"It is apparent, therefore, that the Secretary of State has approached this case on the basis that he does not accept the adjudicator's findings of fact. He gives reasons for rejecting them, but the reasons are essentially the same as the reasons given in his original letter of March 1994." "
"[The applicant's counsel] sought to distinguish this case from [ Alkesan] on the grounds that there had been a change of the overall situation in Sri Lanka between the special adjudicator's decision and the Minister's recommendation, while that was not the case here. I believe that to be a distinction without a difference. Whether or not such a factual distinction existed, it would make no difference in law whatsoever. The Minister, presumably through the prerogative, is the custodian of the discretion to exercise these extra-statutory powers. The special adjudicator has not been entrusted with those powers, although whenever the special adjudicator thinks it right to express a view on their exercise, the Secretary of State takes that into account (as set out above) as he is entitled (and chooses) to do. But it remains the Minister's discretion and his discretion alone. There is no room in that situation for any application of the principles of res judicata or issue estoppel in any form whatsoever."
"Those are issues upon which the Secretary of State is always likely to have extra material which might not have been before a particular adjudicator, and more importantly, the situation in relation to the state of affairs in the country is something which is fluid and may change from time to time." [p.378] Elhasoglu was not decided until the day after Collins J's decision. Mr Pleming submits that there is no sound basis for distinguishing either of these cases, and certainly not Elhasoglu. It was not suggested there that the situation in Turkey had changed materially since the adjudicator's decision, only that the Secretary of State was entitled to reach his own independent decision on that situation. So too here, submits Mr Pleming, the Secretary of State was entitled to disagree with the special adjudicator on the issue of primary fact as to whether or not the respondent had committed adultery. Mr Pleming submits, indeed, that the present case is a fortiori to Elhasoglu: if the Secretary of State is not bound to follow an adjudicator's recommendation, still less is he bound to accept his findings of fact. I for my part acknowledge that these submissions in combination present a formidable case on appeal. Should it, however, succeed? That the Secretary of State's decision was a separate and discrete decision to be taken by him alone cannot be doubted. It is equally clear that it can only be challenged here on Wednesbury grounds. Both sides agree that the Secretary of State was required to have regard to the adjudicator's findings of fact as a material consideration. Was he, however, in the circumstances of this case, then entitled to disagree with them? That is the critical question. Mr Blake submits that the Secretary of State can only reach a different factual conclusion from the adjudicator if he has good reason to do so. In considering whether good reason exists, two particular matters must be borne in mind. First, that the adjudicator has what is generally regarded as the unique advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses as they give their evidence orally in the course of an adversarial process. Second, that the adjudicator is an independent appellate authority, deciding issues of fact impartially as between the rival parties, here the Secretary of State and the respondent. The adjudicator's independent role in the scheme of the legislation is exemplified not merely by his power to review the Secretary of State's decisions on questions of fact and to allow appeals, but also by his power to make recommendations (both under s.19(3) and extra-statutorily) and, if asked, to report to the Secretary of State under s.21. True, such recommendations and reports are not binding upon the Secretary of State; but they must be recognised as coming from an independent tribunal. These two considerations taken together seem to me of great importance in this case. I am not, I hope, influenced excessively in this view by this Court's recent decision in R v Warwickshire County Council ex parte Powergen plc (unreported, transcript dated31st July 1997 ) when we rejected a highway authority's contention that, after a planning appeal in which their highway objection had been fully considered and rejected, they nevertheless remained "entitled to adhere to and act upon their original view that the public would not benefit from this development because of the highway dangers it would create."
"I believe on the contrary that the inspector's conclusion on that issue, because of its independence and because of the process by which it is arrived at, necessarily becomes the only properly tenable view on the issue of road safety and thus is determinative of the public benefit."
"considered internal conditions in Turkey, together with the activities of the PKK there, in some considerable detail over several pages ..."
"... given the irreversible nature of the harm that might occur if the risk of ill-treatment materialised and the importance the court attaches to Article 3, the notion of an effective remedy under Article 13 requires independent scrutiny of the claim that there exist substantial grounds for fearing a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3."
"He [the adjudicator] does not, in terms, spell it out, but it is impossible to conclude other than that he was inevitably influenced by it [ the respondent's evidence]."