Mr D Sutherland v Park’s of Hamilton (Townhead Garage) Ltd: 8002735/2025

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS (SCOTLAND)

Case No 8002735/2025

Venue Glasgow

Hearing 11 June 2026

Between

Mr D SutherlandClaimant

Park’s of Hamilton (Townhead Garage) LimitedRespondent

Before

Employment Judge M A Macleod

Date 18 June 2026

JUDGMENT

The Judgment of the Employment Tribunal is that the claimant’s claims all fail, and are dismissed.

REASONS

[1]The claimant presented a claim to the Employment Tribunal on 9 November 2025 in which he complained that he had been automatically unfairly dismissed and subjected to detriments as a result of having made a protected disclosure.

[2]The respondent submitted an ET3 response in which they resisted the claimant’s claims.

[3]A Hearing was listed to take place on 11 and 12 June 2026 at the Employment Tribunal, Glasgow. As it turned out, the Hearing concluded within one day, and the second day was vacated as it was not required. ETZ4(WR)

[4]The claimant appeared on his own behalf, and Ms Greig appeared for the

[5]A Joint Bundle of Documents was produced to the Tribunal by the parties, and relied upon in the course of the Hearing.

[6]The claimant had, prior to the Hearing, sent to the respondent, but not to the Tribunal, a witness statement and draft submission. It appears that there were two version of the witness statement. Having checked the Tribunal’s own digital file I could find no evidence that the claimant had disclosed this statement to the Tribunal. The claimant provided a written copy of the witness statement, which the respondent confirmed had already been seen by them. It was agreed that this could form the basis of the claimant’s evidence, but that further questioning may be required in order to clarify certain matters within the statement.

[7]The claimant gave evidence on his own behalf.

[8]The respondent called as witnesses Colin Graham, William Cumming and Dominic Cameron.

[9]Based on the evidence led and the information provided, the Tribunal was able to find the following facts admitted or proved. Findings in Fact

[10]The claimant, whose date of birth is 12 September 1994, commenced employment with the respondent initially on 3 June 2019 as a Sales Executive. His employment ended on 28 April 2024, upon his resignation. He had worked in the respondent’s Glasgow Mini branch.

[11]During the course of the claimant’s employment with the respondent from 2019 to 2024, he had been involved in an accident while driving his company car, resulting in damage which was covered by the respondent’s group insurance policy. However, the respondent’s contract with the claimant required him to repay the cost of the excess or that part of the excess which was outstanding. On 30 March 2024, the claimant signed an agreement (entitled “Wage Deduction”), in the following terms (34): “I agree that the sum of £166.67 be deducted from my wages until such time as the outstanding balance of £1500 is repaid in full and that should my employment with the Company cease, any outstanding amounts will be deducted from any monies due to me at that time."

[12]The claimant made one payment of £166.67 towards the cost of the excess, before his resignation, but the balance remained outstanding.

[13]The respondent subsequently raised proceedings in Hamilton Sheriff Court under the Simple Procedure in order to recover the balance from the claimant. The case called before the Sheriff on 26 November 2024 and was continued in order to allow the parties to carry out settlement discussions (51). However, the respondent decided to abandon that claim (52).

[14]The reason given by the respondent, and by Colin Graham, Group HR, for abandoning the proceedings was that it was known by them that they were due to take over three garages operated by Lookers, for whom the claimant was by then working. Given that he would transfer to the employment of the respondent by operation of the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006, Mr Graham considered that it would be more constructive to address the outstanding balance with the claimant directly rather than by proceeding through the court process.

[15]The respondent maintained their right to recover the outstanding amount.

[16]The claimant returned to the employment of the respondent on 30 June 2025, having joined Lookers as a Sales Executive in May 2024. He was based at the Motherwell Land Rover site, and remained there following the transfer.

[17]On 4 July 2025, the claimant attended at the Motherwell site. He was asked to meet with Colin Graham in a private office.

[18]Mr Graham attended the Motherwell site in order to meet with the staff and senior managers, to get to know them and the business. When the claimant came to the office to meet with him, Mr Graham said that it was necessary to address the “elephant in the room”. By this he meant the outstanding sum of money which the respondent considered was still due to them by the claimant, following the repayment agreement during his previous employment with the respondent.

[19]Mr Graham’s concern was that the claimant had, in his view, a contractual obligation to repay the balance of the sum owed by him, and that until he did so, there was an issue of “trust and integrity”. Mr Graham felt that if the claimant were not prepared to meet his obligations in relation to the damage to a company vehicle, there was a risk that if he caused damage to another vehicle in the Motherwell site, the cost to the business would be greater due to the fact that Land Rovers are much more expensive than Minis; and that the claimant would, again, refuse to pay. However, he wished to approach the matter in a conciliatory fashion and advised the claimant that he was willing to reach an agreement to repay what was outstanding, but without insisting upon the expenses of the litigation or interest on the sum.

[20]The claimant’s response was to refuse to engage with this discussion, and to insist upon what he regarded was owed to him, namely outstanding expenses and holiday pay, from the end of his previous employment. Mr Graham sought to persuade the claimant that the two issues were entirely separate, but that he or Dannii Weir of the respondent would be prepared to sit down with him to work it out. Mr Graham’s view was that the claimant’s approach to the meeting was evasive and assertive, bordering on belligerent.

[21]The claimant’s evidence was that Mr Graham essentially told him that if he did not repay the debt he would lose his job. Mr Graham denied this, and said that he tried to stress that there may be consequences for him if he did not repay the debt, for example whether he would be permitted to use company cars, including for test drives. As a Sales Executive, this would restrict his duties very considerably.

[22]He did not, in my judgment, threaten the claimant during that discussion or tell him that if he did not repay the debt he would lose his job; he did, however, make clear that if he did not engage with the respondent about this, there would a concern on their part that he could not be trusted to drive expensive vehicles given the risk that he would not be wiling to pay for any damage.

[23]The claimant’s view was that this was a historic matter, and should not have been raised by the respondent; in addition, he believed that the amount he was owed may have been greater than the amount he owed the

[24]Mr Graham was frustrated by the claimant’s attitude. He felt that he was seeking to reach an agreement in order to resolve the outstanding debt due to the company by the claimant, but that the claimant was “dealing in absolutes”, finding all sorts of arguments to refuse to pay back what he owed.

[25]Mr Cumming joined the meeting, and in his evidence confirmed that both he and Mr Graham advised the claimant that they would look at the situation and see what could be resolved. It was obvious to him that the claimant was very unhappy at the prospect of being required to repay any sums outstanding to the company.

[26]The meeting ended, and the claimant went immediately to speak to Dominic Cameron, the General Manager in the Motherwell site. The claimant recorded the discussion on his mobile phone, without advising Mr Carmeron that he was doing so, nor seeking his permission.

[27]A copy of the transcript of the recording was produced by the claimant (61). Both parties agreed that this was to be admitted and relied upon, and that it was an accurate record of the conversation.

[28]The claimant told Mr Cameron about the meeting which he had just had with Mr Graham and Mr Cumming. He said that Mr Graham had told him that they needed to address the elephant in the room, which is that when he had left the respondent’s employment before, he had damage on a company car.

[29]The claimant went on: “So, basically, I’d left. My car had damage on it. Although there was a contesting of they owed me money for holidays that I was due and expenses that I was due. So I was like, well, I’m not paying for it until you address the money that I’m owed from you, because essentially what they were saying was I owed them, the offset would have been that they actually owed me money, which is why I refused to pay it. So I went to court and they pulled out of court, I got the letter here – a simple procedure abandonment notice…”

[30]The claimant went on to report to Mr Cameron: “So they pulled out of court. He’s telling me to pulled (sic) out of court because they knew they were buying us. I don’t really believe that, but. My interpretation of that conversation I just had is it feels like they’re pretty much blackmailing me into now wanting me to still pay this money, or they’re saying they can’t trust me to drive any of these cars…”

[31]The claimant said that he wanted the company to prove to him that he owed the money, being willing to draw a line in the sand and move on from it, as the company already had by pulling out of court. He told Mr Cameron that he was looking for advice, as he felt that his next step was to contact ACAS. He complained that he felt he was being bullied, and that he had expected them to tell him that they were not going to require him to pay the outstanding amount.

[32]Mr Cameron responded by saying “I think that you’re saying Blackmail, you mean strongarm”. Mr Cameron did not believe that blackmail was the appropriate description of what he had said, but that perhaps his employer was seeking to persuade him by strong tactics into agreeing to make the repayment. The claimant said: “Well, whatever you want to word it. They’re pretty much trying to use it against me almost as if you’re not going to be able to have a demo (company car), or you’re not going to be able to touch any of the cars outside, unless you pay us this money. It’s pretty much what we’re saying. Because they’re telling me, let’s just clear it, pay the money that you owe, and then we’ll forget about it. But if I don’t pay it, then then (sic) what I’m not allowed to do my job properly?”

[33]Mr Cameron expressed the view that blackmail was something different to what the claimant had described. The claimant responded by saying that the way it felt to him was “get out or pay us the money. That, in simple terms to me is, do this or else, even though it’s got nothing to do with current employment with Lookers coming over as a TUPE protected employee, I don’t see why this should give them any advantage over saying, well, if you don’t pay what we were owed now that we’ve got you again, then you can get lost, basically…”

[34]Mr Cameron said to the claimant: “Okay, I don’t I wasn’t part of the conversation. However, I think the dealing with the reality of the situation if you’re asking me for advice, then the decision is, if you want to stay here and you want to carry on, you speak to them and you come to some kind of agreement and just say, how much did you say it was.”

[35]After further discussion, the claimant stated: “Right well I will not be paying it, I’ve went to court, I’ve went through the stress of all that already. I’m not setting up a payment plan with them. I am not paying it. And they can’t just take it off my wages, given that they had to go to court for it before, and I have got the case. I don’t think it would very good a good look for them to just be like yeah, we’re just going to take that money off of you … But I’m not paying it because, again, they’ve still not come back to me with the information of why I’m contesting about the payment…”

[36]It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence that the respondent told the claimant that they would be deducting any sums from his wages. It is clear that they were seeking to come to an agreement about this matter.

[37]The claimant did suggest that he was not going to pay unless they could prove to him that he had in fact taken all of his holidays and was not entitled to any holiday pay. However, he said he knew “for a fact” that the respondent owed him holidays. He also pointed out that he had agreed to pay for the damage he had caused, but that they had not taken into account the expenses and holiday pay which he was due, and also that they had said that there was additional damage discovered.

[38]He summed up his position as being that “…they feel like they’ve got one over for me, it’ll be like, give us the money, or you can we’ll restrict you from being able to do your job properly because we don’t trust you, or you can leave.”

[39]The meeting concluded after Mr Cameron said that he would speak to Mr Graham and then hope to come back to the claimant.

[40]Mr Cameron did not contact the claimant that day or over the weekend, as he was advised by Mr Graham that he was intending to dismiss the claimant. Mr Cameron himself advised Mr Graham that he did not consider that the claimant would be a great loss to the business.

[41]The claimant attended work over the weekend, but did not have any further discussions about this matter with anyone.

[42]On Monday 7 July 2025, Mr Graham called the claimant, and they spoke for approximately 7 minutes. In that call, Mr Graham told the claimant that the respondent had decided to dismiss him with immediate effect. Initially he said that he did not require to give him any reason for his dismissal (on the basis that he lacked the minimum qualifying service upon which to base a claim of unfair dismissal; however, on being pressed by the claimant, he said that the claimant’s performance and attitude were not considered to have been up to the necessary standard expected, and that the company lacked trust and confidence in him, particularly given that he had refused to make payment in relation to the damage previously caused and they were concerned that this may represent his attitude in the future if he caused damage to another vehicle. They considered the claimant’s sales record to be insufficient, and they felt that he was very aggressive and critical to his managers in his attitude at work. Mr Graham had spoken to the claimant’s managers and to others within the site and concluded that the claimant should be dismissed.

[43]The claimant asked for a written statement of the reasons for his dismissal, but none was forthcoming.

[44]Following the termination of his employment, the claimant applied for and received Job Seekers’ Allowance. He decided that he did not want to return to the motor trade, considering there to be a risk that wherever he went to work, even in Looker’s, the respondent may take over that business and he would be transferred to their employment again.

[45]The claimant was interviewed for a number of jobs, and was successful in obtaining new employment with Lanes Group, a drainage specialist, as an Area Development Manager, for which he was interviewed on 10 or 11 October, and 18 October 2025, and where he started on 3 November 2025. It is full time position attracting a basic salary of £32,000 with commission on top. The claimant considers that he will not start to earn commission until approximately a year into the job, as he would require to build up contacts and learn about the business.

[46]He was unwell following his dismissal by the respondent, and attended his GP on 1 September 2025, where he was diagnosed with “low mood” and prescribed an anti-depressant medication, which he took for approximately 4 weeks. The statement of fitness for work indicated that he would be unfit for work until 28 September 2025 (90). Thereafter he was fit to take up work. Submissions

[47]Both parties made brief oral submissions. These are not summarised here but were taken into consideration and are referred to, where appropriate, in the Decision section below.

The Relevant Law

[48]Section 43A of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA”) provides: “In this Act a ‘protected disclosure’ means a qualifying disclosure (as defined by section 43B) which is made by a worker in accordance with any of sections 43C to 43H.”

[49]A qualifying disclosure is defined in section 43B as “any disclosure of information which, in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure, is made in the public interest and tends to show one or more of the following:a. That a criminal offence has been committed, is being committed or is likely to be committed;

b. That a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which he is subject;

c. That a miscarriage of justice has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur;

d. That the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered;

e. That the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged; or

f. That information tending to show any matter falling within any one of the preceding paragraphs has been, or is likely to be deliberately concealed.”

[50]Section 47B prohibits a worker who has made a protected disclosure from being subjected to any detriment by any act, or any deliberate failure to act, by his employer done on the ground that the worker made a protected disclosure.

[51]Helpful guidance is provided in the decision of Blackbay Ventures Ltd (t/a Chemistree) v Gahir

[2014] IRLR 416

at paragraph 98: “It may be helpful if we suggest the approach that should be taken by employment tribunals considering claims by employees for victimisation for having made protected disclosures. 1. Each disclosure should be identified by reference to date and content. 2.. The alleged failure or likely failure to comply with a legal obligation, or matter giving rise to the health and safety of an individual having been or likely to be endangered or as the case may be should be identified. 3. The basis upon which the disclosure is said to be protected and qualifying should be addressed. 4. Each failure or likely failure should be separately identified. 5. Save in obvious cases if a breach of a legal obligation is asserted, the source of the obligation should be identified and capable of verification by reference for example to statute or regulation. It is not sufficient as here for the employment tribunal to simply lump together a number of complaints, some which may be culpable, but others of which may simply have been references to a check list of legal requirements or do not amount to disclosure of information tending to show breaches of legal obligations. Unless the employment tribunal undertakes this exercise it is impossible to know which failures or likely failures were regarded as culpable and which attracted the act or omission said to be the detriment suffered. If the employment tribunal adopts a rolled up approach it may not be possible to identify the date when the act or deliberate failure to act occurred as logically that date could not be earlier than the latest of act or deliberate failure to act relied upon and it will not be possible for the Appeal Tribunal to understand whether, how or why the detriment suffered was as a result of any particular disclosure; it is of course proper for an employment tribunal to have regard to the cumulative effect of a number of complaints providing always have been identified as protected disclosures. 6. The employment tribunal should then determine whether or not the claimant had the reasonable belief referred to in s43B(1) and under the ‘old law’ whether each disclosure was made in good faith and under the ‘new’ law whether it was made in the public interest. 7. Where it is alleged that the claimant has suffered a detriment, short of dismissal it is necessary to identify the detriment in question and where relevant the date of the act or deliberate failure to act relied upon by the claimant. This is particularly important in the case of deliberate failures to act because unless the date of a deliberate failure to act can be ascertained by direct evidence the failure of the respondent to act is deemed to take place when the period expired within which he might reasonably have been expected to do the failed act. 8. The employment tribunal under the ‘old law; should then determine whether or not the claimant acted in good faith and under the ‘new’ law whether the disclosure was made in the public interest.”

[52]In addition, I had reference to the well-known decisions in Kuzel v Roche Products Ltd

[2008] EWCA Civ 380

, Fecitt & Ors v NHS Manchester

[2012] ICR 372

and Cavendish Munro Professional Risks Management Ltd v Geduld

[2010] ICR 325

EAT.

[53]In, Kilraine v London Borough of Wandsworth

[2018] EWCA Civ 1436

, at paragraphs 35 and 36, the Court of Appeal set out guidance on whether a particular statement should be regarded as a qualifying disclosure: “35. The question in each case in relation to section 43B(1) (as it stood prior to amendment in 2013) is whether a particular statement or disclosure is a ‘disclosure of information which, in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure, tends to show one or more of the matters set out in sub-paragraphs (a) to (f). Grammatically, the word ‘information’ has to be read with the qualifying phrase ‘which tends to show [etc]’ (as, for example, in the present case, information which tends to show ‘that a person has failed or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which he is subject’). In order for a statement or disclosure to be a qualifying disclosure according to this language, it has to have a sufficient factual content and specificity such as is capable of tending to show one of the matters listed in subsection (1). The statements in the solicitors’ letter in Cavendish Munro did not meet that standard. 36. Whether an identified statement or disclosure in any particular case does meet that standard will be a matter for evaluative judgment by a tribunal in light of all the facts of the case. It is a question which is likely to be closely aligned with the other requirement set out in section 43B(1), namely that the worker making the disclosure should have the reasonable belief that the information he discloses does tend to show one of the listed matters. As explained by Underhill J in Chesterton Global at [8], this has both a subjective and an objective element. If the worker subjectively believes that the information he discloses does tend to show one of the listed matters and the statement or disclosure he makes has a sufficient factual content and specificity such that it is capable of tending to show that listed matter, it is likely that his belief will be a reasonable belief.” Discussion and Decision

[54]There is no List of Issues presented by the parties in this case, but the issues are straightforward, in my judgment:a. Did the claimant make a protected disclosure within the meaning of section 43B of the Employment Rights Act 1996?

b. If so, was the reason, or if more than one the principal reason, for his dismissal that he had made a protected disclosure?

c. Further, if he did make a protected disclosure, was he subjected to a detriment for that reason?

[55]I deal with these issues in turn: a. Did the claimant make a protected disclosure within the meaning of section 43B of the Employment Rights Act 1996?

[56]The claimant asserts that in his conversation with Mr Cameron, his General Manager, on 4 July 2025, he made a protected disclosure within the meaning of section 43B(1)(a), namely that a criminal offence had been committed.

[57]Essentially, this turns on the claimant’s allegation that he had been subjected to blackmail by Mr Graham and Mr Cumming in his meeting that day.

[58]The claimant’s position is slightly curious. He maintains that blackmail is a criminal offence, but that he did not know that at the time. His use of the word blackmail appears to me to be a colloquial one, rather than a strict legal definition. Essentially, it is my understanding from the evidence that the claimant is looking to assert that by telling him that if he did not repay the money, that would have consequences for his ability to do his job: more particularly, that Mr Graham told him that if he did not repay the outstanding sum, the respondent would not allow him to test drive or drive any of the company’s vehicles.

[59]He went on to suggest that by telling him this, the respondent was effectively forcing him out of the business.

[60]Considering the factors to be considered in the Blackbay judgment, I sought to determine whether or not the claimant had made a protected disclosure.

[61]The date and content of the disclosure: on 4 July 2025, the claimant alleged that he had been the subject of blackmail to Mr Cameron, by Mr Graham in particular.

[62]The basis upon which it is said to be protected and qualifying: that a criminal offence had taken place, namely that he had been the victim of blackmail by Mr Graham. That was the failure alleged to have taken place.

[63]It is not possible to identify the allegation by reference to a statute or regulation. The claimant has not pointed to any such statute. The Theft Act 1968 is a statutory provision only applying to England and Wales, and not Scotland. There is no statutory equivalent in Scotland.

[64]Whether or not the claimant had a reasonable belief under section 43B(1) and whether the matter was in the public interest: in a sense, any criminal act may be said to be in the public interest, but the question of greater relevance here is whether or not the claimant had a reasonable belief that he had been subjected to a criminal offence.

[65]I also take account of the Cavendish Munro judgment, in which it was made clear that there must be the disclosure of information, rather than a mere allegation of wrongdoing, and that it must be specific.

[66]Taking all of these factors into account, I am not persuaded that the claimant made a protected disclosure on 4 July 2025 to Mr Cameron, for the following reasons.

[67]The claimant’s assertion changed during the course of the conversation with Mr Cameron: initially (61), he maintained that “it feels like they’re pretty much blackmailing me into now wanting me to still pay this money, or they’re saying they can’t trust me to drive any of those cars”; later (62) when Mr Cameron suggested he meant “strongarming” rather than blackmailing, he said “Whatever you want to word it. They’re pretty much trying to use it against me almost as if you’re not going to be able to have a demo (company car); or you’re not going to be able to touch any of the cars outside, unless you pay us this money.” Later, he said “But again, strongarm, blackmail, bully, whatever, the word you want to use is to be then told, pay it or leave.”

[68]He did not consistently assert that he was being subjected to the criminal offence of blackmail.

[69]He did not know at that time whether or not blackmail was a criminal offence.

[70]Blackmail is a word which is often used in ordinary discourse, but in order to meet the legal definition, it appears to me that there must be a demand for money, property or some advantage under the threat of some harm to the individual. The claimant’s assertion here was that the respondent demanded money from him, under threat, in the event of non-payment, that he would be prevented from driving the company’s vehicles.

[71]In my judgment, the claimant has not properly set out a complaint that he was being blackmailed by the respondent in the meeting which he had with Mr Graham and Mr Cumming. Mr Graham’s version of the meeting differed notably from the claimant’s, in that he said that he did raise the outstanding debt which the claimant had previously admitted, and for which he had signed an agreed repayment schedule, but offered the claimant time to consider his position and reach a reasonable accommodation with them. The claimant was plainly offended by this on the basis that he considered that this related to a prior period of employment, and that the court proceedings in which the debt had been pursued were dropped by the

[72]However, Mr Graham went on to say that there was an issue of trust and integrity with the claimant, by which he meant that if the claimant was not prepared to honour his previous contractual obligation to repay a sum due because of damage to a vehicle for which he was responsible, there was doubt in the mind of the respondent that if this happened again he would refuse to repay the sum due once more.

[73]In my judgment, this falls far short of the claimant’s assertion that this amounted to blackmail. It was a meeting in which, rightly or wrongly (and it is not for the Tribunal to judge whether or not that contractual obligation remained), the respondent raised the concern about the outstanding repayment and indicated that if he did not repay the sum, they could not trust him to drive their vehicles. They did not threaten to dismiss him, but wished to resolve a matter which they considered to be outstanding, and of importance. They were met by the claimant arguing about this and other matters, and clearly expressing an unwilling to pay.

[74]Accordingly, I do not consider that the claimant was making a disclosure of information, but an allegation against the respondent, and that he did not have a reasonable belief that a criminal offence had been committed on the basis that he did not know at the time whether or not blackmail could be said to be a criminal matter. He did not disclose the commission of a criminal offence, but alleged that he had been treated unfairly. It falls short of blackmail because, in my judgment, the respondent were raising a matter which hung over the relationship between them and the claimant and needed to be resolved, but they were not seeking any personal gain from the conversation. They were simply looking to resolve a debt which the claimant had admitted was due (by the signing of the repayment agreement) but which had not been paid.

[75]On the basis that the claimant’s alleged disclosure did not amount to a protected disclosure, his claim must fail. b. If so, was the reason, or if more than one the principal reason, for his dismissal that he had made a protected disclosure? c. Further, if he did make a protected disclosure, was he subjected to a detriment for that reason?

[76]Notwithstanding my finding that the claimant did not make a protected disclosure, I address the question of whether he was dismissed because he had raised a disclosure to the respondent. In my judgment, he was not. He was dismissed for a variety of reasons. Fundamentally, what changed, in Mr Graham’s mind, following his meeting with the claimant on 4 July was that the claimant had insisted to Mr Cameron that he would not repay the outstanding sum; but in addition, Mr Cameron had received information from the site that the claimant’s performance and attitude had been unsatisfactory, and accordingly that he was “no loss to the company”. Mr Graham had been perturbed by what he perceived to be the claimant’s evasiveness and obstructiveness in his meeting with him, and found that Mr Cameron and others had reinforced his concerns about the claimant. That was why he had decided to dismiss him. He considered that the company could no longer have trust and confidence in the claimant.

[77]I found Mr Graham to be a clear and credible witness. I had no difficulty accepting from him that he considered the claimant’s performance and attitude to be lower than the standards expected, and that the claimant’s refusal to engage with him in negotiating a resolution of the outstanding debt demonstrated an attitude which he found unacceptable.

[78]In my judgment, these were the reasons why the claimant was dismissed. He was not dismissed, in my view, for having raised with the respondent the allegation that Mr Graham had blackmailed him. The greater concern for Mr Graham arising out of the conversation with Mr Cameron was the clear refusal to contemplate repaying any of the debt previously acknowledged to be due.

[79]Accordingly, even if the claimant had made a protected disclosure, it would be my conclusion that he was not dismissed for that reason. Similarly, I do not consider that the conversations which the respondent had with the claimant on 4 and 7 July 2025 amounted to detriments to him, and certainly not detriments on the grounds that he had made a protected disclosure.

[80]It is therefore my judgment that the claimant’s claims in this case all fail, and are dismissed. 18 June 2026