"On20 December 1999 Mr David Steele misrepresented the material fact that on signing his JSA3 form he declared that he was not in receipt of an Occupational Pension, when in fact he was in receipt of an Occupational Pension. As a consequence, Jobseeker's Allowance amounting to£1684.29 from10 December 1999 to29 March 2001 (both dates included), as detained on the schedule, was paid which would not have been paid but for the misrepresentation. Accordingly, that amount is recoverable from Mr David Steele."
"You were informed of the overpayments after the date of the bankruptcy order and you are still liable for this debt. Your bankruptcy order has now been discharged and we will now pursue recovery."
"Where it is determined that, whether fraudulently or otherwise, any person has misrepresented, or failed to disclose, any material fact and in consequence of the misrepresentation or failure - (a) a payment has been made in respect of a benefit to which this section applies; or (b) any sum recoverable by or on behalf of the Secretary of State in connection with any such payment has not been recovered, the Secretary of State shall be entitled to recover the amount of any payment which he would not have made or any sum which he would have received but for the misrepresentation or failure to disclose."
"(1)'Bankruptcy debt', in relation to a bankrupt, means... any of the following - (a) any debt or liability to which he is subject at the commencement of the bankruptcy, (b) any debt or liability to which he may become subject after the commencement of the bankruptcy (including after his discharge from bankruptcy) by reason of any obligation incurred before commencement of the bankruptcy,... (3) For the purposes of references in this Group of Parts to a debt or liability, it is immaterial whether the debt or liability is present or future, whether it is certain or contingent or whether its amount is fixed or liquidated, or is capable of being ascertained by fixed rules or as a matter of opinion; and references in this Group of Parts to owing a debt are to be read accordingly. (4) In this Group of Parts, except in so far as the context otherwise requires, 'liability' means (subject to subsection (3) above) a liability to pay money or money's worth, including any liability under an enactment, any liability for breach of trust, any liability in contract, tort or bailment and any liability arising out of an obligation to make restitution."
"Subject as follows, where a bankrupt is discharged, the discharge releases him from all the bankruptcy debts..."
"In my judgment, the liability to repay on the part of the claimant is a liability which has already arisen. In that sense it can be contrasted with a liability to pay costs which arises in future. Only the extent of enforcement of the liability and the method of enforcement are to be determined by the [Secretary of State] as actual or potential creditor of the claimant."
"(4) Even if, as Mr Arnold forcefully contends on the authority of Re Sutherland Deceased, a contingent liability can exist for insolvency purposes without any existing or underlying obligation, the discretionary nature of the court's power to order costs indicates that there is no liability, contingent or otherwise, in the absence of a court order."
"(1) Costs of legal proceedings are in the discretion of the court. Until an order for payment of costs is made there is no obligation or liability to pay them and there is no right to recover them. (2) Once legal proceedings have been commenced there is always a possibility or a risk that an order for costs may be made against a party and, in certain circumstances, even against a non-party or the representative of a party. I would accept that an order for costs is a 'contingency' which may or may not happen at some stage during or at the conclusion of the proceedings. (3) The fact that an order for costs (a) creates an obligation to pay money and (b) is a contingency in legal proceedings is not sufficient, however, to make a claim that the court should exercise its discretion to make such an order a 'contingent liability' of the person against whom such an order may ultimately be made. It is accepted that before an order is made there is no present liability to pay. Nor can there be a future liability: there is no certainty that the court will exercise its discretion to make such an order. If, as some of the authorities hold, a contingent liability must arise out of an existing or underlying liability, no such liability can exist simply by reason of a claim for costs made in a writ, summons, application or notice of appeal to the judge or to the Court of Appeal."
"In my judgement Mr Arnold's endeavour to uphold the judge founders on his inability to distinguish between liability and risk of liability. Of course when his client issued his strike-out application he exposed himself to the risk of a liability for costs contingent on the future exercise of the court's discretion when determining the pending application. The element of contingency is certainly satisfied but, in my judgment, the element of liability is not. The future exercise of the court's discretion might eliminate that risk of liability. Equally it might elevate the risk of liability into an actual liability, either present, in diem, or subject to taxation. This essential distinction between incurring a liability and exposing oneself to the risk of liability should not be undermined."
"The claim and the misrepresentation being indivisible, if the claimant lacked the capacity to make a misrepresentation, she lacked the capacity to make the claim. In that event benefit was paid to her in the mistaken belief that a claim that had not been made had been made and, there being no power to pay without a claim, is recoverable by the Secretary of State, not under section [71(1)] but on ordinary principles of restitution."