"To DFL in administrative receivership and Mr Raja"
"In the position of valuing the properties for the Receivers, in seeking offers for the properties and negotiating thereon, in considering the most suitable method of sale and in advising the Receivers, the Defendant owed the Deceased a duty of care at common law to exercise the skill and care of a reasonably competent chartered surveyor."
"It seems to me that it is reasonable and in the public interest to expect professionals, and indeed anyone else offering particular skills for reward, to exercise them with reasonable competence. The Defendant here knew that it was called in to use its expertise to assist in working out the rights of the parties under the two charges in question. To put it more bluntly to obtain what it could for the properties so that DFL would be repaid (in the circumstances largely for the benefit of Midland) any surplus going to Mr Raja. In view of these considerations it could well be said that to hold the Defendant liable, should its negligence have caused loss to Mr Raja, would satisfy the fair, just and reasonable test. I do not consider the spectre of double recovery or multiplicity of proceedings to be real problems; our legal procedures are well able to deal with such matters. As to whether the receiver's duties in and about the sale are the same as the Defendant's in these circumstances, that, in my judgment is more relevant to the scope of the duties in question than to their existence."
"17. ... It may well be that equity could provide an answer just as well as the common law. However, I am only asked to answer the question whether there is a common law duty in the particular circumstances of this case. Unless it has been shown that to hold the Defendant subject to a common law duty of care to Mr Raja would adversely interfere with the recognised equitable duties of mortgagees and receivers, I would hold such a common law duty to exist in this case. 18. It is clear, on the authority of Medforth , that Midland and the receivers owed an equitable duty to DFL to obtain a proper price. The Defendant was called in to value the properties and assist in the selling process. It owed a common law duty in contract and tort to the receivers who instructed it. I do not consider that a common law duty of care imposed on the Defendant for Mr Raja's benefit would be contrary to the spirit of the identified equitable duties or interfere with the principles behind them in any way. Indeed, as I have held, the receivers owed a duty to Mr Raja to obtain a proper price for the properties, a similar duty on the Defendant would support rather than detract from the principles involved."
"I do not accept that there is any difference between the answer that would be given by the common law to the question what duties are owed by a receiver managing a mortgaged property to those interested in the equity of redemption and the answer that would be given by equity to that question. I do not, for my part, think it matters one jot whether the duty is expressed as a common law duty or as a duty in equity. The result is the same. The origin of the receiver's duty, like the mortgagee's duty, lies, however, in equity and we might as well continue to refer to it as a duty in equity."
"In my judgment, in principle and on the authorities, the following propositions can be stated. (1) A receiver managing mortgaged properties owes duties to the mortgagor and anyone else with an interest in the equity of the redemption. (2) The duties include, but are not necessarily confined to, a duty of good faith. (3) The extent and scope of any duty additional to that of good faith will depend on the facts and circumstances of the particular case."
"They are duties in equity imposed in order to ensure that a receiver, while discharging his duties to manage the property with a view to repayment of the secured debt, nonetheless in doing so takes account of the interests of the mortgagor and others interested in the mortgaged properties."
"In my judgment, therefore, if either [the mortgagees] or [the mortgagees' agents] were guilty of negligence in connection with the sale, [the mortgagees] are liable to compensate the plaintiffs for any damage which they have suffered by reason of that negligence."
"The approach adopted by Cross LJ creates a form of strict liability on the mortgagee. His duty of care to sell at the best price reasonably obtainable is not delegable in the sense that he can avoid or perform his duty merely by appointing a reputable agent to conduct the sale, but extends to ensuring that reasonable care is taken by any agent or professional adviser employed by him in the sale. The extension of his duty may be an accident of history, but it promotes justice for the mortgagor who is thereby saved from the invidious, and often difficult, task of apportioning blame between the mortgagee and his agents and can also claim credit for any loss when settling accounts with the mortgagee. Moreover, the mortgagee can be assumed to be better placed to know the facts relating to a claim against the agent, is frequently in a better financial position to pursue the claim, and ultimately it must be remembered that it was the mortgagee who chose the agent who was later negligent. Once the special rule applicable to mortgagees is accepted, there is no sufficient reason to distinguish the position of the mortgagee and the receiver, and it would therefore appear that a receiver is subject to a like strict liability in respect of disposals. After Medforth it remains to be seen whether similarly strict principles will be applied to the negligence of agents in situations other than disposals of the charged property."
"Concessions of law. It is, of course, settled law that in exercising a power of sale a mortgagee or receiver owes a duty to the mortgagor to take reasonable care to obtain a proper price: Downsview ... per Lord Templeman. On the pleadings two unsettled points of law emerge. First, is it a defence for a mortgagee or receiver to say `I instructed a competent estate agent'? Second, does any such agent owe a direct duty to the mortgagor, either as a result of an equitable duty or as a duty of care for the purpose of the tort of negligence? The second point raises a subpoint, `Is any duty of care of the agent wider than the duty of care of the mortgagee'. There is no settled authority on the first point. It was conceded at first instance in Cuckmere ... that the defence did not run. The Court of Appeal would not consider it because the evidence might have turned out differently if the point had been alive. The point has a long history (going back at least to Tomlin v Luce ... and has been the subject of considerable debate in Commonwealth decisions, particularly Commercial and General Acceptance Ltd v Nixon ... in the High Court of Australia. The second point may be related to the first, for if the mortgagee is not liable for the agent's negligence and the agent himself owes no duty of care then the mortgagor would be without any remedy against anyone when his property is sold at an undervalue through an agent's negligence."
" ... In what circumstances should a duty of care be owed by the adviser to those who act on his advice? I would answer -- only if it is foreseeable that if the advice is negligent the recipient is likely to suffer damage, and there is a sufficiently proximate relationship between the parties and that it is just and reasonable to impose the liability."
" ... the assumption of responsibility referred to is the defendants' assumption of responsibility for the task not the assumption of legal liability. Even in cases of ad hoc relationships, it is the undertaking to answer the question posed which creates the relationship. If the responsibility for the task is assumed by the defendant he thereby creates a special relationship between himself and the plaintiff in relation to which the law (not the defendant) attaches a duty to carry out the task so assumed ..."
"the more the merrier"
"(1) Any balance from proceeds of realisation held by the bank after the satisfaction of secured creditors was held for Mr Huish. Therefore, if John Francis [the agent] gave negligent advice to, for example, the bank, as to the realisation of its security, and the bank acted on it, that balance due to Mr Huish might be diminished. (2) It was the bank's reliance on the advice which might injure Mr Huish and not his own reliance ... (3) John Francis were employed to give advice to the security holders. They owed a duty in contract to advise them as to their best interests in the situation. (4) The interests of the security holders might not be the same as those of Mr Huish. It was submitted that there was an identity of interest, namely to raise as much money from the security as possible. In very broad terms that is true. But it is notorious that creditors and debtors are frequently in conflict as to what should be done with regard to security, as to what should be sold and how and when. The reason is that there are often conflicts of interest between the two ... (5) If the duty of the security holders and Mr Huish may conflict and duty of John Francis is as to the security interests, how can they also owe a duty to Mr Huish? The only answer which can be given is that they owe a duty to him when their primary duty to the security holders permits. That can be met by limiting the ambit to what I have called the Cuckmere duty, namely the duty to take reasonable care to obtain a proper price. It would then be a similar duty owed to both security holder and owner. Such a concept, however, presents a problem. In my view John Francis either owned a duty of care to Mr Huish when they were advising the security holders or they did not. A duty limited in the way suggested is not consistent with the concept of duty of care as developed in English law. (6) The bank owed Mr Huish a duty to take reasonable care to obtain a proper price. It is submitted that there is no need to place John Francis under a like duty in order to provide Mr Huish with a remedy: compare Parker-Tweedale v Dunbar Bank and Marc Rich v Bishops Rock Marine . This was met with the submission that it might well be an answer for the bank to say that they had taken advice from a reputable firm and they were not responsible if the advice turned out to be negligent."
"If that is right, to place John Francis under a duty to Mr Huish would be to duplicate a remedy already available against the bank."
"There is no express reliance, I accept, but that was equally a case in many building society cases before the Smith v Eric Bush case."
"Of course, in many cases the mortgagee may suffer no damage himself by reason of the agent's negligence because the purchase price, though less than it should have been, exceeds what is owing to the mortgagee. In such circumstances it may be that nowadays the law would allow the mortgagor to recover damages directly from the agent although not in contractual relations with him; but that was certainly not so a hundred years ago when Wolff v Vanderzee(1869) 20 LT 353 was decided."
"Suggestions that a mortgagee is selling agent owes a duty of care in tort to the mortgagor must now be doubted."
"66. For example if the mortgagee employed an in-house surveyor, there would be no doubt that the in-house surveyor would probably be liable in tort directly as well as the mortgagee for his negligence."