“They’re going to most likely be doing the same thing as they did last year.”
“HB: Right, that’s what we gotta keep doing, just keep, I gotta bite the bullet lose the back and move it forward. CG: Yeah! HB: And also lighten up so if it rallies I have what to sell? CG: Yeah, you have something left to sell, yeah indeed.” and “HB: Well we started to bite the bullet a little bit and if we do it every day I don’t think it will be a problem. CG: Yeah! HB: What d’you think? CG: . . . I think it’s absolutely right. HB: Everybody’s waiting for it to run up and . . . I’m not sure it will run up and I’m not sure what the hell’s gonna happen, so if we lighten up a bit, if we keep moving everything forward, they can’t squeeze us.” “HB: Right, that’s what we gotta keep doing, just keep, I gotta bite the bullet lose the back and move it forward. CG: Yeah! HB: And also lighten up so if it rallies I have what to sell? CG: Yeah, you have something left to sell, yeah indeed.” and “HB: Well we started to bite the bullet a little bit and if we do it every day I don’t think it will be a problem. CG: Yeah! HB: What d’you think? CG: . . . I think it’s absolutely right. HB: Everybody’s waiting for it to run up and . . . I’m not sure it will run up and I’m not sure what the hell’s gonna happen, so if we lighten up a bit, if we keep moving everything forward, they can’t squeeze us.”
“Chancery courts had further regularly awarded interest, including not only simple interest but also compound interest when they thought that justice so demanded, that is to say in cases [(1)] where money had been obtained and retained by fraud, or [(2)] where it had been withheld or misapplied by a trustee or anyone else in a fiduciary position.”
“Two points of importance are to be observed about the law relating to the award of interest by courts of law [in 1981]. The first point is that neither the Admiralty Court nor Courts of Chancery, have awarded interest, except in respect of monies for which they were giving judgment. The second point is that the Admiralty Court never, and Courts of Chancery only in two special classes of case, awarded compound, as distinct from simple, interest.”
“Thus, it appears to me that in the Westdeutsche Landesbank case, two of their lordships were firmly of the view that the equitable jurisdiction was limited to the categories of case expressly identified by Lord Brandon in LaPintada (viz. Lord Slynn and Lord Lloyd). Two of their lordships, (Lord Goff and Lord Woolf) thought that the equitable jurisdiction was quite general, or was capable of legitimate extension to be quite general. Lord Browne-Wilkinson took fraud cases out of his analysis of the equitable jurisdiction. He did not expand upon that type of case, but otherwise he stated the law along the traditional lines to be found, for example, in the judgment of Buckley LJ in Wallersteiner v Moir (No. 2). Moreover, when faced with the submission that the equitable jurisdiction should be expanded to apply to a common law claim to which it had not been previously applied, the majority of their lordships held that they should not do so in an area where parliament had twice declined to authorise the award of compound interest.”
“In the absence of fraud courts of equity have never awarded compound interest except against a trustee or other person owing fiduciary duties who is accountable for profits made from his position. Equity awarded simple interest at a time when courts of law had no right under common law or statute to award any interest. The award of compound interest was restricted to cases where the award was in lieu of an account of profits improperly made by the trustee. We were not referred to any case where compound interest had been awarded in the absence of fiduciary accountability for a profit.”
“These authorities establish that in the absence of fraud equity only awards compound (as opposed to simple) interest against a defendant who is a trustee or otherwise in a fiduciary position by way of recouping from such a defendant an improper profit made by him.”
“I can see the force in an argument of principle that the grant of the equitable remedy of compound interest should be ancillary to an equitable cause of action either personal or proprietary, whether concurrent with common law claims or not.”