"The nature of the case is that had (BGM) detected the fraud during their audit of the l985 accounts, the steps preliminary to liquidation of the companies would have been commenced in early l986 leading to their liquidation in approximately mid-l986. In the case of (Galoo) the loss can be quantified as follows"
" see Ultramares Corporation v Touch (1931) 174 NE 441, 444; it is also to confer on the world at large a quite unwarranted entitlement to appropriate for their own purposes the benefit of the expert knowledge or professional expertise attributed to the maker of the statement. Hence, looking only at the circumstances of these decided cases where a duty of carte in respect of negligent statements has been held to exist, I should expect to find that the "limit or control mechanism ... imposed upon the liability of a wrongdoer towards those who have suffered economic damage in consequence of his negligence" rested in the necessity to prove, in this category of the tort of negligence, as an essential ingredient of the "proximity" between the plaintiff and the defendant, that the defendant knew that his statement would be communicated to the plaintiff, either as an individual or as a member of an identifiable class, specifically in connection with a particular transaction or transactions of a particular kind (eg in a prospectus inviting investment) and that the plaintiff would be very likely to rely on it for the purpose of deciding whether or not to enter upon that transaction or upon a transaction of that kind."
"It seems to me that this masterly analysis, if I may say so with respect, requires little, if any, amplification or modification in the light of later authority and is particularly apt to point the way to the right conclusion in the present appeal."
"Their Lordships in Caparo's case regarded the purpose of the statutory requirement for an audit of public companies under the Companies Act l985 as the making of a report to enable shareholders to exercise their class rights in general meeting - not as extending to the provision of information to assist shareholders or others as to the making of decisions as to the future investment in the company. These, as we read the decision in Caparo's case, were the essential elements of its ratio by which the plaintiffs' claim on the facts of that case were held to be untenable. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that it is at least arguable that the present case can be distinguished from Caparo's case on its assumed facts. On such facts, each of the directors, in making the relevant representations, was aware that Morgan Crucible would rely on them for the purpose of deciding whether or not to make an increased bid, and intended that they should; this was one of the purposes of the defence documents and the representations contained therein. Morgan Crucible duly did rely on them for this purpose. In these circumstances, subject to questions of justice and reasonableness, we think it plainly arguable that there was a relationship of proximity between the directors and Morgan Crucible sufficient to give rise to a duty of care - particularly bearing in mind that, while Morgan Crucible had their own independent advisers, much of the information on which the accounts and profit forecast was based was presumably available to the defendants alone." and at 324 F, dealing with the case against Judkins , the auditors: "
" see Ultramares Corporation v Touch (1931) 174 NE 441, 444; it is also to confer on the world at large a quite unwarranted entitlement to appropriate for their own purposes the benefit of the expert knowledge or professional expertise attributed to the maker of the statement. Hence, looking only at the circumstances of these decided cases where a duty of carte in respect of negligent statements has been held to exist, I should expect to find that the "limit or control mechanism ... imposed upon the liability of a wrongdoer towards those who have suffered economic damage in consequence of his negligence" rested in the necessity to prove, in this category of the tort of negligence, as an essential ingredient of the "proximity" between the plaintiff and the defendant, that the defendant knew that his statement would be communicated to the plaintiff, either as an individual or as a member of an identifiable class, specifically in connection with a particular transaction or transactions of a particular kind (eg in a prospectus inviting investment) and that the plaintiff would be very likely to rely on it for the purpose of deciding whether or not to enter upon that transaction or upon a transaction of that kind."
"It seems to me that this masterly analysis, if I may say so with respect, requires little, if any, amplification or modification in the light of later authority and is particularly apt to point the way to the right conclusion in the present appeal."
"Their Lordships in Caparo's case regarded the purpose of the statutory requirement for an audit of public companies under the Companies Act l985 as the making of a report to enable shareholders to exercise their class rights in general meeting - not as extending to the provision of information to assist shareholders or others as to the making of decisions as to the future investment in the company. These, as we read the decision in Caparo's case, were the essential elements of its ratio by which the plaintiffs' claim on the facts of that case were held to be untenable. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that it is at least arguable that the present case can be distinguished from Caparo's case on its assumed facts. On such facts, each of the directors, in making the relevant representations, was aware that Morgan Crucible would rely on them for the purpose of deciding whether or not to make an increased bid, and intended that they should; this was one of the purposes of the defence documents and the representations contained therein. Morgan Crucible duly did rely on them for this purpose. In these circumstances, subject to questions of justice and reasonableness, we think it plainly arguable that there was a relationship of proximity between the directors and Morgan Crucible sufficient to give rise to a duty of care - particularly bearing in mind that, while Morgan Crucible had their own independent advisers, much of the information on which the accounts and profit forecast was based was presumably available to the defendants alone."
"Once again, it may be of critical importance for the trial judge to consider in the context of duty of care and proximity whether Morgan Crucible could reasonably have regarded themselves as persons to whom the relevant representations were directly or indirectly addressed. For present purposes, however, we think it will suffice to say that in our judgment Morgan Crucible , on their proposed pleadings and the assumed facts, have established an arguable case as to duty of care for the same reasons (mutatis mutandis) as those relating to the directors in the case of the financial statements and the same reasons (mutatis mutandis) in relating to the directors and Hill Samuel in the case of the profit forecast."