“a person who is vulnerable as a result of old age, mental illness or handicap or physical disability or other special reason ….”
“- Chronic backache – Disc - Cramps from neck to lower back - Rheumatism in my lower parts of my legs - Left hand injured - Right eye reduced eyesight - Depression”
“This gentleman has chronic backache and arthritis. He is unable to lift anything and has been referred to the [Royal National]. His ankles are swollen and painful. He cannot walk more than less than 100 meters. He also suffers from anxiety with depression. He cannot sleep at night and nightmares makes him awake. He is on the following medication: [Details of his medication are then set out] He is finding it difficult to cope with all these things at the present time. I shall be grateful if you would urgently re-house him in good accommodation, suitable for his current and long term medical needs. Otherwise his problems will only become worse.”
“Ms Rose Riley a psychic [sic] consultant has made a regular consultations sessions for him in the surgery every week since August 2003.”
“Dr Sultan’s latest letter is essentially a cut and paste of his letter a month before. It adds no materially new information, but confirms mobility on the flat is reasonable. He is on no treatment for arthritis. My previous advice remains applicable.”
“Dr Sultan’s third letter affirms [sic] my advice of7 October 2003 and I continue to make no housing recommendations.”
“Mr Bellouti also advised that he is required to do exercises for his back and because of the limited space in his room he is unable to complete the exercises without lifting the bed and propping it against the wall which is entirely unsatisfactory given his back injuries. He has recently been diagnosed with diabetes and as a consequence he has been put on a special diet and if he is late in from college he is unable to prepare his supper due to the kitchen being locked between the hours of 9.00 pm and 7.00 am. Mr Bellouti scored 30 in the Beck Depression Inventory and falls into the range of severe depression (range 29-63). He also reports that he has suicidal thoughts but he denied any plans to carry out such an action and the risk of harm to others seems remote. It appears that his housing problems have added to his depression, he is unable to sleep and finds concentrating difficult and if more suitable accommodation was available his mental health and his physical health would improve considerably. In the light of the above information I would be grateful if you could reassess Bellouti’s housing needs.”
“His depression is being treated at low level and is not such as to materially impede reasonable function. No housing recommendations.”
“In reaching my decision I have noted the following facts. You are 43 years old. You have described yourself as unhealthy, suffering from chronic back pain and Arthritis. You also suffer from Anxiety and depression. Although you have been prescribed medication by your GP the Council’s Medical Advisor is of the opinion that your Mental illness is being treated at low level and is therefore not considered significant or severe. You are not receiving treatment for Arthritis. As such, no housing recommendations have been made. …. You are presently aged 43 years and in view of this, I am satisfied that you cannot reasonably be described as being vulnerable. Neither do I think, taking into account your reasonable health, that you can be described as suffering from any physical disability. Taking into account the medical information available to me, and this having been assessed by the Council’s Independent Medical Advisor, I am not persuaded that you, when homeless, are any less able to fend for yourself than the ordinary homeless person. I am satisfied that it cannot be so serious as to expose you to any greater risk of injury or detriment than the ordinary homeless person.”
“1. I write to confirm that Mr Bellouti suffers from severe mental depression with suicidal thoughts. He is currently on Amitriptyline, Proporanolol and Temazepam. He is also having weekly therapy sessions with a clinical psychiatrist to keep him sane. If he is evicted and made homeless he is bound to commit suicide, for which the council will be squarely responsible. 2. Mr Bellouti has severe problems with his spine and this has made him less mobile and less active. He has been given Diclofenac, Co-Dyramol and Brufen but with minimal relief. If he is forced to live rough on the streets he will probably need to be hospitalized. 3. Mr Bellouti suffers from diabetes. His anxiety and depression have made his blood glucose level fluctuate. His diabetes and anxiety are the cause of his chest pain. His diabetes will become complicated and he may need to be hospitalized if he is not provided with a secure and comfortable environment. It is a requirement by law that a person suffering from diabetes, depression and a spinal problem needs to be carefully considered both by the social services and the council before they could even think of disturbing his housing needs. I finally write to conclude that if this man is evicted, potentially the council will become liable, not only for his suicide, but also for the deterioration of his physical health as he is hardly able to walk 100 metres because of his arthritis and spinal problems.”
“With regards to queries that you raised: 1. When a doctor says someone is depressed and suicidal he is expressing his diagnosis based on examination. When I say he is depressed and has suicidal ideas I mean he is liable to commit suicide and is highly vulnerable. He is taking Amitriptyline, Propranolol and Temazepam for treatment. Do you want him to commit suicide before you believe that statement? Even in a court of law the judge accepts my expert witness opinion without adulteration or hesitation, and you are not beyond the courts. As regards Mr Bellouti’s therapy sessions he is seen by me and our clinical psychologist Rose Riley. He was diagnosed with type 2 diabetes mellitus in October 2003, which at present is diet controlled.”
“Even though Wandsworth sought advice from Dr Keen regarding Mr Bellouti’s spinal problems and depressive illness, we do not consider that it is reasonable for Wandsworth to rely upon the adverse recommendations of Dr Keen regarding these two conditions. This is because due to Wandsworth’s lack of inquires with Mr Bellouti’s GP it would appear that the information Wandsworth provided to Dr Keen was not a full and up to date account of the nature, symptoms and extent of these conditions in order to consider the issue of vulnerability. Had such inquires been carried out then we consider that Dr Keen would not have considered that Mr Bellouti’s “back problems is not considered significant or severe nor such as to impede reasonable mobility” (Medical Assessment Sheet dated 27.08.03) and that “his depression is being treated at a low level and is not such as to materially impede reasonable function” (Medical Assessment Sheet dated 10.02.04). This is because Mr Bellouti’s GP has stated in his report dated14 April 2004 that Mr Bellouti suffers from severe mental depression with suicidal thoughts and that he is having weekly therapy sessions with a clinical psychiatrist. We consider that given the adverse symptoms of Mr Bellouti’s illness and treatment and medication that he is receiving, it would not be reasonable for Wandsworth to rely upon the adverse recommendation of Dr Keen when Mr Bellouti’s GP considers that it is highly likely that he would commit suicide if he was to be made homeless. Furthermore, due to the deterioration in Mr Bellouti’s physical health Mr Bellouti’s GP concludes that Mr Bellouti cannot walk more than 100 meters because of his arthritis and spinal problems. Therefore, we consider that Wandsworth cannot rely upon the findings of Dr Keen as he considers that Mr Bellouti’s back problem does not impede reasonable mobility.”
“The medical issues are as follows: DEPRESSION/SUICDAL THOUGHTS The applicant suffers from depression according to his GP, but this has been treated at low level with amitriptyline alone, a minor and outdated antidepressant drug which has largely been superseded in modern clinical practice. He is also being treated with counselling from a psychologist (described wholly erroneously by Dr Sultan as a “psychiatrist” on 14 Apr 04 and as a “psychic consultant” on 18 Sep 03). His condition has not been such as to necessitate referral to a psychiatric hospital or specialist psychiatrist, nor to be admitted to a psychiatric unit, and his condition is clearly not psychotic or severe in nature, as this would have necessitated greater or multiple drug treatment or psychiatric referral. I note Dr Sultan’s assertion that he is at risk of suicide particularly if made homeless, but this is not borne out by the reports from the psychologist who is in regular therapeutic contact with the applicant, who says: He also reports that he has suicidal thoughts but he denies any plans to carry out such an action. I also consider the risk of self-harm low given Dr Sultan’s decision to prescribe him with Temazepam, a well known sleeping drug which is toxic in overdose and responsible for a significant proportion of all pharmacological self harm throughout the UK. DIABETES The applicant’s diabetes has not necessitated hospital referral nor drug treatment at any time and there is nothing to suggest it is unstable or severe in nature. It is not considered significant nor related to housing. BACK PAIN The applicant has suffered from back pain; although this is described by Dr Sultan as “arthritis”, this is not borne out by the reports from the Royal National Orthopaedic Hospital at Stanmore which make no such assertion, and there is no confirmed substantive underlying diagnosis. The applicant has completed both short and medium term rehabilitation programmes and was recommended by his consultant Mr Sullivan to continue with an exercise regime at a local gym. His mobility on the flat is reasonable, and his overall condition is clearly not such as to significantly impede his reasonable mobility. Arguably it is in his interests to mobilise as much as possible. OTHER MEDICAL ISSUES The applicant has in the past been prescribed other medications which are minor in nature – Loratadine, Nasonex and Sodium Cromoglycate used for hay fever/allergies; Trimotheprim used for urinary infection; and Hyoscine and Propanolol, both minor drugs with multiple uses. None of these indicate any condition of any severity or relevance to housing. In summary, none of the above medical issues, either singly or as a whole, are considered such as to significantly impede reasonable function and I continue to make no housing recommendations.”
“There are four separate circumstances in which a person may be in priority need but I am satisfied that three of these (pregnant women, persons with whom dependant children reside or who might reasonably be expected to reside with and persons whose homelessness resulted as an emergency, such as fire or flood) do not apply to your circumstances. As you are aware, your current homelessness arose as a result of your eviction from your home. Hence you did not cease to occupy accommodation as a result of violence. You have not notified us of the existence of a dependant child for the purposes of this application. I note that your application to the Council was made without dependants. This was confirmed in an interview at this office on20th August 2003 and26th August 2003 . Further, I have considered whether you are vulnerable as a result of an institutionalised background or remand. You have not specified any involvement with the Criminal Justice System in relation to previous arrests or a custodial sentence. Hence this category is not relevant to you. Additionally you have not served in the armed forces or being in foster care. The one remaining category of priory need relates to whether you can be considered to be a vulnerable person as a result of old age, mental illness, handicap, physical disability or other special reason. The circumstances of your case are such that this category is relevant and I have therefore carefully considered whether it applies to your circumstances. I note from Rv. LB Camden ex p Pereira (May 1998) that the test case which should be applied when assessing vulnerability under Section 192(2) of the above Act is whether the applicant is, when homeless, less able to fend for himself than his/her peers so that injury detriment to him/her will result when a less vulnerable person would be able to cope without harmful effects. In my review of your case, I have firstly noted that you are now aged 43 years old. You have made your own housing arrangements to date, prior to this application. You are also capable of seeking and understanding any advice given by and Advice agency or Legal services organisation. You have specified that you have medical problems for consideration in your application. Your medical problems as contained in your hospital reports, information from your GP, Dr Sultan, and your Psychologist have been referred to this council’s Medical Adviser for a recommendation. These letters and reports confirm that you have been diagnosed as suffering from a depressive illness, a back problem, and type 2 mellitus diabetes. The recommendation from the Medical Adviser confirms that such treatment is at a low level. You have been referred to a Psychologist and to the Royal Orthopaedic Hospital for a physiotherapy assessment and treatment. I note your GP’s comments in his letter dated14th April 2004 to your solicitors that you suffer from severe mental depression with suicidal thoughts. However, this has been treated at low level with ‘amitriptyline’ alone, which is a minor and outdated antidepressant drug and has been largely superseded in modern clinical practice. He also states that you are being treated by a “psychiatrist”
“His health condition is deteriorating and becoming worse.”
“I can confirm that I have referred Mr Kamel Bellouti to see a psychiatrist. Mr Bellouti is depressed. His concentration is poor. He has a loss of libido and a loss of interest in life. He is lethargic and sleepless. He has suicidal ideas and thinks of ending his life. He has no energy. He breaks down weeping. He has partial insight with suicidal ideas. I have also referred Mr Bellouti to The Royal National Orthopaedic Hospital because of the severe pain in his neck and back which is affecting his movement. Lastly I also referred Mr Bellouti to St George’s Hospital because of his diabetes. He is developing Charcot’s joints, and has peripheral neuropathic symptoms and signs.”
“20. Mr Colville argues that Mr Adelaja wrongly took into account the initial report obtained from Dr Keen because the correct question was not asked, and even if it had been, Mr Adelaja gave no reason for preferring Dr Keen’s opinion to that of Dr Sultan. I have already commented on the first part of that submission. Mr Adelaja was clearly entitled to take into account Dr Keen’s assessment of Mr Bellouti’s mental and physical condition, whatever the actual question which drew his answers. As to the second part of that submission, the review letter clearly gives detailed consideration to all the medical reports that had been submitted and throughout states Mr Adelaja’s assessment of Mr Bellouti’s physical and mental condition. He was, of course, entitled to rely on the grounds Dr Keen put forward for differing from Dr Sultan if he considered that those grounds were cogent, as plainly he did. 21. Mr Colville further submits that Mr Adelaja considered each aspect of Mr Bellouti’s medical condition separately, but nowhere considered the overall effect of the individual matters of which he complained. That is to overlook not only the fact that Mr Adelaja gave consideration to every matter advanced, but also the express statement, which I have already quoted: “I have applied all of the above facts, together with your current social circumstances, to the question of vulnerability, in line with the established interpretation of that concept within the meaning of the above-named legislation.” 22. Mr Colville further submits that Mr Adelaja should have sought further reports before reaching his conclusion. Wandsworth, he points out, obviously thought it was relevant to obtain a report from the Royal Hospital but never did so. In the absence of a report from the Royal Hospital, the letters that had been sent by it gave a clear indication of the reason why Mr Bellouti had been treated there, and what the follow up had been. In R v Royal Borough of Kensington & Chelsea ex parte Bayani(1990) 22 HLR 4066 it was held by the Court of Appeal: “(1) the duty to make enquires is to make such inquires as are necessary to satisfy the authority. As it is the authority which has to be satisfied, the scope and scale of the inquires is primarily at least a matter for them. However, the inquires must be those which are necessary to enable the authority to make a decision. (2) if the court is to intervene by way of judicial review, it must be on the basis that the inquiries have not reached the required standard in the circumstances of the case. The appropriate test in a case of possible intentional homelessness is whether a reasonable authority having made the inquires and only the inquires which the authority in question in fact made could have been satisfied that the applicant was homeless intentionally. If a reasonable authority could not have been so satisfied, the necessary inquires will not have been made.” 23. Not having received the requested report from the Royal National, it was for the review officer to decide whether he was in a position to make a fair and reasonable assessment without it. He clearly took the view that he was. I can see no ground for holding that he acted unreasonably in coming to that conclusion. It is to be noted that Mr Bellouti himself, or through his solicitors, could have obtained a report from the Royal Hospital either for the original decision or for the review or on this appeal. In the absence of such a report, there is no ground for me to conclude that even if a report had been obtained, it would have contained any material that would have made any difference to the outcome. 24. Mr Colville also submits that Dr Keen’s last report raised additional matters upon which Mr Bellouti and/or Dr Sultan should have been asked to comment. The toing and froing between Dr Sultan and Dr Keen had to stop somewhere. Dr Sultan had written five letters to Wandsworth. He had fully set out his assessment of Mr Bellouti. Wandsworth had asked Dr Keen to comment on all of them. Again, it was for the review officer to determine whether he had sufficient material to make a fair and reasonable assessment. There are no grounds for holding that he acted unreasonably in acting upon the material he in fact had before him, or for concluding that even if further comments had been requested from either Mr Bellouti or Dr Sultan, anything material would have resulted. 25. Finally, I deal with Mr Colville’s submission that Mr Adelaja wrongly applied the test in Pereira. He points firstly to that part of the review letter where Mr Adelaja states: “I note from R v London Borough of Camden ex parte Pereira (May 1998) that the test which should be applied when it is assessing vulnerability under Section 192(2) of the above Act is whether the applicant is, when homeless, less able to fend for himself than his/her peers so that injury detriment to him/her will result when a less vulnerable person would be able to cope without harmful effects.”
“I am satisfied that you are not at greater risk of injury or detriment in the situation of homelessness in comparison with other and assumed average homeless people, and, as an indication of vulnerability”
“I note from R v London Borough of Camden ex parte Pereira (May 1998) that the test which should be applied when it is assessing vulnerability under Section 192(2) of the above Act is whether the applicant is, when homeless, less able to fend for himself than his/her peers so that injury detriment to him/her will result when a less vulnerable person would be able to cope without harmful effects.”
“I am satisfied that you are not at greater risk of injury or detriment in the situation of homelessness in comparison with other and assumed average homeless people, and, as an indication of vulnerability”
“35. Before considering the precise nature of the legal question for application by the Council, I should set out the material terms of section 189, which specifies who has a priority need for accommodation, namely – “(a) a pregnant woman or a person with whom she resides or might reasonably be expected to reside;(b) a person with whom dependent children reside or might reasonably be expected to reside;(c) a person who is vulnerable as a result of old age, mental illness or handicap or physical disability or other special reason, or with whom such a person resides or might reasonably be expected to reside;(d) a person who is homeless or threatened with homelessness as a result of an emergency such as flood, fire or other disaster." 36. In the exercise of its functions relating to homelessness and its prevention a local housing authority or social services authority is required by section 182 of the 1996 Act to “have regard to such guidance as may from time to time be given by the Secretary of State”
“The critical test of vulnerability for applicants in all these categories is whether, when homeless, the applicant would be less able to fend for himself than the ordinary homeless person so that he would be likely to suffer injury or detriment, in circumstances where a less vulnerable would be able to cope without harmful effects In considering whether such applicants are vulnerable, factors that a housing authority may well wish to take into account are: (i) the nature and extent of the illness or disability which may render the applicant vulnerable; and (ii) the relationship between the illness or disability and the individual's housing difficulties.” 37. Earlier guidance was in substantially similar terms and eventually found its expression in the classic test of Hobhouse LJ (as he then was) in Pereira on the meaning of the word “vulnerable” insection 59(1)(c) of the Housing Act 1985 , the predecessor of section 189(1)(c). In order properly to analyse the rival submissions in this case, I should set out, with some emphases of my own, the bulk of the passage in Hobhouse LJ's judgment, at 330, with which Waller LJ and Robert Walker LJ (as he then was) agreed, in which his expression of the test appears: “… The Ortiz test should not be used: the dictum of Simon Brown LJ in that case should no longer be considered good law (The same applies to what Mann J. said in Di Dominico). The council must consider whether Mr Pereira is a person who is vulnerable as a result of mental illness or handicap or for other special reason. Thus, the council must ask itself whether Mr Pereira is, when homeless, less able to fend for himself than an ordinary homeless person so that injury or detriment to him will result when a less vulnerable man would be able to cope without harmful effects. The application of this test must not be confused with the question whether or not the applicant is at the material time homeless. If he is not homeless, the question whether he is in priority need becomes academic. The question under paragraph (c) can only arise if (or on the assumption that) he is at the material time homeless. A particular inability of a person suffering from some handicap coming within paragraph (c) to obtain housing for himself can be an aspect of his inability as a homeless person to fend for himself. Such an individual may suffer from some mental or physical handicap which makes him unable to cope with homelessness in a way which does not apply to the ordinary homeless person. But it is still necessary, as is illustrated by the decided cases, to take into account and assess whether in all the circumstances the applicant's inability to cope comes within paragraph (c). It must appear that his inability to fend for himself whilst homeless will result in injury or detriment to him which would not be suffered by an ordinary homeless person who was able to cope. The assessment is a composite one but there must be this risk of injury or detriment. If there is not this risk, the person will not be vulnerable. In so far as the judgments of Hodgson J. in Sangeramano and Webster J. in Carroll might be thought to suggest something different, those dicta should not be followed.” 38. I draw the following conclusions about section 189(1)(c) and that formulation of its meaning: 1) It is section 189(1)(c) in its broad and immediate statutory context that a local housing authority has to apply, not the Pereira test as if it were a statutory formulation. The Pereira test is simply a judicial guide - albeit and to the extent that it is sufficiently precise, an important one - to interpretation and application of the statutory provision. 2) The broad statutory context involves, as Hobhouse LJ noted at page 320 of his judgment in Pereira, by reference to observations of Lord Brightman in ex p Pulhofer[1986] AC 484 , 517 and Lord Hoffmann in O'Rourke v Camden LBC[1990] 3 WLR 86 , at 90: first, a matter of “priority” as between homeless persons; and second, a scheme of social welfare conferring benefits at public expense on grounds of public policy on those whom it identifies as entitled to such priority. 3) The scheme of the section is not to establish whether an applicant is homeless, but to establish whether he is a person whom the local housing authority believes to be homeless and eligible for assistance has a priority need entitling him to assistance. It does that by defining a number of circumstances, one of which is vulnerability, by which he may qualify as a person having a priority need. 4) Pereira establishes that a person is vulnerable for the purpose if he has such a lesser ability than that of a hypothetically “ordinary homeless person” to fend for himself that he would suffer greater harm from homelessness than would such a person. One has only to attempt to apply the Pereira test to any particular case by asking the question whether the applicant would, by reason of whatever condition or circumstances assail him, suffer greater harm from homelessness than an “ordinary homeless person”, to see what a necessarily imprecise exercise of comparison it imposes on a local housing authority. Given that each authority is charged with local application of a national scheme of priorities put against its own burden of homeless persons and finite resources, such decisions are often likely to be highly judgmental. In the context of balancing the priorities of such persons a local housing authority is likely to be better placed in most instances for making such a judgment. 5) In its immediate context, Pereira established that a homeless applicant’s lesser ability than that of “an ordinary homeless person” to fend for himself in finding suitable accommodation may, on its own or in combination with other circumstances, amount to vulnerability for this purpose. However, the test does not impose as the sole, or even an integral, requirement of the notion of fending for oneself that an applicant should also be less able than normal to fend for himself in finding accommodation. I derive that proposition, not only from the context of the other categories of those qualifying for priority for which section 189(1) provide and which could not logically be so confined, but also from the following consideration of Hobhouse LJ's judgment against the backcloth of authorities to which he referred. a) Hobhouse LJ began his judgment by mooting the possibility that "vulnerability" as defined in paragraph (c) is not general vulnerability but is confined to the effect of any of its manifestations described in that paragraph on a homeless person's ability to find a home without statutory assistance. Thus, he said, at pages 319 and 320: “… Within section 59(1) there is a potential contrast. Paragraphs (a), (b) and (d) do not touch upon the ability of a person to find accommodation without assistance. A pregnant woman has a priority need for accommodation simply by reason of her being pregnant. It is irrelevant to her qualifying as a person with priority need that she has an unimpaired ability to find and obtain accommodation suitable to her needs. By contrast the word ‘vulnerable’ used in paragraph (c) at least potentially may raise the question whether there is some special reason which peculiarly handicaps the relevant person in obtaining suitable accommodation, indeed this may be the primary source of his vulnerability.” (my emphases) b) It is apparent from his judgment at pages 320 and 321 that he was influenced in considering that tentative distinction by the reasoning of the Court, given by Waller LJ in R v Waveney Council, ex p Bowers[1983] 1 QB 238 , which was adopted by the Secretary of State as part of his guidance to which, bysection 71 of the 1985 Act (see now section 182 of the 1996 Act and the current guidance), local housing authorities are required to have regard in the exercise of their functions. It is from such reasoning, its treatment by subsequent authorities and the guidance that he drew the test that he formulated on page 330 of his judgment (see paragraph 38 above). c) However, the treatment of the guidance in a number of first instance authorities to which he went on to refer was variously: to regard it: 1) as expanding or going beyond the meaning of an ability to "fend for oneself when homeless so as to include a consideration of an ability to find and keep accommodation – ex p Sangeramano(1984) 17 HLR 94 , per Hodgson J; and ex p Carroll(1987) 20 HLR 142 , per Webster J; or 2) as confining it to such consideration, that is, vulnerability in the housing market – ex p Di Dominico(1987) 20 HLR 153 , per Mann J (as he then was). The latter meaning was approved, though extended by Simon Brown LJ in Ortiz v City of Westminster(1993) 27 HLR 364 , in refusing leave to appeal so as to make it one of two essential requirements, the other being greater suffering than most if the applicant fails to obtain suitable accommodation. d) The uncertainty left by these authorities was considered but not clearly resolved by this Court in R v Kensington & Chelsea LBC, ex p Kihara(1996) 29 HLR 147 , in which Simon Brown LJ, whilst expressing doubts as to the cumulative nature of the two requirements he had suggested in Ortiz, expressed the view that either might do, though less ability than an ordinary homeless person to find accommodation might “on occasion have more to do with whether or not the applicant is truly homeless”
“… Within section 59(1) there is a potential contrast. Paragraphs (a), (b) and (d) do not touch upon the ability of a person to find accommodation without assistance. A pregnant woman has a priority need for accommodation simply by reason of her being pregnant. It is irrelevant to her qualifying as a person with priority need that she has an unimpaired ability to find and obtain accommodation suitable to her needs. By contrast the word ‘vulnerable’ used in paragraph (c) at least potentially may raise the question whether there is some special reason which peculiarly handicaps the relevant person in obtaining suitable accommodation, indeed this may be the primary source of his vulnerability.” (my emphases) b) It is apparent from his judgment at pages 320 and 321 that he was influenced in considering that tentative distinction by the reasoning of the Court, given by Waller LJ in R v Waveney Council, ex p Bowers[1983] 1 QB 238 , which was adopted by the Secretary of State as part of his guidance to which, by section 71 of the 1985 Act (see now section 182 of the 1996 Act and the current guidance), local housing authorities are required to have regard in the exercise of their functions. It is from such reasoning, its treatment by subsequent authorities and the guidance that he drew the test that he formulated on page 330 of his judgment (see paragraph 38 above). c) However, the treatment of the guidance in a number of first instance authorities to which he went on to refer was variously: to regard it: 1) as expanding or going beyond the meaning of an ability to "fend for oneself when homeless so as to include a consideration of an ability to find and keep accommodation – ex p Sangeramano(1984) 17 HLR 94 , per Hodgson J; and ex p Carroll(1987) 20 HLR 142 , per Webster J; or 2) as confining it to such consideration, that is, vulnerability in the housing market – ex p Di Dominico(1987) 20 HLR 153 , per Mann J (as he then was). The latter meaning was approved, though extended by Simon Brown LJ in Ortiz v City of Westminster(1993) 27 HLR 364 , in refusing leave to appeal so as to make it one of two essential requirements, the other being greater suffering than most if the applicant fails to obtain suitable accommodation. d) The uncertainty left by these authorities was considered but not clearly resolved by this Court in R v Kensington & Chelsea LBC, ex p Kihara(1996) 29 HLR 147 , in which Simon Brown LJ, whilst expressing doubts as to the cumulative nature of the two requirements he had suggested in Ortiz, expressed the view that either might do, though less ability than an ordinary homeless person to find accommodation might “on occasion have more to do with whether or not the applicant is truly homeless”
“The question we have to consider is whether or not the applicant is vulnerable and secondly whether the vulnerability is as a result of old age, mental illness or handicap or physical or other special reason. Dealing first with the meaning of “vulnerable,” vulnerable literally means “may be wounded” or “susceptible of injury” (see The Concise Oxford Dictionary, 6th ed. (1976), p.1305). In our opinion, however, vulnerable in the context of this litigation means less able to fend for oneself so that injury or detriment will result when a less vulnerable man will be able to cope without harmful effects. …. When approaching the test of vulnerability it is necessary to look at other examples. A pregnant woman is an obvious example, old age is another, although the vulnerability of a man aged 65 is not quite so obvious. An individual who is deaf or dumb is another. In this case if the applicant’s problems arose solely because of his drink problem, it would be very difficult to say that his condition arose from mental illness or handicap, etc., but it is not the sole cause. It would appear from the affidavit of the local authority that particular reliance was placed on the words “substantially disabled mentally or physically” in the Code of Guidance and that led them to the conclusion that accommodation only had to be provided for those in substantial need. It was also suggested in the course of the argument that the case had to be brought within one or other of the categories mentioned in section 2 (1) (c). In our judgment this was not the correct approach. The first question which has to be considered is whether or not there is vulnerability. If there is vulnerability, then does it arise from those matters which are set out within section 2 (1) (c)? It may not arise from any single one but it may arise from a combination of those causes.”
“The question before me is not whether the defendant made adequate inquiries of third persons for this purpose. Indeed, it would be difficult to assert that the defendant failed to make any such inquiry that any reasonable authority would have made. The point is rather whether, when inquiries of third persons yield significant information inconsistent with that provided by the applicant, which will substantially affect the decision of the local authority, the local authority must put that information to the applicant and give him an opportunity to comment on it.”
“The information provided by the claimants’ GP is significant, and has materially affected Mr Cruickshank’s conclusions. It follows that the defendant may not lawfully finally decide whether any particular accommodation is suitable for the claimants without taking into account their responses, now in evidence, to their GP’s letters.”