“In the result I have reached the conclusion that although stray remarks may possibly have been made by various persons at different times during the meeting, perhaps as an aside or a casual observation, no one made it clear to Mr Butler that he was not to proceed with the third option of external cabling, and that he left the meeting reasonably under the impression that it was for FAFS to decide which route to pursue. Equally I am not satisfied that Mr Butler told the meeting that the roof was “precarious” or unsafe in some way or that it was brought home to him that any other person considered the roof to be dangerous. I accept his evidence that it was a long time since he had been on the roof himself, and he had no recollection one way or another about the state of the roof at the time of the meeting. What he did know, and what he told the others, was that the line of the existing cable lay along an external length of wall and that it was an option to lay the new cable along the same route as before. In general terms I accept the substance of Mr Butler’s evidence on this topic.”
“So far as Humphries are concerned, the case against them in essence is that as main electrical contractors in overall charge of the electrical work which needed to be done on site, including installation of the new fire alarm system, they owed Mr Gray as one of the persons who would be directly affected by their decisions a duty at common law to take reasonable care for his safety. The potential existence of such a duty is well established in cases such as Clay (supra) and McArdle vAndmac Roofing Co[1967] 1 ALL ER 583 . A more recent example is Davis v Earldene and Others unreported, CA QBENF 98/0242/1.23 February 1999 . In the present case the existence of such a duty is confirmed, and its scope defined, in my judgment by the following considerations: i. The quote for the work which Humphries received from FAFS was for£134,662 , and their own quote to Thistle was£148,834 . Thus the premium which Humphries were charging for supervising the contract (rounded off) was£14,171 . Clearly a substantial degree of supervision was envisaged in return for such a payment. ii. That quote contained the words “we require daily liaison” and an assurance that the work would be carried out “in accordance with the Factories Act”. iii. The order Humphries placed with FAFS on24 November 2000 requested a method statement, risk assessment and programme of works. It stated “all work to be agreed and carried out with the close liaison with Mr CD Lewis contracts manager”. iv. Mr Lewis told Health and Safety investigators that he was prepared to prevent FAFS from starting on site if risk assessments were not supplied. v. Humphries’ standard terms and conditions provided that FAFS’ work had to be carried out to Humphries satisfaction and in conformity with all reasonable directions by Humphries, and that FAFS must comply with Humphries’ health and safety policy. vi. That policy acknowledged Humphries’ duty to “co-ordinate safety activities between main contractor, sub-contractor and any other individuals who might be working on the same site”
“In my judgment this was a wholly unwarranted assumption on Mr Lewis’s part and, of course, completely the reverse of the true contractual situation. If Mr Lewis had called for a proper risk assessment and method statement from FAFS he would have realised that there was a proposal to carry out work which would entail FAFS’ employees walking on the roof outside the hotel and Humphries, as the main contractor in charge of coordinating safety activities, ought then in my judgment either to have forbidden the work or alternatively have taken energetic steps to ensure that it could be done in safety. If Humphries had taken such action, in all probability Mr Gray’s accident would have been avoided. The matter does not rest there, however, because on my findings Mr Lewis was informed at the meeting on 12 December that Mr Butler was considering the external option for routing the new cable. He therefore had actual knowledge that FAFS were contemplating the possibility of work which would require their employees to go out on the roof. Again, energetic steps should have been taken to prevent that happening, at all events until a safe system for doing the work had been devised.”
“In my view they did. Thistle either knew or ought to have known that FAFS’ employees had been in the habit of going out on to the roof for repairs to the system over the past quarter of a century. So far as is known those employees had never been reproved or told not to go there without the permission of Railtrack or its predecessors. On 12 December Thistle were told that FAFS were contemplating the possibility of work which would require further access to the roof. Their case is of course that Mr Butler was instructed unequivocally to abandon the external option, but I have found earlier that they failed to make that instruction clear and Mr Butler was left under the impression that he could, if he chose, route the cable externally. In my view Thistle owed a duty to FAFS and their employees to make the true position plain beyond any doubt and that they failed, on my findings, to do. In my judgment this failure was negligent conduct on their part and contributed in some measure to the death of Mr Gray. ”
“2.3 West Wing 2nd to 3rd Floor crossing between Wing and Main Building to be agreed/some surface wiring may be required.”
“JB The running of the cable on the exterior of the wall was one of three alternatives that was discussed. RJS Was it agreed with Humphries that this would be the method to run the wiring? JB That’s that’s (sic) at the meeting prior to the accident, no it wasn’t agreed, it was agreed that that would be one of three alternatives to be investigated.”
“JB The running of the cable on the outside was merely an alternative it was down to us to investigate those three alternatives. RJS Did you investigate those alternatives? JB Regretfully that was what we were doing effectively when the accident happened. It appears that to me and this is only my opinion that Andrew and Ian investigated the exterior run for the cable, decided it was relatively simple exercise and started to carry it out”
“Mr Ford: Did you make those people who were present on the walkabout aware of those two alternatives? A. I did. Q Was anything said about the safety implications of any of those options? A. No. Q Was any decision taken about which of those three options ought to be decided on? A. Not at that time.”
“Mr Porter: I accept you and I do not agree about this, but you maintain the insistence that the three options that are in your statement were actually thought of on 12 December? A. The three options were certainly relayed at to (sic) the meeting of 12 December. Q But, even on your case, only as options at that stage? A. Yes. Q You never communicated the option had become a confirmed option or the chosen option? A. We did not relay the chosen option, no. Q Indeed, you did not even give Mr Gray and his colleagues any guidance as to which should be chosen option 3? A. I did not. Q You left it entirely to Mr Gray and his colleagues to decide? A. Yes.”
“After some discussion it was decided that Mr Ian Gray and myself would take the annex part of the job. After further discussion with Mr Ian Gray it was decided to use the existing cable tray on the outside wall of the hotel. Whilst Ian was working inside the corridor, I went outside onto the roof to make use of an existing cable tray which was fixed to the outside wall of the hotel to run my cable”
“3. Did Railtrack recognise the roof as fragile? The station roof area is listed as a hazardous area in the Station Hazard Directory. 4. Was there any agreement between Railtrack and Thistle? Did Railtrack warn Thistle by way of notices or otherwise? All high level glazed areas present risks hence Railtrack has a high level permit system in place. The relevant hazard directory is kept in Victoria Station reception and anyone requiring access to the roof must sign in at reception. They are then briefed on access arrangements and must satisfy a Railtrack designated member of staff that they are competent to undertake the work they are intending to do. They must also have radio contact at all times. Method statements and risk assessments are required 7 days in advance of any works being undertaken on the station.”
“A negligence claim is habitually analysed compartmentally by asking whether there was (a) a duty of care; (b) breach of that duty and (c) damage caused by the breach of duty. But damage is the essence of a cause of action in negligence and the critical question in a particular case is the composite one, that is whether the scope of the duty of care in the circumstances of the case is such as to embrace damage of the kind which the plaintiff claims to have suffered. As Lord Bridge of Harwich said in the Caparo case[1990] 2AC 605 , 627: “It is never sufficient to ask simply whether A owes B a duty of care. It is always necessary to determine the scope of the duty by reference to the kind of damage from which A must take care to save B harmless.”
“The essential question which has to be asked in every case, given that damage which is the essential ingredient of the action has occurred, is whether the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant is such … that it imposes upon the latter a duty to take care to avoid or prevent that loss which has in fact been sustained.”