“11 The claimant’s accident was caused entirely or contributed to by his own negligence for any and all of the following reasons. 12 The accident occurred because the claimant unscrewed the pocket from the high temperature cooling line, thereby allowing the water (under 3.5 bar pressure) to escape. In order to replace the defective thermosensor the correct procedure was to unscrew the sensing device, not the pocket. 13 The claimant knew the correct procedure. Approximately 10-15 days before the vessel arrived in Hamburg there was a discussion in the officers' smoking room one evening. Present were the Master, the chief engineer (Mr Domuzin), the second engineer and the claimant. The second engineer mentioned the defective thermosensor and said that it would not be possible to change it unless the high temperature cooling system was shut down, allowed to cool and then drained. Upon hearing this, the claimant said that it was not necessary to shut down and drain the system. He left the officers’ smoking room briefly and returned with a Pleiger Wit-P-10 thermosensor (a defective unit that had failed in another part of the engine room). The claimant then demonstrated the method of changing the thermosensor by unscrewing the sensing device and not unscrewing the pocket. The second engineer was satisfied with this demonstration. Mr Domuzin was already familiar with this procedure. 14 In any event, the claimant, as an experienced ship’s electrician would be expected to be familiar with such procedures. On5 September 2001 the claimant told Mr Domuzin that he had 10 years experience as a ship’s electrician. Between 5 September and18 November 2001 the claimant’s performance of his daily tasks satisfied Mr Domuzin that the claimant was an experienced and competent ship’s electrician. The thermosensor in question was of a common type. 15 The claimant was acting entirely on his own initiative. He was not on duty at the time. He had not been requested or ordered to change the thermosensor. Further, the claimant was in the engine room without having notified either the bridge or the duty engineering officer of his presence or intention, contrary to the ship’s standing orders.”
“43 On a number of occasions it was made clear on behalf of the first defendant that it was not running a case to the effect that there were circumstances immediately surrounding the accident, such as the obvious heat of the relevant pipe, that should have alerted the claimant to his peril. Likewise it is not the claimant’s case that, muddled by lack of sleep, he did something that otherwise he would have known to be wrong. 44 It is the claimant’s case that deliberately and with justification he loosened the nut with the intent of removing the whole unit. It is his case that he reasonably expected there to have been in place a pocket that would have prevented the escape of water from the pipe. But despite the devotion of time during the hearing to photographs of a variety of units and the suggestion that there might have been, onboard another vessel, at least one welded pocket, I find it impossible to find any rational basis for what the claimant did. At best he had no idea of whether or not there was, in fact, a fixed pocket. The fact that I find that at some time onboard some other ship they may have been a welded pocket, really carries matters no further forward in his favour. It cannot be said that welded pockets were of such currency as to justify taking the risk of undoing the nut. Insofar as screw pockets are concerned, the standing rule was that where there was only nut or where there were two nuts, the nut next to the pipe was the one that released the pocket or in this case, there being no pocket, the sheath. 45 In the present case, there were only two safe ways of dealing the situation. One was to drain the pipe and remove the whole unit. The other was to undo the ring and remove the sensor, leaving the sheath in place. While removing the sensor might not have constituted best practice from a mechanical point of view, it did represent the only safe alternative to draining the system. There can be no doubt that to a material degree the claimant was the author of his own misfortune. 46 It is a truism that the apportionment of liability in a case of this sort is a balancing act. The difficulty is to select those ingredients which go to make the balance. Often injury is suffered because of a knowing self exposure to risk by a claimant. He may choose not to wear safety boots or ear defenders. In this case the idea that the claimant in some wanton way chose to expose himself to inevitable injury from the course that he took has only to be stated for it to be rejected. Wonderful as is the human mind, it is also unfathomably strange. In some mysterious way, when the claimant went down to the engine room to replace the sensor, he thought that the whole unit and not just the sensor should be removed and that there would be no escape of water. In such circumstances it could be argued that the claimant was innocent of blame, in a morally culpable sense, but that argument cannot relieve the claimant of a finding of contributory negligence. Apart from momentary inattention in justifiable circumstances, it is negligent not to concentrate when concentration is required. 47 I have already found that the owners were in part the cause of the claimant’s acting as he did but I think the bitter fact to be that the negligence of that claimant was the major cause of his accident. That said, there was a heavy responsibility upon the first defendant to protect the claimant. In the circumstances, I find the claimant to have been 60 percent to blame for his accident.”
“But despite the devotion of time during the hearing to photographs of a variety of units and the suggestion there might have been, onboard another vessel, at least one welded pocket” and concludes with the words: “I find it impossible to find any rational basis for what the claimant did.”