"Mr Mehra contends by way of defence that he is not liable for the acts of Oakprime. I refer to my detailed findings as to Mr Mehra's conduct set out above. The relevant principles are referred to in Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, 17 ed., par. 4-49, C. Evans Ltd v Spritebrand Ltd[1985] 1 WLR 317 , and Williams v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd[1996] 1 BCLC 131 . In the present case Mr Mehra authorized, directed and procured the acts complained of with full knowledge that the acts complained of were tortious. He is accordingly personally liable." "
"The touchstone of liability is not the state of mind of the defendant. An objective test means that the primary focus must be on things said or done by the defendant or on his behalf in dealings with the plaintiff. Obviously, the impact of what a defendant says or does must be judged in the light of the relevant contextual scene. Subject to this qualification the primary focus must be on exchanges (in which term I include statements and conduct) which cross the line between the defendant and the plaintiff. Sometimes such an issue arises in a simple bilateral relationship. In the present case a triangular position is under consideration: the prospective franchisees, the franchiser company, and the director. In such a case where the personal liability of the director is in question the internal arrangements between a director and his company cannot be the foundation of a director's personal liability in tort. The inquiry must be whether the director or anybody on his behalf, conveyed directly or indirectly to the prospective franchisees that the director assumed personal liability towards the prospective franchisees. An example of such a case being established is Fairline Shipping Corporation v Adamson[1975] QB 180 . The plaintiffs sued the defendant, a director of a warehousing company, for the negligent storage of perishable goods. The contract was between the plaintiff and the company. But Kerr J held that the director was personally liable. That conclusion was possible because the director wrote to the customer, and rendered an invoice, creating the clear impression that he was personally answerable for the services. If he had chosen to write on company notepaper, and rendered an invoice on behalf of the company, the necessary factual foundation for finding an assumption of risk would have been absent. A case on the other side of the line is Trevor Ivory Ltd v Andersen[1992] 2 NZLR 517 . This case concerned negligent advice given by a one-man company to a commercial fruit-grower. Despite proper application of the spray it killed the grower's fruit crop. The company was found liable in contract and tort. The question was whether the beneficial owner and director of the company was personally liable. The plaintiff had undoubtedly relied on the expertise of the director in contracting with the company. The New Zealand Court of Appeal unanimously concluded that the defendant was not personally liable. McGechan J, who analysed the evidence in detail, said, at p. 532, that there was merely "routine involvement" by a director for and through his company. He said that there "was no singular feature which would justify belief that Mr Ivory was accepting a personal commitment, as opposed to the known company obligation."
"Prima facie a managing director is not liable for tortious acts done by servants of the company unless he himself is privy to the acts, that is to say unless he ordered or procured the acts to be done. That is authoritatively stated in Rainham Chemical Works Ltd v. Belvedere Fish Guano Co. Ltd[1921] 2 AC 465 , where it was sought to make a company liable for an explosion upon their works in the course of manufacturing high explosives. The company was held liable on the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330 . It was also sought to charge two directors with liability. They were eventually held responsible because they were in fact liable on the ground that they were managing directors of the company, that the company was under their sole control as governing directors, and that they were responsible for the work done by their servants. Lord Buckmaster said[1921] AC 465 , 476: 'I cannot accept either of these views. If the company was really trading independently on its own account, the fact that it was directed by cfMessrs. Feldman and Partridge would not render them responsible for its tortious acts unless indeed, they were acts expressly directed by them. If a company is formed for the express purpose of doing a wrongful act, or if, when formed, those in control expressly direct that a wrongful thing be done, the individuals as well as the company are responsible for the consequences, but there is no evidence in the present case to establish liability under either of these heads.' Perhaps that is put a little more narrowly than it would have been if it had been intended as a general pronouncement without reference to the particular case; because I conceive that express direction is not necessary. If the directors themselves directed or procured the commission of the act they would be liable in whatever sense they did so, whether expressly or impliedly."