Ms J Harris v Vets Now Emergency Ltd: 8002653/2025

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS (SCOTLAND)

Case No 8002653/2025

Venue Edinburgh

Hearing 25 and 26 March 2026

Between

Ms Jade HarrisClaimant

Vets Now Emergency LimitedRespondent

Before

Employment Judge M A Macleod

Mr S Keen (instructed by Barrister) for respondent

Date 8 May 2026

JUDGMENT

The Judgment of the Employment Tribunal is that the claimant was a self-employed contractor of the respondent, and not an employee nor a worker, and therefore that the claimant’s claim of unfair dismissal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

REASONS

[1]The claimant presented a claim to the Employment Tribunal on 3 November 2025, in which she complained that she was unfairly dismissed by the

[2]The respondent submitted an ET3 response in which they resisted the claimant’s claim, and significantly denied that she was an employee of the respondent. They therefore denied that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the claim.

[3]A Preliminary Hearing was listed to take place on 25 and 26 March 2026 at the Employment Tribunal, Edinburgh. The Heairng was listed for the purpose of determining the following preliminary issue: Whether the claimant was an “employee” as defined in section 230 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA); and whether she had 2 years’ continuous service required for the Tribunal to hear a claim of unfair dismissal in terms of section 108(1) of ERA.

[4]The claimant appeared on her own behalf, and Mr Keen, barrister, appeared for the respondent.

[5]A Bundle of Productions was produced by the respondent. Where reference is made to that Bundle, it will be identified by the page number, with the prefix “R”. The claimant also produced a bundle of documents, and where that is referred to, it will be given the prefix “C”.

[6]The respondent called as witnesses Laurie Ann Casey, their Area Director, and Gillian Izzi, Head of People.

[7]The claimant gave evidence on her own account.

[8]Based on the evidence led and the information provided, the Tribunal was able to find the following facts admitted or proved. Findings in Fact

[9]The respondent is a dedicated out of hours emergency and critical care service for pets. Its headquarters are in Dunfermline, Fife, and operates over 60 clinics and 2 veterinary hospitals across the United Kingdom.

[10]In order to provide this service, the respondent relies upon a large bank of locum staff.

[11]The claimant qualified as a veterinary nurse in 2018.

[12]The claimant entered into a contract with the respondent dated 27 March 2024 (R146ff), and said to be effective from 15 April 2024. It was headed “Contract for Services”.

[13]Under “Services”, the contract provided: “On an ad hoc and casual basis, the Business requires the service of veterinary nurses. You are in business on your own account as an independent Veterinary Nurse and have the skills and abilities to offer veterinary services which may be of use to the Business from time to time. When requiring your services, the Business commits to giving you as much notice as possible when offering any engagement, although there is no obligation on the part of the Business to provide such engagement or for you to accept any engagement offered.”

[14]Under the “Operative Provisions”, paragraph 1 confirmed that the contract could be terminated by either party on giving a minimum of 24 hours’ notice.

[15]Paragraph 4 provided: “The Business shall not control, nor have any right of control as to how the Veterinary Nurse is to perform the Services. The Business recognises that the Veterinary Nurse offers Professional services at a high level of expertise and as such the Veterinary Nurse cannot be told how to perform the Services. Without prejudice to the foregoing generality, the Veterinary Nurse is required to follow the standard operating procedures as outlined by the Business and at all times must comply with the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons (RCVS) Code of Professional Conduct. In addition, during any engagement, the Veterinary Nurse must follow any standard operating procedures or professional practice guidelines in place from time to time as issued by the Business and brought to the attention of the Veterinary Nurse.”

[16]Paragraph 10 provided: “Subject to the terms of this clause 10, the Veterinary Nurse may, at his/her absolute discretion, send a substitute or delegate to perform the Services, however must notify the business in writing of the fact that a substitute or delegate will be providing the Services and confirming the identity of that substitute or delegate. This right to send a substitute or delegate is subject to the satisfaction of the Business that the substitute meets the same criteria of qualification and competence as required in the initial engagement, which the Business regards as having a minimum of six months post qualifying experience. The Veterinary Nurse must provide the name and RCVS number of any proposed delegate to the Business before any delegate or substitute performs the Services. Further, any substitute will be required to have completed the locum registration process in place from time to time by the Business and be registered on their locum bank.”

[17]In paragraph 11, the contract stipulated that where a substitute or delegate were sent by the Veterinary Nurse, the respondent would have no contractual, financial or legal relationship with the substitute or delegate. The Veterinary Nurse would be responsible for arranging payments to the substitute or delegate and the substitute or delegate would only be answerable to the Veterinary Nurse.

[18]Under “Financial Risk”, the contract provided that the claimant would negotiate the price for the Services and would be obliged to honour that price (paragraph 17), and that any defective work carried out by her would be corrected by her at her own cost or in her own time.

[19]The contract went on to provide, under “Freedom of the Veterinary Nurse to Undertake Other Services”, at paragraph 24: “The Veterinary Nurse is free to undertake other Contracts for Services for other parties at any time, either, before, after, or concurrently with the Contract for Services.”

[20]Paragraph 25 stated that: “The Veterinary Nurse may advertise his/her services in any way he/she sees fit but will require written approval from the Business to use the name of the Business in any such advertising.”

[21]Under “Intention of the Parties”, paragraph 30 provided: “Both parties agree and intend that the relationship of the Veterinary Nurse to the Business will be that of locum and nothing in this Contract for Services shall render him/her an employee, worker, agent or pranter of the Business and the Veterinary Nurse shall not hold himself/herself out as such.”

[22]In paragraph 28, the contract provided: “for convenience, the Veterinary Nurse will be paid through the Business’ payroll and tax and National Insurance contributions will be deducted directly at source.”

[23]In paragraph 31, it was stated that “This agreement constitutes a contract for the provision of services and not a contract of employment and accordingly the Veterinary Nurse shall be fully responsible for and shall indemnify the Business for and in respect of:-a. any income tax, National Insurance and social security contributions and any other liability, deduction, contribution, assessment or claim arising from or made in connection with the performance of the Services, if HMRC decide that the Veterinary Nurse is anything other than an (sic) locum and where the recovery is not prohibited in law; and

b. any liability arising from any employment-related claim or any claim based on worker status (including any award of compensation and all reasonable costs and expenses) brought by the Veterinary Nurse or any substitute or delegate against the Business arising out of or in connection with the provision of the Services.”

[24]The respondent operates a Locum Network Team (LNT) to recruit locum staff and complete the onboarding process. The LNT checks that the individual has the necessary qualifications and skills to operate at the necessary level. They organise an induction to a clinic, and then hand the locum’s details to the resourcing team, who send out shifts.

[25]The resourcing team offers shifts to locum staff, who then decide whether or not to accept those shifts. The system relied upon is known as HOROS, which sets out every shift which needs to be covered on the system, and which has not been otherwise allocated to a permanent member of staff or a locum. That is the list of shifts available. The resourcing team then sends out the list of available shifts to the locums, and wait for replies, whereupon the locum is booked in for the shift.

[26]An example of this was on 24 October 2024, when Elizabeth Phinn, of the resourcing team, emailed the claimant at 12.27pm (155) with a list of the available shifts in a variety of locations (Aberdeen, Dundee, Edinburgh, Kilmarnock and Kirkcaldy) during December 2024. The claimant replied on 28 October 2024 (155) to say that she could work the nights of 24/25 December in Kirkcaldy. The claimant was then booked in for those 2 nights by the “Gaps” team, using the Gaps email address (154).

[27]The claimant responded on 29 October 2024 to say that these shifts were not booked in at a higher rate due to being Christmas Eve and Christmas Day. She advised that she would work both shifts but not for the normal rate, as she had never been paid that rate on the 3 previous occasions on which she worked those dates.

[28]Ms Phinn replied to advise that she had been booked in at BH rate which was £30 per hour, a higher rate than she would normally be paid for.

[29]The claimant responded (153) to say: “I appreciate you booking them in however its Christmas Day and Christmas Eve madnesses … I’ve worked these crazy shifts before there (sic) quite taxing. I’ve only ever had 45/hr upwards. Happy to secure them for 40/hr otherwise I’d rather stick to normal shifts if it’s only 5/hr extra and spend Christmas with family down south.”

[30]Ms Phinn confirmed that she was only able to offer £35 per hour, but that would be it. The claimant responded to say that “I’ll skip unless we can compromise at 40/hr. I had 45/hr and 50/hr every single Christmas shift in previous years to sacrifice being away from home at Christmas.”

[31]She then emailed (153) to confirm cancellation of the Christmas shifts, on 30 October, and this was acknowledged and confirmed by the respondent (152).

[32]This was not unusual. Locum staff such as the claimant could seek to negotiate a particular rate for a shift, and if they did not regard it as acceptable, they were free to cancel it. No consequence arose for the claimant as a result of cancelling the shifts.

[33]The shifts would then be returned to the list of shifts requiring to be covered and would be offered to the remaining locums.

[34]A further example was noted on 24 January 2025, when the Gaps email issued a list of shifts which were uncovered from 24 January to 1 June 2025, in a variety of Scottish locations (175). The claimant responded by setting out a lengthy list of shifts which she was prepared to cover in different Scottish locations. Her preference (173) was to be located in Kirkcaldy but if shifts were not available there she was content to move to Dundee, Edinburgh or Aberdeen.

[35]The claimant also worked in clinics in the north of England, including Middlesbrough.

[36]A list of cancelled shifts, and the reasons for cancellation, was produced by the respondent (326), which were related to the claimant. Sometimes they were simply cancelled by the claimant, but on occasions she was either unwell or recorded as “no show”.

[37]The respondent from time to time has had to cancel shifts. On 19 December 2024, Sam MacGregor, Area A Director, emailed Gaps to request that the claimant be cancelled from Kirkcaldy on 9 and 22 January 2025, due to a permanent nurse taking the shifts.

[38]In February 2025, the claimant had an exchange with Gaps. An email was sent setting out a number of available shifts on 3 February 2025 (184). These ranged from Aberdeen to Portsmouth and a number of locations between. The claimant replied to say she could work in Aberdeen on 8 and 9 February 2025. Ms Phair confirmed that she could book, or had booked (the email being unclear), these shifts for the claimant at £25 per hour.

[39]The claimant replied (183) on the same day: “I appreciate your prompt confirmation of the Aberdeen shifts. However, I am seeking clarification regarding recent scheduling and rate concerns. Last week, I submitted multiple shifts at a rate of £25/hour, which were rejected in favour of a £24/hour rate. For those same shifts, I received a follow-up email today inquiring if I could still work them. As you know, I am happy to book multiple shifts in advance. Over the past three years, I have maintained a £25/hour rate with various companies, including extended periods with gaps, often travelling further to accommodate these. Could you please confirm if this rate will pose issues for future shift submissions? It’s important to note that with Vets Now, my agency does not take a commission. In contrast, when booking shifts with other companies, my £25/hour rate is accepted, and the agency typically takes an additional £12/hour, resulting in a total rate of £37/hour for first-opinion day shifts, which are generally less demanding than those at Vets Now. Quite often, I am the only nurse, the receptionist, the anaesthetist, while also juggling inpatient care. Vets Now is far more demanding considering it’s the same rate of pay as first opinion. If there is a change in the rate structure, I may need to prioritise day shifts with other companies or consider a permanent role elsewhere. As you’re aware, I consistently submit my availability months in advance to facilitate scheduling with gaps. Despite my efforts, coordinating shifts has become increasingly challenging recently. You mentioned today that you can book Aberdeen shifts because they’re in the same week, leaving me again confused when the other shifts I submitted, following the same structure, were rejected. I hope we can establish a clearer understanding moving forward to prevent any future confusion.”

[40]The respondent agreed to pay the claimant at the rate of £25 per hour to avoid the need for “back and forward about rates”

[41]The respondent does not issue guidance to the locum staff to advise them how to do their jobs, as they are professional staff and are taken to be equipped with the skills and experience to carry out the functions attributed to them.

[42]The respondent does operate a Locum Feedback Process (86ff), whereby feedback, both positive and highlighting the need for improvement, may be given to a locum either verbally or in writing. A locum may be listed as “Do Not Use” when their performance or behaviour is significantly and/or consistently below the respondent’s expected standards.

[43]The respondent maintained that they did not provide the claimant as a locum with a uniform and/or name badge. The claimant produced a photograph bearing to be from her Instagram feed, showing herself (clearly) holding a guinea pig, and wearing a blue shirt with the “Vets Now” logo (albeit reversed in the photograph). She also maintained that there was a name badge but this was obscured by the guinea pig.

[44]Ms Casey professed no knowledge of this, other than that locums were permitted to wear whatever scrubs or uniform was available in the clinic where they were posted. It is not clear that the claimant had a name badge identifying herself.

[45]The claimant did not have access to the respondent’s intranet, nor did she have a Vets Now email address. She had an individual login to allow her access to the clinical records system, as required in order to carry out her role and to meet regulatory requirements, in order to ensure that accurate records were maintained and the nurse treating each patient was identifiable.

[46]So far as arranging a substitute was concerned, Ms Izzi, of the respondent’s HR department, confirmed that they would not expect the claimant to be responsible for paying a substitute, who would require to satisfy the respondent of their registration and compliance with the RCVS Code of Conduct before being permitted to work for the respondent. The claimant could suggest someone to cover a shift for them, but it would be a matter for the respondent to decide whether or not to allow that person to work.

[47]The claimant lived with a friend who was also a veterinary nurse, and operated through a limited company. She would cover shifts for the claimant for time to time, and would be paid through the limited company. The claimant did not pay her; the respondent did. This individual carried out shifts for the respondent independently, and accordingly was already known to them as a qualified and registered professional.

[48]The claimant was paid directly by the respondent in respect of the work she carried out, subject to the deduction of tax and national insurance. The respondent’s position was that this was a point of convenience for both the claimant and the respondent, and applied to locums unless they opted to be paid through a limited company. Approximately 50% of locums in the company were paid through PAYE, though it rises to 84% when the locums are veterinary nurses such as the claimant (veterinary surgeons also provide locum services to the respondent).

[49]Due to a concern that locum staff might be able to claim holiday pay, it was decided by the respondent in early 2024 to pay rolled-up holiday pay, calculated on a proportion of pay due for hours worked in the previous period, through the PAYE system to locums.

[50]The claimant’s position was that she would not have accepted the position had she been aware that she was not regarded as an employee. She considers that she has been deducted the incorrect amount of tax if she was not an employee of the respondent. She was doing approximately 15 to 20 shifts per month in the last 7 months of her contract with the respondent. She received messages from the Gaps team, and Lizzie in particular, putting her under pressure to accept shifts from the respondent.

[51]The claimant offered services to other companies (as is apparent from her email of 3 February 2025 (183) set out above) while she carried out locum shifts for the respondent, though the majority of her shifts were provided to the respondent. She maintained that when she referred to seeking permanent employment elsewhere, she meant that she may have to give up what she regarded as permanent employment with the respondent in order to do this, rather than simply giving up locum work. However, this is not consistent with an Instagram post dated 13 November 2024 (160), in which she said “Everyone thinks I don’t work because I’m always roaming the Scottish Highlands, but I’m actually a locum veterinary nurse with 10 years of experience! Locuming gives me the freedom to work across the UK, from remote clinics to ECC shifts, meeting incredible professionals and constantly learning…”

[52]The claimant was a permanent employee of Independent Vetcare Limited from 23 May 2022 until 31 May 2023.

[53]The claimant was not paid in respect of shifts which were cancelled, even when she was unwell; she received no sick pay, and did not require to submit statements of fitness to work to the respondent to cover her absence. Submissions

[54]Both parties presented submissions to the Tribunal at the conclusion of the evidence, and counsel for the respondent relied upon a written skeleton submission. These are not summarised here, but are referred to as appropriate in the decision section below.

The Relevant Law

[55]Section 230 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 provides as follows:(1) In this Act “employee” means an individual who has entered into or works under (or, where the employment has ceased, worked under) a contract of employment.

(2) In this Act “contract of employment” means a contract of service or apprenticeship, whether express or implied, and (if it is express) whether oral or in writing.

(3) In this Act “worker” (except in the phrases “shop worker” and “betting worker”) means an individual who has entered into or works under (or, where the employment has ceased, worked under)— (a) a contract of employment, or (b) any other contract, whether express or implied and (if it is express) whether oral or in writing, whereby the individual undertakes to do or perform personally any work or services for another party to the contract whose status is not by virtue of the contract that of a client or customer of any profession or business undertaking carried on by the individual; and any reference to a worker’s contract shall be construed accordingly.”

[56]Reference was also had to the well-known authorities in this area.

[57]In Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance

[1968] 2 QB 497

, it was found that there required to be a sufficient degree of control exercised by the potential employer in order to establish an employment relationship. It was said by the court that the approach the Tribunal should take is as follows: “A contract of service exists if these three conditions are fulfilled: 1. The servant agrees that, in consideration of a wage or other remuneration, he will provide his own work and scale in the performance of some service for his master; 2. He agrees expressly or impliedly that in the performance of that service he will be subject to the other’s control in a sufficient degree to make that other master; 3. The other provisions of the contract are consistent with it being a contract of service.”

[58]In Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher

[2011] ICR 1157

, where there is a dispute between the written terms and the reality of the working relationship, the Tribunal must look beyond the contractual documentation and consider all of the circumstances in order to determine the true agreement between the parties.

[59]On the question of substitution, I was referred to Pimlico Plumbers Ltd v Smith

[2018] ICR 1511

[60]On the question of continuous service, I considered the terms of section 108 of the Employment Rights Act 1996. Discussion and Decision

[61]The issues for determination in this Hearing were: Whether the claimant was an “employee” as defined in section 230 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA); and whether she had 2 years’ continuous service required for the Tribunal to hear a claim of unfair dismissal in terms of section 108(1) of ERA.

[62]During the course of submissions, the respondent’s position altered slightly, to include the possible finding that the claimant may be a “worker” rather than an “employee”, though I understood that their primary submission remained that she was an self-employed contractor.

[63]It is also important to consider whether, if she were an employee, she had 2 years’ continuous service with the respondent required for the Tribunal to hear a claim of unfair dismissal in terms of section 108(1) of ERA.

[64]It is important to consider all of the circumstances in determining whether or not the claimant was, as she submitted, an employee of the respondent. The authorities make clear that the Tribunal should not consider a form of checklist, but should review whether or not a contract of service exists from the circumstances, including the terms of any written agreement between the parties.

[65]The parties did present a written agreement in this case, though the claimant’s position was that she did not sign it. However, in evidence it was clear that both parties did consider it to govern their relationship, though it was also apparent that not all of the terms were implemented in practice.

[66]The claimant, from the evidence, worked for the respondent as a locum Veterinary Nurse, and moved from location to location according to her acceptance of shifts offered to her by the Gaps team of the respondent.

[67]There was a degree of flexibility available to the claimant in the arrangement, which was apparent from her own evidence and from the Instagram post (160) in which she spoke of the freedom to work across the UK.

[68]The terms of her contract (144ff) provided that she commenced on 15 April 2024. It is useful to consider a number of those terms, and the evidence relating to the practical arrangements operated by the respondent in their engagement with the claimant.

[69]The contract specifically stated that the claimant was in business on her own account, as an independent Veterinary Nurse, and that there was neither any obligation on the part of the respondent to provide engagements to her nor any obligation on her part to accept any engagement offered. The claimant characterised the arrangement as a zero-hours contract, but that of employer and employee. She maintained that had she realised that she was not to be an employee, she would not have accepted the contract.

[70]A proportion of the Veterinary Nurses who acted as locums for the respondent were paid and operated through service companies in their own names. The claimant did not do so, and was paid directly. However, it was open to her to be paid through a limited liability company if she so chose.

[71]On the face of it, the contract is plainly not a contract of employment, but a contract for services, in which there was said to be no mutuality of obligation between the parties. It does not appear to me to be a zero hours contract.

[72]In its outworking, the arrangement was consistent with this provision. There were occasions upon which the claimant declined to accept shifts, without any negative consequence upon her, on the basis that either the dates did not suit her, she was unwell or she was not satisfied with the rate of pay on offer. She was free to do so, and the respondent was free not to offer the claimant any shifts.

[73]It should be said that the evidence did demonstrate that there was a degree of regularity in the claimant’s acceptance of shifts, and the process which was followed was that each locum would be provided with a list of shifts, with dates and times, and locations, and would choose the ones which they considered suitable for them. The claimant regularly did accept shifts when they were offered in these terms.

[74]In my judgment, however, she was not obliged to do so. She did not always accept shifts, or when she did, only accepted a small number of shifts within a particular date range. She did, as I have found above, refuse to accept certain shifts.

[75]She was paid according to agreement. She was in a position to negotiate a rate of pay for shifts offered (for example, in February 2025 in Aberdeen (183), when she was able to secure a slightly higher rate (£25 per hour) than the standard rate (£24 per hour)). This is not consistent with an employment relationship wherein the rate of pay is set out in the contract of employment and agreed by parties at the outset. It is consistent with paragraph 13 of the contract.

[76]Paragraph 13 also provided that the price agreed would include an element of rolled-up holiday pay. This was how the claimant was paid in respect of holidays. This was consistent with the terms of the contract.

[77]This was, however, redolent of the arrangements typical of a worker, or possibly employee with a zero-hours contract, where the number of hours over a period of time might be uncertain, and accordingly holiday pay would be rolled up into the pay at the time it was paid. It is inconsistent with a selfemployment arrangement, in that if an individual is truly a contractor, and is only to be paid for the work actually performed, there would be no entitlement on the part of that individual to be granted paid holiday.

[78]The contract specifically provided that either party could terminate the contract by giving a minimum of 24 hours’ notice. This was the notice which was given to the claimant on termination of the arrangement, though it appears that it would more appropriately be characterised as notice that the claimant would no longer be offered any shifts.

[79]The contract provided at paragraphs 10 and 11 that the claimant could arrange for a substitute or delegate to perform the services of the contract, at their absolute discretion. It was stated that the respondent would have no contractual, financial or legal relationship with the substitute or delegate, and that the claimant would be solely responsible for arranging payments to the substitute or delegate, who would only be answerable to the claimant.

[80]This was not how the relationship worked in practice, as the respondent admitted. The claimant did ask her flatmate to cover for her on occasions, but this was an individual who was already on the register of locums available to the respondent, and accordingly she was paid directly by the respondent, and not by the claimant. Further, it is clear that the substitute would be answerable to the respondent in the same way as the claimant would be, and not to the claimant herself.

[81]This was not a true substitution arrangement. Essentially, the claimant would be unavailable for a shift, and another locum would take her place. This is no different to the situation where the claimant would cancel a shift and the respondent would require to find another locum to fill it. The fact that the claimant suggested it to another locum does not mean that it was a substitution or delegation. However, in my judgment, this was simply confirmation that the claimant could cancel a shift with impunity, and that the respondent would then be left with the responsibility of finding another locum to carry it out. This is inconsistent with an employment relationship.

[82]The claimant’s flatmate was paid through a service company which she operated, by the respondent, in relation to the shifts she carried out, whether substituting for the claimant or not.

[83]Paragraphs 24 and 25 permitted the claimant to provide services to other companies as she wished, without restriction, other than that if she advertised her services using the name of the respondent, she would require written approval for the terms of her advertisement. In practice, the claimant did provide services to other companies while engaged with the respondent. This was consistent with the terms of the contract.

[84]The claimant did not receive sick pay in relation to those shifts which she was unable to take up due to illness, and she was not paid in relation to shifts which she cancelled or did not fulfil. This was consistent with the contract, and inconsistent with a contract of employment.

[85]The claimant was paid via PAYE, through the respondent’s payroll, and tax and national insurance were deducted at source from her pay.

[86]The claimant agreed to represent herself as a locum, rather than as a worker or an employee. This is consistent with the claimant’s own comments, in particular on her Instagram post. It seems likely that the claimant would call herself a locum since she was participating in a locum service; in any other situation, it is difficult to imagine the claimant describing herself as a worker or an employee, unless seeking to argue the matter before a Tribunal.

[87]It is necessary to consider the degree of control which the respondent had and exercised over the claimant in the arrangements made.

[88]The claimant required to demonstrate that she was suitably qualified and professionally registered with the RCVS, when carrying out shifts for the respondent; she agreed to undertake her duties as a locum in a professional manner, exercising all due care and attention at all times, and to devote such time, attention, skill and ability as the services required. In addition, she required to adhere to all reasonable standards of safety, and the respondent’s Health and Safety procedures, as well as reasonable operational requirements relating to working hours and security.

[89]The claimant was not provided with her own uniform or name badge, though she could use any uniform which was suitable for her and available on the premises where she was based on each occasion. She was not provided with an individual email address, though she had a login to have access clinical records systems, and did not have access to the respondent’s intranet.

[90]The claimant was free to carry out her professional duties as she saw fit, subject to the requirement to adhere to appropriate professional standards. She was not subject to individual line management by the respondent’s managers, though she was given feedback in the event that performance issues arose, and that ultimately led to the termination of the contract with the

[91]These adminicles of evidence are not persuasive of a level of control which would be expected of an employer towards an employee. They are simply indicative of the need for the provider of a service to ensure that appropriate standards are maintained in the delivery of that service. They do not say anything about the nature of the relationship between the provider and the individual with whom they contract in order to carry out the service.

[92]However, it is clear, in my judgment, that the respondent could not, and did not, exercise control over the claimant’s engagement with them in the basic arrangements which were made with her as a locum. The claimant was free, both in terms of the contract and in the manner in which the arrangements were made, to take or refuse such shifts as she wished to accept; she was also free to cancel a shift which she had booked, without consequence or penalty. She was paid only according to the work which she did, and was not paid by salary for a particular number of hours, and she could, and did, negotiate her rate of pay according to what she considered appropriate.

[93]She worked elsewhere, and was free to do so, for other companies. She could arrange for another to take her place if she did not or could not fulfil a booked shift, albeit that the arrangements were not those laid out in the contract.

[94]She did not work in one location, but in many locations across the United Kingdom for the respondent, taking advantage of the freedom which her working arrangements gave her. When she stressed this in her Instagram post, she undermined her assertion that she was in a regular working schedule as an employee with the respondent. That freedom was critical to her, and it was a freedom inconsistent with an employment relationship where mutuality of obligation would constrain it.

[95]It is important to note that the term “locum” does not, of itself, define the nature of the contract. A locum may well be an employee of a business or organisation, working under a temporary contract of employment to cover a particular need. Equally, a locum may be self-employed or a worker. The question is dependent on the individual circumstances in which the individual is working.

[96]In this case, it is my judgment that the claimant was not an employee, employed under a contract of employment.a. the respondent exercised very little control over her working weeks;

b. she had complete freedom to accept, refuse or even accept and cancel shifts from the respondent as she wished;

c. she could negotiate her pay for each particular shift, and if not satisfied did not have to carry out the shift;

d. she could work for another company while in her engagement with the respondent, without constraint;

e. she was only paid for the shifts which she worked, and not paid in respect of sick pay or other benefits if she were unable to carry out a shift due to illness;

f. she was not subject to the respondent’s performance management processes, nor to line management control;

g. she did not have an email address or access to the respondent’s intranet;

h. she had professional freedom to act as she wished in carrying out her responsibilities, subject to complying with a legitimate requirement to ensure that the standard of her work was acceptable from the point of view of her regulatory standards and obligations; and

i. there was no mutuality of obligation between the claimant and the

[97]There were some points which were inconsistent with the respondent’s assertion that she was a self-employed person. In particular, the claimant received holiday pay, rolled up and calculated in arrears according to the number of hours worked over the material period in question; and her right of substitution in the contract was, on closer inspection, little more than a right to decline a particular shift and allow another locum registered with the respondent to step in and accept the shift. There was an element of personal service, and there was some regularity to the work which she carried out. She was paid through the respondent’s PAYE system, as a convenience to her and to the respondent, but it was not entirely clear under which schedule she was taxed. In effect, she was on the payroll, rather than truly being a selfemployed contractor supplying invoices to the respondent.

[98]In considering these aspects of the claimant’s working arrangement, I have not concluded that they are sufficiently weighty as to demonstrate that the claimant was an employee of the respondent. It is necessary to consider the whole arrangement in the round, and in my judgment, the lack of mutuality of obligation and the degree of freedom which the claimant had to make her own working arrangements means that she was not an employee.

[99]The respondent’s position is that the claimant was a self-employed contractor, and not a worker nor an employee. Although it is not consistent with a selfemployment relationship that an individual would be on the payroll and have tax and national insurance payments deducted from their pay, or that an employee would receive holiday pay, I accepted that these were arrangements made out of convenience to both parties and did not signify that the claimant was other than self-employed, based on the overwhelming evidence presented to me.

[100]The claimant’s position was that had she realised she was not an employee, she would never have taken up the position in the first place. I considered that this assertion had to be treated with a degree of reserve. I regarded it as a rhetorical point of emphasis rather than entirely accurate, since the claimant’s contract, which she confirmed she had seen even if no signed copy of it was produced, was quite clear as to the lack of mutuality of obligation and stated explicitly in paragraph 30 that the intention of the parties was that nothing would render her an employee or worker of the business. While it is apparent that there were some inconsistencies in the outworking of the arrangement, the central arrangements made were consistent with, and redolent of, a selfemployed contractor providing services to the respondent without mutuality of obligation.

[101]Accordingly, it is my judgment that the claimant was a self-employed contractor during the course of her engagement with the respondent.

[102]As a result, the claimant has no right to make a claim of unfair dismissal against the respondent, and there is no need to dispose of the question relating to the claimant’s length of service under section 108(1) of ERA.