and only marginally more expensive than demolition and re-building. Accordingly, he submitted that the proposed demolition of “Ripple” was per se contrary to the Development Plan and therefore, fell within paragraph (iii) of the Council’s scheme of delegation, as one that would “significantly depart… from the provisions of the adopted Development Plan or interim policies”, including its Supplementary Planning Guidance, and, therefore required reservation to the Planning Committee.

[37]It follows, Mr Lewis submitted, that Richards J wrongly held that the question whether the proposal accorded with the Development Plan and Supplementary Planning Guidance was a matter of planning judgment for the officer subject to interference by the courts only on Wednesbury grounds. He pointed out that the policy in Carlton-Conway was importantly different from that here in that it did not contain any presumption against the proposed development and that Tesco and Woods were not concerned with whether a planning officer had made a decision outside his powers under a scheme of delegation or where there was a clear policy presumption against the development in question.

[38]Mr Kolinsky submitted that the flaw in Mr Lewis’s analysis was the premise that the demolition of “Ripple” was per se contrary to the Development Plan, when all that the Plan and the Guidance provided was a presumption against demolition of buildings of townscape merit. He pointed out that there was nothing in the policy to suggest that the presumption was irrebuttable and submitted that the very use of the notion of a presumption contemplated circumstances in which the demolition of a building of townscape merit may yet be appropriate and accord with policy.

[39]These submissions of Mr Lewis largely overlap with those with which I have dealt and rejected under sub-issue (1). As must be apparent from my discussion of that sub-issue, I respectfully endorse the reasoning of Richards J in paragraphs 31 to 35 of his judgment (see paragraph 20 above) as to the nature of the officer’s exercise of delegated power in this case, essentially one of planning judgment impugnable only on Wednesbury grounds. As I have said, Mr Lewis’s submissions overlook the fact that the Supplementary Guidance, which effectively reproduces the Development Plan, necessarily envisaged circumstances in which, notwithstanding the general presumption against demolition of a building of townscape merit, such demolition could conform with the Plan and the Guidance in certain circumstances. In that event, demolition would accord with the Council’s planning policies, not conflict with them.

[40]And, as the Court indicated in Woods, the interpretation and application of planning policy will frequently raise questions of planning judgment for the decision maker, including whether the proposal constitutes a significant departure from planning policy. It is clear from the officer’s report in this case that he addressed the policy presumption against demolition but found that in the particular circumstances of the case, demolition was appropriate and hence accorded with the Council’s policies. In my view, and for the reasons I have given, that was a decision that was open to him on the policies and other facts in this case and was certainly not challengeable on Wednesbury grounds as to jurisdiction or as a planning decision.

[41]I would, therefore, dismiss the appeal.

Lord Justice Moore-Bick:

[42]I agree that the appeal should be dismissed for the reasons given by Auld LJ.

Sir Peter Gibson:

[43]I also agree.