“(1) If in the course of the winding up of a company it appears that any business of the company has been carried on with intent to defraud creditors of the company or creditors of any other person, or for any other fraudulent purpose, the following has effect. (2) The court, on the application of the liquidator, may declare that any persons who were knowingly parties to the carrying of the business in the manner above-mentioned are to be liable to make such contributions (if any) to the company’s assets as the court thinks proper.”
“7 Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (SA) was incorporated in Luxembourg in 1972. Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd (Overseas) was incorporated in the Cayman Islands in 1975. Both were formed to carry on the business of banking and were duly authorised in the jurisdictions of their respective incorporation. The former but not the latter was also authorised to carry on the business of banking in the United Kingdom. In 1976 both of them became subsidiaries of BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) SA (Holdings). The moving spirit behind BCCI was Mr Agha Hasan Abedi. The businesses of SA and Overseas were both similar and intermingled. As is now notorious the group collapsed in 1991 and all three companies are now in compulsory winding up in at least one jurisdiction (paras 3-15 of the points of claim). 8. Mr Abedi was also concerned with International Credit and Investment Co Ltd, a company incorporated in Liechtenstein in 1973, the successor to its business, International Credit and Investment Co Overseas Ltd, a company incorporated in the Cayman Islands in 1976 and the latter’s holding company ICIC Holdings Ltd which was also incorporated in the Cayman Islands in 1977. Unless it is necessary to distinguish between them we will refer to these companies generically as ‘ICIC’. The liquidators assert that ICIC was controlled by BCCI and was directed by Mr Abedi and other persons acting under his direction. It is alleged that ICIC was used by BCCI to hold shares in BCCI and as a vehicle for the purchase by BCCI of its own shares from BoA (paras 16-20 of the points of claim). 9. In paras 27 and 28 the liquidators set out the fraud in the conduct of the business of BCCI on which they rely and the causes of the insolvency and collapse of BCCI which they allege. The latter includes the artificial inflation of the group’s capital by the acquisition of its own shares through nominees and the declaration and capitalisation of stock dividends out of fictitious profits. Paragraphs 29 to 33 deal with the initial capital of BCCI on its formation. Paragraphs 34 to 80 deal with the subsequent apparent, but as alleged fictitious, increases in capital. For present purposes it is sufficient to record that SA was formed pursuant to a memorandum of understanding dated5 June 1972 which recorded that BoA would subscribe for 25% of the initial share capital of$2.5m and the management group would assume full responsibility for providing the balance. Of the balance of 75%, 60% would be subscribed by two named shareholders who would grant options over those shares to the management group. In the event the balance of 75% was subscribed by a number of individuals resident in the Middle East referred to in the points of claim as ‘the Middle East Investors’. They granted options and powers of attorney to Mr Abedi as required by the memorandum of understanding. The liquidators allege that the acquisition of such shares by the Middle Eastern Investors or some of them were funded by ‘non-performing and evergreen’ loans from BCCI which ‘were not intended to be repaid by the Middle Eastern Investors’. By June 1980, as alleged by the liquidators, the only real capital SA or Holdings had was$4.8m provided by BoA; the rest of the reported capital was fraudulently misstated. 10. In addition to being a major shareholder BoA also provided banking facilities to BCCI. As either a member in or banker to BCCI BoA carried out a number of audit and credit examinations of BCCI between 1974 and 1977. Details of these and other examinations or investigations into the affairs of BCCI are contained at paras 81 to 125 of the points of claim. In general terms they recorded the increasing concern of BoA as to its involvement with BCCI. For present purposes it is only necessary to refer to a few of them. They are a memorandum dated8 March 1977 (the March 1977 memorandum) indicating in some detail the growing concern of BoA as to the imprudent banking practices of BCCI (para 102); a confidential report dated23 September 1977 to a senior officer of BoA written by Mr Frank Winfield (the Winfield report) (para 104); a letter from Mr Poort and Mr Trueblood, who had been concerned in the credit examination of BCCI for 1977 carried out between 3 October and25 November 1977 , to the vice-president of BoA credit examination department dated12 December 1977 (the Poort and Trueblood letter) accompanying the 1977 credit examination report and the report, dated February 1978, of Mr Vaez, an examiner with BoA’s regulatory body, OCC, following a review of some of BoA’s files (the OCC memorandum). 11. In paras 126 to 158 the liquidators describe what is called the divestiture. This is the process whereby BoA disposed of its shareholding in BCCI. There are a number of material features to which we should refer. The background to the divestiture was the resolution of the executive council of BoA passed on30 November 1977 to divest from BCCI and to begin the reduction of its credit lines with a view to disengaging from BCCI in due course and the content of the Poort and Trueblood letter with the credit examination report into BCCI for 1977 sent to the senior officers of BoA on12 December 1977 . The letter had reiterated the problems of BCCI including inadequate reserves, unsatisfactory accounting records, incomplete credit files and loan collection difficulties. Eleven days later, on23 December 1977 , BoA entered into an agreement with ICIC whereby ICIC would buy the BoA’s shares in BCCI for a minimum price of$32.4m over a three year period from 1978 to 1980. The agreement contained no express provision whereby BoA would lend to ICIC the money necessary to complete the purchase. The liquidators allege that it was in fact so agreed or understood at the time. The agreement was completed by purchases over the years 1978 to 1980 and they were in fact funded by BoA pursuant to three separate loan agreements with ICIC made in June 1978, 1979 and 1980. The liquidators allege that, contrary to the various press releases and statements made by BoA at the time, the reason for the divestiture was the concern of BoA as to the banking practices of BCCI and the substantial effect of the arrangement was the repurchase by BCCI of those of its shares then held by BoA. The liquidators also allege that the ostensible loan to ICIC was repaid by BCCI by the transfer of funds to BoA’s branch office in Bahrain. 12. A summary of the liquidators’ case on fraudulent trading, divided into Case I and Case II, and BoA’s participation in both cases is contained in paras 159 to 166. Case I covers the period between 1977 and 1983, Case II covers the entire period from the time of incorporation to 1991. For the purposes of this appeal it is only necessary to note the allegations made in relation to Case I. It is alleged in para 159.3 that: ‘Between 1977 and 1983 the business of BCCI SA was carried on with intent to defraud its creditors and depositors and/or the creditors of any other person and/or for a fraudulent purpose, namely to mislead its regulators as follows . . . 159.3 The Middle Eastern Investors or some of them were nominees for Abedi (who was in turn a nominee for BCCI). The shares in BCCI Holdings registered in the names of the Middle Eastern Investors or some of them were funded by non-performing and evergreen loans booked in BCCI SA (which loans were not intended to be repaid) and therefore did not represent real capital. Further or alternatively, by recording shares in their names when they or some of them were BCCI nominees, BCCI thereby misrepresented to the regulators, its depositors and creditors, the amount of its capital and the identity of the beneficial owner of its shares.’ The alleged participation of BoA, ignoring for present purposes the separate corporate bodies, was selling the shares in BCCI, lending the repurchase price ostensibly to ICIC but in reality to BCCI and receiving repayments thereof from BCCI. 13. In paras 167 to 172 the liquidators deal with the knowledge they allege BoA to have had concerning Case I. In para 169 it is alleged: ‘In entering into the divestiture agreement and/or in receiving the divestiture payments [BoA] knew or was recklessly indifferent or deliberately blind to the fact that . . . 169.4 BCCI Holdings and/or BCCI SA was largely capitalising itself in that it owned 70% of its issued share capital alternatively owned at least 50% thereof by December 1977 by reason of the facts that : 169.4.1 The Middle Eastern Investors or some of them were nominees for Abedi (who in turn was a nominee for BCCI) and the shares registered in their names were funded by non-performing and evergreen loans provided by the BCCI Group (which loans were not intended to be repaid) . . . 169.4.2 ICIC which . . . owned 70% of the issued share capital of BCCI Holdings, (a) was not a separate entity from BCCI; (b) had no self-generated earnings and derived almost all its income from dividends which it received from BCCI most of which dividends were stock; (c) was controlled and funded by BCCI Group; (d) was used by BCCI as a vehicle to hold shares in BCCI . . .’ Paragraph 170 indicates what the liquidators will rely on in support of the allegations of knowledge contained in para 169. Paragraph 170.4 sets out in 14 sub-paragraphs, . . . , the matters relied on in support of the allegation that BoA knew that BCCI was capitalising itself through the Middle Eastern Investors or some of them. Paragraph 170.5 does the same in relation to the allegation of knowledge that: ‘(a) ICIC Overseas was not a separate operating entity from BCCI; (b) had no self-generated earnings and derived almost all its income from dividends which it received from BCCI most of which dividends were stock; (c) was controlled and funded by the BCCI Group; (d) was used by BCCI as a vehicle to hold its own shares [and to buy back the BoA Group’s shares in BCCI]; (e) could not fund out of its own resources (or those of BCCI’s management) payment for shares in BCCI which it held or the subordinated loans which it gave to BCCI Holdings or BCCI SA [or the purchase price for the BoA Group’s shares in BCCI which it purportedly bought or the repayment of the divestiture loans from BoA] and as a result (i) the real purchaser of [BoA’s] shares in BCCI Holdings was BCCI SA and/or BCCI Holdings; (ii) the real borrower of the divestiture loans was BCCI SA; (iii) the repayment of the divestiture loans would be effected by BCCI SA (as was in fact the case) and (iv) accordingly the divestiture would inevitably exacerbate BCCI SA’s underlying capital . . .’ There follow 29 paragraphs or sub-paragraphs . . . 14. In paras 173 to 186 the liquidators set out the detail of their Case II consisting of misrepresentations as to ownership and inflation of capital and earnings, the secret acquisition of control of foreign institutions, non-performing loans and bribes. The alleged knowledge of BoA is set out in detail in paragraph 187 which contains 58 paragraphs or sub-paragraphs. In paras 189 to 226 the liquidators set out further matters on which they rely as constituting the further knowing participation in the fraudulent activities of BCCI after 1978. These include the allegation that notwithstanding the resolution of the executive council of BoA passed on30 November 1997 BoA in fact increased its credit lines to BCCI. The conclusion, expressed in para 228, is that BoA is liable to contribute to the assets of BCCI the amount of the deficiency with regard to its creditors estimated to be at least$6bn .”
“It is essential to get the document database into a state as close as possible to its final form in good time for all the relevant documents to be able to be put to expert and factual witnesses, and it also essential for trial bundles to be finalised no later than the fixed date, in order that proper preparation for the trial itself, including skeleton arguments, can be carried out in a reasonably orderly and efficient way.”
“All in all I consider that to make these amendments would add to the case significantly and inappropriately, might well require additional disclosure and would require substantial additional review and analysis of the documentation required for trial. This would render unworkable the presently prescribed programme for completion of the Bank of America’s analysis of the documents and requests for inclusion in the database. That is set on a timetable, sought by the liquidators, which is tight already and should not be allowed to slip.”
“The parties shall have permission to amend the Statements of Case as follows:- 1.1 The Applicants shall have permission to re-amend the Amended Points of Claim in accordance with paragraphs 56 and 57 of the Judgment of Mr Justice Lloyd handed down on21 December 2001 (the Judgment”) . . . 1.2 The Respondents shall have permission to amend the Points of Defence, limited to a response to the Re-Amended Points of Claim and as directed in paragraph 57 of the Judgment . . . 1.3 The Applicants shall have leave to amend the Points of Reply, limited to a response to the Amended Points of Defence and as directed in paragraph 57 of the Judgment . . . 1.4 Save as aforesaid, permission to amend the Amended Points of Claim and the Points of Reply in the form of the draft before the Court is refused.”
“56. In the result I will permit the liquidators to re-amend the Amended Points of Claim, but not as they seek. It will be for their legal team to reformulate the amendments, but in principle the position is as follows: i) There will be no allegation of nomineeship in relation to any of the subscribers to the initial share capital in 1972. ii) An allegation of nomineeship on the basis already made, will be allowed to continue as regards three named subscribers to the 1973 share issue, as set out in paragraph 39 of the proposed Re-Amended Points of Claim. iii) No allegation of nomineeship will be allowed as regards any of the shares taken under the rights issues in 1977, 1978 and 1979. iv) The new formulations of the case set out in paragraphs 32B.2 and 32B.3 of the proposed Re-Amended Points of Claim may not be advanced. v) Equally, the Points of Reply may not be amended as proposed in paragraph 62.4.4 of the draft. 57. At the same time the opportunity should be taken to bring into the Points of Claim, and successive statements of case, such minor amendments as have been agreed between the parties over the last couple of years, . . .”
“By its nature case management is quintessentially a matter for the court in which the proceedings are being conducted, and the scope for intervention by an appellate court in relation to case management decisions taken by that court is necessarily limited in my view. Only in the most compelling circumstances, as I see it, would intervention of that kind be warranted.”
“Lloyd J’s error, in concluding that the amendments raised a new case, vitiated the entirety of his reasoning. Permitting the amendments would not have added to the case and would not have either broadened the scope of disclosure nor jeopardised the timetable to trial. On the contrary the proposed amendments reduced the scope of the existing allegations and would have reduced the task of preparing for trial.”
“It is common ground for the purposes of the appeal that ‘knowingly’ includes wilful blindness or reckless indifference and that to succeed on a claim under section 213 of the 1986 Act it is necessary to show that the defendant acted dishonestly.”
“159 Between 1977 and 1983 the business of BCCI SA was carried on with intent to defraud its creditors and depositors and/or the creditors of any other person and/or for a fraudulent purpose ("fraudulent trading case I") as follows: . . .”
“161. Further or alternatively, at all material times the businesses of BCCI SA and/or BCCI Overseas were carried on with intent to defraud their creditors and depositors and/or the creditors of any other person and/or for a fraudulent purpose namely to mislead the regulators of BCCI SA and/or BCCI Overseas ("fraudulent trading case II") by: 161.1 misrepresenting the ownership of BCCI Holdings' shares and/or the ultimate ownership of BCCI SA's and/or BCCI Overseas' shares; and/or 161.2 misrepresenting the amount of BCCI Holdings' share capital and/or the capital of BCCI SA and/or BCCI Overseas; and/or 161.3 . . . and by so doing prejudicing the interests of their creditors and depositors and misleading their own regulators.”
“169 In entering into the divestiture agreement and/or in receiving the divestiture payments BOA, BAC and BIFC and each of them knew or was recklessly indifferent or deliberately blind to the fact that: . . .”
“169.1 BCCI SA did not have the amount of capital which it was required to have and maintain by inter alia the LBC, alternatively BCCI SA's recorded share capital was fraudulently misstated.” . . . 169.4 BCCI Holdings and/or BCCI SA was largely capitalising itself in that it owned 70% of its issued capital alternatively owned at least 50% thereof by December1977 by reason of the facts that: 169.4.1 The Middle Eastern investors or some of them were nominees for Abedi (who was in turn a nominee for BCCI). and/or the BCCI Group and the shares registered in their names were funded by non performing and evergreen loans provided by the BCCI Group (which loans were not intended to be repaid) as pleaded in paragraphs 32, 32A, 39 and 80.4.1 above. 169.4.2 ICIC which, according to BOA’s credit examiners, owned 70% of the issued share capital of BCCI Holdings, (a) was not a separate operating entity from BCCI; (b) had no self-generated earnings and derived almost all its income from dividends which it received from BCCI most of which dividends were stock; (c) was controlled and funded by the BCCI Group; (d) was used by BCCI as a vehicle to hold shares in BCCI; and (e) could not in any event fund out of its own resources (or those of BCCI's management) (i) payment for the shares in BCCI which it held or the subordinated loans which it purportedly provided to BCCI Holdings and/or BCCI SA; (ii) payment for the shares of BAC or BIFC in BCCI Holdings which it purportedly purchased nor could it repay out of its own resources (or those of BCCI's management) any loan required to finance the said purchase. 169.4.3 BCCI SA had no other source of capital apart from BCCI Holdings, which in turn had no sources of capital outside the BOA Group as, so far as material no third party was interested in acquiring shares in BCCI Holdings.”
“170. In support of the allegations of knowledge contained in paragraph 169 above, the Applicants will rely inter alia upon the following (in the following sub-paragraphs an allegation that BOA, BAC, BIFC and each of them knew a fact includes an allegation that BOA, BAC, BIFC and each of them was recklessly indifferent or deliberately blind to the fact): 170.1 In relation to the contention that BOA, BAC, BIFC and each of them knew that BCCI SA did not have the amount of capital which it was required to have and maintain by inter alia the LBC, alternatively that BCCI SA's recorded capital was fraudulently misstated the Applicants will rely upon the facts and matters pleaded in paragraphs 170.2 to 170.5 below.”
“188 Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the Applicants will contend that BOA continued to participate in BCCI SA's and/or BCCI Overseas' fraudulent trading after 1978 in the manner alleged in paragraphs 189 to 226 below in circumstances where it knew that BCCI SA and/or BCCI Overseas were trading in the manner pleaded in paragraph 161 and 173 to 185A above or in circumstances where it had no reason to believe that BCCI SA and/or BCCI Overseas had ceased to trade in that manner, alternatively, BOA was recklessly indifferent whether or not BCCI SA and/or BCCI Overseas continued to trade in that manner, being solely interested in the profitability of its relationship with BCCI SA and/or BCCI Overseas. In support of this contention, the Applicants will rely inter alia upon the following: . . .”
“32. On incorporation, BCCI SA had a paid up capital of US$2.5 million . BOA subscribed US$500,000 . BOA's Italian subsidiary, Banca D'America E D'Italia ("BAI"), subscribed US$125,000 . (BOA and its affiliates are hereafter referred to as "the BOA Group"). The balance of the subscription money (US$1,875,000 ) was credited to a number of Middle Eastern shareholders ("the Middle Eastern investors") including Sheikh Zayed to whom US$500,000 was credited, representing 10,000 shares. The Middle Eastern investors granted Abedi call options (exercisable at any time), general powers of attorney to deal with the shares as he liked and general proxies (without instructions) to vote the shares. The terms of the call options (which inter alia empowered Abedi to sign the share register as evidence of the exercise of the call options) and powers of attorney were approved by BOA. The shares registered in the names of the Middle Eastern investors or some of them were funded by non performing and evergreen loans booked in BCCI SA, which loans were not intended to be repaid by the Middle Eastern investors. On or about28 December 1976 , Sheikh Zayed sold to ICIC 10,000 BCCI shares.”
“32A At all material times the shares held by the Middle Eastern investors or some of them pursuant to nominee and/or guaranteed buyback arrangements with Abedi were beneficially owned and/or controlled and funded by BCCI. References hereafter to the Middle Eastern investors or shareholders do not and are not intended to include Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (“ADIA”) which acquired shares in BCCI in 1981 or Sheikh Mahfouz who became a BCCI shareholder in 1986.”
“39. In order to correct its gross undercapitalisation BCCI SA resolved to double its paid up capital to US$5 million . US$500,000 was subscribed by BOA. BIFC subscribed US$125,000 . US$875,000 was credited to a new set of Middle Eastern investors funded wholly or partly by non performing and evergreen loans from BCCI SA's Abu Dhabi branch (which loans were not intended to be repaid) from which the funds were transferred to BCCI SA's account with BOA Luxembourg SA, one of BOA's subsidiaries. . . .”
“52 On or about31 December 1975 , BCCI Holdings acquired 154,000 BCCI SA shares representing 70% of BCCI SA's issued and recorded paid up share capital and issued equivalent shares in BCCI Holdings to BCCI SA's former shareholders. At the same time, the recorded share capital of BCCI Holdings was increased from US$7.7 million to US$13,697,000 by the issue of 119,940 shares for cash. ICIC Limited, which had no self-generated earnings and had a recorded net worth of less than US$100,000 , was credited with US$5,637,000 while US$360,000 was credited to two Middle Eastern investors. As a result, Abedi and/or the BCCI Group controlled all the issued share capital of BCCI Holdings pending the exchange by the BOA Group of its BCCI SA shares in return for an equivalent number of shares in BCCI Holdings. . . .”
“65. . . . on29 December 1977 , BCCI Holdings increased its recorded share capital by US$20 million (from US$30 million to US$50 million ): US$10 million by way of stock dividends; US$10 million by way of a rights issue of 200,000 US$50 shares at US$ 125 each. . . . . . . 70. In December 1978, BCCI SA again increased its recorded share capital to US$40 million by issuing 160,000 shares to BCCI Holdings for cash. At the same time, BCCI Holdings purportedly gave BCCI SA a new subordinated loan of US$15 million . . . . 71. At an extraordinary general meeting of BCCI Holdings held on22 December 1978 , the recorded share capital of BCCI Holdings was increased from US$50 million to US$70 million by a purported rights issue of 400,000 shares of US$50 each at US$125 each. . . . 76 In December 1979, the recorded share capital of BCCI Holdings was increased from US$70 million to US$90 million by (a) declaring and capitalising a stock dividend of US$5 million and (b) a rights issue of 300,000 US$50 shares (with a face value of US$15 million ) for US$125 each. The premium of US$22.5 million was credited to the "General and Other Reserves". It appears from BCCI Holdings' board minutes of a meeting held on or about28 December 1979 that the entire US$37.5 million (share capital and premium) was " transferred to a reserve account for shares to be allotted to Mr Aijaz Afridi acting for third parties ", notwithstanding that the recorded capital increase was attributed to a rights issue. . . . 77. In February 1980, the recorded share capital of BCCI Holdings was increased from US$90 million to US$95 million by the declaration and capitalisation of a US$5 million stock dividend. In or around April 1980, the recorded share capital was further increased by US$15 million to US$110 million . That increase was attributed to a rights issue of 300,000 US$50 shares for US$125 each. . . .”
“80. Notwithstanding the above purported increases of BCCI SA’s and/or BCCI Holdings' share capital or capital funds, between 1972 and June 1980, the recorded capital of BCCI SA and/or BCCI Holdings was fraudulently misstated in that the only real capital which BCCI SA and BCCI Holdings had was the capital contributed by the BOA Group totalling US$4.8 million . Further or alternatively, BCCI SA never had the amount of capital which, as a bank, it was required to have and maintain by inter alia the LBC for the following reasons: . . .”
“80.4 BCCI Holdings and/or BCCI SA was largely capitalising itself in that it owned 70% of its issued capital, alternatively owned at least 50% of its issued capital, by December 1977: 80.4.1 The Middle Eastern investors or some of them were nominees for Abedi who was in turn a nominee for BCCI and the shares registered in their names were funded by non performing and evergreen loans provided by the BCCI Group as pleaded in paragraphs 32 and 39 above, which loans were not intended to be repaid. Accordingly, the shares registered in the names of the Middle Eastern investors or some of them did not represent real capital to BCCI Holdings or BCCI SA nor were they sources of capital to BCCI Holdings or BCCI SA. Further or alternatively, by recording shares in the names of the Middle Eastern investors when they or some of them were nominees for BCCI, BCCI thereby misrepresented to its depositors, creditors and regulators the amount of its capital and the identity of the beneficial owner of its shares and/or the fact that the shares were funded and controlled by BCCI.”
“156 Throughout the period of the divestiture, the BOA Group knew that BCCI Holdings’ shares were worthless because inter alia: . . . 156.2 The only real capital was the US$4.8 million contributed by the BOA Group which had been lost. . . . . . . 158 As a result of the divestiture, BCCI Holdings owned (at least initially) all its shares, financed by BCCI SA through the misapplication of depositors’ monies.”
“65 . . . In relation to the increase of share capital, in December 1977, BCCI Holdings’ board resolved to allot the shares to Afridi for subscription on behalf of unspecified third parties. The shares allotted to Afridi were subsequently registered in the names of a number of Middle Eastern investors. Such Middle Eastern investors included Sheikh Khalifa, Prince Pahlavi, Al Soweidi, Sheikh Faisal Al Qasimi, Majid Futtaim, Sheikh Adham, Sheikh Sultan Al Qasimi, Stock Holdings, Crescent Holdings and Ghaith Pharaon, each of whom was funded by a non recourse and/or evergreen loan booked in BCCI and/or its affiliates. . . . 71. ... On10 November 1978 , BCCI Holdings’ board resolved to allot the 1978 rights shares to Afridi acting on behalf of unidentified third parties. The shares were allotted to Afridi and subsequently registered in the names of a number of Middle Eastern investors. Such Middle Eastern investors included Sheikh Khalifa, Prince Pahlavi, Al Soweidi, Sheikh Adham, Sheikh Sultan Al Qasimi, Stock Holdings, Crescent Holdings, Ali Reza and Swaleh Naqvi, each of whom was funded by a non recourse and/or evergreen loan booked in BCCI and/or its affiliates. . . . 76. ... The 1979 rights shares were allotted to Afridi and subsequently registered in the names of a number of Middle Eastern investors, including Sheikh Khalifa, Al Soweidi, Sheikh Faisal Al Qasimi, Sheikh Adham, Stock Holdings, Crescent Holdings, Swaleh Naqvi, Prince Salman Al Saud, Prince Khalid Rahman, Ghaith Pharaon, Harib bin Sultan, Prince Naif Al Saud, Ziad Shaath, Wabel Pharaon, Butti bin Bishr, A R Khalil and Mohammed Hammoud. The shares registered in the names of the identified Middle Eastern investors were funded by non recourse and/or evergreen loans booked in BCCI and/or its affiliates.”
“32A In relation to share issues by BCCI SA and/or BCCI Holdings between September 1972 and June 1980 referred to in paragraphs 32, 39, 65, 71 and 76 of these Re-Amended Points of Claim, the shares registered in the names of the Middle Eastern investors identified in those paragraphs were funded by non recourse and/or evergreen loans booked in BCCI and/or its affiliates. Such Middle Eastern investors are Sheikh Khalifa, Prince Pahlavi, Al Soweidi, Sheikh Faisal Al Qasimi, Majid Futtaim, Sheikh Adham, Sheikh Sultan Al Qasimi, Stock Holdings, Crescent Holdings, Ghaith Pharaon, Ali Reza, Swaleh Naqvi, Prince Salman Al Saud, Prince Khalid Rahman, Harib bin Sultan, Prince Naif Al Saud, Ziad Shaath, Wabel Pharaon, Butti bin Bishr, A R Khalil and Mohammed Hammoud or any of them. Such shares were held by these Middle Eastern investors or some of them pursuant to nominee and/or guaranteed buyback arrangements with Abedi and were beneficially owned and/or controlled and funded by BCCI.”
“159.3 The Middle Eastern investors identified in paragraph 32A or some of them were nominees for Abedi (who was in turn a nominee for BCCI). The shares in BCCI Holdings registered in the names of the Middle Eastern investors identified in paragraph 32A above were funded by non recourse and/or evergreen loans booked in BCCI SA, BCCI Overseas and/or BCCI’s affiliates (which loans were not intended to be repaid). . . . [*]. Accordingly, the shares registered in the names of the Middle Eastern investors identified in paragraphs 32A . . . [*] (save Sheikh Zayed) or some of them did not represent real capital. Further or alternatively, by recording shares in the names of such Middle Eastern investors when they or some of them were BCCI nominees, BCCI thereby misrepresented to the regulators, its depositors and creditors, the amount of its capital and the identity of the beneficial owner of its shares and/or the fact that the shares were funded and controlled by BCCI. [*Note: the words omitted relate to a further allegation, introduced by a proposed paragraph 32B which is outside the scope of this judgment. They are the same words as those omitted from the text of paragraph 80.4 earlier in this judgment] . . . 169 In entering into the divestiture agreement and/or in receiving the divestiture payments BOA, BAC and BIFC and each of them knew or was recklessly indifferent or deliberately blind to the fact that: . . . 169.4 BCCI Holdings and/or BCCI SA was largely capitalising itself in that it owned at least 50% of its issued capital as at31 December 1977 ,31 December 1978 ,31 December 1979 and30 June 1980 by reason of the facts that: 169.4.1 The Middle Eastern investors identified in paragraph 32A or some of them were nominees for Abedi (who was in turn a nominee for BCCI). The shares registered in the names of the Middle Eastern investors identified in paragraph 32A above were funded by non recourse and/or evergreen loans provided by the BCCI Group (which loans were not intended to be repaid) as pleaded in paragraphs 32, 32A . . . [*] 39, 65, 71, 76 and 80.4.1 above. . . . [*]. Accordingly, the shares registered in the names of the Middle Eastern investors identified in paragraphs 32A . . . [*] (save Sheikh Zayed) or some of them did not represent real capital nor were they sources of capital to BCCI Holdings or BCCI SA. Further or alternatively, by recording shares in the names of such Middle Eastern investors when they or some of them were nominees for BCCI, BCCI thereby misrepresented to its depositors, creditors and regulators the amount of its capital and the identity of the beneficial owner of its shares and/or the fact that the shares were funded and controlled by BCCI. [*Note: see earlier notes: the same words are omitted] . . . 170.4 In relation to the allegation that BOA, BAC, BIFC and each of them knew that BCCI SA and/or BCCI Holdings was capitalising itself through the Middle Eastern investors identified in paragraph 32A .. .above (save Sheikh Zayed) or some of them, the Applicants will rely inter alia upon the follow. 170.4.1 At BCCI Holdings’ board meetings in December 1977, November 1978 and December 1979, the board resolved that BCCI Holdings should undertake the 1977, 1978 and 1979 rights issues respectively. On each occasion, the board resolved to allot the rights shares to Mr Afridi (a BCCI employee) acting on behalf of unspecified third parties. On each occasion, the rights shares were allotted to Mr Afridi and subsequently registered in the names of certain Middle Eastern investors and ICIC. Among such Middle Eastern investors were those identified in paragraphs 65, 71 and 76 above, each of whom was funded by a non recourse and/or evergreen loan booked in BCCI and/or its affiliates. The manner in which BCCI Holdings’ board resolved and carried out the 1977, 1978 and 1979 rights issues, in particular, the allotment of the rights shares to Mr Afridi acting on behalf of unspecified third parties, raised real doubts as to the substance of the capital increases effected by each of those 3 rights issues. The minutes of the December 1977 BCCI Holdings board meeting at which the allotment to Mr Afridi was authorised and/or confirmed were signed by Mr Lamarche, a BOA Senior Vice President. Mr Lamarche attended the BCCI Holdings board meetings in November 1978 and December 1979 at which the 1978 and 1979 rights issues were authorised and/or confirmed.”
“ 13. Reckless indifference [ and 14. Deliberate blindness] : If it is alleged that BOA, BOA and BIFC were recklessly indifferent[/deliberately blind] in relation to any of the facts alleged in PoC [Points of Claim] paragraphs 169 and 169.4.1 [(and if and to the extent that the Liquidators intend to advance a case in relation to deliberate blindness which is different from that advanced in relation to reckless indifference)], please explain the following matters: 13.2[/14.2] The basis for the allegation that each such individual was recklessly indifferent[/deliberately blind], explaining in particular: . . . (1) Whether, and if so how and from what date, it is alleged that he actually knew any of the underlying facts and/or the contents of any of the documents pleaded in the particulars in PoC paragraphs 170.4.1 to .14 (specifying which underlying facts and contents, if not all). (2) The enquiries which it is alleged that each such individual should, if he had been acting honestly, have made as a result of having such actual knowledge, and of whom such enquiries should have been made . . .”
“13.2(f) Further, the manner in which BCCI carried out its rights issues on29 December 1977 and in December 1978 and December 1979 whereby all the shares were allotted to Mr Afridi for subscription on behalf of unspecified third parties should have raised real doubts as to the substance of the capital increases effected by the rights issues which were taken up ostensibly by ICIC and the Middle Eastern investors. The minutes of the December 1977 BCCI Holdings board meeting at which the allotment to Mr Afridi was authorised were signed by Mr Lamarche. Mr Lamarche attended the BCCI Holdings board meetings in November 1978 and December 1979 at which the 1978 and 1979 rights issues were authorised and/or confirmed. Mr Lamarche should have enquired as to the (i) identities of the unspecified third parties on whose behalf Mr Afridi was subscribing all the rights shares; and (b) [sic] the source of funding for the shares being allotted to Mr Afridi.”
“This [paragraph 32A] is a referential paragraph, bringing together matters alleged in five others: Paragraph 32 as regards the 1972 subscriptions, 39 for the 1973 issue, and 65, 71 and 76 for the rights issues in 1977, 1978 and 1979. As regards 1973, paragraph 39 is limited to refer specifically only to three shareholders who took shares on that occasion. As for the later rights issues, the Amended Points of Claim does not allege in terms that the subscribers were nominees funded by BCCI, whereas the Re-Amended Points of Claim would do so in relation to identified individuals.”
“Paragraph 80.4 would be amended to refer to the position at dates after 1977, up to June 1980, and consequential changes would be made to paragraphs 159 and 169.”
“It is clear that the proposed re-amendments would be new ways of putting the case.”
“As I see it, the effect of this is to exclude any plea of nomineeship in relation to the shares subscribed for in 1972, to leave in the allegation that three of the subscriptions in 1973 were funded by non-recourse or evergreen loans from BCCI (as set out in the proposed draft re-amended version of paragraph 39 of the Points of Claim), to exclude the case sought to be made about the 1977, 1978 and 1979 rights issues in paragraphs 65, 71 and 76, and to exclude the new cases sought to be made in paragraphs 32B2 and 3. In consequence 32A will refer only to the three investors named in paragraph 39, and paragraph 32B1 will also be so limited . The Points of Reply will also not be amended as proposed in paragraph 62.4.4. . . .”