“In case of an Event of Default, the Trustee may, and shall if requested to do so in writing by holders of at least thirty per cent in principal amount outstanding of the Bonds …. and …. subject to it being secured and/or indemnified to its satisfaction, direct the Security Agent to enforce the security created in the Security Documents in favour of the Bondholders ….”
“The Trustee shall not be bound to take any proceedings mentioned in Clause 9 or any other action in relation to these presents unless respectively directed or requested to do so …. in writing by the holders of at least thirty per cent in principal amount outstanding of the Bonds and …. then only if it shall be indemnified to its satisfaction against all Liabilities to which it may thereby render itself liable or which it may incur by so doing.”
“Without prejudice to the right of indemnity by law given to trustees, the Issuer and the Guarantor shall indemnify the Trustee …. and keep it …. indemnified against all Liabilities to which it …. may be or become subject or which may be incurred by it in the execution or purported execution of any of its …. trusts, powers, authorities and discretions under these presents ….”
“The …. Trustee at its discretion may, and if so requested in writing by the holders of at least thirty per cent in principal amount outstanding of the Bonds …. shall (subject …. to being indemnified to its satisfaction), give notice to the Issuer and the Guarantor that the Bonds are, and they shall accordingly immediately become, due and repayable at their relevant redemption value, …. , upon the occurrence of any of the following events (“Events of Default”) ….”
“…. provided that in the case of paragraphs (ii) …. the …. Trustee shall have certified that such event is materially prejudicial to the interests of the Bondholders.”
“We understand that the Trustee has received instructions to accelerate the Bonds, and that it requires appropriate indemnity arrangements before it will do so. This letter is (i) to reserve our client’s rights in all respects in such matters, (ii) to call to your attention one material issue in connection with any enforcement of the Bonds, and (iii) to request a process for assuring [sic] that we have the correspondence and other information you and your clients deem relevant and an opportunity for informed and constructive discussion of Elektrim’s position with you over the next few weeks. 1. It remains the case that affiliates of [DT] have arbitration proceedings under way against Elektrim and ET and that an acceleration of the Bonds will give rise to a claim of economic impairment against Elektrim by [DT] – with the stipulated contractual remedy being that [DT] may purchase [the PTC shares] for book value. We expect this claim would arise again as a result of an acceleration of the Bonds. Any such claim (and clearly any such outcome) would severely damage the value of the PTC shares …. with direct consequences on the value of security pledged to secure the Bonds and on the prospects for full repayment on or before the maturity of the Bonds. This risk was discussed with you in the earlier restructuring in 2002; and you will recall that [DT] initiated ‘economic impairment’ claims as part of its arbitration at that time. This risk is part of the overall consideration the Trustee should give to any acceleration request (as well as to its own indemnity arrangements). Based on what we understand of the facts today – this risk remains a compelling factor against acceleration of the Bonds …”
“20. On16th April 2004 the solicitors for Elektrim wrote again to those for Concord asking for an undertaking to give 2 days notice to Elektrim before delivering an indemnity to the Trustee and for Concord to authorise the Trustee to give 2 days’ notice to Elektrim before issuing a notice of acceleration. The writer expressed the hope that such undertakings “would enable vigorous settlement negotiations to be undertaken”. 21. On Monday19th April 2004 the solicitors for Elektrim notified those for the Trustee of their clients’ intention to make an ex parte application in the Commercial Court for an injunction to restrain the Trustee from declaring the bonds to be immediately due and repayable. The solicitors for the Trustee notified those for Concord. The latter asked Elektrim to desist from applying for the injunction for 48 hours to enable them to complete consideration of the requests made by Elektrim in the letter of16th April 2004 . In the event the application for an injunction was not made. 22. On20th April 2004 the solicitors for the Trustee wrote again to those for Concord with a further draft of the indemnity it sought extended to cover any damages arising under the arbitration proceedings then threatened by Elektrim. On the same day the solicitors for Concord sought an undertaking from Elektrim that it would not arrange for the sale of ET’s stake in PTC. It was not given. 23. On23rd April 2004 the solicitors for Concord sent to the Trustee and its solicitor an indemnity “which we believe is in satisfactory form” executed by both Concord and Elliott Associates LP. They indicated that they expected the Trustee to accelerate the bonds that day and emphasised that the Trustee should not tell Elektrim of the delivery of the indemnity and imminent acceleration. The indemnifier was Concord and its obligations were guaranteed by Elliott Associates LP. The form had not been negotiated between the solicitors for the Trustee and Concord. Later that day the solicitors for the Trustee replied to the effect that the Trustee had expected a joint and several indemnity from Acciona and Elliott Associates and wanted legal opinions as to the validity of the obligations undertaken by the Elliott companies. Later still the solicitors for Concord sent to those for the Trustee on a strictly privileged and confidential basis audited financial information relating to Elliott Associates LP. 24. Further exchanges between the solicitors for the Trustee and Concord took place later in the evening of 23rd April. The former pointed out a number of features of the form of indemnity submitted by Concord with which it did not agree. The latter supplied the legal opinions previously requested. On Monday26th April 2004 the solicitors for Concord wrote commenting on the form of indemnity sought by the Trustee. They suggested that some of the provisions sought by the Trustee went beyond what was reasonable and asked the Trustee to point out all the specific provisions which it found unreasonable and their reasoned justification for those findings. On the same day Elliott Associates LP wrote to the Trustee undertaking to give the Trustee 10 days’ prior notice of any return to partners of 50% or more of total partners’ capital. 25. On27th April 2004 the solicitors for the Trustee warned those for Concord that the Trustee was not then satisfied with the indemnity on the financial front, particularly in view of the length of time that litigation arising out of an acceleration might last. On28th April 2004 the solicitors for Concord wrote a long letter responding to the various points made by the Trustee and enclosing a further deed of indemnity executed by both Concord and Elliott Associates LP. They asked the solicitors for the Trustee “to confirm by return that the Trustee will now accelerate the bonds without further delay”
“Unfortunately, in these circumstances Law Debenture are not able to reach the conclusion that the indemnity proffered is satisfactory. The magnitude of the liabilities which may be incurred by acceleration are such that unfortunately the Trustee requires greater comfort than Elliott has to date provided. The Trustee still has a number of concerns including the uncertainty surrounding the level and composition of Elliott’s assets from time to time and, in particular, the fact that these may be affected by matters such as the possibility that capital can be withdrawn and that Elliott may not be ready to liquidate assets to meet any demand. This uncertainty is not acceptable to the Trustee. As a result, the Trustee has reached the conclusion that in order to accelerate without delay a guarantee or an indemnity from a body such as a major clearing bank is required. This is in no way a comment on Elliott’s standing. It is simply that in these circumstances in particular given the comments made by Hunter Baker in his letter to you and to us of2 April 2004 , it is possible to see that post any acceleration, the Trustee could be in receipt of a claim for many hundreds of millions of Euro.”
“27. The claim form was duly issued on30th April 2004 . It was supported by a witness statement made the same day by Mr Roome, a partner in the solicitors acting for Concord. In paragraph 15 he criticised the attitude of the Trustee and of the points made by its solicitors. In paragraph 15.13 he dealt with the cost of providing a bank guarantee for a period of five years in the sum of€500m as between€13m and€14m per annum. On3rd May 2004 the solicitors for Concord wrote to those for the Trustee in relation to a letter from Elektrim dated29th April 2004 . They pointed out: “2. Elektrim has one valuable asset, namely its shares in ET and Carcom, which in turn hold shares in PTC, the very substantial Polish Telecommunications company. Elektrim is aware that it is contrary to the terms and conditions of the Bonds (see Condition 12(vii)) for Elektrim to sell this asset without Bondholder consent. Elektrim has nonetheless been openly negotiating for the sale of this asset. 3. The Committee of Bondholders is extremely concerned that the proceeds of any sale of the PTC shares (in breach of Condition 12(vii) of the Bonds) would be dissipated by ET and Carcom or otherwise used for purposes other than the redemption of the Bonds.” 28. On5th May 2004 the solicitors for the Trustee wrote to those for Concord at length setting out the information and protection the Trustee required. They enclosed a form of Letter of Credit. The form of Letter of Credit was in a sum of€1bn . for a period of 12 years. They concluded “For the avoidance of doubt, we should make clear that given the possible scale of liabilities and the duration of the risk an unsupported indemnity from Elliott Associates LP will not satisfy [the Trustee].”
“In considering the form of indemnity provided to it, the Trustee naturally considered the possible liabilities which might arise against it if it were to take the step of accelerating the Bonds. Elektrim has made it clear …. that it contends that there has been no ‘Event of Default’ entitling the Trustee to serve an acceleration notice and has threatened to seek damages in the event that such a notice is served.” (Emphasis supplied)
“Elektrim has already threatened the Trustee with a damages claim arising from Elektrim’s contention that there has been no event of default or no event of default involving material prejudice to the bondholders.”
“The first point is this. An obvious answer for Elektrim [if] it is contested that the right to accelerate is not valid will be to say and establish in court that it is not a valid acceleration, and as a consequence it is not economically impaired. So the real likelihood is that nothing will happen if Elektrim can successfully show that acceleration was invalid, and it will litigate the position and if it is right it can establish it. If it is wrong it has no claim.”
“As I said yesterday, there are numerous hurdles, the first hurdle being that Elektrim has to establish no breach under the bond [i.e., presumably, no ‘Event of Default’]. That was the first hurdle. No events before that. Because if there was, then there could be no complaint [i.e., presumably, an acceleration under the terms of condition 12 could not give rise to a valid claim].”
“Your Lordship will see …. what Skadden Arps are saying in paragraph 1 of their letter. Acceleration of the bonds will give rise to a claim of economic impairment against Elektrim….”
“If there is no event of default, then there is no power, authority or discretion to serve the notice. That is the first argument.”
“My Lord, the next point which is made is the suggestion that the acceleration notice on its own would have no consequences. I think I have dealt with this in addressing your Lordship this morning. I repeat the point that the mere service of the acceleration notice is not the whole of the story. It is a stepping stone to further steps by the bondholders. More than that, it is itself a fact which could cause any of the creditors of the company to call in their own debts and precipitate the whole castle of cards coming down. If the trustee were to serve a notice without the right to do so we say that would be an actionable claim and it would be a breach of contract. The service of such a notice, which is capable of having such consequences, is quite different from, for example, a party to a contract just alleging that the other party is in breach. It is a public act which has obvious consequences, not a mere assertion.”
“…. it was suggested by counsel for Concord that the onus was on the Trustee to establish reasonableness. I do not agree. The onus is on the party who seeks to impugn the determination by the Trustee. Accordingly it is for Concord to establish unreasonableness in the Wendesbury sense ….”
“…. where the maximum amount [of a possible claim] is unknown the amount of any retention should be calculated on the basis of what is, on reasonable but not fanciful assumptions in favour of the trustee, the worst case. …. Thus the issue of Wednesbury unreasonableness alleged by Concord must be considered on a ‘worst case scenario’ from the point of view of the Trustee.”
“…. there is no reason to think …. that if the Trustee accelerates the bonds it may be successfully sued by Elektrim ….”
“37. Counsel for the Trustee accepted that the right conferred on the Trustee by condition 12 to be ‘indemnified’ did not entitle the Trustee to insist on security as such. His submission was that the requirement for the indemnity to be to the satisfaction of the Trustee entitled it, within the limits of Wednesbury reasonableness, to reject an indemnity if it was not suitably secured. He also accepted that Vivendi Universal had no direct claim against the Trustee in the event of a wrongful acceleration. He submitted that it could well have an indirect claim through Elektrim. 38. Counsel for the Trustee submitted that the question was not as formulated by counsel for Concord but as posed by the claim form, namely whether in the circumstances the Trustee is entitled not to be satisfied with the indemnity offered. He submitted that the answer was affirmative with the consequence that the Trustee was under no present obligation to accelerate the bonds. He contended that Elektrim had an arguable claim against the Trustee for damages for breach of contract in the event of a wrongful acceleration of the bonds which could well amount to an award of€1bn . or thereabouts. He suggested that in view of all the uncertainties it is not unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense to require the protection of the Trustee to endure for a period of 12 years. He contended that none of the clauses in the Trust Deed relied on by Concord would provide a clear and complete defence so as to make it unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense to insist on an indemnity.”
‘Could an acceleration give rise to a cause of action, and if so for what?’
“39. If the answer to this question is in the negative, as counsel for Concord submits, then the succeeding questions do not arise. The starting point is to recognise that the relationship between the Trustee and Elektrim is contractual. The contract is to be found in the terms of the Trust Deed and of the bonds. Clause 9.3 of the Trust Deed and Condition 12(ii) of the Bonds entitles the Trustee to accelerate the bonds by requiring immediate repayment if there is an event of default. Plainly any notice given under either of those provisions requiring immediate repayment in any case where there is no event of default will constitute a breach of contract. In any such event Elektrim will be entitled to damages assessed in accordance with the usual principles. 40. The submission for Concord I have summarised in paragraph 36(3)(i) above accepts that Elektrim is not bound by the judgment of Peter Smith J to the effect that the suspension of the nominated director constituted an event of default. But counsel submitted that it is fanciful to suggest that another judge is likely to reach any different conclusion. This submission presupposes that Elektrim would not be in a position to adduce any further evidence or different submissions to those advanced before Peter Smith J. But this is not an assumption the Trustee is required to make. The letter dated2nd April 2004 from the solicitors for Elektrim, which I have quoted in paragraph 19 above, contains a clear indication that Elektrim would adduce further evidence including evidence of the law of Poland. 41. Accordingly it is necessary to consider what level of award might be made against the Trustee in the event of Elektrim successfully alleging that there was no event of default entitling the Trustee to accelerate the bonds. The contention of the Trustee is based on the matters referred to in paragraph 5 above. The Trustee contends that the letter from the solicitors for Elektrim dated2nd April 2004 and the letter from the solicitors for Concord both indicate that there is an agreement or agreements between Elektrim and DT to the effect that if DT can establish that Elektrim has become economically impaired then DT is entitled to acquire the 51% shareholding in PTC it does not already own at book value. The Trustee submits that an acceleration, even if wrongful, may well give rise to such impairment, not least by causing creditors of Elektrim themselves to insist on prompt repayment. 42. Counsel for Concord submits that such suggestions are fanciful. She contends that an invalid acceleration could not give rise to economic impairment. She points out that Elektrim does not hold the 51% shareholding in PTC so that no loss would be sustained by Elektrim even if DT did succeed in establishing economic impairment of Elektrim. 43. In my view the submissions of Counsel for the Trustee cannot be stigmatised as fanciful. The agreement or agreements between DT and Elektrim have not been adduced in evidence in this action. The best evidence, and allowing a good deal of latitude in recognition of the need to have regard to ‘the worst case scenario’, is that DT has the right to acquire the outstanding 51% of the shares in PTC at book value. Whether the test is ‘economic impairment’ or whether that is a convenient shorthand for the various insolvency procedures available to creditors of Elektrim is unclear. Further there is no evidence as to what the insolvency processes would be under the law of Poland. Either way it seems to me to be plain that there is a risk that a wrongful acceleration of the bonds could give rise to whatever is the exact event which triggers the right of DT to acquire the shares in PTC. 44. If the right of DT does arise then will it give rise to some loss and if so to whom? In particular can that loss underpin an award of damages for a comparable amount in favour of Elektrim against the Trustee? Plainly if the true value of the 51% holding in PTC is greater than book value then a loss equivalent to the difference will be sustained by the present holders of that 51%, namely ET and Carcom. Counsel for Concord submits that such a loss, which she does not accept, could not be recoverable either directly or indirectly by Elektrim. As she points out, whatever may have been the position when the agreement between DT and Elektrim was concluded, Elektrim now holds only one share in PTC. 45. Plainly the loss, if any, will be sustained directly by the present shareholders in PTC, namely ET and Carcom. But Elektrim holds 49% of the shares in both those companies, the remaining 51% being held by Vivendi Universal. If a substantial and corresponding loss is sustained by ET and Carcom because of the loss of the PTC shares at book value then it may diminish the value of their shares in the hands of Elektrim. Such a loss is, in principle, recoverable by Elektrim against the Trustee in respect of the assumed breach by the Trustee of the contract between the Trustee and Elektrim. 46. Counsel for the Trustee submits that it should not be assumed that the loss arising from the exercise of the pre-emption right of DT over the PTC shares attributable to the 51% shareholding of Vivendi Universal in ET and Carcom is not recoverable by Vivendi from Elektrim and by Elektrim from the Trustee. He points out that there is a partnership between Elektrim and Vivendi Universal constituted by an agreement dated28th June 2001 of which no details are available. He suggests that it is more than likely that under the agreement Elektrim has provided some protection to Vivendi Universal to protect the latter from the PTC shares being removed from ET and Carcom at an undervalue. It seems to me that this is a good deal more speculative but unless and until the Trustee has been provided with a copy of all the relevant underlying documents I do not see why it should be required to assume that any loss sustained by Vivendi Universal cannot be recovered from Elektrim and by Elektrim from the Trustee if the cause of the shares being taken by DT is economic impairment triggered by an unjustified acceleration of the bonds.”
“47. The amount of the loss is also hotly disputed. For the Trustee counsel relies on an announcement made on16th September 2003 of an offer by DT to buy from ET and Carcom their 51% holding in PTC for€1.1bn . The sale did not proceed but, it is submitted, the offer is some indication of the open market value of 51% of the shares. The Trustee also tentatively suggested in its letter to Concord’s solicitor dated5th May 2004 that the book value might be as low as€100m ; but it got no response. It is the difference between these two figures which led the Trustee to suggest that the amount of the letter of credit it sought should be€1bn . 48. Counsel for Concord challenged both figures. With regard to the open market value she suggested that, as the press release which gave the bid price as€1.1bn . also showed, only€400m or 36% would have been due to Elektrim. This is true, but of the remaining€700m €691m or 63% of the whole was due to Vivendi Universal. Thus 99% would have been due to Elektrim and Vivendi Universal together. With regard to the book value counsel for Concord relied on the annual report and accounts of PTC for the year 2003, which are available on the web but in Polish, as showing that the book value of the PTC shares is the equivalent of€439m . But that would be the book value for 100% of the shares in PTC; the book value for 51% is€224m . The conclusion counsel for Concord invited me to reach is that the estimate of potential liability at€1bn is so absurd as to indicate clearly how unreasonably the Trustee has approached the whole question of indemnity. 49. I do not reach that conclusion. The figures are high but they are more than mere speculation. In the absence of any better evidence I do not see why the open market value of 51% of the PTC shares should not be taken to be€1.1bn or thereabouts. Even if it is correct at this stage to fix the book value at€224m . this still gives rise to a loss to Elektrim and Vivendi Universal together of€876m or thereabouts. Accordingly I conclude, in answer to the question I posed at the beginning of this section, that on the basis of such information as is now available and on a worst case scenario a wrongful acceleration could give rise to a claim by Elektrim against the Trustee for damages in the region of€876m or thereabouts.”
‘Is a claim by Elektrim against the Trustee precluded by the terms of the Trust Deed?’
“58. For all these reasons I consider that none of the clauses on which Concord relies could provide a clear and unambiguous defence to the claims of Elektrim. It follows that in considering the adequacy or otherwise of the indemnity offered by Concord the Trustee was entitled to consider that it was potentially liable for€876m or thereabouts.”
‘Was the indemnity offered adequate?’
“65. Reverting to the issue between counsel as to what is the question the court is required to answer, it is not, in my view, whether or not the Trustee was justified in seeking an indemnity by means of a letter of credit in the sum of€1bn . Rather it is whether the Trustee was Wednesbury unreasonable in concluding that the indemnities offered on 23rd and28th April 2004 were unsatisfactory. For the reasons I have given, in my judgment, the answer to that question is in the negative. Accordingly I dismiss this application.”
“A rightly rejected demand for delivery by one who is not entitled to delivery is an act devoid of legal significance.” (Emphasis supplied)
“A ‘demand’ made without any basis for making it or insisting upon compliance is not in reality a demand at all. …. It is a request which can be voluntarily acceded to or refused as the person to whom it is made may choose.”
“The primary risk borne by lenders who incorrectly invoke a MAC clause is liability for damages suffered by the borrower. Whether or not they acted in the good faith belief that a material adverse change had occurred may not be a defence. It is thus incumbent on lenders deciding whether to invoke a MAC clause in uncertain circumstances to consider the impact on the borrower, and therefore their liability. The most potentially serious remedy is terminating lending commitments and accelerating loans. These actions could trigger cross-default provisions in other financings and result in a bankruptcy of the borrower, with potential liability for the loss of its going concern value. ….”
“Plainly any notice given under [condition 12] requiring immediate repayment in any case where there is no event of default will constitute a breach of contract.” (Emphasis supplied)