"8. These payments out by DLM, and subsequently by the Company, both to Mr. Stern (and to his son, at his direction) and to Keristal were known to me at the time, and were paid out with my agreement. Whether paid to Keristal, or otherwise for Keristal's benefit, or to Mr. Stern (or his son, at his direction) or otherwise for their benefit, it was understood and agreed by me and Mr. Stern, that all these payments were to be regarded as a loan from Keristal to Mr. Stern, with the monies in question being debited to the Keristal-DLH loan account, or (if that loan account was overdrawn) would be covered by substantial monies which Mr. Stern and I had agreed would be advanced by Keristal to DLH from profits on non-DLH transactions which were about to be realised. 9. Having agreed to this arrangement in principle, Mr. Stern and I would discuss each year, and confirm, the maximum which he would be allowed to draw in this way (technically as a loan to him from Keristal) on account of his and his family's 24.5% share of the realised, and anticipated, profits from non-DLH transactions - including the profits received or anticipated by Hollandale and Remile from the sale of the Brussels properties."
"In a solvent company the proprietary interests of the shareholders entitle them as a general body to be regarded as the company when questions of the duty of directors arise. If, as a general body, they authorise or ratify a particular action of the directors, there can be no challenge to the validity of what the directors have done. But where a company is insolvent the interests of the creditors intrude. They become prospectively entitled, through the mechanism of liquidation, to displace the power of the shareholders and directors to deal with the company's assets. It is in a practical sense their assets and not the shareholders' assets that, through the medium of the company, are under the management of the directors pending either liquidation, return to solvency, or the imposition of some alternative administration."
"Holdings' policy is to have all management functions - including the purchase and sale of properties - carried out through the medium of a management company which has always been based in London, essentially under my direction and control...Although I am not a registered director of Holdings I execute all major decisions over its activities and that of its subsidiaries"
"I do not accept that either [the Inland Revenue or the Customs and Excise] was willing to allow the group to trade out of its difficulties. In each case, though with different degrees of emphasis at different times, there was a requirement that liabilities falling due be paid."
"[Mr Stern] claimed that he had the 'informed knowledge and consent' of the Inland Revenue, but it seems to me that he presented an overoptimistic and incomplete picture of the position to Mr Barnes"
"So far as Keristal was concerned, again it was a question of discussing the funds which became available as and when they appeared. Keristal had its own needs, and generally wanted some of the funds for itself. In addition it often owed money to the group. As regards making additional funds available, beyond the repayment of its debts, and moreover the question what those funds should be used for, there was no policy or prior agreement. Mr Stern suggested in evidence that there was an understanding, at least as regards the prospective proceeds of Ilot 68, but his evidence was in very general and vague terms. In my judgment the position was the same in relation to this property as for the others."
"It seems to me on balance, having taken account of Mr. Stern's submissions, that this is a serious case. It is a case in which there was a protracted period of trading while insolvent and I accept Mr. Richards submission that that seriousness in itself is exacerbated by the fact that at a time when creditors of the company's group were not being paid Mr. Stern was receiving substantial funds from the companies which would otherwise have been available to creditors. Whether if a CVA had been proposed it would have been successful either in obtaining approval or in carrying on is I think a matter in some doubt in circumstances in which there was no cash flow with which to pay current liabilities. So far as the drawings are concerned, I have accepted Mr. Angus's evidence as being helpful and truthful so far as he was concerned, but his source of information was entirely indirect. He was in no position to check or monitor whether the drawings were properly based and that is I think also true of the auditors. I am not aware of any verification on their part of the basis of these drawings. How far they were aware of the drawings, I do not know. I can take the clean audit certificate as only a very minor matter to bear in mind in this context. I do accept, as Mr. Stern submits, that the consideration of what else the company's board should have done in the context had to be adjudged in relation to circumstances as they were at the time and not with hindsight. Nevertheless it seems to me that Mr. Stern's conduct in continuing the management of these two companies in turn, in putting Westminster in place without any change in the system on the failure of DLM and the substantial drawings that he made without adequate justification does seem to me to make this a serious case. Thinking about the case in the light of my judgment and in the preparation for this hearing, I had independently come to the conclusion that it was a case in the top bracket and that a period of 12 years, subject to submissions made to me, might be the appropriate period. Having heard Mr. Stern's submissions I remain of that view and I will therefore impose a period of disqualification of 12 years."